

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
IN THE 1970s: A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

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摘 要

一九六〇年代末期，國際關係劇變，中華民國必須在政治上和經濟上應付與日俱增的挑戰，在外交行為上採取較為彈性的立場，因此維持官方和準官方關係的國家在逐漸增加之中，在經濟上與一百多個國家維持商業關係。

作者以權力、經濟發展和政治取向的效果來衡量對外交行為的影響，提出四個假說：

第一、國家愈有力量愈要與中華民國發展貿易關係。

第二、國家愈有力量愈要與中華民國發展更為密切的政治關係。

第三、政治取向愈相同的國家，愈要與中華民國發展合作的關係。

第四、經濟愈開發的國家，與中華民國在非政府性的國際機構分享更多的會員資格。

作者以量化的方法蒐集資料，加以統計和分析，獲得結論，整個研究結果十分成功：這些變數與國家外交行為有高度的關係，唯一沒有十分符合作者期望的是政治關係與權力變化的關係。

中華民國目前除與美日加強經濟關係外，特別加強與西歐國家的貿易關係，雖然意識型態立場不變，但經由政府和非政府組織積極參予國際活動，以達到在國際社會中的合法地位。

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the 1960s, we have observed a dramatical changes in international relations, especially the coming of the era of detente initiated by the former U.S. President Richard Nixon and his foreign policy anchorman Henry Kissinger. Under this changing circumstances, the Republic of China (ROC) government has had to deal with increasing challenges both politically and economically in this international system.

In 1971, the Republic of China reluctantly left the United Nations and, consequently, its seat was occupied by Communist China. Subsequently, President

Nixon's state visit to Communist China in February, 1972 and the severance of diplomatic ties between ROC and Japan in September, 1972 brought forth a severe blow to the people and government of ROC. From the perspective of the people and government of ROC, they felt betrayed by the two most trusted and close allies on whom ROC had depended economically and politically.

Obviously, it became inevitable that in the international arena ROC had to suffer a lot of setbacks. Its diplomatic position was eroded seriously since the UN decision on October 25, 1971. More than fifty nations have shifted their diplomatic recognition from ROC to Communist China. Only some 25 nations still maintain official relations with ROC now. [1] Needless to say, the ROC government had to make necessary adjustments in its policy to survive in the drastically changing environment, and the questions of how to get out of the isolation in the international society and how to maintain its international status have appeared to be the critical and immediate targets of its foreign policy.

It goes without saying that the ROC government urgently needs to develop its economic relations with countries all around the world. The energy crisis of 1973-1974 demonstrated clearly the vulnerability of its economy to the worldwide problem of energy. In order to avoid, or at least to lessen, the impact of the energy problem, the people and government of ROC in Taiwan have been compelled to launch aggressive international trade activities searching for more reliable sources of energy and raw materials.

In addition to its dependence on foreign energy supply, ROC's heavy dependence on international trade requires that it maintains strong economic relations with other nations. Over the past three decades, the percentage of exports in GNP increased from 9 percent in 1952 to 49 percent in 1980; that of imports, from 15 percent to 49 percent. [2] These figures reflect its highly dependence on foreign trade. Searching for markets and establishing a friendly commercial relation are the central issues under study by the private and official institutions in Taiwan. Just as the last U.S. ambassador to ROC Unger had described: "... The Nationalist Chinese have already had to face the problem of securing essential imports of materials, finding markets for manufactured exports and insuring safe passage for their citizens abroad in the absence of diplomatic relations." [3]

Confronting these challenges, the ROC government, in fact, has taken a more flexible stand on its foreign policy behavior toward other nations. This changing behavior has already born some fruit. Currently, the number of countries which maintain quasi-official or official relations with ROC is increasing. [4] Economically, the ROC government in Taiwan keeps commercial relation with more than one

hundred nations. [5]

How did the ROC government adjust its foreign behavior to deal with the changing situation in the global society? What kinds of determinants do influence its foreign behavior? To which nations would it respond more? Does political ideology still play a critical role? How does the international trade influence its behavior? While bearing these questions in mind, I am searching for the key to the solutions.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW

When discussing nation's foreign behavior, it is important to identify the factors that may influence their foreign policy behavior and help predict that behavior best. Traditionally, there are three factors---power, economic development, and political orientation---which are regarded as key determinants of foreign policy.

2.1. Power Determinant:

Power has long been regarded as the center of international politics, especially by those who apply the realist approach to international relations. They focus on power as key variable in the explanation of international political behavior. Hans Morgenthau was in the realist school and put equal symbol between world politics and struggling for power. To him, the problems of the world consist of the "drives to live, to propagate, and to dominant," and in the satisfaction of these drives, power is centrally important. [6] Spykman, another well-known realist, presented that state must make the preservation and improvement of their power position a principal objective of their foreign policy for the purpose of survival. [7]

It is true that a nation's major object in the world is to survive and, accordingly, how to strengthen national security becomes the major concern, i.e., increasing its power by means of using its own resources and/or making alliance with big powers. So does ROC's object. In reality, ROC's situation is very unique. In addition to competing with other nations, ROC must confront a formidable challenge from the Communist China regarding its legitimacy over China. This confrontation has lasted for more than thirty-two years. It seems that the longer the confrontation exists, the more disadvantages ROC would have to face. Is it true?

