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Social Movements in 2014: A Comparative Study on Hong Kong and Taiwan

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Abstract

The present thesis argues that the resemblance found between Taiwanese students in their local claims and those of Hong Kong students, has provided an opportunity for both societies to start collaborating at a transnational level. The first formal approach between Hong Kong and Taiwan activists came in January 13, 2014. Pro-democracy groups of students and politicians from Hong Kong and Taiwan gathered in Taipei for a weekend of talks. This marked the first real approach between both democratic advocates.

Locally the struggle was directed at the governments and internationally against the PRC. The objectives of these movements favor democracy, identity and self-determination. Therefore, both social movements and societies push for similar objectives and share a common foe. After the meeting a new level of cooperation was reached between the two sides that was shown during the Sunflower movement in Taiwan and the Occupy the Central with Love and Peace OCLP in Hong Kong. The world is witnessing the dawn of a cross-national approach between social movements that seek to strengthen the force of their claims.

The argument of the present study is based on the Social Movements Impact theory, using Professor's Doug McAdam's dynamic interactive model of a collective action, in a Robert Putman's "Two Level-game" case of opportunity. This theoretical framework suggests that a social movement of one country (Hong Kong or Taiwan) can be used as a reference the society of another to renew the "international opportunity" (rejection of a local policy or a country: PRC) created by the local government. This case was seen on the on September 28, 2014 when abruptly emerged the protests in Hong Kong and, almost immediately, near four thousand people gathered at Taipei's Liberty Square to show their support. The fact that such a large group of people, most of them students, gathered in so short period of time, provides the ground for the present study to explore if the sentiment is spread in the Taiwanese student community.

Abbreviations

OCLP: Occupy Central with Love and Peace

ECFA: Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement

CSSTA: Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement. Understood as the services section of the ECFA trade agreement.

CEPA: Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement. Accord signed between the PRC and Hong Kong in 2003.

HKSAR: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

ROC: Republic of China − Taiwan. For the purpose of the present study ROC or Taiwan will be use to refer to the government in the island of Taiwan.

PRC: People's Republic of China. In the present study to avoid a constant repetition of the acronym, the author will also use Mainland China, Beijing or China to refer to the PRC government.

LY: Legislative Yuan. A long the present study the abbreviation for these words would be

EY: Executive Yuan. A long the present study the abbreviation for these words would be

ARATS: Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits

SEF: Straits Exchange Foundation

Definitions

Democracy: In this study it will be found that term democracy will refer to the increasing and direct involvement of the society in the political process, rather than a specific model of democracy. In essence, the definition here used refers to a political system in which a supreme power is vested in the people.

Self-determination: Defined as: determination by the people of a territorial unit of their own future political status. (Merriam-Webster, 2015)

Democratic movement: For the purpose of the present study this term will be defined as social movement that defines its democratic goals in a particular manner that has a direct relation to its immediate reality. Therefore, although it seeks to create the institutional space for the society to have further participation in the political arena, the objectives and level of reach varies according to the groups' objectives.

Cross-border approach: This term refers to the creation of a connection or a relation between two entities that transcends the border of the territories defined by the respective states from which these entities emanate from. In the present study it will specifically refer to the approach between social movement of Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Chapter 1 Introduction

On the night of the September 28, 2014 Hong Kong would see the rise of a mass mobilization that would be echoed around the world. On the eve of this event, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement announced they would organize a civil disobedience to express the rejection of Beijing's decision for not allowing free candidacy for the Chief Executive. Shortly after the announcement, activists and students decided go to the streets to express their discontent. As the events were rapidly changing between students gathering in front of government offices and the authorities dispersing them, it was decided to rush the mass mobilization originally planned for October 1st. Eventually, several thousand people more poured down into the streets. The evolving situation would challenge the idea of "one country two systems", by questioning its sustainability. (BBC News China, 2014).

Meanwhile, as the social movement developed, mass media portrayed it as a movement that desired revolution. The media started to provide different names to call the movement (revolution, protests, etc.). Nevertheless, this was a democratic movement. Eventually media outlets would identify this civil disobedience by the name of the main organizing group: Occupy the Central with Love and Peace (OCLP).

During the demonstrations there were different feelings in the air but all converged into a strong unity? Since its handover to the People's Republic of China (PRC), people in Hong Kong began to increasingly demand guarantees on civil rights and increasing their participation in the political system. The PRC leaders would find that people in Hong Kong were no longer the "economic animal" that once it was believed they were during the colonial times. As years progressed the "one country two systems model" would found political challenges, provoking in Hong Kong's society a rejection towards identifying themselves as citizens of the PRC. It seemed as a new identity was emerging. These factors converged in the day of the civil disobedience of September 28. Therefore, when the authorities engaged the protestors with a strong reaction by the police, who tried to disperse the movement, most of them students, other people in the society were drawn to the streets

to show their support. It seemed, as people were driven by this increasing identity of being "Hong Kongers"[1]. (Lee & Chan, 2011; Li A. , 2014)

On the other hand, as this situation unveiled, the Taiwanese society was paying close attention. Taiwan had previously experienced a mobilization on March 2014, called the Sunflower movement. During the first days of this movement 300 students stormed the Legislative Yuan to occupy it and avoid the ratification of the services section of the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC – Taiwan). The agreement objectives are to increase the economic interaction between the strait. Student-led demonstrators conceived that this agreement put in danger Taiwan's political and economic sovereignty. (Kaeding, 2014; Economist, 2014) Since that moment, the Taiwanese youth developed a latent sentiment of anxiety and rejection towards the development of the agreement and PRC-ROC rapproachment.

The situation lived in Taiwan served as reference for activist in Hong Kong who decided to approach Taiwanese advocates from the former Sunflower movement to get advises on mobilizations prior to the September 28, 2014 incident. According to Lin Fei-fan (leader of the Sunflower movement) in an interview retrieved by The Wall Street Journal, activists from Hong Kong requested his and other Taiwanese students' expertise to learn how to organize a huge rally, mobilize people and boost the moral. Moreover, as Lin Fei-fan accepted in the same report, his help did not stopped there, as he mentions both sides "[were] in constant touch with each other, to offer encouragement and support" (Hsu, 2014). When the mobilization began in Hong Kong there was even the failed attempt of Lin to personally assist the protest but the immigration officials rejected his entrance to Hong Kong.

As the mobilization developed in Hong Kong on September, the Democratic Alliance of Hong Kong and Macau Students in Taiwan (港澳在台北民主同盟) decided to quickly organize a sit-in in Taipei's Liberty Square on the same date. Along with the support of

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[1] This identity definition has been established by the poll made by the Hong Kong University to 1,026 Cantonese-speaking people in Hong Kong, age 18 or above since 1997 to 2014. In it, these people identify themselves as citizens of Hong Kong rather than Chinese citizens or from the People's Republic of China (University of Hong Kong, 2014).

many presidents of civil organizations in Taiwan (like Taiwan Association for China Human Rights, New School for Democracy, Taiwan Society for Democracy, Black Island National Youth Front, etc.), several thousands[2] of people, between overseas and local Taiwanese students, joined to show their support. At this point it was clear that the social movement in Hong Kong had brought the attention and empathy of hundreds of students and other sectors of the Taiwanese society (Kaeding, 2014). In the words of Ian Rowen[3]: "[activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan]…both trumpeted democracy, self-determination, rationality and peace" (Rowen, 2014).

Currently students in Taiwan are fearful for the ROC's future if a failure on politics produces a loss of sovereignty to the PRC. The dwindling Taiwanese economy in need of foreign investment and trade, and its increasing opening policy to the PRC infuses doubt and rejection. Moreover, when these factors are mixed with the Hong Kong event featuring similar characteristics (democracy, identity and self-determination), there is the possibility that Taiwanese students feel a connection between their situation and that of Hong Kongers.

Furthermore, if this linkage creates recognition of a similar cause (as has already did between activists), there is the plausibility that regular Taiwanese students felt or feel a communion[4] with the events and people in Hong Kong. Thence, the situation allow us to bring into perspective the research question that the present study would like to address, which is: Has the support provided by Taiwanese students to activist shown that they have developed a mature level of recognition and empathy towards Hong Kongers' struggle for democracy, identity and self-determination?

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[2] The police did not revealed an official number but estimates of The Wall Street Journal and Japan Times round the number of total participants to 4,000 people. (Dou & Hsu, 2014; The Japan Times, 2014)

[3] Ian Rowen is a PhD candidate in geography at the University of Colorado, Boulder and was visiting fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica. Rowen assisted both mobilizations to produce an "occupational ethnography" of both movements that was published as an article in the magazine "*Anthropology News*" of the American Anthropological Association.

[4] By communion the author refers to a high level of recognition of Hong Kongers' claims, which in turn motivates Taiwanese students to express their agreement through actions, like: demonstrations of support, use of symbols, donations etc.

