


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The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan

HONGYING WANG and YEH-CHUNG LU*

In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power.

Soft power is a phrase coined and popularized by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s. At that time much of the world saw the US as an over-stretched empire whose power was in decline.¹ Nye countered this pessimistic view with his book, *Bound to Lead*.² He argued that the US may have lost its dominance in the world in terms of traditional economic and military power, but it still had great advantages over its competitors in terms of soft power. In contrast to 'hard' or 'command' power, which is the ability to change what others *do*, Nye defines 'soft power', or 'co-optive power', as the ability to shape what others *want* by being attractive. This attractiveness rests on intangible resources, such as culture, ideology, and institutions, which could help to legitimize a given state's power and policy in the eyes of others. The ability to frame the

*Hongying Wang is associate professor of political science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Her research focuses on Chinese politics, political economy, and foreign policy. She is the author of *Weak State, Strong Networks: The Institutional Dynamics of Foreign Direct Investment in China* (Oxford University Press). Her recent articles have appeared in *The China Quarterly*, *Development*, and *The Journal of Asian Business*. Professor Wang holds a B.A. from Peking University and a Ph.D. from Princeton University. Yeh-Chung Lu is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at George Washington University, Washington, DC. His research interests include nationalism and ethnic conflict, crisis management, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and economic cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the annual meeting of the Association of Chinese Political Studies, Louisville, Kentucky, April 2006, the international conference on China in the World Order, University of Nottingham, UK, September 2006, the Conference on Taiwan Issues, Columbia, South Carolina, November 2006, and the annual meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, Richmond, Virginia, October 2007.

1. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
2. Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU




Figure 1. Journal articles with 'soft power' (all three translations) in abstract.

international agenda and set the rules of the game is an important type of soft power. In his more recent book *Soft Power* Nye refines the notion with greater clarity. A country's soft power, Nye states, rests upon the attractiveness of its culture, its domestic political and social values, and the style and substance of its foreign policies.³ In the last few years, Nye has expressed serious concerns over America's turn toward unilateralism in its foreign policy. He sees it as reducing the popularity of the US around the world, including among its allies, and thus undermining the country's soft power.⁴

In recent years the concept of soft power has gained currency in both Chinese and Taiwanese public discourse. In China, translated as *ruan shi li*, *ruan li liang*, or *ruan quan li*, it peppers academic and policy discussions about world politics, Chinese foreign policy, domestic politics, and even corporate governance. A search of the China Academic Journals database, which covers more than 4,000 academic and policy journals since 1994, shows that the phrase first appeared around 1997, but has taken off since 2001.⁵ Figure 1 shows the number of journal articles with 'soft power' (in all three forms of translation) in their abstracts.

In Taiwan, the term 'soft power' has been translated in several different ways. 'Soft' has been translated as *rou xing* or *ruan xing* whereas 'power' has been translated as *quan li*, *guo li*, or *li liang*. Its first appearance in the mass media can be traced back to 1992, in an article stating that mainland China was in fear of Western countries' soft power and 'peaceful evolution'.⁶ Scholars formally introduced this concept when China's rhetoric about 'comprehensive national power' caught Taiwan's attention in the mid-1990s.⁷

What does 'soft power' mean in the Chinese and Taiwanese discourse? Why has this concept attracted so much attention in both cases? What are its policy implications? This paper explores these questions. The concluding section will summarize the

3. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 11.

4. Joseph Nye, 'The decline of America's soft power', *Foreign Affairs* 83(3), (May/June 2004), pp. 16–20.

5. In fact, the basic idea—if not the phrase—of soft power was first introduced to China in 1992 with the Chinese translation of Nye's 1990 book, *Bound to Lead*.

6. Liu Fang-chi, 'Using soft power aptly to catalyze the CCP's qualitative change' [*Shanyong Rouxing Liliang, Cuihua Zhonggong Zhibian*], *The United Daily* (Taipei), (17 January 1992), p. 11.

7. Sung Kuo-cheng, *China's Comprehensive National Power for the Next Century* [*Zhongguo Kuashiji Zonghe Guoli*] (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1996).

findings and make some observations about the influence and limitations of Nye's theoretical formulation.

I. Conception of soft power

China

An overview of Chinese application and discussion of the concept suggests a variety of interpretations, some of which do not correspond with Nye's definitions. We first examine the various meanings of 'soft power' in the Chinese discourse, and then compare them with Nye's formulation.

At the most abstract level, Chinese scholars and analysts define soft power as intangible, non-quantifiable, non-material or spiritual power.⁸ More specifically, they view it as the ability to persuade others with reason and to convince others with moral principles.⁹ Many equate soft power with the power to subdue the enemy without a fight (*bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing*), as famously said by Sun Zi, the legendary military strategist of the Warring States period.¹⁰ They also see soft power as similar to what ancient Chinese philosopher, Mencius, called the kingly way (*wang dao*) rather than the bully's way (*ba dao*).¹¹ The former requires governing by moral example whereas the latter involves governance by brute force. At this abstract level, Chinese understanding of soft power is consistent with, though broader than, Nye's definition of soft power. As one article points out,

domestic and foreign scholars and media tend to understand the meaning of soft power according to Joseph Nye's authoritative definition, limiting it to the area of international politics and regarding it as merely a component of state power. But following Marxist philosophy and its theory of general contradictions, we will find that soft power actually exists among all kinds of competing entities and that the concept of soft power has broader theoretical significance than the above narrow definition.¹²

Therefore soft power applies not only to nations, but also regions, organizations and even individuals.¹³ This conception of soft power is more encompassing than Nye's definition. It goes beyond a country's ability to influence other countries through its attractiveness to include, for example, the ability to generate compliance in a society by moral example and persuasion.

8. Wang Junzhou and Sun Lianzhong, 'Curbing worms have small ways, flying dragons have big ways' ['Huo Qu Gu Xiaowang, Long Xiang Nai Da Lai'], *Jingji Wenti Tansuo* no. 4, (2005), pp. 4–8; Xu Jun, 'Soft power—America's new comparative advantage in international trade' ['Ruanshili—Meiguo Zai Guoji Maoyi Zhong de Xinxing Bijiao Youshi'], *Guoji Shangwu* no. 4, (2004), pp. 5–10; Cao Jingzhu, 'Worried thoughts on soft power' ['Ruanshili zhi Yousi'], *Xuexi Yuekan* no. 9, (2004), pp. 1–3; Huang Muyi, 'Philosophical thinking regarding "soft power"' ['Guanyu "Ruanshili" de Zhexue Sicao'], *Zhexue Shijie* no. 12, (2004).

9. Zhai Kun, 'Arroyo feels China's soft power' ['Aluoyue Ganshou Zhongguo Ruanshili'], *Shijie Zhishi* no. 18, (2004), p. 67.

10. Sun Xiaoying, 'Build up soft power, grasp every opportunity of peaceful unification' ['Dazao Ruanshili, Bawo Heping Tongyi de Mei Yige Jihui'], *Dongnanya Zongheng* no. 12, (2004), pp. 77–81.

11. Qi Qianjin, 'US soft power declines rapidly' ['Meiguo Ruanshili Jiju Hualuo'], *Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan*, (19 July 2004), pp. 46–48.

12. Marxism views contradictions as inherent in all ideas, events and movements. Since competition exists among all entities, power, including soft power, exists everywhere.

13. Huang Muyi, 'Philosophical thinking regarding "soft power"'.

Where does soft power come from? The Chinese discourse suggests that the most notable sources of soft power in the international arena are culture and domestic institutions and values. First, Chinese academics and policy analysts agree with Nye that culture is a major aspect of soft power. In fact, they see cultural competition as an increasingly vital part of international competition.¹⁴ They stress that Chinese soft power lies in its cultural traditions, from its language to literature, from its philosophy to medicine, from its art to architecture, and from its cuisine to marshal art. As one of the major civilizations in the world, they argue, Chinese civilization has unique characteristics. Historically, its influence radiated throughout East and West Asia and even reached Africa and Western Europe. The emphasis on harmony, rooted in Confucianism and other schools of thoughts of ancient China, makes Chinese culture widely appealing. It promises to counter-balance the self-centered value system of the West and offers an attractive alternative to the confrontational approach to the world that has come to characterize Western, especially American, diplomacy.¹⁵ They urge China to use its new technologies to spread Chinese culture and values around the world.¹⁶ In contrast, the discussion of the cultural component of American soft power focuses on contemporary popular culture. Chinese scholars and policy analysts argue that American cultural hegemony includes the export of popular cultural products ranging from movies to music, from books to computer software, and from soft drinks to clothing. They view American dominance of the global media as being especially conducive to the spread of American culture. They claim that the widespread popularity of American culture has been an effective instrument of mental conquest and of legitimizing America's domination in the world.¹⁷

Second, domestic institutions and values feature prominently in the Chinese discourse about soft power. On the one hand, Chinese scholars and analysts agree with Nye that American ideology and institutions constitute an important part of American soft power around the world. They note, critically, that the US has used the promotion of the American ideal of democracy and the American model of the market economy to expand American influence abroad.¹⁸ On the other hand, they are keen to point out that successful models of economic development can be a source of soft power for China and other developing nations. While criticizing the so-called

14. Wang Huning, 'Cultural expansion and cultural sovereignty: challenges to the concept of sovereignty' ['Wenhua Kuo Zhang yu Wenhua Zhuquan: Dui Zhuquan Guannian de Tiaozhan'], *Fudan Xuebao* no. 3, (1994), pp. 9–15; Jiang Qiping, 'The postmodern meaning of soft power: the power of identity' ['Ruanshili de Houxiandai Yiyi: Rentong de Liliang'], *Xinxi Kongjian* no. 8, (2004), pp. 44–51.

15. Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun, 'Three basic elements of China's soft power in international politics' ['Guoji Zhengzhi zhong de Zhongguo Ruanshili San Yaosu'], *Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Yanjiu* no. 4, (2003), pp. 45–49; Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun, 'Chinese "soft power": the ever "hardening" power of harmony' ['Zhongguo "Ruan Shili": Buduan "Ying" hua de Hexie Liliang'], *Dangyuan Ganbu zhi You* no. 12, (2006), pp. 6–11.

16. Pang Zhongying, 'Soft power in international relations and other issues' ['Guoji Guanxi zhong de Ruanlilang ji Qita'], *Zhanlue yu Guanli* no. 2, (1997), pp. 49–51; Gong Shuduo, 'Beware of US use of cultural "soft power" to Westernize and fragment China' ['Jingti Meiguo yi Wenhua "Ruanshili" Xihua, Fenhua Zhongguo'], *Gaoxiao Lilun Zhanxian* no. 7, (2005), pp. 49–51.

17. Zhang Shan, 'The soft power and hard power of hegemony' ['Baquan Zhuyi de Ruanlilang he Yinglilang'], *Shehui Kexue Luntan* no. 5–6, (1999), pp. 4–8; Han Yan, "'Soft power": the "ultimate weapon" of US new hegemony' ['"Ruan" Shili, Meiguo xin Baquan Zhuyi de "Shashoujian"'], *Kexue Shehui Zhuyi Yanjiu* no. 1, (2001), pp. 51–53; Li Huan, 'A preliminary analysis of the soft power of the US' ['Qianxi Meiguo Guojia Ruanlilang'], *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao* no. 1, (2002), pp. 23–28.

18. Li Huan, 'A preliminary analysis of the soft power of the US'.

'Washington consensus', which refers to the neo-liberal economic principles that the US and US-dominated international financial institutions have sought to impose on the rest of the world, some of them are nonetheless happy to talk about the 'Beijing consensus'. Popularized by Joshua Cooper Ramo through the Foreign Policy Center in the UK, the Beijing consensus refers to China's model of fast economic development without losing its own way of life.¹⁹ In contrast to the Washington Consensus, which touts market-based solutions to economic problems, such as privatization, deregulation, and fiscal discipline, the Beijing consensus champions stability, development and reforms in that order.²⁰ Citing positive comments about China's development in foreign media and expressions of admiration of China's achievement by foreign statesmen and commentators, many Chinese pundits argue that the Chinese development model has become widely appealing to other countries, especially developing countries.²¹ Even though the Chinese government has not sought to use the Beijing consensus to compete against the Washington Consensus,²² some commentators assert that the world has been attracted to the Chinese model, making it an important component of Chinese soft power.²³

Like Nye, Chinese scholars and policy analysts attribute soft power in the international arena to superior diplomatic skills and styles. Sophisticated public relations strategies and tactics can create a positive image of a country on the international stage and thus improve the soft power of a nation. Their favorite example is how Zhou Enlai's graceful diplomatic style helped improve China's status in the world from the 1950s to the 1970s. In the contemporary era, they argue that China's independent (meaning resistant to outside pressure, free from alignment, non-ideological, and non-confrontational) foreign policy and its orientation toward 'peaceful rise' have made China appealing.²⁴ In contrast, an arrogant diplomatic style and a lack of respect for international law can undermine the appeal of a nation among other nations and thus reduce its soft power. They often cite the unilateral diplomacy of George W. Bush and the recent decline of American prestige in the world to illustrate this point.²⁵

19. Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2004).

20. Eric Teo, 'US China ideological rivalry heats up', *Japan Times*, (5 January 2006), available at: <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/member/member.html?eo20060105a1.htm>.

21. Pang Zhongying, 'Soft power in international relations and other issues'; and Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun, 'Three basic elements of China's soft power in international politics'.

22. Some scholars have warned against the concept of the Beijing consensus on the grounds that there is not enough substance to it (e.g. Tang Runqian) and that it sounds too aggressive and expansionist (e.g. Zheng Yongnian). Indeed, the Chinese government has refrained from embracing the term. See Tang Runqian, 'Cheers for the "Chinese way"' ['Wei "Zhongguo Daolu" Hecai'], *Hebei Shifan Daxue Xuebao*, (March 2005), pp. 5–13; and Zheng Yongnian, 'Do not exaggerate the "Beijing Consensus"' ['Qiemo Kuada "Beijing Gongshi"'], *Lianhe Zaobao*, (15 February 2005), available at: <http://zaobao.com/special/china/taiwan/pages7/taiwan150205d.html>.

23. Zhang Jianjing, 'The "Beijing Consensus" and the increase of China's soft power' ["Beijing Gongzhi" yu Zhongguo Ruanshili de Tisheng'], *Dangdai Shijie yu Shehui Zhuyi* no. 5, (2004), pp. 10–14; Wang Yuchen, 'A brief discussion on the lessons of "Beijing Consensus" for the improvement of China's soft power' ['Luelun "Beijing Gongshi" dui Tisheng Zhongguo Ruanshili de Qidi'], *Zhongnan Caijing Daxue Xuebao* no. 1, (2005), pp. 3–8; Tao Wenzhao, 'Hard power and soft power: an analysis of the contemporary co-existence of the two systems' ['Yinglilang he Ruanlilang: Dangdai Liangzhi Gongcun de Taishi Fenxi'], *Yantai Daxue Xuebao* 18(2), (2005), pp. 197–201.

24. Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun, 'Three basic elements of China's soft power in international politics'; Zheng Shuonong, "'Hard power" and "soft power"' ["Yingshili" he "Ruanshili"], *Guoji Gongguan* no. 2, (2005).

25. Li Huan, 'A preliminary analysis of the soft power of the US'; Qi Qianjin, 'US soft power declines rapidly'; Xiong Guangqing, 'The weakening of US soft power by the Iraq War' ['Yilake Zhanzheng dui Meiguo Ruanshili de Xueruo'], *Xueshu Tansuo*, (April 2005), pp. 95–98.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

In addition to referring to culture, domestic institutions and values, and diplomacy as sources of China's attractiveness to the world, the Chinese discourse suggests a number of other non-material components of national power, which are not related to making China attractive to other countries. One such component is national coherence, which refers to the orientation of the population toward unity and cooperation to achieve national goals. Some analysts view a strong national identity as the necessary glue for national coherence. According to one commentator, 'under correct guidance, national identity, expressed through national spirit, national sentiment, and national language, etc. can exhibit its unique strength and thus form the clustering of soft power'.²⁶ Others claim that ideological purification—correct political attitude resulting from Marxist education—is the key to ensure national unity.²⁷ Another proclaimed component of soft power is regime legitimacy. Chinese analysts argue that only when a government enjoys the backing of the population can the country gain international status and influence. Popular support of the government, in turn, depends on the government's willingness and ability to satisfy the needs and demands of the people in terms of social justice and equality.²⁸ It involves political reforms that will provide people with the opportunity of political participation in a democratic system.²⁹ In addition, they believe political legitimacy requires government officials to live up to high ethical standards, staying clear of corruption.³⁰ Interestingly, analysts who explore these two components of soft power—national cohesion and regime legitimacy—do not describe them as sources of American soft power but simply offer them as prescriptions for China's development of soft power.

In the Chinese discourse, science and technology are seen as important sources of soft power, just as they are important sources of hard power. For instance, many argue that the American lead in information and communications technology has been a foundation of its cultural dominance in the world³¹ and the superior innovation system in the US has been a major source of its comparative advantage in international trade.³² For those who see soft power as applicable to organizations other than states, the technological sources of soft power are just as prominent. For instance, for enterprises, soft power consists of technology, brand names, human resources, and coordination capacity.³³

26. Luo Yunxuan, 'A discussion of the question of national consciousness in a country's soft power' ['Shilun Guojia Ruanshili zhong de Minzu Yishi Wenti'], *Guizhou Minzu Yanjiu* no. 1, (2005), pp. 7–13.