Let us examine ROC's situation in this confrontation. First, Communist China controls an absolutely large proportion of area and population of China. Secondly mainland China possesses enviable natural resources, such as petroleum, iron and coal. A third fact is that over 120 nations recognize the Communist China govern-

ment as the representative of China. In contrast, ROC possesses very limited natural resources, and only 25 nations recognize it. Furthermore, in recent years Chinese Communists have vigorously pushed for the China reunification movement and, simultaneously, offered some incentives to invite the ROC government to participate into reunification negotiations. However, those Chinese Communists have stopped short of providing a guarantee, i.e., the repudiation of using military forces as one means to carry out their reunification plan. On the other hand, owing to its previous experiences, it is very hard for the ROC government to have any trust with Chinese Communists. Under these circumstances, the ROC government should adopt appropriate policies to improve its national security. Nevertheless, with extreme natural resources constraint, its power could not be enhanced by itself.

Making alliance with big powers would be an alternative dealing with its national security problems. Having reviewed ROC's political situation, Clough, a ROC-watcher, indicated that the reason why ROC was able to survive in the 1950s and the 1960s depended upon its relations with the United States and Japan --- two powerful nations in the world. [8] As a matter of fact, if we sift through the voting records and documents of the United Nations General Assembly on the so-called Chinese representation question, we could discover that the genuine support of the United States successfully helped the ROC government maintain its seat in the United Nations during the 1950-1971 period. [9]

Clough, furthermore, predicted that the relationship between ROC and major powers other than the United States and Japan, will progressively strengthen by the ROC government in Taiwan. He describes that "they (the ROC leaders) have placed special emphasis on Western Europe because of its importance as a potential market, source of technology, supplier of capital, and even, conceivably, as an important future supplier of military equipment." [10] Not only official statements but also the articles of the major newspapers in Taiwan unfolded this kind of tendency. [11] Whatever difficulties exist, lots of high ranking ROC governmental officials have paid a visit to the Western European nations in the past several years. [12] This tendency further confirms that ROC's foreign behavior would have much to do with those powerful countries.

In an empirical study of Communist China's foreign policy behavior, Rhee found that power disparity is an important determinant. He concluded:

The over-all intensity of Chinese [Communists'] interaction with a nation measured by summing her cooperation and conflict behavior with that nation is mainly determined by the power distance of the nation from [Communist] China. The more

powerful a nation, the more likely that she has intense interaction with [Communist] China. [13]

Next, we will focus on "what power is." While discussing the elements of power, Morgenthau touches upon not only the tangible material elements but also the intangible psychological elements such as national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, the quality of government. He considers that those intangible elements should have some kind function in the calculation of national power. One of Morgenthau's contemporaries, Organski maintains that "one of the most important characteristic of a nation is its power, for power is a major determinant of the part that the nation will play in international relations." Organski regards power as the function of geography, population, resources, economic development, population, national morale, and political structure (including diplomatic skill). [14] The similarities in the concept of power between Morgenthau and Organski are apparent in terms of the elements of power.

Furthermore, Ray Cline presents that "power" will be a combined factor which could explain a nation's foreign behavior in a scientific way. He points out that "the extent to which one country can pursue its international and domestic aim . . . is based in the final analysis on its own national power as compared with that of other nations." His concept of power focus on both the tangible and the intangible elements. Whatever his focus is, his most special presentation is the "power" formula. It is necessary for us to have a more profound insight into his formula. The formula we intend to study is presented as follows:

$$PP = (C + E + M) * (S + W)$$

PP = perceived power

C = critical mass; population and territory

E = economic capability

M = military capability

S = strategic purpose

W = will to pursue national strategy. [15] ✱ 5/4 PM 5:50

In view of this formula, we can understand and comprehend the function of the multiplication symbol. However, the question is concerned with the measurement of the last two elements---national strategy and national will. Of course, none would or could deny the importance of the national strategy and national will to pursue it to a nation's power. The question lies in the invention of a reliable and valid scaling method. Cline claims that he worked out such a scale with the help of E.N. Luttwak. But he did not provide detailed information to substantiate its

reliability and validity. Owing to this, I would like to hold a very doubtful view to this scale, and wait for further studies on this scaling method.

As to the elements of power, Alexandroff and Rhee put their emphasis upon the tangible material elements in their empirical studies. [16] Simply speaking, both of them define power as military capabilities and industrial production capabilities. Since it is impossible to get a reliable scaling method measuring intangible psychological elements of power, I will follow their definition of power.

In addition to their similarities in the elements of power, Morgenthau, Organski and Cline have an identical interpretation of the power. They conceive that power relationship between nations would result in conflict behavior. Morgenthau stipulates three basic patterns of a nation's behavior in terms of how they relate to power. The first one is to support the status quo; the second one is to adopt some sort of imperialistic, outward movement; the third one is to demonstrate its power. His theory implicitly expresses the belief that power factor involves deciding whether a nation will go to conflict with other nations, not deciding whether a nation will pursue cooperation with other nations. In an empirical study, Alexandroff hypothesizes that if A acts conflictually toward B, then B acts conflictually toward A; if A acts cooperatively toward B, then B acts cooperatively toward A. This is the so-called symmetry hypothesis. He finds that the pattern of symmetry is strongly confirmed for cooperation and less strongly confirmed for conflict. [17] This study, at least, shows that among nations there exist the inclination for more cooperation and the power distance between nations will not necessarily bring about conflict behavior.

In his empirical study, Rhee argues that nation A would have a much more interaction with nation B, given the condition that nation B possesses a higher military and production capabilities. Here, the interaction may be either conflictual or cooperative. He doesn't ascertain whether the power distance between nations will result an inclination to conflictual behavior. [18]

In view of the current international situation, it might be conceivable that the power distance between nations would generate or incline to generate cooperative behavior. In *The Coming End of War*, Levi stresses the necessity of international cooperation, due to the following factors: the internationalization of national interests, changes in the international system, spheres of influence and inequality, the rationality of foreign policy, and policies for developed and developing states. [19] Therefore, we could assume that the power distance between nations might produce a more cooperative behavior.