1.1 Research Design

1.1.1 Hypothesis

The present hypothesis takes base on the Social Movements Impact theory, using Doug McAdam's interactive model of a collective action, in a Robert Putman's "Two Level-game" case of opportunity (della Porta & Kriesi, 2009). This theoretical framework suggests that a social movement of one country (Hong Kong or Taiwan) can be used as a reference to the society of another to create a bridge for mutual struggle for democracy, identity, self-determination and rejection of a common foe (PRC). Thus, the present study defends that the hypothesis answering the question: "Has the support provided by Taiwanese students to activist shown that they have developed a mature[5] level of recognition and empathy towards Hong Kongers' struggle for democracy, identity and self-determination?" is the following:

The present work argues that the response to this question is affirmative. The medullar ideas of democracy, identity, self-determination and rejection of the PRC, found in both societies has allowed students in Taiwan to develop a sense of unity with the people of Hong Kong. First, collaboration started between activists of both sides creating a line of communication since January 13, 2014. Second, Hong Kong activists assisted to learn and support the Sunflower movement. Third, on September 2014 when the social movement in Hong Kong burst, Taiwanese activists supported Hong Kongers with the help of Taiwanese students. This showed that students in Taiwan possibly had a greater understanding of the needs and demands of their peers in Hong Kong.

Therefore, the present author argues that the elements of democracy, identity, self-determination and rejection of the PRC provided the ground for the Taiwanese youth to identify themselves with the Hong Kong protestors, although both sides have their particular political, economic and geographical realities. Hence, this could prove that a large proportion of Taiwanese students have developed a clear understanding of the

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[5] By "mature" the present author refers to a fully-grown or developed sentiment of recognition and unity from Taiwanese students towards their counterparts in Hong Kong, in their social struggle. Thus, if this developed recognition and sense of unity exists, it can be present regardless of the particularity of the case and it can be measure.

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similarities and claims between both sides, transcending this particular event, to foster an increasingly strong collaboration between both societies. Thus, the world may be witnessing the dawn of a strong approach from Taiwanese to their Hong Kong counter parts in their struggle for democracy, identity and self-determination against the PRC.

1.1.2 Research Goals and Objectives

The present study's main objective is to prove that the collaboration between social movements has shown that Taiwanese students have developed a mature level of recognition and empathy for Hong Kongers' struggle for democracy, identity, self-determination and rejection of the PRC. Therefore, it will be asked through the application of a survey to a random sample of Taiwanese students of three selected public universities, if the recent mobilizations in Hong Kong were followed, empathize with, and supported by them. Furthermore, it will be measure if they agree if further collaboration between collective actions is needed for both societies to achieve their respective goals.

Following the main goal's objective, in order to identify if the protests in Hong Kong were followed, created affinity and communion by the selected population of Taiwanese students, the questions to be answer will be:

1) Do Taiwanese students taking the survey feel empathy and communion for the OCLP's movement democratic and self-determination claims?

2) Do Taiwanese students taking the survey recognize the idea that there is a "Hong Konger" identity[6] and support it?

3) Do Taiwanese students taking the survey agree with the idea that cooperation between student of Hong Kong and Taiwan can propel each other's claims?

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6   Cantonese-speaking people in Hong Kong that identify themselves as citizens of Hong Kong rather than Chinese citizens or from the People's Republic of China (University of Hong Kong, 2014).

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4) Do Taiwanese students taking the survey believe that is important for both Taiwanese and Hong Kongers to support each other's claims to increase the power/intensity/to be more feasible

1.1.3 Methodology

The present epistemological study will be searching for qualitative data taken from random sample of Taiwanese university student of three public universities. The main research interest is to analyze if the collaboration of two social movements of two countries (Hong Kong or Taiwan) can create a bridge in the recognition of the mutual struggle for democracy, identity, self-determination and rejection of a common foe (PRC). This approach has its base on the theory the Social Movements Impact theory, based on Doug McAdam's interactive model of collective action, in a Robert D. Putman's "Two Level-game" case as suggested by Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi. Thus, following this guideline the present study will be divided as follows.

The first part of the present thesis will based its research in consultation of previous studies and statistics to generate an overview of the socio-political situation lived in these countries. In this way the study will provide a perspective of the context that created the ground for the social movement in Hong Kong and its support in Taiwan.

Second part of the research will consist in applying close-end questionnaire based on a Likert Scale to retrieve the opinion of the students of the three public universities in Taiwan. The main purpose of the questionnaire is to observe how has the Hong Kong movement been perceive by Taiwanese students (independently if they actively supported the movement or not) in regards of the following criteria:

1) If students:

   a) Know what the OCLP is.

   b) Recognized and supported the Hong Kong movement's democratic claims of seeking direct election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.

   c) Largely perceive that there is a "Hong Kong" identity and if they support the idea behind it.

   d) Students felt empathetic and sensed a "communion"[7] with protesters in Hong Kong because they were searching for: democracy, identity and rejection of the PRC political system.

2) If the Taiwanese students linked this event as an example to reinforce their rejection of the PRC's increasing influence.

3) If they see further collaboration with their Hong Kong peers as important to keep their rejection of the PRC and maintain their: democracy, identity and self-determination

Furthermore, the sample of students to be analyze will comply with the following characteristics:

   a) Those studying in: National Chengchi University, National Taiwan University and National Normal University.

   b) Those who are between the ages of 18-30 years old.[8]

   c) The total size of the sample to be analyze will be as follows:

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[7] By "communion" the present author refers to the idea of feeling the responsibility to express support for the situation in which people in Hong Kong were.

[8] The selection of this sample is based on the population distribution in Taiwan, in which 70 percent of the society has between 15-60 years old, with an average age of 38 years old (National Statistics Republc of China (Taiwan), 2014). Therefore, the ideas of this group of the population, and future leaders, have a strong weight in the society.

From the total populations of the universities, here shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Total Number University students in NCCU, NTU and NTNU

National Chengchi University	National Taiwan University	National Taiwan Normal University	**Total number of students**
15,000	30,000	10,893	55,893[9]

The present universities were chosen following the next criterion:

1) These public universities are considering the best within the public system[10] of education in Taiwan and several of their members have and will occupy important governmental posts in the future.

2) These universities' student associations were the most active during the mobilizations.

3) The sample of these universities will show if effectively the influence of the activism is really shared by most part of the students of these universities.

The present survey will aim to set its goals of having a tolerable error margin of 3 – 4% in the number of responses. Therefore, this disposition sets the figures of feature interviewees as follows:

Confidence	Error 5% Population to interview	Error 4% Population to interview	Maximum population: 1,018 students
90%	271	422	
95%	382	594	

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9   The numbers are based on the numbers that appear in universities' official websites (National Chengchi University, 2015; National Taiwan University, 2015; National Taiwan Normal University, 2015)

10   The public system in Taiwan comprises the largest pool of students. Therefore, this study is based on this area, as it is more representative of the perspectives on the situation the majority of students have in all Taiwan.

99%	656	1018	

The ultimate aim of the survey is to achieve the maximum level of interviewees as possible to achieve a high level of confidence (in this case 1,784 of students). The application of the survey will be 1 month and 6 days (from June 3th to July 1st) the work will set a minimum acceptance level of 90% confidence with 4% error. In order to achieve this goal the survey will be sent to (+/-) 1,018 students of the selected universities with the help of the central offices in each university. (Custom Insigth, 2015) For the sample to maintain an equitable representation of the total population, interviewees per university will be maintain as symmetrical as possible.

Main variables of the Questionnaire:

1. Democratic protests

   The combination of four elements created the "Democratic protests" variable: a) Measurement of the Interest of the interviewee toward social movements happening in the PRC (foreign) and Taiwan (local); b) measurement level of knowledge of the particular case of the Hong Kong movement and the level of importance for the interviewee; c) measurement of the level in which the interviewee felt being awareness, sensitivity, understanding, while experiencing the feeling, thoughts and similar experiences towards those who support the movement by asking his level of "empathy".; and d) measurement of the level of pro-activeness in helping democratic social movements in the PRC.

2. Identity

   This item was composed by two questions. The first item provides 5 options that combine the two perspectives of identity as argued by Malte Philip Keading: essentialist and constructivist[11]. Therefore, the answers provided in two questions

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[11] According to Kaeding essential and constructivist perspectives can be subdivided into civic and ethno-cultural. From these subdivisions there are three basic perspectives to classify nationalism in Taiwan, which are the following:

separate and in two differently combined, the following variables: a) bloodline, language, culture, race and territory; b) views the nation as an "imagined political community". The second question measures in the interviewee acknowledges that a "Hong Konger identity exists and should be maintained.

3. Taiwan-China Relations

This item uses a combination of elements that can be divided in: socio-political, economy and politics, and social. The "socio-political" item seek to ask the interviewee their opinions if their career options had any connection with cross-strait relations and in this way measure their awareness of the topic and importance they place to it in their daily lives.

The "economy and politics" item, the questions are destined to measure student's perspective on cross-strait economic relationship between Taiwan and the PRC, economic status of Taiwan and the dangers of an economic interdependence on China for Taiwan's democracy, sovereignty and the political survival of ROC's government.