27. See Shen Jiru, 'We cannot neglect improving our country's "soft power"' ['Buneng Hushi Zengqiang Woguo de "Ruanshili"'], *Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan*, (11 October 1999), pp. 12–13; Li Baohua, 'The comprehensive construction of a relatively prosperous society should pay attention to the construction of "soft power"' ['Quanmian Jianshe Xiaokang Shehui ying Zhongshi "Ruan Liliang" Jianshe'], *Lilun Qianyan* no. 2, (2004), pp. 28–29; and Dong Liren, 'Strengthen ideological education, improve Chinese soft power' ['Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu, Tigao Zhongguo Ruanshili'], *Li Lun Jie* no. 9, (2005), pp. 33–34. This top-down approach to cultivating soft power forms a sharp contrast with the situation in the US, where soft power comes from the market place of ideas. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

28. Sun Xiaoying, 'Build up soft power'.

29. Xu Xiujun, 'The post-Cold War international competition of soft power and China's choices' ['Houlengzhan Shidai de Guoji Ruanliliang Jingzheng yu Zhongguo Xuanze'], *Guizhou Shifan Daxue Xuebao* no. 3, (2005), pp. 40–43.

30. Cao Jingzhu, 'Worried thoughts on soft power'.

31. Zhang Shan, 'The soft power and hard power of hegemony'.

32. Xu Jun, 'Soft power'.

33. Hou Li, 'Cultivating "soft power"' ['"Ruanshili" Peiyang'], *Xinxi Kongjian* no. 8, (2004), pp. 40–43; Jin Zhoujin, 'Returning to Plato's technical original spot' ['Huidao Bolatu de Jishu Yuandian'], *Xinxi Kongjian* no. 8 (2004), pp. 36–39.

Chinese understanding of the sources of soft power encompasses the three components of soft power identified by Nye—culture, domestic institutions and values, and substance and style of foreign policy. But their emphasis is different from Nye's regarding the first two components. Nye's discussion of American soft power highlights *contemporary* American pop culture while Chinese discussion of Chinese soft power underscores *traditional* Chinese culture. Nye stresses the attraction of American *political* institutions and values, such as democracy and human rights, while Chinese analysts emphasize the attraction of the Chinese *economic* development model. Furthermore, in terms of policy recommendations, Chinese analysts attach great importance to the *domestic* foundation of soft power broadly defined, such as national coherence and government legitimacy, whereas Nye has focused his attention on improving the substance and style of America's *foreign* policy to make the US more attractive abroad.

Taiwan

Nye's conception of soft power has been contingent, in part, on the hot issues faced by American foreign policies, such as the end of the Cold War, the Kosovo crisis, the 9/11 incident and war in Iraq, and the East Asia Summit.³⁴ Similar to Nye's practical concerns, Taiwan also takes a policy-oriented approach to the concept of soft power, in which the key is how to change others' preferences through persuasion.³⁵ This policy focus is made obvious by the sources and forum of the discourse on soft power. Unlike in China, in Taiwan academic discussions are overshadowed by the rhetoric of practitioners, and journal articles by scholars are no match for op-ed pieces by former government officials.³⁶ In other words, while the Chinese discourse of soft power has been among theoreticians, its counterpart in Taiwan has been among practitioners.

Taiwanese discourse defines soft power broadly. Most Taiwanese commentators employ Nye's definition and regard soft power as 'co-optive power', namely the ability to shape others' preferences with attractiveness and persuasion. As a chief proponent of this concept in Taiwan, Lin Bi-jaw employs 'soft power' as an umbrella concept that includes power elements other than military strength and punitive sanctions, which enhance a country's attractiveness. These elements comprise culture, political system, openness of the information society, education, ideology, economic models, economic competitiveness, IT innovation, foreign investment and international aid.³⁷ This is broader than Nye's original formulation that excludes economic power from soft power.

34. See Nye, 'The decline of America's soft power'; and Joseph Nye, 'The rise of China's soft power', *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, (29 December 2005), available at: http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/1499/rise_of_chinas_soft_power.html.

35. Poong Hwei-luan, 'International relations in the information age: theory and practice' ['Zixun Shidai Guoji Guanxi Lilun yu Shiwu zhi Yanjiu'], *Wenti yu Yanjiu* 39(5), (May 2000), pp. 1–15; Lu Hsiu-lien, 'Taiwan miracle: the power of soft power' ['Taiwan Chiji: Ruoxing Guoli'], Speech to Taiwanese media during her visiting to Latin America, (25 September 2000), available at: http://www.president.gov.tw/1_vice_president/c890925.html; Lin Bi-jaw, 'Wielding soft power to open a new round in the cross-Strait relations' ['Yi Ruanxing Liliang, Kai Liangan Xinju'], *The China Times* (Taipei), (12 May 2004), p. A15.

36. E.g. Lin Bi-jaw, 'Wielding soft power to open a new round in the cross-Strait relations'; and Su Chi, 'Soft power + defensive national defense = national security' ['Ruan Quanli + Shoushi Guofang = Guoan'], *The United Daily* (Taipei), (24 January 2006), p. A15.

37. Lin Bi-jaw, 'Wielding soft power to open a new round in the cross-Strait relations'.

As for the question of where soft power comes from, most Taiwanese agree that political institutions, culture, and diplomacy are its major sources. In particular, they emphasize democracy as being the most valuable soft power asset Taiwan holds internationally.³⁸ This view seems to be shared by various political groups. For instance, explicitly citing Nye, President Chen Shui-bian refers to democracy and civil society as a source of Taiwan's soft power.³⁹ Likewise, on his trip to Europe in February 2006, then Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Ma Ying-jeo claimed that 'soft power', featuring democracy, peace, and prosperity, was crucial for Taiwan in the future in terms of its domestic politics and cross-Strait relations.⁴⁰

Several interviews with Taiwan representatives in the US indicate that the Taiwanese government sees 'democracy' as a major source of Taiwan's attractiveness to the American public. 'Democracy is a shared value between US and Taiwan', says a senior Taiwanese official stationed in Washington DC, 'and democratization indeed makes it easier to sell Taiwan's image in the States'.⁴¹ Taiwan supporters confirm that the peaceful party-turnover in the 2000 election in Taiwan made an especially strong impression on the US and has attracted more support for Taiwan's democracy and stability.⁴² Commentators in Taiwan argue that Taiwan's democratization could be a great example for non-democratic countries, just as Taiwan's economic achievements set an example for the developing countries in the 1980s.⁴³

In addition to this value dimension, culture also features prominently in Taiwan's discourse on soft power. However, compared to China, proponents of soft power in Taiwan place less emphasis on traditional Chinese culture in their arguments. This is due to the political schisms within Taiwan society, where some people prefer separation from China, others favor the status quo, and still others would like to join China in the future under more favorable conditions. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government deliberately employs Taiwanese and aboriginal culture on the island to distinguish its political and cultural identities from China. For instance, an article in the official *Taiwan Review* praises the Robin Hood-style characters in Taiwan's glove puppetry dramas for their fighting against injustice and tyranny—synonyms for the KMT's top-down rule and its Sinocentric cultural view.⁴⁴ The DPP and its supporters in Taiwan believe that a unique Taiwanese identity could undermine China's attempt at reunification with Taiwan.⁴⁵

38. *Ibid.*

39. *A-Bian Zongtong Dianzi Bao* no. 141, (24 June 2004), available at: http://www.president.gov.tw/1_epaper/93/930624.html.

40. *The China Times* (Taipei), (13 February 2006), p. A04.

41. Interview with a senior official at Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US (TECRO), Washington, DC, 23 November 2005.

42. Interview with Dr Chen Wen-yen, Executive Director, Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), 22 November 2005.

43. Samuel C.Y. Ku, 'Southeast Asia and cross-Strait relations: the policy of separation of politics and economics', *Journal of Contemporary China* 7(19), (November 1998), pp. 421–442; Lu Hsiu-lien, 'Taiwan miracle'; Lin Bi-jaw, 'Wielding soft power to open a new round in the cross-Strait relations'; Shane Lee, 'A new interpretation of "soft power" for Taiwan', *Taiwan International Studies Quarterly* 1(2), (Summer 2005), pp. 1–23.

44. Pat Gao, 'Handy homeland heroes', *Taiwan Review*, (29 September 2006), available at: <http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=23287&CtNode=119>.

45. Huang Chiau-tong, 'Using Taiwanese nationalism to confront Chinese nationalism' ['Yong Taiwan Guozu Zhuyi Dui kang Zhongguo Guozu Zhuyi'], *Taiwanus.net*, (2 May 2004), available at: http://taiwanus.net/Taiwan_Future/bookseries/book_11/137.htm; Lee, 'A new interpretation of "soft power" for Taiwan'.

Some commentators, however, hold a different and broader view than the official tones. They suggest that in addition to Taiwan's artistic assets such as the Cloud Gate Dance Theater (*Yunmen Wuji*) and aboriginal artifacts, Taiwan should include traditional Chinese culture to compete with China over attractiveness. They maintain that the traditional form of Chinese characters, which has been abandoned by mainland China but continues to be used in Taiwan, is better connected to Chinese history and culture and therefore constitutes Taiwan's niche given the growing global interest in Chinese culture.⁴⁶ They point out that Taiwan actor, Wu Hsing-kuo, has been the only performer with a background in Chinese opera that has appeared in the Metropolitan opera *First Emperor of China* in New York in 2006. It indicates Taiwan's role in representing traditional Chinese culture on the international stage.⁴⁷ However, none of the commentators has suggested that traditional Chinese cultural assets alone could represent Taiwan to the world.