2.2. Political Orientation Determinant:

Secondly, let us take a look at the role of political orientation factor. As a matter of fact, the term of political ideology might be more appropriate. According to Schleicher, students of international relations have given increased attention to ideology mainly for two reasons. The first and most apparent reason is the development in a number of powerful states of ideologies and institutions which contrast sharply with those of liberal and democratic societies, namely, Communism and Fascism. The second one is that ideology has become more important with the growing influence of the masses in decision-making, especially in the area of foreign affairs.²⁰ Schleicher argued:

“Increasingly, however, foreign affairs affect the citizens in most intimate ways. Even though the general public does not exert a continuous and positive influence over their direction, public opinion, nevertheless, limits the range of alternatives available to decision-makers.”²¹

No matter what the reasons are, how this factor affects a nation's foreign behavior should be identified. Holsti argues that the ideology can be related to political goals and action in at least five ways. First, it establishes the intellectual framework through which policy-makers observe reality. Secondly, it establishes the long-range goals of a nation's external behavior, to be promoted through diplomacy, propaganda, revolution, or force. Thirdly, the ideology serves as a rationalization and justification for the choice of more specific foreign policy decisions. Fourthly, the set of doctrines in communism defines for policy makers the main stages in historical development within which specific foreign policy strategies can be enunciated. Finally, the Communist ideology posits a moral and ethical system which helps prescribe the correct attitudes and evaluative criteria for judging one's own actions and those of others.²² Rhee in *Communist China's Foreign Behavior* unholds this factor and draws the conclusion that:

The amount of the net cooperation of [Communist] China with a nation . . . is mainly determined by the difference of the nation in political orientation from [Communist] China. The more similar a nation's political orientation to [Communist] China . . . , the more likely that she has high net cooperation with [Communist] China.²³

In view of current international relations, we tend to suspect that political orientation really makes a nation's foreign behavior different. The argument relates to international economic interdependence. Since the beginning of the 1970s, nations

around the world have become more and more interdependent upon each other than over before, especially after 1973-74 world energy crisis.²⁴ A nation which lacks sufficient natural resources definitely would make an attempt to obtain them from other nations. On the other hand, a nation always wants to expand its foreign trade so as to earn hard currency for buying necessary goods and services. No nation, we may expect, can afford to be isolated from the interdependent chain. Even the United States, whose richness in the natural resources has been known as virtually inexhaustible, would have to get involved in international trade to a significant extent. According to statistics, imports account for more than half of the supplies of 23 strategic materials consumed by U.S. industry. Besides, most of them is from the Third World and the Soviet Union.²⁵ Without those strategic materials American industry would severely handicapped. To tune down the role of political orientation is necessary if a nation would like to tide over storm in the world economy.

Even Communist China which had long been the advocater of so-called "self-reliance" strategy already gave way to the revisionism and opened its door for foreign investment and technology. Why did Communist China make such a dramatic change? Was it concerned with the death of Mao or the extermination of "Gang of Four"? Those might be minor reasons for the change. The most important reason is that if it wants to be a real power, or just to survive in this world, Communist China ought to extend its communication with other nations. Whatever reasons there were, Communist China has kept a very low profile on issues of ideology when it deals with other nations.

The commercial relations between Western European and Eastern European nations would be the best illustration. On the one hand, the West badly needs to get enough energy and raw materials for maintaining the industrial development. They need import energy and raw materials from the East and the Soviet Union. For example, West Germany, which already gets up to 15 per cent of its natural gas from the Soviet Union through existing network of pipelines may receive up to 30 per cent if the new line is completed as planned by 1990.²⁶ On the other hand, the East and the Soviet Union need to import advanced technology and capital from the West.²⁷ A large sum of investment has been thrown into the East by the Western capitalists and debts owed to the west by the East are the best evidences showing the financial dependence of the East. In 1978, these debts already reaches forty seven billion U.S. dollars.²⁸ The demands and needs between both sides constitute a very complicated set of relationship. These complicated relations undermined the American economic embargo against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1980, and weakened the bargaining position of the U.S. All these facts substantiate the influ-

uence of political orientation having been diminished to a certain level.

Among the researchers discussing the influence of ideological difference on ROC's foreign behavior, John W. Garver is quite suspicious of the influence of the ideological idfference on ROC's foreign behavior. Garver, with his sensitivity to the problem, makes a very daring inference that "a symbolic and low-level real relationship between the Soviet Union and Taiwan has already been established, and has expressed itself largely in the form of unilateral actions hinting at the possibility of the development of more direct ties."²⁹ In order to maintain ROC's international status, Garver even suggests that ROC should make very low level political ties with the Soviet Union and its allies, while also maintaining such ties with the U.S. and Japan.

Hungdah Chiu holds that "at present the ROC government *officially* excludes any such possibility of relations with the Soviet Union, but this policy could change it . . ."³⁰ With careful examination of the words he uses and with an appreciation of his expertise in international law, it seems to us that Chiu implicitly indicates the possibility of private contacts between ROC and the the East bloc would increase if the West (especially the U.S. and Japan) withdraw their supports. One thing to be noticed is that the viewpoint of the possibility of collaboration between ROC and the Soviet Union is shared by the students of ROC's politics, such as Ralph N. Clough, John F. Copper, Frank Ching, Gottfried-karl Kindermann.