The "social" item has the intention to ask the interviewees to provide their opinion in regards of the hypothetical case of unifying Taiwan with the PRC. Furthermore, they are ask if they agree to create a strong collaboration with the society in Hong Kong to maintain their democracy, identity and self-determination. Lastly it is asked for the students to agree or disagree if in case cross-strait relations are mishandled it could create a new "Hong Kong" out of Taiwan.

These variables will help to confirm if the students see in the Hong Kong society a potential ally who they understand and relate in regards of their present situation.

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1) Ethno-cultural nationalism: […] […T]he Taiwanese identity is based on specific historical experiences and perceived cultural differences between the Taiwan people and mainland Chinese[.T]he focus is on the colonial past of the island and its long separation from the China.
2) Multi-ethnic nationalism: […] [T]he Taiwanese nation is a harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation of four ethnic groups, the Mainlanders, the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the aborigines.
3) Political or State nationalism: […] [T]he foundation of a Taiwan nation is in line with the institutions of a liberal state. The rise of the Taiwan identity is seen as directly connected to its geographical and political separation from China and its subsequent democratic development. (Kaeding, 2011)
    These perspectives served to mold the propositions offered to Taiwanese students to pick the one closer to their definition to be Taiwanese.

In order to conduct the sought retrieval of the positions of students, the method chosen would be close-end Likert Scale type of questionnaire. The use of this method stands as the most optimal scheme to analyze qualitative information. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that there are also disadvantages.

First, the advantages of close-end questions lay on the feasibility of coding and interpreting the information. Moreover, the Likert Scale has the sole purpose of being a psychological response scale aiming to retrieve the preferences or degree of agreement of the respondents. Therefore, interviewees provide responses on a non-comparative approach and unidimensional manner. Despite these advantages, the disadvantage presents when respondents are provided with pre-armed statements that do not exactly reflect their opinion. As Bertram argues, "… there is no way to ensure that participants view the difference between 'agree' and 'completely agree' " (Likert Scales …are the meaning of life, 2004). Hence, the responses are approximations of the participant's perspectives.

However, if the method of open-end questions is preferred challenges may increase. Although open-end questions provide exact answers of the interviewees, the wide range of variables in these answers makes coding very difficult. Furthermore, answers from open-end questionnaires are challenged in achieving a clear interpretation without recurring to a higher level of assumption through a series of direct and indirect connections (Knapp, 1990; McLeod, 2008). For these reasons, the author of the present study has decided to use the method of close-end Likert scale to interpret the responses.

Finally, the questionnaire will be applied through an online survey using "Google Documents". The advantages of applying an online survey are the following:

1) It is automatic and provides a real-time access: As respondents respond in real-time, the information is stored and can be access immediately.
2) Rapid deployment: this tool provides the advantage of rapidly reaching the subjects and retrieve the intended information.

3) Allows flexibility in the process of creating the survey (all types of surveys can be put forward under this tool.

4) Anonymity: as there is no interviewer the respondents feel more confident in providing responses.

Disadvantages:

1) Respondent availability can be limited, as respondents will receive the survey to their emails.

2) Cooperation problems: as many interviewees constantly bombarded by other advertisements may not be interested to respond or end the survey.

3) No interviewer: the lack of a trained person to clarify sections of the survey can produce less reliable data. (Gingery, 2011)

Once acknowledge these disadvantages, the present author proposes the following measures to address the problematic:

1) The survey can also be distributed in social media (like Facebook, twitter, etc.) making the availability of the subjects to increase.

2) The cooperation problems are hard to tackle, but can be reduce by implementing a short questionnaire. A 1 or 1.5 page questionnaire with 15 questions can help reduce this risk.

3) The lack of interviewer can be addressed by making a concise and explicative paragraph of what is required for the respondent to do. As this questionnaire is based on a Likert Scale, the tasks required from the interviewee will be similar in shape and form.

Third and finally, the answers of the questionnaire will serve to draw the final conclusions. Once the results from the questionnaire are obtained they will be coded and interpreted. As the interpretation shows the results obtain will be compared with hypothesis of the present study to support it or overthrow it.

1.2 Research Motives

The present study motives rise from the sudden eruption of support lived in Taiwan during the social movement in Hong Kong. The particular democratic claims pushed by the OCLP movement in seeking direct election and open candidacy for Chief Executives appealed to a large group in the Taiwanese society. The affinity led to a rapid mobilization in Taiwan of several thousands of people to show their support for the events taking place in Hong Kong. Regardless, if activists of both sides (Hong Kong and Taiwan) may have worked together to gather people at the Taipei liberty square, the large group that suddenly attended the sit-ins in Taipei showed a real sentiment of communion between Taiwanese students and their peers in Hong Kong.

The lack of further formal study, due to this particular case novelty leaves these questions partially answered. Experts, news reports, NGO's talk about the "clear" effect of the implications of the movement of Hong Kong in Taiwan, but there are no serious recent reports backing their assumptions. So far statistics, principally serving other purposes have serve to draw approximations and, from there, conclusions (Chow, et al., 2012; Luh, 2014; The Economist, 2014; J.R., 2014; Kaiman, 2014; Bush III, 2014; Mancini, 2014; Kasoff, 2014; Daly, Glaser, & Looney, 2014; Rowen, 2014).

The present study could provide a clear understanding of what is the position and disposition of these new members of the Taiwanese society in their search of maintaining alive their precepts. In addition, it the study could shed light on the opportunity and limitations for activists in both sides to maintain and develop this new relationship with the help and disposition of a community that might agree on that union. Hence, the present study will provide the space to for others to follow more closely the development of this possible communion between societies in their search for democracy, identity and self-determinism.

1.3 Professional Significance of the Study

The Social Movements Impact theory in a "Two Level-game" case is developing and examples can still be provided to enrich it. In the case of domestic affairs, social movements are a doctrine that has been expanding. Due to its relative novelty, the cases in which transnational interactions have taken place have not fully research (della Porta & Kriesi, 2009). In the case of Taiwan there is an immediate example of support to movements in other country. Therefore, transnational support has existed in Taiwan.

The current case of study is still not fully studied. It is true that there are several writings about cross-strait relations that talk about social movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong (So & Hua, 1992 ; chang, 1998; Zhao, 2001; Masden, 2009; Huang & Li, 2010; Cai, et al., 2011). There have been also several cultural and political approaches (Pui-tak, 2002; Mittler, 2001; Jung, et al., 2013; Chuang, 2014; Wang, et al., 2015).

Moreover, for this particular case there can also be found widely accessible reports from news agencies (Luh, 2014; The Economist, 2014; J.R., 2014; Kaiman, 2014) and NGO's (Bush III, 2014; Mancini, 2014; Kasoff, 2014). There have also been talks from specialists about possible repercussions for Taiwan (Daly, Glaser, & Looney, 2014). Nevertheless, serious studies talking about this rising union of societies is still not largely available (Weiss, et al., 2012; Kaeding, 2014) .

Therefore, present study could open a path in this new facet witnessed between two social movements in East Asia. Both collective actions could develop a new level of collaboration with this alliance that transcends their borders in their fight for similar claims. Hence, it would be seen that what previously were focalized points of contention, now they have evolved to increase their power to challenge the opportunities found in their respective political systems (democracy, identity and self-determinism), and reject the major threat (the PRC) that exceeds their borders. Thus, by proving that Taiwanese students have developed this mature recognition of their counterparts in Hong Kong, it would provide the grounds to expect and argue that further and stronger collaboration between sides could take place in the future.

1.4 Theoretical framework

The present study's theoretical framework combines the theory of collective action as proposed by Doug McAdam's dynamic interactive model and their outcomes in the international arena in a "Two-level game" case as proposed by Robert D. Putman (Putman, 1988; della Porta & Kriesi, 2009)

McAdam's dynamic interactive model for analyzing the emergence of Contentious Politics

Source: (McAdam, 1999)

Model to track international relations based on Putman's concepts.

Source: (della Porta & Kriesi, 2009)

1.5 Literature Review

Following with the previous theoretical framework, the present literature will review will answer the following questions: what is a social movement? How should a social movement be understood? And how can a social movement impact a society locally and globally?

The present literature review will be structured as follows: First, the analysis will start by defining the term "social movements". Second, the review will provide a brief overview of the classical views of social movements, which will help the reader to identify where the principal debate took place. Third, it will present the new Social Movements theory and their impacts (called "Social Movements Impact theory" or "Outcome theory") according to William Gamson's ideas. Fourth, the study will explain how Charles Tilly, Sydney Tarrow and Doug McAdam reshaped the debate of Social movements Impact theory when proposing the usage of the term "collective action". Fifth and final, it will be described how a collective action reaches an international level according to the ideas presented by Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi in relation with the "Two level-game" theory of Robert D. Putman. Without further due let us begin with the analysis.