A third component of soft power discussed in the Taiwan discourse is diplomacy. Scholars in the Institute of International Relations (IIR), a prestigious think tank, propose that the government should not narrowly focus on formal bilateral diplomacy; instead, it should engage in public diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy, including international aid and regional cooperation.⁴⁸ It should also try to use its initiatives in human security to help shape the international agenda.⁴⁹ Others believe that the professionalism of Taiwan diplomats is a form of soft power, creating a positive image of Taiwan around the world.⁵⁰

Other than government-level diplomacy, some scholars suggest that Taiwan's burgeoning civil society and its participation in international affairs could help Taiwan build up a positive image abroad.⁵¹ For instance, Chen Jie points out that Taiwan's participation in global NGO networks is conducive to escaping from the economic-diplomatic trap in Southeast Asia, where Taiwan has to economically reward every country that makes a diplomatically favorable gesture to Taiwan, but cannot do much if the same country expresses its support for China's 'one China principle'. Chen argues that Taiwan's NGOs can cooperate with grassroots organizations in Southeast Asian countries on transnational issues such as labor rights, environmental protection, and social justice, to better present Taiwan's image. Moreover, given that many politicians in these young democracies used to be local civil rights advocates before coming into office, this sort of cooperation could increase their fondness and future political support for Taiwan.⁵² Practitioners of

46. Shiang Jun, 'The dilemma of promoting "soft power"' ['Tisheng "Rouxing Guoli" de Kunjing'], *The Apple Daily* (Taipei), (26 August 2005), p. A23.

47. Charles Kao, "'To devote every effort" vs. "To act moderately according to one's ability"' ['Quanli Yifu vs. Liangli er Shaowei'], *The United Daily* (Taipei), (25 November 2006), p. E07.

48. Wu Lin-jun, 'To actively participate in regional organizations' ['Yi Jiji Touru Quyu Zuzhi'], *ET Today*, (22 May 2004), available at: <http://www.ettoday.com/2004/05/22/11081-1633735.htm>.

49. Lin Bi-jaw, 'Wielding soft power to open a new round in the cross-Strait relations'.

50. Interview with a senior official at Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US (TECRO), Washington, DC, 23 November 2005.

51. Chen Jie, 'Beyond diplomacy', *Free China Review*, (1 April 1999), pp. 36–42; Lin Ji-Lang, 'NGO diplomacy: the strategic thinking of Taiwan's experience' ['Fei Zhengfu Zuzhi Waijiao: Taiwan Jingyan de Zhanlue Sikao'], *Quanzhou Zhengzhi Pinglun* no. 4, (October 2003), pp. 1–24; Yi-ching Ho, 'Helping a friend in need', *Taiwan Review*, (1 June 2007), available at: <http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=24251&CtNode=119>.

52. Chen Jie, 'Beyond diplomacy'; and Chen Jie, 'Burgeoning transnationalism of Taiwan's social movement NGOs', *Journal of Contemporary China* 10(29), (November 2001), pp. 613–644.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

Taiwan's NGOs also agree that a genuine, apolitical, and value-oriented engagement with the global civil society could contribute to Taiwan's attractiveness around the world in the long run.⁵³

Taiwan's discourse on soft power, especially the academic discussions, goes beyond democracy, culture, and diplomacy as factors that make Taiwan attractive to the world to include other non-material sources of national power. Analysts argue that good governance, continuing economic development, and social stability, constitute the domestic foundation of Taiwan's soft power.⁵⁴ They contend that human resources such as high levels of education are sources of soft power.⁵⁵ They suggest that Taiwan's IT advancement nowadays is another source of soft power because it could facilitate Taiwan's communication with its friends in this era of globalization and set a model for other countries in economic development.⁵⁶ Finally, similar to China the Taiwan discourse views national pride as a source of national power. For example, President Chen Shui-bian refers to national pride as soft power, pointing to the 'Red Leaf legend' in Taiwan's history and Taiwan's successful bid for the 2009 World Games.⁵⁷

To summarize, the meaning of soft power in the Taiwan discourse is broader than Nye's formulation. Unlike Nye's focus on US foreign policy, in the Taiwan context it has both a foreign policy and a domestic component. Proponents of this concept argue that democracy is the greatest asset for Taiwan's soft power vis-à-vis China and Taiwan's progress in this area makes it attractive to the US public. Moreover, they propose that other elements such as national morale, popular identity with Taiwan, good governance, and economic development also constitute the soft aspects of Taiwan's power.

II. Why so attractive?

China

It is not often the case that a new theoretical concept gets picked up by the policy circles of far-away countries right away. Why has China so readily embraced the concept of soft power? We argue the main reason is that Nye's theoretical framework seems to answer some fundamental questions faced by China in recent

53. Yi-ching Ho, 'Helping a friend in need'.

54. Lin Bi-jaw, 'Wielding soft power to open a new round in the cross-Strait relations'; Chu Shinmin, and Mingshian Cheng, 'Developing Taiwan's soft power in the face of China's peaceful rise' ['Miandui Zhonggong Heping Jueqi, Fazhan Taiwan Ruanxing Guoli'], *The United Daily* (Taipei), (7 September 2004), p. A15; Paul S.P. Hsu, 'Taiwan soft power', *Caixun*, (December 2006), pp. 174–175.

55. Charles Kao, 'Taiwan's way out: to stand out in the world with soft power' ['Taiwan de Chulu: yi Ruanxing Shili Lizu Shijie'], *The United Daily* (Taipei), (1 March 2006), p. A15.

56. Lu Hsiu-lien, 'Taiwan miracle'; Wong Ming-Hsien, 'Shaping US grand strategy in the post-911 era' ['Xingsu hou Jiuyiyi Shidai Meiguo de Quanqiu Dazhanlue'], foreword in Tungchie Tsai, *Meiguo Baquan de Maodun yu Weilai* [Translation of Nye's *The Paradox of American Power*] (Taipei: Zuoan Wenhua, 2002), pp. 13–24; Hsu, 'Taiwan soft power'.

57. A junior baseball team from a very poor countryside of Taiwan, the Red Leaf Junior Baseball Team, defeated then-world champions, a well-equipped Japanese team, in 1968. This victory inspired most people on Taiwan at that time. See *A-Bian Zongtong Dianzi Bao* no. 141, (24 June 2004); Huang Guo-en, and Yang Ying-chao, 'Sports activities and comprehensive national power' ['Tiyu Huodong yu Zonghe Guoli'], *Dazhuan Tiyu* no. 71, (2004), pp. 59–64.

years. First, with China's miraculous economic growth and so much talk about the rise of China, Chinese policy makers and analysts are naturally interested in the question of what makes for great powers. Nye's theory suggests that great powers must possess both hard (i.e. material) and soft (i.e. non-material) power. This seems to be quite convincing to Chinese policy analysts. They note that historically, empires built on hard power alone were short-lived. In the contemporary world, they see the end of the Cold War as offering two extreme examples. On the one hand, they argue, the Soviet Union collapsed in large part because of its loss of soft power. Although it had impressive hard power, being once the largest producer of steel, oil, natural gas and coal and a strong military rival of the US, the Soviet Union lacked soft power, as made clear by its poor coordination of the economy, the loss of government legitimacy, and the weakening of social coherence.⁵⁸ The United States, on the other hand, lingers on as a superpower despite some decline of its hard power because of the viability of its soft power.⁵⁹ Chinese pundits believe that hegemony and leadership requires the support of both material and non-material foundations. They claim that if China is to become a great power, it has to develop comprehensive national power, which includes soft as well as hard power.⁶⁰

Second, what is the nature of international competition in today's world? Nye's framework suggests that with the obsolescence of major wars in the post-imperial era, competition in soft power has become more and more important in international relations. Chinese analysts seem to find this persuasive. They argue that since the end of the Cold War, this trend has become even more salient. Nations increasingly compete with one another on beliefs, institutions, cultural attraction, and human resources.⁶¹ For example, the US has actively tried to influence others by bringing the American way of life to other parts of the world. The West, in general, has sought to use engagement to lead China down the road of 'peaceful evolution'.⁶² To counter this attack, China must launch its own offensives, using its own sources of soft power.⁶³ Some commentators see China and Taiwan as engaged in a soft power competition. They argue that the peaceful unification with Taiwan requires the Chinese government to develop and use soft power to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan.⁶⁴

Third, Chinese policy makers and analysts are keenly aware that China's rapid economic development in recent decades has generated suspicion and concern around the world. Some fear that a stronger China would be a more assertive and

58. Shen Jiru, 'We cannot neglect improving our country's "soft power"'.

59. Han Yan, "'Soft power'"; Li Huan, 'A preliminary analysis of the soft power of the US'.

60. Zhang Shan, 'The soft power and hard power of hegemony'.

61. Luo Yunxuan, 'A discussion of the question of national consciousness in a country's soft power'; Li Shuangwu, 'The fight over soft power' ['Ruanshili zhi Zheng'], *Shishi Baogao* no. 4, (2005), pp. 42–46; Xu Xiujun, 'The post-Cold War international competition of soft power and China's choices'.

