

**Lin, Anwu** 林安梧, *Misplaced Dao: The Essential Problem of Chinese Political Thought* 道的錯置—中國政治思想的根本困結

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This book, in eleven chapters and three appendices, is an accumulation of Lin's understanding of and investigation into the deficiency of Chinese traditional culture. The gist of it can be traced back to 1979 when Lin wrote the essay, "The Entanglement of Intellectualism (*zhu zhi* 主智), Beyond-intellectualism (*chao zhi* 超智), and Anti-intellectualism (*fan zhi* 反智) in Chinese Political Tradition," which is included in this book as Appendix 1, taking issue with YU Yingshi's 余英時 view in Yu's "Anti-intellectualism and Chinese Tradition 反智論與中國傳統." To Lin, it is ambiguous for Yu to take Confucianism as intellectualism and Daoism and Legalism as anti-intellectualism, to think that through the "Confucianism's tending to Legalism 儒家法家化" the framework of Chinese political tradition was set, and even to generalize Chinese political tradition as "anti-intellectualism." Such tendency does exist. However, there is an entanglement of intellectualism, beyond-intellectualism, and anti-intellectualism behind it.

For Lin, the fundamental reason is that the constructive presentation of reason (*lixing de jiagou biao xian* 理性的架構表現) is not developed in Confucianism and the sliding from beyond-intellectualism to anti-intellectualism of Daoism is due to the lack of the functional presentation of reason in Confucianism. Only when such phenomenon is treated properly can we further discuss if there is any contradiction between Chinese traditional culture and democracy and the rule of law. Notably, the discussion about the development of Confucianism from Confucius, to Mencius, to Xunzi and the way it can be connected with despotism is an important part. Lin suggests that the role of human beings is most important in Xunzi's theory. However, due to Xunzi's neglect of the transcendence of morality, human consciousness is just a kind of moral recognition. Besides, in Xunzi's theory, to govern and civilize people and set the natural world in order at the same time must be a heavy burden for the sage. Therefore, the worldly ruler must transform such a burden into power and puissance. In this way, the ideal of Confucianism that "the ruler *should be* the virtuous, competent, and wise sage" would finally become "the ruler *is just* the virtuous, competent

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and wise sage.” Only through this analysis can we know the reason that Hanfei’s 韓非 political thought, mainly inherited from Xunzi, could lead to the “Misplaced Dao”—a term coined by Lin in reference to the phrase “Misplaced Concreteness” from A. N. Whitehead’s *Science and the Modern World*—which presumes that, the higher the class is in a political hierarchical system, especially in a despotic totalitarianism, the closer it is to the Dao. Thus, the monarch or the ruler could be taken as the embodiment or even the incarnation of Dao.

Additionally, there is an even more radical theoretical basis of Misplaced Dao: the theory of three manifestations of Being (*cunyou santan lun* 存有三態論), which Lin extracted from the thought of XIONG Shili 熊十力 and developed in his own doctoral dissertation *Being, Consciousness, and Practice: The Interpretation and Reconstruction of Philosophy of the Substance and Function of XIONG Shili* 存有·意識與實踐：熊十力體用哲學之詮釋與重建. The first chapter of the book reviewed here, “On Dao and Language,” can be seen as the pithiness of the inner logic between the Misplaced Dao and the theory of three manifestations of *Being*.

In Chapters 2, 3 and 5, Lin elucidates the connotation of Misplaced Dao. Generally speaking, Lin points out that, in the Chinese cultural tradition, socio-historical totality and ontological background is the nursery for the generation of the Misplaced Dao. Regarding Ontological background, Lin draws from the studies of Tu Weiming 杜維明, FEI Xiaotong 費孝通, and ZHANG Guangzhi 張光直, and points out that, because Chinese traditional culture posits the mode of “continuity of being” or integration of human and nature, the inner secret of Chinese traditional culture is a kind of “resonating of *qi* (*qi de gantong* 氣的感通).” This mode emphasizes the familiarity and mutual concern of the interaction between people. Meanwhile, based on and raised in such an ambience, kinship (*xueyuan xing* 血緣性), soil-root (*tugen xing* 土根性) and morality (*daode xing* 道德性) also become closely correlated connections.

According to Lin, kinship can be explained as the “natural connection of kinship”; the clan society is its reflection in the real world; and the “father” is its highest symbol. Morality can be explained as “moral connection of personality” rooted in kinship with “sage” as its highest symbol. As for soil-root, it is the Han culture’s inherent characteristic of not migrating from the native land. Because of the small farm economy, kinship and morality are based on soil-root. The coalescence of kinship, morality, and soil-root leads to the clan society, whose pattern is directed by the “natural connection of kinship” or “the vertical axis of kinship.” It also makes for a ritual society, which implies the “intentions of morality and thinking.” Lin, quoting Fei, shows that, though soil-root is the nursery of kinship, it is also restricted by kinship. The region formed by soil-root could merely be a projection of kinship that involves sanguinity, locality, favoritism, etc., rather than an objective one that is completely developed by some kind of constitution.