1.5.1 Definition of Social movements

To define the term "social movements" it is not a simple task. It is important to note that the definition has had an evolutionary status highly dependent on the approach adopted. The term "Social Movements" was first established as a scholarly discussion by the German sociologist Lorenz von Stein in 1850. In its origins von Stein rounded its definition as: "… [A] *unitary process by which the whole working class gained self-consciousness and power*" (Tilly, 2004). As professor Charles Tilly provides his insights over this definition, he says it was clearly influenced by Marx and Engel's ideas published in the "Communist Manifesto" of 1848. Tilly argues von Stein's definition alludes to the ideas of Marx and Engels that proposes that people will act on the behalf of collective goods (collective action), when their social class is in complete contradictions with those of their antagonists (Tilly, 2004; Tarrow, 1995) .

Tilly explains that through the 19th century political analysts discussed social movements in a pluralistic[12] manner. Tilly provides us with an excellent quote recovered from the German Journal Die Gegenwart (The Present) to express the conceptions of political analysis of the era: "social *movements are in general nothing other than a first search for a valid historical outcome*" (Tilly, 2004, p. 6). Thus, Tilly explains that in this period people analyzing social movements categorized them by program, organization, and setting. Thence, Tilly argues that this kind of political analysis gained weight and shape the perspectives of analysts. As these pluralistic ideas expanded, political critics trying to refer to the outcome of these mobilizations started to call them brawls and riots. Finally the term got so blurred to the point that it was difficult to differentiate between sporadic brakes of violence or a social movement (Tilly, 2004).

The classical social theory based on political pluralistic ideas conveys largely a psychological approach, commonly framed as the "Classical models". These would serve to lead the debate up to mid-20th century in the understanding of social movements. Nevertheless, it cannot be omitted that there were those, like the politicians Vladimir Ilich Uliánov (Lenin) and Marco Gramsci, who continued working on Marx and Engels ideas to provide a different understanding of this phenomenon. As it will be seen further in this literature review their work would serve to reshape the current perception of social movements (Tarrow, 1995).

Social movements bring into perspective different concerns of societies. The awareness of these topics and their results is something that has intrigued for several decades' different researchers. The classical view conceives these groups as something not rational, something that had to be explained by understanding the individuals conforming it. Nevertheless, this perspective failed to explain the continuous rise of social movements or their repeated presence in history. It would until the publication of the book "The Strategy

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[12] Pluralism, in political science is the view that in liberal democracies power is (or should be) dispersed among a variety of economic and ideological pressure groups and is not (or should not be) held by a single elite or group of elites. Pluralism assumes that diversity is beneficial to society and that autonomy should be enjoyed by disparate functional or cultural groups within a society, including religious groups, trade unions, professional organizations, and ethnic minorities (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). For pluralist like Robert Alan Dahl, only a few kinds of groups have the power to stop political processes. Under this conception it is argued that it is through the political ground that groups have their voices heard or silenced. According to Dahl, politicians search first to have pluralism. (McAdam, 1999)

of Social Protest" by William Gamson (1975) that a clear divergent idea to conceive social movements burst leaving behind the old precepts. Therefore, the "Social Movement Impact Theory" or "Outcome Theory", as it is now known, is interested in analyzing social movements and the effects they produce in society. Although currently this theory has been in continuous expansion, it cannot be denied it novelty in comparison with others. Therefore, it provides the opportunity of creating a work that could serve to enrich the worldwide community (Fox Piven & Cloward, 1979; Kitschelt, 1986; Putman, 1988; Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992; Johnston, et al., 1994; Tarrow, 1995; Giugni, et al., 1998; Giugni, et al., 1999; McAdam, 1999; Tilly, 2004; della Porta, et al., 2009; della Porta, et al., 2013)

1.5.2 Classical Social Theory

Classical social theory sees social movements as a cause of a "strain" in the structure. Following this criterion, these theories try to answer what is the cause provoking the strains. In his book "*Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970*" Professor Doug McAdam provides a model (here observed in Figure 1) that integrates the basic ideas found in most of the classical social perspectives.

Figure1. Classical Model

Source: (McAdam, 1999)

From this figure it can be clearly observed that the classical social theory focus on a psychological state that causes disruption. The proponents following these precepts see a psychological disruption as the reason for social movements to take place. Hence, these kinds of analysts are social psychologists. As an example, the present study retakes

McAdam's brief explanation of the classical theories of Mass Theory, Status Inconsistency and Collective Behavior[13].

The "Mass Theory" advocates see it as an organism conformed by intermediate groups without a large structure integrated to the social and political life. Therefore, it is only through isolation or social "atomization" that a strain can be generated in the system creating feelings of "alienation and anxiety". Thus generating a social movement.

In the case of the theory of "Status Inconsistency", it is believed that the disparities in the individual's social ranking can create a strain. As the Mass Theory states, it is through these tensions that the individuals get "afflicted" and "atomize". If acute it can derive into a social movement.

Finally, there is the case of the "Collective behavior" theory. Although, as McAdam argues, this theory does not clearly presumes a status of inconsistency or atomization, it assumes that any sever social strain can lead to a social movement. As McAdam quotes the human behaviorist Niel J. Smelser "[…] *the more sever the strain the most likely is such an episode to appear*". (Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 , 1999)

As this brief summary shows there are three tendencies that can be found. First, the individuals are considered the object of analysis. Thus, psychological problems in the individuals are pointed as the reason for social movements to be created. Second, it is considered that the political system has no flaws or deficiencies. Therefore there is no need to analyze it. Third, as McAdam argues, this leaves out the explanation of why individuals decide to unite in a movement and why historically there has been taking place different movements (Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 , 1999).

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[13]   For further discussion please refer to: Eun-Young, N. (2008). Status Inconsistency and lifestyle among status groups: focusing on cultural capital and social capital. *DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY , 37* (2), 169-186.
Macy, M. W. (1990). Learning Theory and the Logic of Critical Mass. *American Sociological Review , 55* (6), 809-826.
Smelser, N. J. (1962). *Theory of Collective Behavior.* (N. J. Smelser, Ed.) New York, New York, USA: The Free Press.
McAdam, D. (1999). *Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 .* (D. McAdam, Ed.) Chicago, Illinois, US: Chicago University Press.

1.5.3 *"Social Movements Impact Theory" or "Outcome Theory"*

As a response to these approaches William Gamson would propose in his book "The Strategy of Social Protest" (1975) that social movements are more than causal strains. In his groundbreaking work William Gamson analyzes 53 social movements in the United States between the periods 1800 and 1945. This author's work served to modify the traditional image and produce a new discussion when analyzing social movements.

In his analysis Gamson outlined the constants observed in the groups and established the parameters to understand social movements. At the same time, the author created a ramification to the social movement theory by measuring its success and impacts. Gamson uses the term "challenging group" when referring to social movements and identify them as antagonistic of the political system. Through the term challenging group, he establishes that these have a "formal organization"[14] and it is an entity that is capable of hold meetings, planning, issuing statements, calling demonstrations and raise money. Furthermore, Gamson states that in order to understand the nature of these groups it is important to differentiate their three types of "target"[15]: He states that it is only through this antagonism

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[14]   By "formal" Gamson says that the level of formality varies. For some groups the idea of membership may not be further than a psychological commitment to be part of the group. To illustrate this he mentions the example of being a member of the Democratic or Republican Party. For others, Gamson mentions, a complete protocol of membership may be required such as: "*blood oaths or other rituals*". As he states: "*formal or informal an organization has name that has taken or given by others*". (The Strategy of Social Protest, 1975).

[15]   The targets Gamson mentions are:
1)   Target of influence: Is a set of individuals, groups or social institutions that must alter their decisions or polices in order for a challenging group to correct a situation to which it objects. This target is the object of actual or planned influence by the group that Gamson calls "antagonist".

2)   Target of mobilization: Are those individuals or groups whose resources and energy the group seeks in carrying out its efforts to change. These are called the group's "constituency". There are two ideas behind the usage of the notion of mobilization:

a) Activation of commitment: This is concerning the efforts to move those individuals that are already committed to a particular action (those who are already members of a cause).

b) The creation of commitment: Is the idea of a change from a low generalized readiness to act, to a high-generalized readiness to act collectively (When a high readiness is present, a minimal effort is needed to make the individuals to act, and vice versa).

3)   Target of benefits: Are those individuals or groups whom the challenging group hopes will be affected positively by the changes that it seeks from its antagonist. The target group to be the benefit from this objective is called "beneficiary". Nevertheless, the changes will affect everyone more or less equally whether they are members other group's constituency or not. (Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 1975)

and constituency that these groups can be identify. To further back these ideas he observed, he provides two criteria that will be followed by these groups:

a) *It must be seeking the mobilization of an immobilized constituency*: A group is no longer a challenging group once it can call upon an already mobilized constituency whenever it decides to attempt influence. He states, that even established groups are continuously making efforts to maintain its members commitments and its apathy. (Interest groups are excluded)

b) *Its antagonist lies outside of its constituency*: Only those who challenge legislations, governmental policies, etc. are considered in this category. Those groups targeting influence within their ranks[16] and are not looking to influence others outside cannot be include in this description.