62. In the Chinese rhetoric the 'peaceful evolution' of China, which they attribute to John Foster Dulles, is an evil and dangerous plot of the West to subtly change China's political system and undermine the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party through peaceful means.

63. Ma Hong, 'Soft power challenges after China's accession to the WTO' ['Zhongguo "Rushi" Hou de Ruanlilang Tiaozhan'], *Zhibu Jianshe* no. 3, (2002), pp. 38–41; Gong Shuduo, 'Beware of US use of cultural "soft power" to Westernize and fragment China'.

64. Sun Xiaoying, 'Build up soft power'.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

aggressive China. How to calm such anxieties? Nye's theory seems to offer a ready solution. Instead of increasing its coercive power, China should concentrate on developing its soft power because the latter would be less alarming and thus more acceptable to other countries in the world.⁶⁵ As a policy analyst in a government think tank puts it,

Great power relations are very delicate during transition period. The old superpower never likes new competitors. As a new great power, China must be careful not giving the US any excuse to be provoked. That's the main reason for China to emphasize soft power. China certainly does not want to confront the US.⁶⁶

Or, in the words of the Chinese ambassador to the UN, 'we don't want to make anyone feel uncomfortable'.⁶⁷

In addition to these calculations, the Chinese may have found the concept of soft power especially appealing because of its apparent compatibility with Chinese traditions. As noted earlier, Chinese scholars and analysts have often drawn parallels between Nye's formulation of soft power and classical Chinese teachings, such as the teachings of Sun Zi and Mencius. Furthermore, their appreciation of non-material forms of power is augmented by the history of the Chinese Communist Party. During the fight against Japan and the Nationalist Party in the first half of the twentieth century, the communists were in a materially inferior position. But their will power and strategies ultimately enabled them to defeat their better equipped opponents. That experience has long solidified their strong faith in the spiritual dimensions of power.

Finally, China has not been alone in embracing the notion of soft power. In East Asia, the same has been true of the scholarly and policy communities of Taiwan, Japan and Korea.⁶⁸ In part this may be due to the irresistible appeal of the concept of soft power. It resonates with the instinct that power does not lie in material resources alone; it has a strong social and psychological dimension. This line of argument goes back to ancient China, as discussed above, and ancient Greece.⁶⁹ In the contemporary study of international relations, scholars continue to develop such concepts as 'authority',⁷⁰ and 'legitimacy',⁷¹ to capture important non-tangible elements of international relations neglected by the traditional focus on hard power. In addition, the widespread influence of Nye's concept may also be the result of competitive learning. Policy analysts and policy makers of one country are keenly attentive to the rhetoric and behaviors of other countries. The Japanese government takes note of the public diplomacy initiatives

65. Liu Canguo, 'A preliminary analysis of the international strategies of China's peaceful rise' ['Qianxi Zhongguo Heping Jueqi de Guoji Zhanlüe'], *Shandong Keji Daxue Xuebao*, (March 2005), pp. 50–61.

66. Interview, June 2006.

67. James Traub, 'The world according to China', *The New York Times*, (3 September 2006), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/magazine/03ambassador.html>.

68. Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, 'Soft power in East Asia', paper presented at the annual conference of the Association of Chinese Political Studies, Louisville, April 2006; Geun Lee, 'New visions and tasks of Korea's diplomacy: Korea's grand strategies in the 21st century', paper presented in the discussion for diplomatic issues, (25 November 2005).

69. Richard Ned Lebow, 'Power, persuasion and justice', *Millennium* 33(3), (June 2005), pp. 551–582.

70. David Lake, 'Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and hierarchy in world politics', *International Security* 31(1), (Summer 2007), pp. 47–79.

71. Ian Hurd, 'Legitimacy and authority in international politics', *International Organization* 53(2), (Spring 1999), pp. 379–408.

of Western countries,⁷² while Chinese policy analysts closely follow Japan's development of soft power.⁷³

Taiwan

Taiwan's interest in soft power is closely linked to its calculations of cross-Strait relations. First, the rise of China in the 1990s and China's policy toward Taiwan has had a major impact on the perceptions of Chinese power in the policy circles as well as academia in Taiwan. In particular, the 1995–1996 missile crises in the Taiwan Strait made it plain that it was increasingly difficult for Taiwan to rely on material power alone to protect itself from mainland China's threat. Given Taiwan's limited material power, many in Taiwan see soft power as the 'weapons of the weak' in pursuit of its security.⁷⁴ In the international front, Yan contends that Taiwan should employ a 'soft power approach' based on shared values to align democracies into a group to defend against Chinese domination in the Asia–Pacific region. And, in this sense, 'peace, instead of nuclear missiles, is the most useful weapon for Taiwan to defend herself'.⁷⁵ Given China's missile deployment in recent years, Taiwan's Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien urges other democracies upholding the same peace-loving values to tell the militarily mighty China to stop threatening the small and democratic Taiwan.⁷⁶

At home, one strategy is to promote a separate Taiwan identity to confront China. In fact, according to polling data collected by the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taipei, in the aftermath of the 1995–1996 missile crises, for the first time in history more people in Taiwan identified themselves as Taiwanese than Chinese.⁷⁷ The current government of Taiwan has been promoting such identity changes. It highlights democracy and human rights in the pursuit of a new national brand. The hope is that this new brand could enhance people's will and confidence to defend Taiwan.⁷⁸

Second, the general public is eager to improve Taiwan's international status and expand its international participation. While it is difficult for Taiwan to compete materially with China in international arenas, Taiwanese intellectuals hope that soft power can help improve Taiwan's international standing. Some suggest that Taiwan should be cautious about politically provocative initiatives in international arenas; instead, it should employ regional and multilateral institutions, such as the Asia

72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook, 2004*, available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/index.html>.

73. Zhan Dexiong, 'The meaning of "soft power" and its lessons for our country' [“Ruanshili” de Hanyi yiji dui Woguo de Qishi], *Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan* no. 7, (2004), pp. 37–39; and Shen Wangshu, “Soft power” knocks on China's door' [“Ruanshili” Kouxiang Zhongguo zhi Men], *Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan*, (21 February 2005), pp. 21–23.

74. Lu Hsiu-lien, 'Taiwan miracle'; Lu Hsiu-lien, 'Vice president address to the 2001 Global Peace Assembly', (13 August 2001), available at: http://www.president.gov.tw/1_vice_president/e900813.html. Also see Jiann-fa Yan, 'Only peace and democracy can smash the menace of China's "three types of warfare"', *Taiwan Perspective e-Paper* no. 37, (1 September 2004), available at: <http://www.tp.org.tw/eletter/story.htm?id=20003746>.

75. Jiann-fa Yan, 'Only peace and democracy can smash the menace of China's "three types of warfare"'.
76. Lu Hsiu-lien, 'Vice president address to the 2001 Global Peace Assembly'.

77. Some argue that the declining percentage of 'Chinese identity' is increasing the difficulties for Beijing's version of peaceful unification. See Gunter Schubert, 'Taiwan's political parties and national identity', *Asian Survey* 44(4), (July–August 2004), pp. 534–554.

78. Lee, 'A new interpretation of "soft power" for Taiwan'.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

Pacific Economic Forum and the World Trade Organization, to demonstrate its capability and willingness to contribute to international cooperation.⁷⁹

Third, Taiwan's interest in soft power is in part a response to the popularity of this concept in China. Just as Chinese policy analysts have closely monitored Japan's development of soft power, analysts in Taiwan have paid close attention to the discourse on soft power in China. Since China is seen as a major threat to Taiwan, when Chinese scholars adopted the concept of comprehensive national power, including soft power, in the 1990s, Taiwanese policy and academic circles paid attention. For instance, many have taken note that China is seeking to enhance both its material/hard power and spiritual/soft power. They point out that China's political influence, cultural attractiveness, and great power diplomacy, along with its economic development and military build-up have posed a great challenge to Taiwan.⁸⁰

Fourth, the success of other small countries has been an inspiration for Taiwan. Stable and cooperative state–society relations have been a major factor underlying economic development and international competitiveness of a number of small European countries.⁸¹ Taiwanese academia have urged the government to invite business community and opinion leaders to cooperatively transform Taiwan into 'the island of attractiveness', like these small European countries (and closer to home, Singapore). They argue that Taiwan can build up its attractiveness through a good environment for investment, suitable working places, quality education, culture and high living standard, tourism, and an emphasis on sustainable development and environmental protection.⁸²

III. Policy implications

China

The discussion of soft power in China has been more than academic. There are two reasons to believe that the policy makers are taking this concept seriously. First, the controlled nature of the Chinese publishing industry would not have allowed opinions contradicting or even diverging from the official position to flourish.

79. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC (Taiwan), *Foreign Relations Yearbook 2003*, available at: http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac2003/01/01_01.htm; Wu Lin-jun, 'To actively participate in regional organizations'; Cheng Tuan-yao, 'Expanding international participation' ['Kuoda Guoji Canyu'], *ET Today*, (22 May 2004), available at: <http://www.ettoday.com/2004/05/22/11081-1633764.htm>.