The core of traditional Chinese society is patriarchy, according to Lin, and the “moral connection of personality” originating from the “vertical axis of kinship” is basically the reflected image of the “natural connection of kinship.” In this way, there is a close relation between father, the ethical symbol of “natural connection of kinship,” and sage, the cultural symbol of “moral connection of personality.” After the imposition of Qin 秦 and Han 漢 imperialism on the same social and cultural background, the “dominant political connection” becomes the core of control, thus alienating “natural connection of kinship,” symbolized as the “father,” and “moral connection of personality,” symbolized as the “sage,” as the reasonable and legitimate base of regality. In this case, the ruler is the sage just because he is the ruler. The ruler becomes the “sage-ruler (*sheng jun* 聖君)” and “ruler-father (*jun fu* 君父),” while the “natural connection of kinship” and the “moral connection of personality” become means to control and oppress people due to the invasion of the

“dominant political connection.” Traditional culture is alienated as the oppressive creed or doctrine. The ideal Dao is misplaced by the effect of the worldly power.

Chapter 4 focuses on the characteristics and the limitations of Hanfei’s political philosophy. Indebted to Max Weber’s analysis of ideal-type and the methodology implied in the philosophy of WANG Chaunshan 王船山, Lin uses the “law as the principle of construction 法 - 結構性原則,” “power as the principle of tendency 勢 - 動向性原則,” and “statecraft as the principle of operation 術 - 運用性原則” to generalize Hanfei’s political philosophy. For transitioning to despotism in Chinese traditional culture, the law is the key in stringing the ethical and political structure together to form an integrated structure. As for power, it involves two aspects: one is the natural tendency of static observation to grasp the whole political situation and the other is a man-made tendency, utilizing law to control ministers. However, such power is limited to the stakes of ruler and ministers and is not exercised in the whole political situation. Therefore it is finally changed into the operation of the ruler’s statecraft. In Lin’s view, the reflection of the misplaced Dao in Hanfei’s political philosophy shows that, in Hanfei’s theory, the operation of statecraft is the prerequisite while the law and power are only its means.

The discussion in Chapter 6, “The Background of the Intentions of Morality and Thinking,” is based on the discourse of “vertical axis of kinship.” “The intentions of morality and thinking” is first coined by LIN Yusheng 林毓生 to explain the reason that there are difficulties in articulating the ideas of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and constitution in China. For LIN Yusheng, the “intentions of morality and thinking” are closely related to Confucian “inner transcendence” cosmology. However, for LIN Anwu, it is not proper for LIN Yusheng to ascribe the “intentions of morality and thinking” to Confucianism. If this issue is properly understood, Confucianism may become a positive spiritual resource for making a constitution of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law in the Chinese tradition. Thus Lin discusses the relation between the Misplaced Dao and the “intentions of morality and thinking” to show that the Misplaced Dao is the actual factor for the over-development of the “intentions of morality and thinking,” and alienates “the autonomous ethic of being mindful in solitude (*shen du* 慎獨)” of Confucianism into a “heteronymous obedience ethic.” In this context, the “heteronymous obedience ethic” is subordinated to the servility and regularity of despotism. This kind of ethic is not really a heteronymous one because it takes the monarch as the highest ruler of the worldly order. LIN Anwu argues that, if the Misplaced Dao could be deconstructed, then the negative effects of the “intentions of morality and thinking” could also be mitigated, and it would become possible for us to step into a socio-cracy (*quanmin zhengzhi* 全民政治) based on the “authorized political connection” and “contractual social connection.”

Chapters 7 and 8 can be seen as Lin’s formula to deconstruct the Misplaced Dao. Lin opens his discourse by discussing MOU Zongsan’s 牟宗三 “self-negation of consciousness to develop democracy and science.” In Lin’s view, Mou’s proposition actually neglects despotism and the enchantment implied in consciousness. Lin argues that these problems could be weighed properly only by an investigation of the enchanted tradition included in the “vertical axis of kinship.” Mou’s suggestion can be seen as an “enchanted transformation.” However, the enchanted characteristic of traditional culture remains in Mou’s theory. Besides, Mou’s theory of self-negation is the problem of “theoretical procedure,” and democracy and science in Western culture pose the problem of “genetic procedure,” while for modern Chinese the practice of democracy and science is the problem of “learning procedure.” These should not be confused. However, Mou, like most intellectuals confronting the impact of Western culture in the early days, did mix them up! Besides, Mou’s discourse still forms a school which can be named as “Apologetic

(*hujiao de* 護教的) New Confucianism,” which discusses abstract moral subjects unrealistically. In comparison, Lin claims to develop a “Critical New Confucianism” or “Post-New-Confucianism.”