Finally to complete Gamson's sketch of the challenging groups, he argues there is a level of "success" and the tendency he observed is that the most violent are the more successful. First the term of "success" is defined by Gamson as a set of outcomes that can be classified in two categories: the "acceptance"[17] of the challenging group by its antagonists as a valid spokesman, and whether the beneficiary gains "new advantages"[18]. Second, through his study Gamson found that 60 percent of the organizations strengthened their cause within

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[16] Gamson puts the example of messianic or utopian communities that are looking to improve their member's lives by changing their way of living. These are excluded. (Gamson, 1975)

[17] The "acceptance" within a society Gamson argues is a relationship between the challenging group and its antagonists that is constantly changing. At the beginning, he says, is passive or active hostility, or indifference at best. The acceptance entails changing from these positions to a positive relation. Therefore, acceptance consist of:
1) Consultation: this must involve some degree of initiative of by the antagonist (individual accepting the group). For example, when the antagonist invites some members of a group to assists an open hearing of the legislative body as is within their interest. But when the group asks to join this invited it is not within the consultation parameter.
2) Negotiations: if the antagonist is willing to enter negotiations with a group consistently and not only when there is a crisis.
3) Formal recognition: when the antagonists make a formal written recognition of the acceptance of a group as a spokesman of his/her interests.
4) Inclusion: this is the type of acceptance that is characterize by the inclusion of challenging group leaders or members in positions of status or authority in the antagonist's organizational structure. It is important that the challenging group members maintain their status formally or informally. (Gamson, 1975)
[18] Gamson argues that in assessing the achievements of benefits "new advantages", the groups own perspectives and aspirations are the starting point. Gamson leaves it open to the interpretation of the researcher to whether the benefits have been "real". To assess this, he argues, is to take into account the benefits that propose that life of people will improve if certain things can happen. If these take place then it can be regarded as new advantages realized. In this way the perspective of the group is taken into consideration. (Gamson, 1975)

the society and 75 percent gained new advantages for their beneficiary. Gamson says that if the group reaches its ultimate goal the challenging group would stop to exist, collapse and form other movements or evolve into new objectives.

Thence, through this explanation Gamson argues that challenging groups can obtain and mobilize resources (money and people) to their cause and obtain "success". This idea contents the Pluralistic perspective of looking at these groups as depending on political context (as it is there where the power lays) and their relative weakness to reach objective. These ideas over the social movements locked the discussion on the topics of a positive "success", disruption/moderation (non-violent vs. violent movements) and internal/external explanations (strength of a movement vs. context in which it moves) (Gamson, 1975; Giugni, et al., 1999)

The challenges presented to the idea of "success" came immediately with the publication of the book "Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed How they fail" of Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1979). In this book, through the construction of the working-class movements, it was established that not all the movements succeed or achieve a better outcome for the beneficiary or society in general. Although the authors do recognize that their intention was not to destroy the idea of a possible success, nonetheless, they recognized that there is also the possibility of negative outcomes.

Piven and Cloward argue that the social context served to limit the actions of the movements. For example, they argue that during 1930's and 1960's industrial workers in the United States managed to secure concessions for their acts of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, as they were vulnerable due to internal leadership problems and external relation with the elites, members disbanded and the bureaucratic organizations that were created collapsed. Therefore, this supported the idea that disorganized and disruptive people threaten a challenging group structure. This perspective was highly criticized. Gamson produced an essay refuting the idea in which it was accepted that outcomes were not all positives nevertheless his observation already contemplated the continuous struggle of keeping a movement active. (Gamson & Schmeidler, 1984).

Gamson's work was continued by other scholars to prove and improve his original findings. The findings were more clearly imprinted in the collaborative work that produce the book "*How Social Movements Matter*" (Giugni, et al., 1999). In this work Marco Giugni argues that based on new analysis following Gamson's work, the relation between violence and success was no longer valid. In addition, through this objection Giugni countered the pluralist idea that when a "disruption" takes place there was a violent reaction to it. Giugni argues that the new tendencies, found in the works (cited in that book) of McAdam and Tarrow, Taft and Ross, showed that violence is counterproductive for the movement too. Giugni argues the new tendency of groups, though some might show eruption of violence, they push forward for concession and "moderation" (Giugni, et al., 1999).

On regards of success and failure of a social movement Giugni clearly outlines the dangers of adopting this kind of perspective. This author is supportive of Gamson's approach in taking the movement objectives as a form of measurement of success, as clearly not doing so would lead to more subjective assessment. Nevertheless, this approach poses the dangers of considering that a social movement is a homogenous entity in which all the actors have the same goals. As this author argues, not all of the results of the social movements meet their goals and sometimes it can produce other unintended positive and negative effects. An example of this was the cases presented by Piven and Cloward's here previously mentioned.

Moreover, in terms of internal and external explanations Giugni argues Gamson's work only addresses what he frames as "pluralists/elitist" controversy. This author argues, that there are problems in Gamson's argument that counters the pluralist view of social movements as: "*responsive to external demands that are not too far from proper channels (political ones)*" (How Social Movements Matter, 1999). Giughi argues that this "elitist" perspective of social movement is better argued through professor David Lipsky's theoretical argument that Giugni paraphrases as "[…] *the acquisition of a stable political resources that do not rely on third parties is an essential condition for challengers to be successful in the long run*" (Giugni, et al., 1999). Through this idea, Guigni argues the discussion can be centered on resources mobilization and the political process. From these

arguments the discussion would move forward in the community dividing them into two sides. On one side, those who saw a relative "weakness" in the social movement due to the lack of resources. In the other, those that defended that social movement have resources, a disruptive potential to create change and make a favorable political opportunity structure (Giugni, et al., 1999).

1.5.4 Social Movements Impact Theory and Collective Action, reshaping the debate

The remarkably contribution of Professor Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow comes in to shape the ideas around social movements. These two authors would found in each other's collaboration, at times close, a stable ground to build on each other's arguments to further develop the theory and the understanding of the possible outcomes social movements. Through Tilly's use of the theory of Collective Action Tarrow would also incorporate certain elements to enrich the conceptions around it. Although all sociologists recognize the origins of these conceptions of collective action (Marx, Engels Lenin and Gramsci), these two authors rephrased the perspective and provided stable and eloquent grounds to understand them. Eventually more researchers would incorporate these ideas to their theories. (della Porta, et al., 2009). In order to understand this approach lets begin by defining collective action.

1.5.5 Collective Action

Tarrow explains that the term of "collective action" has three key elements that have been taken from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci. Tarrow argues, that Marx's answer as he confirmed "*[p]eople will engage in collective action, when their social class is in fully developed contradiction with its antagonists*." Tarrow says, that Marx and Engels managed to understand that collective action was rooted in the structure. What Marx failed to answer was "*why those who revolt fail*?" Here, as Tarrow argues, Lenin would pick up this question and offer two structural solutions. He would propose trade-union interests (to have a support of the ideas) and a guardian of the "real" interests of the worker. In this case, as

Tarrow explains, Lenin appointed him as such leader. Nevertheless, it would be the Italian politician theorist Antonio Gramsci that would realize that organization was not sufficient. Tarrow argues, that Gramsci came up with a formula to solve Lenin's structure. This consisted of two principal ideas: 1) the fundamental task of the party was to create a historic bloc of forces around the movement, and 2) was to create a cadre of "organic intellectuals" to complement other intellectuals. Thus, Tarrow argues, provided the element of culture and historicism to the structure in this "collective action" (Power in Movement, 1995).

Furthermore, Tarrow summarizes and states that collective action is in essence "*movements are sustained interactions between aggrieved social actors and allies, and opponents and public authorities*" (Power in Movement, 1995). Thus, he argues that it is in Tilly's explanation of the concept "repertoire of contention" that lays the medullar structure of a social movement and the explanation of collective action. Tarrow quotes Tilly to complete the explanation as conceived in our days as: "the whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different kinds of different individuals or groups" (Power in Movement, 1995).

Tarrow explains, based on the evolution of the concept that in its essence is a structural and cultural theorem. He explains and quotes Tilly when he says "*well established actions*", are not only what people "*do*", but he argues, it is "*what they <u>know how to do</u> and what others <u>expect</u> them to do*." (Power in Movement, 1995) Tarrow explains that these actions are a collection of activities such as sit-ins, protests, etc. Moreover, he argues that these actions change over time, but not drastically rather, as he says, "*glacially*". He explains changes in the repertoire resulted from a further intervention of the nation state in the society to retrieve taxes and wage war. Therefore, as he continues his argument, "[s]*uch structural changes lay behind the dramatic changes in the repertoire at the beginning of the modern capitalist state*" (Power in Movement, 1995).

Tarrow argues that Tilly's approach on collective action poses a problem as Tilly tries to incorporate the concept of "repertoire of contention". Tarrow argues in his work that Tilly's perspective is broad and unclear when Tilly describes it as: "[…] *social movement that*

appears as a <u>form</u> of collective action, along with the seizure of grain, the force illumination, the strike, the election rally, the demonstration and other forms of action" (Power in Movement, 1995). He states that this is a lose definition that needs to be corrected as it could denote any type of movement. Tarrow explains that Tilly's stand on collective action is that early forms of action were "*local and patronized.*" This poses, as he argues, the problem of not being able to distinguish between what allowed local movements become national and autonomous. Therefore, he argues that in order to explain this concept better, there is the need to divide between old and new repertoires. He argues that in this way it could be clear the difference the rise of national movements. Moreover, Tarrow suggests this method can reveal the "modularity"[19] of the emergence of the new repertoire.