80. Sung Kuo-cheng, *China's Comprehensive National Power for the Next Century*; Sung Kuo-cheng, 'The impact of China's hosting of the 2008 Olympics on its national comprehensive power and the cross-Strait relations' ['Zhonggong Zhuban 2008 Aoyun dui qi Zonghe Guoli yu Liangan Guanxi de Yingxiang'], *Gongdang Wenti Yanjiu* 27(8), (August 2001), pp. 1–3; Samuel C.Y. Ku, 'Southeast Asia and cross-Strait relations'. Though Sung actually employs Ray Cline's formulation of comprehensive national power instead of Nye's notion of soft power, his introduction of the concept of the spiritual and soft dimension of power is conducive to Taiwan academia's understanding of soft power.

81. Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

82. Charles Kao, 'Taiwan's way out'; You Chang-shan, 'Latent advantages in 20 years: six "invisible competitiveness"' ['Ershi Nianlai de Yinxing Youshi, Liuge "Kanbujian de Jingzhengli"'], *Yuanjian Zazhi*, (July 2006), available at: http://www.gvm.com.tw/theme/inpage_cover.asp?ser=12198. In addition, Nye's personal visit to Taiwan was conducive to promoting this idea in Taiwanese academia and policy circles. During his public speech at a think tank, he mentioned how the US found Taiwan attractive with its successful democratization. See Joseph Nye, 'The situation of security in East Asia', speech delivered to the Institute for National Policy Research, Grand Hyatt, Taipei, Taiwan, 6 July, 2001. Given Nye's status in American academia as well as policy circles, it is not surprising that his praise of Taiwan's political achievements and pragmatic view on cross-Strait relations have generated strongly positive responses in Taiwan.

The extensiveness of the discussion of soft power in the public discourse indicates official interest in and endorsement of this notion. Second, the Chinese government has become increasingly dependent on experts in policy making, especially policy analysts of the growing number of official and semi-official think tanks. Given how widely the concept of soft power has been debated among the experts, it is more than likely that it has reached the policy makers through one or another channel. There are already signs showing the Chinese government to be more sensitive to soft power than before. This involves both a more conscious effort to develop Chinese soft power and heightened vigilance against the influence of foreign soft power on China, but here we will limit my attention to the former.

The Chinese government has long been attentive to its image in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences. But in recent years, probably as a result of the explicit realization of the importance of soft power and of the sources of soft power, it has become more sensitive to mobilizing its soft power resources to improve its attractiveness at home and abroad. As analyzed above, the public discourse in China identifies three major sources of Chinese soft power—Chinese culture, China's development model, and China's independent and peaceful foreign policy. Indeed, the Chinese government has taken active steps to mobilize all these power resources to enhance its influence.

First, in the last few years the Chinese government has placed a new emphasis on the development and promotion of Chinese culture. On the one hand, this has been manifested in a greater appreciation of soft sciences as opposed to the traditionally favored hard sciences. Policy makers and analysts alike seem to believe that philosophy and social sciences are central to a country's soft power. In March 2004 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued an opinion calling for faster development of philosophy and social sciences. Correspondingly the development of philosophy and social sciences was the theme of the monthly seminar of the Politburo in May 2004.⁸³ Furthermore, as noted earlier, the public discourse identifies ideological purification as a way to strengthen national coherence and thus soft power. Not surprisingly, the government has launched renewed efforts at ideological indoctrination, including a ten-year Marxist Theory System Project. With a staff appointed by the Politburo, this project seeks to explain and justify the dramatic changes in China in the reform era. The purpose is to give the government greater legitimacy and persuasive power vis-à-vis the public.⁸⁴

The new emphasis on cultural power has also led to greater efforts to promote Chinese language and culture overseas. The Chinese equivalent of TOEFL (Test of English as Foreign Language) has become more popular than ever before. There have been more and more Chinese cultural events in other countries. To institutionalize the spread of the Chinese language and culture, in 2004 China began to set up Confucian Institutes in other countries. Initiated by the Ministry of Education, Confucian Institutes are joint ventures with local partners aimed at teaching Chinese culture and language around the world. By mid-2007, 155 Confucian Institutes and Confucian Classrooms had been established in 53 countries.⁸⁵ The hope is that the Confucian

83. Yang Taoyuan, 'Increase China's soft power' ['Tisheng Zhongguo Ruanshili'], *Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan*, (7 June 2004), pp. 14–15.

84. Interview, June 2006.

85. See <http://chinaqw.com.cn/hwjy/hjxw/200705/27/73917.shtml>.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

Institutes will resemble the British Council, l'Alliance Francais, and the Goethe Institute, and become effective instruments for cultural diplomacy. Unlike the development of social sciences and the enhancement of Marxist ideology, which aims at increasing the government's soft power over the population at home, this aspect of cultural development aims to expand Chinese soft power abroad.

Second, in recent years Chinese government officials have begun to speak of a Chinese development model. Although this may sound similar to the concept of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', which has been part of the official lexicon since the 1980s, there are important differences. The reformers coined the phrase of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' as a political tactic to legitimize their not-so-socialist transformation of China in the eyes of the domestic audience. In contrast, the notion of a Chinese development model has gradually emerged as a result of China's sustained economic growth and the growing international admiration for China's economic success. Although the Chinese government has shunned the more provocative phrase of 'Beijing Consensus' because it 'does not want to raise a different banner that competes with the Washington consensus',⁸⁶ Chinese officials have not been shy to proclaim that China has blazed a different trail toward modernization than the prescription of Western theories, and that China's development model offers important and useful lessons for many developing countries as they meet the challenge of modernization.⁸⁷ Having learned the lessons of its zealous effort to export its revolutionary model during the Maoist era, the Chinese government is not actively promoting the Chinese development model abroad, but it clearly sees the demonstration effect of the Chinese model as part of China's political and moral power. Indeed, some observers argue that the Chinese model has already attracted much following in parts of Africa and Latin America, where left-leaning governments have explicitly sought economic development without far-reaching liberalization.⁸⁸ In this process, the Chinese model is increasing Chinese attractiveness in those areas of the world.

Third, in the last decade the Chinese government has paid a great deal of attention to China's image in the world. It has sought, in particular, to convince the world that China is a responsible great power.⁸⁹ This new orientation has shaped Chinese diplomacy in both substance and style. During times of crises, China's policy choices have reflected its new sensitivity toward its image. For example, during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998, the Chinese government resisted the pressure for RMB devaluation even though there were ample economic reasons for it to let that happen. China's policy led to detrimental economic consequences in the short run, but it won China valuable international respect.⁹⁰ Likewise, China's policy toward the on-going nuclear crisis in North Korea has also significantly departed from its past patterns.

86. Interview, June 2006.

87. Yu Keping, 'A dialogue about the "Beijing Consensus" and the Chinese development model' ['Guanyu "Beijing Gongshi" yu Zhongguo Fazhan Moshi de Duihua'], *Dangdai Shijie yu Shehui Zhuyi* no. 5, (2004), pp. 4–9.

88. Anver Versi, 'Africa needs new models', *African Business*, (March 2006), p. 13; Richard Lapper, 'Latin America dances to the China beat', *Financial Times*, (11 November 2004).

89. Liping Xia, 'China: a responsible great power', *Journal of Contemporary China* 10(26), (February 2001), pp. 17–25; Hongying Wang, 'National image building and Chinese foreign policy', *China: An International Journal* 1(1), (March 2003), pp. 46–72.

90. Hongying Wang, 'China's exchange rate policy in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis', in Jonathan Kirshner, ed., *Monetary Order: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 153–171.

Instead of standing by its ideological ally, North Korea, or staying aloof from the thorny situation, the Chinese government played an active mediating role among the various parties concerned. Again, its efforts have brought about positive evaluations from the international community.⁹¹ Aside from its image-conscious policies regarding these crises, the Chinese government has more broadly attempted to improve its appeal around the world.

Close to home, China has adopted a good neighbor policy. It has settled long-term border disputes with Russia, Vietnam and central Asian countries, making unprecedented concessions.⁹² It has shown new flexibility regarding territorial disputes on the Sino–Indian border and in the South China Sea. In Southeast Asia, where China’s growing power has caused some anxiety, China has launched a major charm offensive. This includes high-level visits to the region by senior Chinese officials, development assistance to Laos, Burma and Cambodia, Free Trade Agreement negotiations with ASEAN, China’s active participation in multilateral organizations in the region in the last decade, its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in 2003, and its new initiatives of cooperation on transnational health, drug trafficking and environmental issues.⁹³ So far, according to some commentators, China’s strategies have led to the rise of its soft power in Southeast Asia to such an extent that it appears to be outpacing the influence of Japan, Taiwan, and even the US in the region.⁹⁴

Farther afield, China has stepped up its public relations effort in various parts of the world. For example, in the past the Chinese government was ill-equipped in building its image in the US. For decades, while the Taiwan lobby was among the most influential in Washington, there was no equivalent of a People’s Republic of China lobby. In the last few years this has changed. The Chinese government has hired some of the most powerful American law firms and public relations firms to build a positive image of China in the US.⁹⁵ According to a study by the Center for Public Integrity, from 1997 to 2005 the Chinese and the Hong Kong governments and government-controlled companies spent \$19 million lobbying various branches of the US government.⁹⁶ Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats are paying more and more attention to public diplomacy. The Chinese Embassy in Washington has established a new working group that focuses on communicating with and befriending influential members of the US Congress. The goal is to improve China’s ability to persuade the

91. Jae Ho Chung, ‘China’s Korea policy under the new leadership’, *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 18(1), (2004), pp. 1–18.

92. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime insecurity and international cooperation: explaining China’s compromises on territorial disputes’, *International Security* 20(2), (Fall 2005), pp. 46–83.

93. Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 14(44), (August 2005), pp. 409–425; David Shambaugh, ‘Return to the middle kingdom? China and Asia in the early twenty-first century’, in David Shambaugh, ed., *Power Shift* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 23–47.

94. Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘China’s charm: implications of Chinese soft power’, Policy Brief of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, no. 47 (2006). For a counter point of view, see Robert Sutter, ‘Why rising China can’t dominate Asia’, *PacNet* 45, (8 September 2006), available at: <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0645.pdf>.

95. Bara Vaida, ‘Lobbying—red star rising on K Street’, *National Journal* 37(30), (23 July 2005), pp. 2370–2375.

96. Marina Walker Guevara and Bob Williams, *China Steps Up Its Lobbying Game* (Washington, DC: The Center for Public Integrity, 13 September 2005), available at: <http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/report.aspx?aid=734>.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

US on issues of importance to China.⁹⁷ Beyond lobbying, the Chinese government has also expanded cultural and educational activities to improve the Chinese image in the US. For instance, in the summer of 2000 China spent millions of dollars sending cultural groups on a road show in the United States. The director of the State Council Information Office explained the motive behind this undertaking—‘I hope some day an American president will say something good about China’.⁹⁸

Chinese analysts seem to believe that the new diplomacy has increased China’s soft power. They point out that the three high profile international summits sponsored by China in 2006—the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Sino–ASEAN summit, and the Sino–Africa summit, which gathered over 50 heads of states, highlight China’s rising influence in the world and the world’s recognition of China’s appeal. They also point out that recent surveys that show more favorable international public opinions toward China than toward the US indicate of China’s rising soft power.⁹⁹

In many ways, China’s new appreciation of soft power has already had an impact on its domestic and foreign policy. It has given the Chinese government a new way to conceptualize and exercise power both at home and abroad. It has inspired the development of new policy instruments. It has added new considerations to Chinese calculations of the costs and benefits of particular policy choices. Furthermore, both Chinese and foreign observers seem to believe that China’s new policy initiatives guided by the concept have actually led to greater soft power for China in the international context.

Taiwan

Since politicians and academics, especially academics with public service experiences, have been the chief proponents of this concept in Taiwan, the discussion of soft power serves more than the diffusion of ideas and has indeed yielded concrete policy changes. First, Taiwan has long been attentive to its international image. As Taiwan’s *Foreign Relations Yearbook 2003* stated, Taiwan has made great efforts in image building worldwide, especially in the US. For instance, according to records of the US Department of Justice, from 1997 to 2003 the Taiwanese government and government-related companies spent more than \$38 million lobbying various branches of the US government. In 2005, in response to China’s ‘charm offensive’, Taiwan’s Government Information Office (GIO) for the first time commissioned the Gallup Organization to conduct a multinational survey on the image of Taiwan.¹⁰⁰ To formulate an image distinct from China, the GIO has changed the name of Taiwan’s

97. Cao Ming, ‘Persuading the US with US methods’ [‘Yi Meiguo de Fangshi Shuofu Meiguo’], *Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan*, (24 October 2005), pp. 38–39.

98. *The New York Times*, (23 August 2000).

99. ‘Chinese “soft power”: the ever “hardening” power of harmony’ [‘Zhongguo “Ruan Shili”: Buduan “Ying” hua de Hexie Liliang’], *Dangyuan Ganbu zhi You*.

100. It notes with pride that the survey finds that more than half of the respondents from the general public in the US, Japan, United Kingdom, France, and Germany have a positive impression of Taiwan. Opinion leaders in the US (91%) and Japan (94%) view Taiwan favorably. Our interviews in Washington indicate that the Taiwan government is highly attentive to the US perception of Taiwan, especially how it compares with the US perception of China (various interviews in November 2005).

official publication aiming at foreign readership. The monthly *Free China Review*, firstly published in April 1951 as part of official propaganda, was renamed the *Taipei Review* in April 2000, and once again changed to the *Taiwan Review* in March 2003.¹⁰¹

Second, as noted earlier, democracy has become Taiwan's salient selling point abroad. The pursuit of this image has brought about institutional changes. To promote democratic values and to connect to the international community, the Taiwan government has established two institutions in the past few years. The first one is the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), which was established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 2003. It is chaired by the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan to express Taiwan's devotion to serve as a bridge between mature and aspiring democracies. For instance, the TFD convened the first World Forum for Democratization in Asia (WFDA) Biennial Conference in 2005 in Taipei, with more than 100 attendees. Most participants were from other democracy aid foundations, including the People in Need Foundation of the Czech Republic, International Center for Democratic Transition of Hungary, Aide for Democracy and Peace Building of Japan, Korea Democracy Foundation, Club of Madrid, and two Washington, DC-based transnational organizations—Community of Democracies and World Movement for Democracy. Several US-government supported foundations also joined the discussion, including International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, Center for International Private Enterprise, and National Endowment for Democracy. It also publishes the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* to attract attention worldwide. The other institution, the meeting of the Democratic Pacific Assembly (DPA) was established under the Presidential office in 2003. It also attempts to be the conveyer of Taiwan's values including democracy and human rights. In 2005, the DPA was reorganized into the Democratic Pacific Union (DPU), to 'build up an international network to strengthen the value of democracy'. As an organization committed to enhancing greater cooperation among Pacific democracies in the areas of democratic governance, human security, economic prosperity and ocean development, DPU now has members from 26 countries in North and South America, the Asia–Pacific region, and the South Pacific region. It is currently headed by Taiwan's vice president Lu Hsiu-lien. The ultimate goal of the DPU is to build up an inter-governmental Union of Pacific Democracies in the future.

Third, Taiwan has taken an active role in foreign aid and has been exporting its experiences of economic development to other countries. The Taiwanese government sent its first agricultural mission overseas in the 1950s, and stepped up foreign aid when its economy started to flourish in the 1980s. In 1997, the government combined the two committees in charge of technical aid and financial cooperation into an independent organization—the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF)—overseen by the MOFA. Beyond its traditional technical and economic aid, since

101. After the DPP seized power in May 2000, the GIO claimed that this decision of name change was made under the KMT's rule and was more corresponding to reality because the old name 'free China' was to address Taiwan's international status as opposed to communist mainland China during the Cold War years. GIO, 'There is no political considerations in new government publications and logos, outsiders should not presume any positions' ['Xin zhengfu kanwu shibiezheng weiceng you zhengzhi kaoliang, waijie buyi fan zhengzhijhua yucun lichang'], available at: <http://info.gio.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=22007&ctNode=3902&mp=1>.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

2001 the ICDF has begun to participate in humanitarian assistance abroad.¹⁰² Besides, with the growing international presence of Taiwan's NGOs, MOFA established the NGO Affairs Committee in 2000 to recruit NGOs to meet the official goal of increasing Taiwan's international visibility.¹⁰³

Fourth, Taiwan has doubled its efforts to include public diplomacy initiatives in its foreign policy. President Chen proposed the concept of 'people's diplomacy'. On the one hand, this concept refers to the engagement of Taiwanese people with the world in transnational and inter-societal networks. On the other hand, 'people's diplomacy' implies the 'democratization of foreign policy making, ... bringing the Taiwanese people more fully into the process'.¹⁰⁴ Under this concept, MOFA had already held six study camps of 'people's diplomacy' in 2005 and 2006. Participants included local political bosses, policy analysts, practitioners from NGOs, and college students and K-12 teachers.¹⁰⁵ This concept bears some resemblance to that of 'public diplomacy' in Nye's work, in that 'people's diplomacy' helps Taiwanese people communicate with the people in other countries, and thus can enhance Taiwan's attractiveness abroad. However, Taiwan's program of 'people's diplomacy' has an important domestic component aimed at improving the ruling party's image among the population at home. For instance, the first study camp was held in the President Chen's hometown, Tainan, and the participants were from the southern part of Taiwan, where the DPP enjoys overwhelming popularity vis-à-vis the KMT. To a degree, this concept of 'people's diplomacy' serves DPP's electoral interests by providing the opportunities for local political bosses to learn about foreign affairs, and by showing the public the contrast between the people-oriented DPP and the elite-oriented KMT in foreign policy decision-making.

Fifth, Taiwan's investment in cultural exchanges is a continuing business that goes back to the mid-1990s under the KMT's rein. Taiwan's Council for Cultural Affairs has established the French-Taiwanese Cultural Award with *Institut de France* since 1996, to promote Taiwan studies among French scholars.¹⁰⁶ The DPP came into office in 2000 and President Chen further proposed to 'build a nation rich in culture'.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Taiwan's Ministry of Education, National Science Council, and MOFA jointly set up the Taiwan Scholarship Program in 2003 for foreign

102. In the year of 2006, the ICDF had more than 200 projects with 34 countries or regional organizations, including 12 countries which benefited from Taiwan's medical assistance. International Cooperation and Development Fund, *The ICDF Annual Report 2006* (Taipei: ICDF, 2006).