Two young students of ROC's security warn that the dichotomous division of nations into two different groups (i.e. friend and foe) would impair the current efforts to reestablish official or quasi-official contacts between ROC and other nations. Assuming that there exist cooperative and conflictual characteristics in the relationship between two friendly nations, Pu and Chi suggest that the ROC government in Taiwan develop some kind of cooperative arrangements or temporary rapprochement with the nations having different societal and value systems (i.e. different political orientation).³¹ In a word, we expect that ROC would diminish the role of political orientation in its foreign policy behavior and take a more flexible position.

From the observation of recent development, it has become clear that ROC government has lessened the importance of the political orientation or political ideology. In November, 1979, the government lifted ban on commercial relations between ROC and the East bloc. In fact, this official announcement simply normalized the existing commercial relations. After that official announcement, the ROC government has taken many steps to promote their relations, e.g. participation in trade fairs held in the East bloc, lifting ban on travels there, and even direct communication with their trading officials.³³ Furthermore, the mass media in ROC

started to report the communication between ROC and the Eastern European nations. This is indeed an unusual phenomenon.

2.3. Economic Development Determinant:

The third factor is economic development. It is universally recognized that economic development plays an indispensable role in the international arena, having a strong impact upon a nation's foreign behavior.

According to rank or status theory, nations more similar in economic status (as opposed to other types of status) will be more cooperative toward one another than states distant from one another in economic development.³⁴ After the analysis of Communist China's foreign behavior, Rhee concludes that "the degree of Chinese cooperation with a nation in international organization is mainly determined by the nation's economic development."³⁵ The more developed a nation, the more likely that it shares membership with China in many international organizations.

Comparing the hypotheses of the rank theory and Rhee's findings, one would find that the degree of a nation's economic development would make difference in foreign behavior. However, the former put its emphasis on the cooperations among nations that have similar levels of economic development, while the latter on the cooperations among nations which have differences in the level of economic development.

Both of these two interpretations of the role of economic development in a nation's foreign behavior have their own supporting evidence. To the former, the most outstanding case is the South-North Dialog which represents the cooperations among the nations of similar economic development to strive for a new international economic development.³⁶ It was not the first time that the Third World showed its solidarity. Since the 1973-1974 energy crisis, the Third World launched a series of cartel formation movements. These movements really constituted a strong impetus to compel the industrial nations to confront the problem. By means of the international organizations or other international forums, the Third World put great pressures on the First World. But, this phenomenon didn't last for long. The main reason is that the Third World reluctantly accepted the reality and struggled for their own survival with their individual capability. The fact is very cruel but nevertheless apparent that any new international economic order couldn't be established without the consents and supports of the industrial and highly developed nations.

On the other hand, numerous individual cases could be gathered to confirm Rhee's finding. It is indisputable that the countries with higher economic development possess enough capital and necessary technology needed by the less developed

countries for their economic development. The decision makers must be concerned with people's rising demands and needs which could be satisfied only through a higher economic development, or they will lose their legitimacy and power. Therefore, those developing countries would like to promote economic cooperation with industrial countries.

Moreover, if a nation wants to accelerate its economic development it ought to increase its communication with the outside world. The more access to the outside world could be guaranteed, the easier it becomes to acquire the necessary capital and technology. Diplomatic relations, of course, could be the most formal channel. However, there exists another channel, i.e., international organizations. In the current international organization as channel to communicate with each other can even compete with diplomatic relations. For the period 1959-1968, 66.1 percent of foreign policy actions were taken with the context of IGOs (Intergovernmental Organizations).³⁷ According to Alger and Brams, participation in international organizations provides most nations with greater access to the outside world than do diplomatic ties.³⁸

Based on the preceding review, I would like to follow Rhee's finding that the distance of economic development between ROC and other nations would have effects on its foreign behavior.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

The basic theoretical framework of this study concerns the impact of ROC's attributes on its foreign behavior. Here, two important concepts---attribute and behavior, should be defined first. According to Rhee's definition, attribute is not property of the nation, but the quantities that define positions of the elements in the field vis-a-vis other nations.³⁹ Simply speaking, attribute means the relative distance between a nation and the object nation on different aspects. In addition, Rhee describes "the directed behavior of one actor to a particular object nation is defined as behavior."⁴⁰ The basic unit of analysis is dyad, e.g. ROC and an object nation, say Japan, constituting a dyad.

It is hypothesized that the degree of the impact on ROC's foreign behavior depends on the effect of three major attributes---power, economic development, and political orientation.

3.1. Measurements:

The power factor includes the following indicators: (1) Gross national product:

the total output of goods and services produced by residents of a country and valued at market prices ultimately paid by the consumer. (2) Military expenditure: For NATO nations, civilian-type expenditures of defense ministry are excluded but military-type expenditures of other ministries are included; grand-type military assistance is included in the expenditures of the donor nation; and purchases of military equipment for credit are included. For other non-communist nations, data are generally the expenditures of Ministry of Defense. (3) Size of armed forces: number of military personnel on active duty; reserved forces are not included. (4) Number of combat aircraft: comprises bomber, fighter bomber, strike, interceptor, reconnaissance, counter-insurgency and armed trainer aircraft. (5) Steel production: the total production of crude steel, both ingots and steel for castings. (6) Energy production: includes the primary sources of energy-coal, lignite, crude petroleum, natural gas and hydro-electricity. We are going to measure the differences between ROC and object nation on those indicators (i.e. ROC's values on those indicators minus those of object nation) as the power distance.