Tarrow argues that when looking at particular movements, old repertoires have two principal characteristics. Retrieving the ideas of the French historian Marc Bloch, Tarrow identifies that: a) in old repertoire the challenger and challenged was direct and, b) the forms of collective action used were attached to the challenger's grievances and their antagonism to their enemies. Through this explanation Tarrow identifies 4 types of old collective action: Bread (periodic food riots), Belief (religion and religious conflicts), Land (customary land rights) and death (due to violent death and funerals in repressive systems).

The new modular repertoires, Tarrow explains, are more general than specific. He argues that they were more indirect rather than direct, flexible rather than rigid, focusing in a few important routines that could be adapted to the confrontation. In this way, Tarrow says: "[o]*nce used and understood it could be diffused elsewhere and employed on behalf of the broader claims of wider social coalitions.*" (Power in Movement, 1995) Tarrow argues that as new claims were spread and how others put them into practice, the older forms of collective action were provided with more general meanings and combined with new schemes. As an example of these spreading actions Tarrow puts forward the example of the

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19   By modularity Tarrow refers to: "[...] *the capacity of a form of collective action to be utilized by a variety of social actors, against a variety of targets, either alone, or in combination with other forms.*" (Power in Movement, 1995)

"barricade" in France. Originally was first appeared in the Paris neighborhoods to protect the small communities from intruders. In the eve of the revolution 1830 people from other neighborhoods in Paris had become aware of the practice and during the revolution end up serving an offensive purpose. Tarrow explains, they serve an internal and external function. They serve as protection from hostile troops and as a rally point that provided the opportunity of creating social network.

Additionally, Tarrow argues that in order for these repertoires to spread communication is basic (diffusion). The author mentions the enormous advantages that were brought since literacy and printing was invented. This way, he argues, "[w]*ith out the capacity to read, potential insurgents would have found it hard to learn of the actions of others with similar claims.*" (Power in Movement, 1995) Nevertheless, he explains, it was not as much literacy but the ownership of books, readership of diaries and pamphleteering that the message got spread.

Tarrow completes the outlook of collective action with three remaining concepts of "mobilizing structures", the "cycles of collective action" and "outcomes". Basing his conclusions on Gamson's work, Tarrow answers the question "once an opportunity appears, how is collective action diffused, coordinated and sustained? He argues, although individuals are the ones who decide to join a movement or not, it is the environment created by the leaders' movement that will influence the will of others. In collective action the leaders' role is seen with an increasingly importance. Therefore, what he calls "mobilizing structures", which are the social networks and institutions stimulating membership, are at the end very important too.

On the other hand, Tarrow explains that by cycles of collative action he refers to the opportunities that appear in the political system for collective action to appear. He states, "*It is through the political opportunities seized and created by protesters, movements and allies that major cycles of protest and revolution begins*." By this Tarrow argues that new opportunities rise when new movements and allies are created. The interaction of these new groups and alliances makes the social interaction more dense and complex. Therefore, Tarrow would argue that the most important "outcome" of opportunities created by the elite

is that protestors would create collective action. Nonetheless, most importantly the <u>waves</u> of movements looking for opportunities that serves as catalysts of mayor social changes and national power struggles. In this way, Tarrow integrates a sketch of the evolution of collective action that was absent in previous pluralistic and "Social Movement Impact Theory".

1.5.6 Current Social Movements (Collective Action) Impact Theory

Based on the previous precepts professor Charles Tilly's work would provide one of the most basic and complete structures to define current social movements. In his book "*Social Movements, 1768-2004*" Tilly clusters the ideas previously presented and introduces three key elements that can be e observed in social movements:

1) Sustained organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities
2) Employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (called the variable ensemble of performances the social movement repertoire); and
3) Participant's concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them WUNC displays). (2004)

Therefore, Tilly argues that if the observer pays close attention to this relation there could be found the "opportunity" for social movements to form and evolve. Furthermore, he explains that not only the social movements evolve but also do those who they oppose. Hence, he proposes three key interacting elements that define this gradual change:

1) Overall political environments (including democratization and dedemocratization) alter in partial independence of social movement's activity and affect its character.

2) Within the interactions that occur in the course of social movements (for example interactions between demonstrators and police), change occurs incrementally as a consequence of constant innovation, negotiation, and conflict.

3) Participants in social movements (including not only activists but also authorities and other objects of claims) communicate with each other, borrowing and adapting each other's ideas, personnel, assistance rhetoric and models of action. They also borrow, adapt, and innovate as they compete with each other for advantages or constituencies. (Tilly, 2004)

Tilly states, that social movements are not created in a vacuum but rather it is a weakness in the political system that does not meet the challenger's objectives (as seen in Gamson and the collective action). Following these concepts, Professor Doug McAdam would create a complete framework of collective action and fully integrating the idea of identity. As McAdam explains, is important for the movement to perceive a "threat", but in order to consider all types of social movements (in his case analyzing ethnic ones) it had to be identity the most important factor. As, he phrases it is the "we-ness" that was also largely responsible in creating "political opportunities structures" (POS) (Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 , 1999). In order to reflect these ideas, he provides the figure here observed here in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Dynamic interactive model for analyzing the emergence of Contentious Politics

Source: (McAdam, 1999)

Thus these concepts would complete the ideas first proposed by Gamson. Although, in collective action we found repeated several ideas presented in Gamson's work, it is the full development of collective action that solves the problems originated in Gamson's approach. Thence, the complications of analyzing social movements as a unitary actor, not having clear whether social movements are a product of an external or internal consequences, the leadership in the group and their evolution; is better solved through collective action. Hence, McAdam's framework of collective action provides an entire cycle in which social movements emerge, interact with those who they oppose and evolve. Finally, with the integration of these concepts it can be address the implications of a social movement in an international level.

1.5.7 Social Movements in the international arena

Professor Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi in the coauthored book "Social Movements in a globalizing world", argue that globalization has been impacting social movements. (2009) To define globalization Della Porta and Kriesi takes support on the definition provided by Anthony Giddens in his book "*Runaway World, How Globalization is reshaping our Lives*" (2000). They state that globalization implies "*the creation and intensification of 'worldwide' social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa*" (Social Movements in a Globalizing World: an Introduction, 2009). These authors state that the growing importance of international, transnational and supranational factors, in which nation states take part will continually shape the their political life. Hence, these developments will impact the society and provoking new types of mobilization.

Della Porta and Kriesi argue that a new is model is needed to understand these developments. These authors supported on Jeffrey W. Knopf's ideas in his book "*Beyond Two-level games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations*" (1993) defends that there are three new types of interactions:

    a) Transnational interactions between social movements of different countries, and

b) Transnational interactions between governments of different countries and cross-level interactions between governments in one country and the government of another.

Thence, they propose that the communication takes place as it is observed in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Model to track international relations based on Putman's concepts.

Source: (della Porta & Kriesi, 2009)

Through this model put together by della Porta and Kriesi, the authors locate as central in the analysis the diffusion of the movements. These authors argue that the "global village" provides the opportunity of creating and maintaining direct interpersonal and interorganizational ties. Moreover, David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford explain that there are three principal conditions for diffusion to take place: 1) the item or pattern being diffused is of interest or utility to both the transmitters and the adopters; 2) both the transmitting unit and the adopting unit share a number of similar cultural and/or structural characteristics that constitute the basis for mutual identification, and 3) the transmitting and adopting units are linked together relationally through social networks, non-relationally through the various media or by both. (Alternative Types of Cross-national Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena, 2009)

Finally, della Porta and Kriese explain that "international opportunities" (like "political opportunities structure") present themselves in different forms. The one that interests the current analysis is the "Two-level game" presented by Robert D. Putman in the in his article "*Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*" (1988). Putman argues that international relations and domestic politics are untangled but other theories do not recognize this. As he explains, negotiations and agreements in the international arena cannot simply be analyzed only on an international or domestic perspective. Putman says, it is important to understand that in each country there are political structures, interests groups, and factions pressuring their agendas. Therefore, leaders of states have to engage in a "general equilibrium" between the states' interactions at a national and international level.

Putman argues that international negotiations involve a "two-level game". The first is the international level, when the negotiators of different countries meet and engage to reach an agreement. In this level what matters are the skills of negotiators and through them governments search to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, at the time they try to minimize adverse consequences of foreign developments. As Putman's argues, and was previously explained, the central decision-makers cannot ignore any of the two games, as long as their countries remain interdependent but sovereign.

On the other hand, the second level is the ratification process that takes place in each country. At the national level, all depends on the political, factional and the interest groups structure. Therefore, the internal debate can propel or undermine a state's position in an international arena. As the international scenario becomes increasingly important, due to globalization, societies around the world become more interested in those developments. Thus, della Porta and Kriesi argue that this provides an international opportunity for social movements to interact.