103. Taiwan's NGOs are very active in international humanitarian aid. For instance, the Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corp, founded by the dentist Liu Chi-chun in 1995, had its international debut in Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, and has been admitted as a full member of CONGO in consultative relationship with the UN. The Taiwan Root and another four humanitarian NGOs have formed an alliance, Taiwan Overseas Aid (TOAID), to exchange information and experience with other NGOs around the world. These five NGOs include Compassion International, the Eden Social Welfare Foundation, the Field Relief Agency of Taiwan, the Noordhoff Craniofacial Foundation and the Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps. By June 2007, TOAID had held four international fora on the roles of NGOs in East Asia.

104. Government Information Office of ROC (Taiwan), *Taiwan Yearbook 2004*, available at: <http://ecommerce.taipeitimes.com/yearbook2004/P113.htm>.

105. Interview with senior officials of the Foreign Service Institute, MOFA, Taipei, 2 June 2006.

106. By the year 2004, there were six institutions and four scholars awarded through this program. See the Institut Français website, available at: http://www.fi-taipei.org/article.php3?id_article=622.

107. See the Office of the President website, available at: http://www.president.gov.tw/1_president/achieve/subject17.html. As a result, the National Museum of Taiwan Literature was built in President Chen's hometown in 2003, and Taiwan has participated in the reparation of world heritage sites in South America since 2005.

students. By the academic year 2006, there were more than 500 foreign students pursuing their undergraduate or graduate studies in Taiwan.¹⁰⁸

As noted earlier, some in Taiwan see a niche for Taiwan to promote its image as the true standard bearer of Chinese culture, including the Chinese language. The ruling DPP has prioritized its cultural de-Sinification since 2000; however, the growing global interests in studying Mandarin/Chinese have led Taiwan to rethink its policy on Mandarin teaching. For instance, the US College Board added Chinese into the Advanced Placement (AP) program in 2006, which has increased the demand for qualified teachers in the market.¹⁰⁹ As a response, Taiwan's universities and educational institutes had set up 25 Mandarin training centers by the end of 2006, up from 13 in 1996.¹¹⁰ Taiwan's Ministry of Education also established the Office for the Promotion and Globalization of Chinese Language and Traditional Characters (*Huayu Zhongxin*) in 2004 to license qualified Mandarin teachers to work abroad. If the Taiwan government continues to pursue its de-Sinification policy, then how to balance people's tangible interests in teaching Mandarin with the identity issues becomes a prominent challenge for the ruling party.

Compared to Taiwan's own past, democracy as a political value has gained roots in promoting Taiwan's image worldwide. The most important policy initiative in this arena has been the establishment of new organizations dedicated to promoting democracy around the world. One can expect that Taiwan will base its international attractiveness on its experience of democratization, though in most cases efforts to do so will be carried out by the NGO-networks. Meanwhile, 'people's diplomacy' not only serves to promote Taiwan's image in other societies, but also contributes to boosting the popularity of the ruling party at home. However, while promoting its new brand, Taiwan's current government also has to cope politically and culturally with the changing global context set forth by China's rise.

IV. Conclusion

The Chinese and Taiwan conception of soft power and its sources draws heavily from Nye's theoretical formulation; but the Chinese and Taiwan conception is more encompassing than Nye's. While Nye considers soft power mainly in the context of international relations, Chinese and Taiwan scholars and policy analysts also think of it in the context of domestic governance. Thus this concept has shaped both domestic and foreign policies in China and Taiwan. Furthermore, these three perspectives differ in their view of the sources of soft power. Nye's discussion of the sources of American appeal to the world emphasizes the attractiveness of contemporary American culture and the US political model. The Chinese discussion of the sources of China's attraction to the world focuses on traditional Chinese culture and the Chinese economic development model. The Taiwan discourse emphasizes Taiwan's distinctive identity, its democratic values and economic development model as well as

108. *China Times* (Taipei), (29 July 2006), p. C08; *The United Daily* (Taipei), (4 February 2006), p. C04; and *The United Daily* (Taipei), (12 July 2007), p. C03.

109. *The United Daily* (Taipei), (5 August 2006), p. C04.

110. Oscar Chung, 'Spreading the word', *Taiwan Review*, (1 April 2007), available at: <http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=24035&CtNode=119>.

HONGYING WANG AND YEH-CHUNG LU

its connection with traditional Chinese culture. However, there is no doubt that Nye has given Chinese and Taiwan policy makers an explicit theoretical framework to incorporate the non-material aspects of power in their policy making. Ironically, this American scholar seems to have had a greater policy impact in China and Taiwan than in the US.

But the usefulness of the concept of soft power in guiding new diplomacy has its limitations. Soft power, according to Nye, is the ability to influence others based on one's attractiveness to them. However, he does not provide a reliable way to measure attractiveness directly. He and other scholars have used a variety of indirect indicators, such as per capita usage of information technology (including personal computers, Internet usage, phone lines and cellphones), the number of patents, R&D expenditure, book sales, music sales, the number of top brand names, etc.¹¹¹ Presumably, these indirect indicators are used because they are the sources of a country's attraction. However, casual observations suggest that these may not be good indicators of how attractive a country is. For instance, on the basis of such indicators, Nye claims that Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country; but so far Japan's advantage in these resources has not resulted in comparable attractiveness in the region or the world. Many people in Asia may love Japanese animation but at the same time detest Japan because of, among other things, its inability to come to terms with its conduct during World War II. In fact, the general impression one gets from the policy circles and the media is that China has overshadowed Japan as a new center of attraction in Asia.¹¹² By the same token, many people in the Middle East may find American fashion and music appealing but harbor strong hostility toward American policies. This means, in a practical sense, that a government keen to improve its soft power will find little guidance from Nye as to how to gauge its attractiveness and exactly what to do to improve its appeal.¹¹³

Another perhaps more fundamental limitation is the questionable link that Nye assumes to exist between attractiveness and the ability to influence and persuade others in international relations. At an individual level, there is ample evidence showing that a more attractive person is more able to persuade than a less attractive one. But does this logic translate to the level of inter-state relations? There are at least two difficulties. First, states are not unitary actors. Some people in the target country may find the power-projecting country attractive, but others may not. Whether the attraction of the power-projecting country enhances its ability to influence the policy of the target country depends on who in the target country find it attractive (e.g. elite or general public) and how much they control policy making (e.g. the degree of checks and balances). For instance, during the Cold War many ordinary people in Eastern Europe were attracted to Western culture and institutions, but the elite was hostile. Given the authoritarian nature of those countries, public admiration for the West did not lead to policy cooperation from their governments. If anything,

111. See Nye, *Soft Power*; Steve Chan, 'Is there a power transition between the US and China?', *Asian Survey* 45(5), (September-October 2005), pp. 687-701.

112. Kurlantzick, 'China's charm'.

113. A recent study by the Rand Corporation suggests that the best single indicator of a country's attractiveness may be poll responses to the question 'where would you like to live other than your own country'; see Gegory Treverton and Seth Jones, *Measuring National Power* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005). But reliable polling data of this kind are very hard to come by.

it worsened the confrontation between the East and the West because of the insecurity it generated among the ruling elite of the Eastern Bloc countries. Second, policy making at a group level has different dynamics than at the individual level. The complex negotiations among group members are likely to reduce the role of affective elements and increase the importance of rationale calculations. While an individual may easily be influenced by another attractive individual, a group is less likely to be 'swept off their feet' by another attractive group. For example, more and more of China's policy makers have spent time in the US and many have enjoyed their experience there. However, there is little evidence suggesting that their attraction to one or another aspect of American society has led to a more accommodating policy toward the US. The recent development between the US and Taiwan over Taiwan's upcoming referendum on UN membership is another case in point. Though democracy is Taiwan's best selling point to the American public, it does not necessarily lead to unconditional US support toward Taiwan. On this issue regarding UN membership in the name of 'Taiwan', US officials have publicly suggested that Taiwan should adopt a more moderate policy while advancing its democracy and security.¹¹⁴ The extent to which attractiveness influences policy in international relations remains an open question.

To conclude, the concept of soft power has gained currency in both China and Taiwan, largely due to the influence of Joseph Nye. Indeed his propositions about soft power have already had a policy impact. However, the limitations of Nye's theoretical formulation mean that it is not able to offer further guidance for China and Taiwan as they contemplate concrete steps to improve their attractiveness to the world and to use its attractiveness to increase its policy influence.

114. The US is concerned that the Chen Administration's referendum on applying UN membership with the name of 'Taiwan' is actually a step toward a formal name change, which could undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and thus the US strategic interests. Therefore, the US has expressed its concerns on many occasions, and in the latest one, Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Christensen reiterated, 'we do not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a referendum'. Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 'A strong and moderate Taiwan', speech to US-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, MD, (11 September 2007).