The role of economic development factor in affecting foreign behavior consists of the following indicators. (1) Gross national product per capita: gross national product divided by total population. (2) Telephone per hundred inhabitants: includes public and private installed which can be connected to central exchange. (3) Non-agricultural labor force ratio: non-agricultural labor force divided by the total labor force. (4) Literacy rate: literates divided by population ten years of age or older. (5) Energy consumption per capita: total energy consumption divided by total population. We will measure the differences between ROC and object nation on those economic development indicators as economic development distance.

The political orientation factor comprises only one indicator---political difference between ROC and the object nation. This indicator uses a dichotomous scale. Those nations that are regarded as having different political orientation from ROC possess the following characteristics: (1) they have diplomatic relations with Communist China; (2) they don't have official or quasi-official relations with ROC. Those nations being treated as not having a different political orientation possess one of the following characteristics: (1) they have diplomatic relations with ROC; (2) they have quasi-official relations with ROC; (3) they have official relations with neither ROC nor Communist China.

The above-mentioned factors are treated as independent variables in this study. The dependent variables are ROC's foreign behaviors. Included in this study are four different behavior patterns. (1) International trading behavior: measured by the total amount of imports and exports between ROC and the object nation. (2)

Political relationship behavior: measured by a nominal scaling examining what kind of relations exist between ROC and the object nations. According to this scaling, 4 points are given to those nations that have diplomatic relations with ROC (e.g. South Korea). 3 points are assigned to those nations that have official or quasi-official relations with ROC (e.g. U.S.A.). 2 points are assigned to those nations that have official or quasi-official relations with neither ROC nor Communist China (e.g. Bahamas). 1 point is assigned to those nations that have diplomatic relations with Communist China only (e.g. the East Bloc). The more points assigned, the closer the relationship between ROC and the object nation. (3) Co-membership behavior: Measured by the number of membership in the non-governmental international organizations that are shared by ROC and the object nation. (4) Cooperative behavior: measured by combining the values of the three preceding variables.

3.2. Hypotheses:

Given the above-mentioned three independent variables and four dependent variables, twelve hypotheses can be formulated to test the relationship between attributes and foreign behavior. However, I choose four of them.

In addition to the prior general discussion in the section on theoretical background and literature review, I will provide more concrete reasons to justify why these four hypotheses have been formulated.

3.2.1 Hypothesis 1:

ROC's economy depends heavily on international trading. Furthermore, developing technology-density and capital-density industries becomes the main target of ROC's economic plan which is aimed, in turn, at transforming ROC into a genuine developed country. With regard to the preceding objectives, i.e., market and technology, it is necessary for ROC to search for the nation that can satisfy its demands and needs. More importantly, ROC needs to important sophisticated technology and a large sums of capital. The major suppliers are, of course, relatively powerful nations.

Therefore, the first hypothesis will be that the more powerful a nation is, the more international trading it will have with ROC.

3.2.2 Hypothesis 2:

As I indicated earlier in this study, ROC needs to maintain its legal status in the international society, if it wants to survive the challenges of the contemporary international political system. ROC's economic capability and capacity have a strong

relationship with its political situation. This means that its economy will be strengthened greatly, if a closer political relationship can be established between ROC and the object nation. More important, it is necessary for ROC to have a closer relationship with relatively powerful nations. The reasons are as follows: 1) those powerful nations have shown their willingness to promote their substantial relationship with ROC; 2) those powerful nations are able to withhold their position, if they meet strong protests and subsequent reprisals from Communist China; 3) their political and economic capabilities are strong enough to support ROC, if they decide to; 4) their attitudes toward ROC will have some kind of effects upon the attitudes of relatively less powerful nations.

Accordingly, I can formulate the second hypothesis: the more powerful a nation, the political relationship that exists between ROC and the object nation will be closer.

3.2.3. Hypothesis 3:

Regarding the challenges of the international arena and international economic interdependence, it seems to me that ROC has already lessened its ideological rigor with a notable alacrity. The "open door" trading policy toward the East bloc reveals a great deal about ROC's current position in political orientation. However, I would like to see whether the trading relationship between ROC and the object nation is influenced by their political orientation.

And so a third hypothesis can be postulated: the more similar the political orientation between ROC and the object nation, the more likely ROC has high cooperation with that nation.

3.2.4. Hypothesis 4:

Owing to the absence of diplomatic relations with most nations around the world, and the expulsion from most intergovernmental organizations, ROC has to develop other alternative channel to communicate with other nations. It is inevitable for ROC to choose non-governmental international organizations as the most important and effective channel. Most of these organizations have something to do with administrative management and technological researches. By means of participation in these organizations, ROC can not only improve its substantial relationship with other nations, but also obtain new ideas and technologies from other members.

Therefore, the fourth hypothesis will be: the more a nation is developed economically, the more membership in non-governmental international organizations it shares with ROC.

IV. DATA & METHOD

In order to test the preceding hypotheses, data required for the measurement of independent variables and dependent variables were collected for 1973 and 1977. In other words, the data are cross-sectional data from two different time points. The reason I chose these two time points is to observe the effects of the Nixon shock and severance of diplomatic ties with Japan on ROC's foreign behaviors. There are one hundred and eleven object nations chosen in this study. This means that there are 111 dyads. These one hundred and eleven nations are those who have trading relations with ROC either in 1973 or in 1977.