Furthermore, Della Porta and Kriesi explain that in this interconnected world a social movement taking place in a country can make reference or be reference to people or governments of another. (Putman, 1988; della Porta, et al., 2009). To this idea Tilly complements by explaining: "[i]*n the intermediate zone of negotiation, people respond to*

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opportunities and threats generated by top-down processes, employing bottom-up networks to create new relations with centers of power." (Social Movements, 1768-2004, 2004) Thence, through these observations, it opens the ground for the present analysis. Thence, current study is interested to analyze if a social movement in one country (Hong Kong) has been used as a reference to the people of another (Taiwan) to renew the "international opportunity" created by the ECFA agreement.

Summary

Let us summarize the concepts presented in this literature review. As seen, the understanding of social movements has not been without complexity. The current scopes in which they are approached have different stages. The concepts proposed by the classical view were challenged by Gamson's work, creating a complete new paradigm in the analysis of social movements and their impacts. Tarrow and Tilly reshaped the approach through the explanation of collective action and provided us with three key elements to distinguish them. Through Tilly's three elements is easier to identify social movements and scrutinize their activities. Moreover, McAdam's interactive model provided us with a tangible image of the theoretical process, discussed by Tilly and Tarrow, in which these groups are engaged since their inception.

These concepts were met by della Porta and Kriesi to explain social movement's international activities. In case there is an international relation between groups (or a group and a society), these authors argue, the connection can take place in two kinds of "diffusion": direct (formal or informal links) and indirect (through mass media and cultural linkage).

Finally, through Putman's "Two-level game" it can be argued that there can be an interaction between societies and social movements of two distinct countries. As della Porta and Kriesi argue the "international opportunities" created by an international agreement, can create the capacity for a social movement to serve as a reference. Thence another country's society, or social movements, can use it to challenge the ratification of the negotiation.

Chapter 2 Taiwan's Case

In this section of the study it will be provided the supporting ground to understand where has the political opportunity structures in Taiwan emerged. For this reason the present chapter will be divided as follows. First, it will be provided a cross-strait relations preamble to understand the political nature and further political developments in Taiwan stemmed from the relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Second, the analysis will address the political tendencies found during the mandate of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and how these have created a conflict with the rising Taiwanese identity. Third, the Anti-Media Monopoly example will serve to illustrate the idea that a mixture between political opportunity structures in addition to the tilting policies toward the PRC created the opportunity for activist to accumulate a series of aggravations. Forth, the study will provide an overview of the negotiations of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), an explanation of its content, its ratification process, and the legal loopholes that led activists and other members of the society to protest over its remaining sections. Fifth, the study will provide an overview of the reasons and events that led students and activists to create an alliance, regardless of their particular claims, to reject the ratification of the CSSTA through the Sunflower movement. Sixth, and final, the study will dedicate a section to understand the importance of the Sunflower movement, the strategy and logistics employed, which translated into its success.

2.1 Cross-strait relations preamble

The relation between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been changing since 1979. These changes have generated a direct effect on the way people living in the ROC perceive the actions of the PRC. During Mao Zedong leadership, the PRC always defended the idea of "One China" and Taiwan was part of it. This ideal was not possible because United States backed the government in Taiwan, allowing it to subsist. Nevertheless, in 1979 the United States changed its policy towards

the PRC that led to the normalization of the U.S.-China relations. This approach between the U.S. and the PRC made ROC to start losing ground against PRC's definition of "One China policy". Immediately Taiwan suffered an abrupt change of its international status, from once having the support of the super power to be in complete isolation. (Huang & Li, 2010)

In the light of these events and in the same year, 1979, the PRC's Standing committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) gathered to send a message to the "Compatriots of Taiwan". The message stated a change in the PRC's policy from a military liberation of Taiwan to a "peaceful reunification with the motherland". This idea will later will be designated the "three links" (because it suggested direct postal, trade and transportation links) and "four exchanges" (free flow of exchange of relatives, tourists, academic and cultural groups, and sport representatives). Following this guideline, on September 1981 Ye Jianying (葉劍英) Chairman of the NPC's Standing Committee delivered a public statement through Xinhua News Agency under the title of "Policy on Return of Taiwan to the Motherland and Peaceful Reunification". This message contained nine points[20] (which later would be named the "nine proposals"). The following year on January 11, 1982 Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) indicated that this nine proposals could be interpreted as "one country, two systems". To complement these ideas, Deng would set forward six more points[21] that would create a clear panorama of the peaceful reunification. (Cai, et al., 2011)

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[20]   The nine proposals are:
1)   The CCP and KMT conduct negotiations on an equal basis for two-party cooperation of a third time.
2)   Both sides reach agreement on the establishment of postal, trade and transportation links as well as family and relative visit, tourism and academic, cultural and sports exchanges.
3)   After reunification, Taiwan could enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and maintain its armed forces.
4)   Taiwan's existing socio-economic system would remain unchanged, as would its way of life and tis economic and cultural relations with foreign countries.
5)   Taiwan's politicians and other representative individuals of Taiwanese society would assume senior positions in national political bodies and participate in running the state.
6)   When Taiwan experiences financial difficulty, the central government could offer financial support as appropriate.
7)   Anyone in Taiwan who wishes to settle down in the mainland, regardless of his/her ethnic and social background, will be guaranteed for proper arrangement without discrimination as well as freedom of entry and exit.
8)   Taiwanese businesses are welcome to invest and establish various kinds of business undertakings in the mainland, and their legal rights and profits would be protected.
9)   Reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese, and therefore suggestions on state affairs from people of all ethnic groups and all social groups in Taiwan are sincerely welcomed. (Anlin, 2011)
[21]   The six points proposed by Deng Xiaoping are the following ones:

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To these developments Taiwan leaders would react and move to put forward counter proposing measures. In 1987 president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) would take the decision to permit mainlander veterans to visit their families and relatives through a "third port" and in this way opening the contact in the Strait. The increasing contact led to the creation of the National Unification Council (NUC) that issued the Guidelines for National Unification (GNU). As these organisms and guidelines came in place, it would also come the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). In correspondence Beijing also introduced the proper institutional platform called: Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) (Cai, et al., 2011). The first meeting of the SEF and ARATS delegations on March 23, 1992, will serve to discuss how to apply the one-China principle in the cross-strait relations. The debate generated different resolutions from both sides all through 1992 and then after. Despite several meetings no clear outcome came from them but one statement that would found in all the declarations: "there is one China but both sides have different interpretations of what does this means". Later on these talks would be incorrectly refer to as the "1992 Consensus"[22] (Huang & Li, 2010).

The talks would continue through these mechanisms reaching levels never seen since 1949. In on April 27-29, 1993 the "Singapore Koo-Wang Joint Agreement" would take place.

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1) The core of the Taiwan issue is reunification of the motherland, and "peaceful reunification has become the common aspiration of both the CCP and the KMT"
2) Taiwan's "absolute autonomy" could not be endorsed, as the "absolute autonomy" of the island is equivalent to "two Chinas".
3) "Different systems could remain across the Straits, but the People's Republic of China (PRC) should be the sole representative of China in the international community".
4) "After reunification, as a special administrative region, Taiwan could maintain its autonomy and adopt a different system from that in the mainland with its own independent judiciary with the final adjudication kept in Taiwan, with its own army as long as it poses no threat to the mainland, while the central government would not send administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan". Instead, "the central government would reserve some positions for Taiwan".
5) "Peaceful reunification by no means implies the mainland's absorption of Taiwan. Needless to say, it doesn't imply Taiwan's absorption of the mainland either".
6) A proper way for peaceful reunification is "to hold talks between the two parties on an equal footing to achieve a third round of KMT-CPP cooperation, rather than talks between the central and local governments. Once the two sides have reached an agreement, it can formally proclaim. But under no circumstances will we allow any foreign country to interfere. Foreign interference would simply mean China is still not independent, and that would lead to endless future troubles." (Anlin, 2011)

22   As Jung Huang and Xiaoting Li, argue in their book "Inseparable Separation The making of China's Taiwan policy"(2010), Koo Chen-fu would explain, Taiwanese business man and diplomat involve in the 1992 talks, that the use of the word "consensus" it is a mistake as there was no agreement on this. Therefore the correct way to call these converging ideas was rather an "understanding". (Huang & Li, 2010)

The talks between the negotiators Wang Daohan (汪道涵) [PRC] and Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) [ROC] would set forward the Agreement on the Use and Verification of Notary Certificates Across the Straits, the Agreement on Inquiry of and Compensation for [Lost] Registered Mail Across the Straits, and the Agreement on the Mechanism of ARATS-SEF Contact and Talks. These negotiations opened two different paths for political and economic interactions (Huang & Li, 2010).