“Critical New Confucianism” will pay more attention to the living life-world and its Subject as a lively existing moral being and take our real world, socio-historical totality and the real experience of human beings as the starting point for the philosophical discourse. Lin also suggests the transition from Mou’s “ontological idealism” to “methodological materialism” and from “examination of morality” to “the critique of society.” In this transition, the theory of human nature can be moved from the background of “natural connection of kinship” and “dominant political connection” into that of “authorized political connection” and “contractual social connection.” Chapter 8 can be seen as the outline of the background, construction, and the possible deconstruction of misplaced Dao; it also can be taken as the summary of the whole discourse of this book and the clue to follow Lin’s argument.

In Chapter 9, inspired by his reading and understanding of *The Complete Works of ZHANG Shengqie* 張深切, Lin treats the complicity between Taiwan and Mainland China. First, Lin shows that, in Zhang’s thought, “Taiwaneseness” and “Chineseness” are under the framework of Taiwan and Mainland China as a cultural continuum. In other words, Lin thinks that the problem between Taiwan and Mainland China should be reflected and treated on the level of “cultural China” and that both sides should be a cultural continuum rather than political oppositions. Unfortunately, almost all Taiwanese discussions about the relation between Taiwan and Mainland China are restricted within political and economical actualities. If we can rethink the conception of China from the perspective of culture and keep the political and economical interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China open, then there could be a possibility of the framework of “Dual Sides as Beneficial to Each Other” and “Diversity in Unity.”

Chapter 10 is an alternative interpretation of the “homeward bound rhyme-prose (*quiqu lai ci* 歸去來辭)” of TAO Yuanming 陶淵明 for rethinking the alienation of human life. Following the interpretation is an adaptation for satirizing the Taiwan political circle. In his interpretation, Lin analyzes how human life and mind are alienated by the attachment to worldly things. He refers to the possibility of returning to the original state of life and mind. As for the adaptation, it is not just an admonishment for Taiwan’s politicians, but also an exhortation for those who are addicted to prestige, fame and gain.

Chapter 11 centers on the practice of New Confucianism. In Lin’s opinion, the condition of Taiwan is besieged in “Double Consciousness of Master and Slave”, that is, an “outer Consciousness of Master and Slave” resulted from the impact of Euro-Anglo centric discourse and “inner Consciousness of Master and Slave” due to the despotic dominance and the discourse of unity or independence resulted from the dream of Chinese cultural matrix. The former causes Taiwanese thought to lose its own creativity and productivity and alienates the philosophical and theoretical studies from the real world they should be rooted in. The latter permeates the people and becomes an abstract presentation of regulative reason visible in Taiwan. Furthermore, the latter finally is what Taiwanese want to remove from their present cultural matrix Taiwan. Theoretically, after such purification, there should be the possibility of developing a new regulative reason to direct the matrix and to form a new culture and an independent and autonomous consciousness.

Appendix 2 is an outline of the discussion on ZHU Xi’s 朱熹 *li* 理 (principle)-centric view of history. Lin opens up his discussion by comparing ZHU Xi’s and CHEN Liang’s 陳亮 views of history, concluding that each has its own deficiency. In contrast, WANG Chuanshan’s “theory of the unity of *li* and trend (*li shi he yi lun* 理勢合一論)” is an

advance. Appendix 3 is a lecture record of the problem of the practice of New Confucianism. It is a general discussion about the main concern of this book.

Although the theme of this book is the deficiency of Chinese political thought, implied in Lin's discourse and argument is his attempt to make a transition from MOU Zongsan's theory to his own. In Lin's opinion, Mou's theory is an "enchanted transformation" of Confucianism. As a dissenter of New Confucianism, Lin's effort could also be understood as "the disenchanting reflection and surmounting (*jie zhou xing de fansi yu chaoman* 解咒型的反思與超邁) of Mou's achievement. In addition to the attempt to answer the problem of modernization in the Chinese world, Lin pays more attention to the possibility of alienation and impurity of Confucian self-cultivation and moral practice when brought out into the mortal world. We can see that he is still a vindicator of Confucianism. However, while treating the issue about the relations of Confucianism and democracy and science, though Lin shows that one deficiency of Mou's theory is its not discriminating the theoretical, genetic, and learning procedure, he should further tell us what mode of thinking should be learned when receiving democracy and science. That is, how should we confront democracy and science and even the whole of Western Culture? Without answering this question, we may possibly live in the Western kind of constitution with the attitude of traditional culture. We may dress in the Western style while having a foot-binding kind of mind (this is a metaphor inspired by *Xiaojiao Yu Xifu* 小腳與西服 by ZHANG Bangmei 張邦梅, a story about XU Zhimo 徐志摩 and ZHANG Youyi 張幼儀).