Data on GNP, GNP per capita, military expenditures, and size of armed forces are collected from *World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfers 1968-1977* by Arms Control & Disarmament Agency. The number of combat planes from *Military Balance 1973-74* by International Institute for Strategic Studies, and *The Almanac of World Military Power* by Dupuy, Hayes, and Andrews, respectively. Energy production and energy consumption per capita are gathered from *Yearbook of World Energy Statistics 1979* by United Nations. Literacy rate is collected from *World Almanac 1981, 1977* by Newspaper Enterprise Association. Non-agricultural labor force ratio is collected from *National Basic Intelligence Factbook* by CIA. The other data are gathered from *Statistical Yearbook U.N.* by United Nations and *Statistical Yearbook of the ROC* by Directorate-general of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, respectively.

As to the behavior variable, data on international trading between ROC and the object nation are collected from *Direction of Trade Yearbook 1979* by International Monetary Fund; co-membership from *Yearbook of International Organizations* by Union of International Association; political relationship from *Introduction to Nations* by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC.

For this study, the values of all indicators are transformed into T scores. This is because the two independent variables (power and economic development) and the dependent variable (cooperative behavior) are formed by summing up T scores on the indicators.⁴¹ For example, the power variable is formed by summing the T scores on the six power indicators; economic development by the five economic development indicators; cooperative behavior by summing the T scores on international trading, political relationship, and co-membership. The T-score is a transformed standard score that belongs to a distribution with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10.⁴² In order to formulate a T-score, we should establish a standard score first. Standard score (Z_i) is equal to the difference between raw score (X_i)

and the distribution mean \bar{X} divided by the standard deviation(s), i.e. $Z_i = (X_i - \bar{X})/s$.⁴³ Secondly, we transform standard score into T score by means of following: $T\text{-score} = 50 + 10 * Z$.

In this study, two statistical techniques are utilized. In the first place, simple Pearson product moment correlation is used to test the strength and direction between variables and to observe whether the hypotheses are confirmed or not. Secondly, a multiple regression technique is applied to see the contribution of each independent variable on the explanation of the variance of dependent variables and to examine whether the relationship is statistically significant. I set .05 as level of significance. A list of indicators and their codes are presented in Table 1; list of variables and their codes in Table 2.

V. FINDINGS

The first analysis is made in order to observe the correlations among indicators of the power variable, among indicators of economic development variable, between the power variable and the economic development variable, between the power variable and the political orientation variable, between the economic development variable and the political orientation variable.

For the 1973 data, the results are presented in Table 3; for the 1977 data is in Table 4. For the 1973 data, we can see that the first result is a high correlation coefficient among the six indicators of the power variable. For the 1977 data, we get a similar finding.

The second result we can see from the Table 3 and Table 4 is moderately positive correlations among indicators of the economic development variable. For the 1973 data, the correlations between the indicator of telephone numbers and other indicators are negligible, .08, .05, .11, .06, respectively. For the 1977 data, the correlations between indicator of telephone numbers and other indicators, on the contrary, are moderately high, .62, .53, .55, .56, respectively.

The third result we can see from these two Tables is relatively low correlation coefficients between the indicators of the power variable and those of the economic development variable. The fourth result is relatively low correlation coefficients between the political orientation variable and the other eleven indicators of the power and the economic development variables respectively.

From the observation of the preceding four results, I can test the appropriateness of the separation of those twelve indicators into three variables---power, economic development, political orientation. The indicators of the power variable

are highly correlated each other. The indicators of the economic development variable are moderately correlated with each other. Besides, low correlations between indicators of power variable and those of economic development variable are very apparent. Low correlation can also be found between indicators of the power variable and indicator of the political orientation variable; between indicators of the economic development variable and indicator of the political orientation variable.

The second analysis deals with the relationship between the power variable and the international trading behavior. In the first place, let us observe the Pearson correlation. The results are presented in Table 5. For the 1973 data, the correlation coefficient is $-.85$, and significant at $.01$ level. The coefficient of determination shows that 72 per cent of variance in international trading behavior can be explained by the power variable. For the 1977 data, the correlation coefficient is $-.92$ and significant at $.01$ level. About 86 per cent of variance in international trading can be predicted by the power variable. These results support the first hypothesis.

Then we will examine the regression of international trading behavior on six indicators of the power variable. The results are in Table 6. For the 1973 data, adjusted R square is equal to $.93$ and significant at $.000$ level. This result supports the first hypothesis. The steel production, military expenditure, energy production, and size of armed forces are statistically significant at $.000$, $.002$, $.001$, $.047$ level respectively. For the 1977 data, adjusted R square is equal to $.94$ and significant at $.000$ level. This also confirms the first hypothesis. The steel production, energy production, GNP, size of armed forces, and number combat aircraft are statistically significant at $.000$, $.003$, $.02$, $.008$, $.006$ level respectively.

Accordingly, the first hypothesis is confirmed by the preceding analyses.

The third analysis is the relationship between power and political orientation behavior. The results of Pearson correlation and multiple regression are in Table 7 and Table 8. For the 1973 data, the correlation coefficient is $-.13$ and significant at $.10$ level. But only 2 per cent of variance in political orientation behavior can be predicted by power. These results can hardly support the second hypothesis. For the 1977 data, we get almost the same results. The correlation coefficient is $-.17$ and significant at $.05$ level. In addition, only about 3 per cent of variance can be accounted for by power. When we regress six power indicators with political relationship behavior, the adjusted R square is 0 for 1973 and so does the data of 1977.

Under these circumstances, it is very hard to accept the second hypothesis.

The fourth analysis is the relationship between political orientation and cooperative behavior. In this analysis, only Pearson correlation is applied. The results are presented in Table 9. For the 1973 data, the Pearson correlation coef-

ficient is $-.55$ and significant at $.01$ level. Almost 30 per cent of the variance in cooperative behavior can be predicted by political orientation. For the 1977 data, the correlation coefficient is equal to $-.68$ and significant at $.01$ level. And 47 per cent of the variance of cooperative behavior can be explained by the political orientation variable. Then, the third hypothesis is moderately accepted.

The fifth analysis is the relationship between co-membership behavior and economic development. The results are presented in Table 10 and Table 11. For the 1973 data, the Pearson correlation coefficient is $-.67$ and significant at $.01$ level. About 44 per cent of the variance in co-membership behavior can be predicted by the economic development variable. For 1977, the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient is equal to $-.66$ and significant at $.01$ level. Again 44 per cent of the variance in co-membership behavior can be explained by the economic development variable. These results support the fourth hypothesis. Let us examine the results of the regression analysis in Table 11. For the 1973 data, adjusted R square is equal to $.49$ and significant at 0 level. What about the contribution of each indicator? After reviewing Table 10, we could find that only the literacy rate is statistically significant. This means that only this indicator makes a contribution to the explanation of the variance in co-membership behavior. For 1977, adjusted R square is equal to $.46$ and significant at 0 level. What about the contribution of each economic development indicator in explaining the variance? In view of the results in Table 11, we could find that only the literacy rate and telephone indicators make statistical significance. This means that only these two indicators make contribution to the explanation of the variance in co-membership behavior.

According to the preceding statistical analysis, the fourth hypothesis, to a relatively high degree, is accepted.

In the final analysis, an attribute index is formulated by summing the values of the three independent variables. Then we carry out a pearson correlation analysis between attribute index and cooperative behavior. The results are displayed at Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. For the 1973 data, the correlation coefficient is $-.79$ and is statistically significant at $.01$ level. sixty-three per cent of the variance in cooperative behavior can be predicted by attribute index. For 1977, we get $-.88$ for pearson correlation coefficient, which is statistically significant at $.05$ level. And about seventy-eight per cent of the variance in cooperative behavior can be accounted for by attribute index as shown by Figure 2.

As a whole, our basic hypothesis---a nation's attributes could influence on its foreign behavior, is firmly accepted.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The study, I believe, as a whole has been quite successful. The only result that does not meet my expectation is the relationship between political relationship behavior and the power variable. The rest shows a statistically significant correlation between dependent variable and independent variable and also in the hypothesized direction.

To a large extent, this study confirms that the traditional concepts of the determinants of a nation's foreign behavior are relevant. Traditionally, scholars describe power, economic capability, ideology as major determinants of foreign policy. In this study, we find that these variables do have relatively high effects upon a nation's foreign behavior. More specifically, Rhee found that national attributes and foreign behavior have a close relationship; his results were attained by empirical study. This study obtains empirical results in relation to ROC's foreign behavior which are compatible with Rhee's findings.

In sum, we have found that there is a simple relationship between ROC's attributes and its foreign behavior. This conclusion can be utilized as a conceptual framework within which we would be able to predict ROC's foreign behavior given our knowledge of its attributes.

Needless to say, ROC will strengthen its relations with industrial nations. Although the United States and Japan will remain the most important nations to ROC, the people and government of the ROC will pay much attention to the other industrial nations which have been neglected for quite a long time. According to recent reports, ROC has sent and is going to dispatch several special procurement missions to Western Europe. These missions give some conjunction of this suggestion.

More important, ROC government must recognize the reality that its political relations with the relatively powerful nation will maintain at a low level. Its future diplomatic efforts should be concentrated upon the development of substantial relations with other nations, particularly with regard to its commercial relations.

In the near future, ROC government would not change its ideological position, even though its contacts with Eastern European countries have been increasing recently. However, following the result in this study, ROC would like to have a more flexible position with respect to its foreign behavior. Finally, ROC, being a Newly Industrializing Country, will take more vigorous steps to participate in the international activities through governmental and non-governmental organizations and to gain a certain kind of legal status in this international society.

NOTES

1. Peng, *Republic of China: An Analysis of its Political system*, p. 29.
2. Kuo et. al., *The Taiwan Success Story*, p. 25.
3. Unger, "Derecognition Worked," p. 109.
4. Peng, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-407.
5. IMF, *Direction of Trade Yearbook 1979*, pp. 100-101.
6. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 33.
7. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, pp. 72-74.
8. Clough, *Island China*, p. 148.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
11. *Central Daily News*, spet, 20, 1980, p. 1.
12. *op. cit.*, July 24, 1980, p. 1.
13. Rhee, "Communist China's Foreign Behavior," p. 188.
14. Organski, *World Politics*, p. 101.
15. Cline, *World Power Trends & U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*, p. 12.
16. Alexandroff, *The Logic of Diplomacy*, pp. 78-80; Rhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-66.
18. Rhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.
19. Levi, *The Coming End of War*, pp. 97-165.
20. Schleicher, *International Relations*, pp. 71-72.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
22. Holsti, *International Politics*, pp. 373-374.
23. Rhee, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
24. Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, p. 259.
25. *U. S. News & World Report*, Nov. 24, 1980, p. 37.
26. *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1980, p. 13.
27. Spero, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-256.
28. *Economist*, Mar. 24, 1979, pp. 101-102.
29. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option," p. 754.
30. Chiu, *China & the Taiwan Issue*, p. 192.
31. Pu & Chi, *The Strategic Diplomacy & Security*, p. 39.
32. ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Statements & Communiques*, p. 19.
33. Peng, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
34. Sullivan, *International Relations*, p. 177.
35. Rhee, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
36. Goulet, *Mexico*, pp. 1-20.
37. McCormick and Kihl "Intergovernmental Organizations and Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 498.
38. Alger & Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals & International Governmental Organizations," p. 646-663.

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39. Rhee, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
41. Cutright, "National Political Development," p. 257.
42. Schmidt, *Understanding & Using Statistics*, p. 114.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

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TABLE 1 List of Indicator

TABLE 2 List of Variable

INDICATOR NAME	CODE	VARIABLE NAME	CODE
MILITARY EXPENDITURE	POA	POWER	POR
SIZE OF ARMED FORCES	POB	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	EOR
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	POC	POLITICAL ORIENTATION	POT
STEEL PRODUCTION	POD	INTERNATIONAL TRADING BEHAVIOR	TRD
ENERGY PRODUCTION	POE	POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BEHAVIOR	DIP
NUMBER OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT	POF	CO-MEMBERSHIP BEHAVIOR	IOR
GNP PER CAPITA	EOA	COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR	SER
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA	EOB	ATTRIBUTE INDEX	ATT
TELEPHONE PER HUNDRED INHABITANTS	EOC		
LITERACY RATE	EOD		
NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE RATIO	EOE		

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TABLE 3 Correlation Matrix for 1973 Data

	POA	POB	POC	POD	POE	POF	EOA	EOB	EOC	EOD	EOE
POB	.76										
POC	.92	.74									
POD	.76	.63	.89								
POE	.84	.62	.75	.60							
POF	.91	.85	.88	.75	.77						
EOA	.27	.10	.32	.29	.25	.28					
EOB	.28	.12	.31	.27	.25	.27	.83				
EOC	.07	.02	.07	.06	.06	.06	.08	.06			
EOD	.19	.17	.26	.29	.07	.24	.37	.21	.12		
EOE	.22	.08	.27	.29	.17	.24	.57	.43	.06	.68	
POT	.15	.07	.19	.22	.10	.13	.25	.28	.07	.42	.36
TRD	-.88	-.67	-.92	-.92	-.77	-.84	-.28	-.27	-.06	-.21	-.24
IOR	-.29	-.44	-.40	-.45	-.17	-.42	-.31	-.16	-.12	-.71	-.52
DIP	-.19	-.09	-.20	-.22	-.16	-.14	-.16	-.17	-.11	-.37	-.28

TABLE 4 Correlation Matrix for 1977 Data

	POA	POB	POC	POD	POE	POF	EOA	EOB	EOC	EOD	EOE
POB	.70										
POC	.92	.69									
POD	.76	.58	.90								
POE	.91	.64	.85	.68							
POF	.95	.78	.90	.76	.90						
EOA	.24	.08	.29	.28	.27	.22					
EOB	.31	.14	.34	.31	.33	.30	.86				
EOC	.42	.23	.49	.48	.36	.43	.62	.53			
EOD	.19	.17	.27	.29	.12	.29	.44	.39	.57		
EOE	.22	.11	.28	.29	.21	.21	.51	.46	.57	.72	
POT	.10	.04	.14	.16	.08	.05	.14	.16	.08	.28	.24
TRD	-.76	-.55	-.87	-.96	-.71	-.76	-.23	-.28	-.43	-.23	-.23
IOR	-.26	-.42	-.38	-.41	-.20	-.32	-.26	-.20	-.55	-.62	-.55
DIP	-.12	-.07	-.14	-.14	-.13	-.08	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.19	-.16

TABLE 5
Relationship between International Trading Behavior
and Power Variable

Year	1973	1977
Correlation Coefficient	-.85	-.92
R Square*	.72	.86
Level of Significance	.01	.01

* Its square root is the Pearson product moment correlation.

TABLE 6
Regression of International Trading Behavior on Six
Power Indicators

Year	1973						1977					
Adjusted R Square	.92						.94					
Level of Significance	.00						.00					
Indicator	POA	POB	POC	POD	POE	POF	POA	POB	POC	POD	POE	POF
Estimate	-.29	.10	.03	-.62	-.17	-.07	.14	.10	-1.0	.24	-.17	-.26
F Significance	.002	.047	.743	.000	.001	.373	.129	.008	.000	.020	.003	.006

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TABLE 7

**Relationship between Political Relationship
and Power Variable**

Year	1973	1977
Correlation Coefficient	.13	.17
R Square	.02	.03
Level of Significance	.10	.05

TABLE 8

**Regression of Political Relationship
Behavior on Six Power Indicators**

Year	1973	1977
Adjusted R Square	0	0
Level of Significance	.433	.548

TABLE 9

**Relationship between Cooperative Behavior
and Political Orientation Variable**

Year	1973	1977
Correlation Coefficient	-.55	-.68
R Square	.30	.47
Level of Significance	.01	.01

TABLE 10

**Relationship between Co-membership
Behavior and Economic Development
Variable**


Year	1973	1977
Correlation Coefficient	-.67	-.66
R Square	.44	.44
Level of Significance	.01	.01

TABLE 11

**Regression of Co-membership Behavior on Five Economic
Development Indicators**

Year	1973					1977				
Adjusted R Square	.49					.46				
Level of Significance	.000					.000				
Indicator	EOD	EOE	EOC	EOA	EOB	EOD	EOC	EOA	EOE	EOB
Estimate	-.64	-.06	-.03	-.13	.11	-.39	-.37	.14	-.17	.09
F Significance	.000	.591	.593	.354	.386	.000	.000	.346	.122	.485

Figure 1 Scattergram between behavior index and attribute index in 1973 data



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Figure 2 Scattergram between behavior index and attribute index in 1977 data