The political path would follow a road with constant setbacks, twist and turns as it was and it is the most delicate one. Since the rapprochement between PRC and the ROC, the latter would continue to strive for international independence, avoidance of ultimate obliteration and absorption, as it would be natural. Being established this; therefore, it was not strange that just after 1993 "Singapore Koo-Wang Joint Agreement", Taiwan authorities put forward a plan to join the UN. On the following year, 1994, President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) strived for reasons to deteriorate the relations with the PRC (Anlin, 2011). This led to the proper reaction from Beijing. The PRC released in 1993 through the Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council joint the "white paper" on "The Taiwan Issue and Reunification of China". This was on the purpose to confirm Beijing's stand, which considers that Taiwan belongs to the Mainland. Subsequently, in 1995 Jiang Zemin would deliver his speech of "Continue to Strive for Accomplishment of the Great Cause of National Reunification" with his eight-point proposal[23]. In June 7th 1995 President Lee

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[23]   The eight points presented by Jiang Zemin are:
1) "Adhering to the 'one China' principal is the basis of and prerequisite for peaceful reunification," opposing any words and activities in support of "Taiwan Independence," "split a separation of the country," and "staged two Chinas'".
2) "We do not have objection to the development of non-governmental economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and other countries," but oppose Taiwan's activities of "expanding international living space" aimed at creating "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan".
3) "It has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations on peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Straits", and "on the premise that there is only one China, we are prepared to talk with the Taiwan authorities on any matters," including all matters that concern the Taiwan authorities. As a first step, negotiations could be conducted to reach an agreement on "the formal ending of the state of cross-Straits hostility under the 'one China' principle." "On the basis thereof, both sides could jointly assume responsibilities to maintain China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and plan for the future development of cross-Straits relations".
4) "We should try our best to achieve the peaceful reunification of China and the Chinese should not fight against the Chinese."
5) "We should spare no effort to develop cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation" and "prevent cross-Strait economic cooperation from being impeded by political disagreement."
6) "The 5000-year splendid Chinese culture created by the sons and daughters of all ethnic groups of China has consistently remained a spiritual tie that holds all the Chinese people together and constitutes an important basis for the peaceful reunification of the motherland."

while in the United States would respond to these eight points with another speech showing increasing search of independence. The situation would lead the third cross-strait crisis[24] in which the United States had to show military support for Taiwan to avoid any military retaliation from the PRC. This event would bring together a strong interaction of the three key players in the process achieving peace talks: PRC, ROC and the U.S (Huang & Li, 2010).

The PRC suspected of the U.S. as the pillar backing Taiwan's independence. Nevertheless, the U.S., would assert in repeated occasions, as it was clear the first time with Clinton's 1998 "three noes"[25], which it would not support Taiwanese leaders if the endeavors they pursued deviated the country from the one China policy and peaceful talks.

From this moment onward a new wave of tension would come in 2000. There were two factors that constrained the situation: 1) during Lee Teng-hui's last year in power, 1999, Tsai Ying-wen (secretary general of the ROC's national security council) encouraged scholars to produce a legal disassociation of the PRC, this would be called the "two states theory"[26]; and 2) the change of power in Taiwan when the Democratic Progressive Party's

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7) "We will fully respect our Taiwan compatriots' lifestyle and desire to be their own master and protect all their legitimate rights and interests."
8) "We welcome the leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland in an appropriate capacity." In the meantime, "we are also ready to accept invitations to visit Taiwan" to "discuss state affairs." (Huang & Li, 2010)

[24]   The first and second Taiwan crisis took place in 1955 and 1958 respectively. In each occasion the PRC tried to seize control of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the ROC. Both occasions ended when the United States interceded on behalf of ROC government. (Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State, 2015)

[25]   For further information please refer to:
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=polisci-faculty-publications

[26]   The "two states" theory was created to break the one China paradox that would eventually ROC's position vis-à-vis PRC. The recounts of this theory that would never see the light, is still classified, comes from to principal strong sources: Ex-president Lee Teng-hui and former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Committee (MAC) Su Chi. It was based on the proposition of the scholars that studied the case and concluded the following:
-   All historical links between Taiwan and Mainland China had to be downplayed. Specifically, Taiwan had to forsake the KMT's long-standing claim that "the ROC has been in existence since 1912" because the "ROC" was merely a national title that had to be retained for the present. Moreover, that claim instilled a historical meaning in the "ROC" and made it more difficult for Taiwan to abandon that title in the future. Additionally, Taiwan had to relinquish some other claims of the KMT's, including that "China is under divided rule" and that "the ROC has been divided by the Taiwan Strait since 1949." This was because it only put emphasis on historical links. Taiwan had to avoid mentioning this in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation in the future.
-   There could not be further mention of reunification; instead Taiwan should adopt the vague term of "integration". This term of reuniting should be avoided in the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines.

candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. Although Chen tried to assure Beijing on his speech of the "Five Noes" (where he promised Taiwan will follow a peaceful path and no independence would requested if Beijing did not use its military force), Beijing did not seem convinced. A letter was sent to senior officials of the Communist Party warning about Chen's dubious intentions, would set the guideline of the perception of Taiwan under Chen's leadership.

Therefore, soon after the theory of "two states" was created, it emerged in Chen Shui-bian's speeches in different occasions. This would serve to justify Beijing's attitude to increase the number of ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan (Huang & Li, 2010). The situation would maintain a high level of tension between the three actors, but a new cycle in the relation would be achieved by the George W. Bush administration calming Beijing's fears.

After the third cross-strait crisis, President George W. Bush would announce a huge arms sale to Taiwan and, at the same time, would send the former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to assure Beijing. This was to assure that if Taiwan took a unilateral action affecting the current status of the negotiations the U.S. would not defend the island and it would only defend the island if Beijing attacked. This would set a new trend that would continue regardless of Chen's continues acts to push "the envelope".[27]

- There should not be more mention of one China. That meant rejecting all KMT's formulas like: "one country, two governments", "one country, two equal political entities". The same would have to be done with the 1992 Consensus, as the new interpretation had to be that only has the "spirit" of what is search for.

- Taiwan should establish a strict national security network to oversee and monitor the cross-strait exchanges.

- The existing ROC constitution had to be amended to change article 4 referring to the territory of the ROC. It would no longer be all China but now it would only refer to Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu. Furthermore, it should provide plebiscites to underline the concept of popular sovereignty and delete the term "prior to national reunification". Finally, the term "mainland area" or "the Chinese Communist authorities" had to be change for "the People's Republic of China" or simply "China" and the also change the terms "two areas" or "equal political entitles [of one China]" to "two states".

- In terms of foreign policy Taiwan should strive to distinguish itself more clearly from China using for membership in the UN or other international organisms. The name to use would no longer be "Chinese Taipei", instead it would be "Taiwan" or "the ROC of Taiwan". (Huang & Li, 2010)

[27]   President Chen Shui-bian never lost his impulse to search for a more independent Taiwan and always seek for further recognition. The reaction of Beijing would not follow the solution seen during 1995-96 crises. Instead, PRC leaders had learned to integrate to their rhetoric a friendly version. In this new position PRC leaders denounced to be open to talk to all the Taiwanese and even those separatist forces (DPP members and President Chen Shui-bian). This friendly position would neutralize any further friction between the U.S. and Beijing, regardless of Taiwan's actions (Huang & Li, 2010).

The rise to power of Hu Jintao would adjust the rhetoric of Beijing to be harmonious with the "peaceful rise". Hu was interested in not creating unnecessary friction between the PRC and the U.S. during the process of the rise of China, in which Taiwan was key. Therefore, Hu would maintain a guideline in his speeches of "peace, stability, and development". This of course did not affect any "soft push" to an "early reunification of the Motherland" that followed the same rhetoric. Hu would generate a four-point initiative for an Anti-Secession Law (ASL), to make clear to the "separatist forces" the following: 1) Never wave adhering to the one-China principle; 2) Never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification; 3) Never stop placing hope in the Taiwan people; 4) Never make compromises in opposing the separatist activities aimed at Taiwan independence.

The creation of the law in 2005 left enough margins in the definition of the one-China principle to avoid any fears within separatists in Taiwan that the island would be immediately annexed. In a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee in Washington between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Japan's foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura, they declare that the "common objective" in the Asia-Pacific was to "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue". This led to the assurance to Hu that all the countries would work for achieving peaceful resolution (Huang & Li, 2010).

In Taiwan the situation created a divided reaction. On one hand, Pan-Greens maintained an anti-ASL position and they even created a mass rally. On the other, the Pan-blues hurry to declare that Taiwan's destiny was sealed and it was the time to create a new policy to approach the eventual reunification with the Mainland China. On July 2005, Ma Ying-jeou would become the KMT chairmanship at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Hu would limit to mention in his congratulation letter his desire for cooperation between parties. The battle Pan-Greens and Pan-blues would continue the bickering over which perspective would prevail regarding this issue will continue until the presidential election of March 20, 2008 when Ma Ying-jeou was declared the victor. The result came as a relief for the PRC. Nevertheless, Ma would pledge in his "three noes" that under his presidency there would not be a discussion with Beijing over reunification, no support to push for *de jure* independence and no use of force.

Apparently, as the authors Jing Huang and Xiaoting Li argue, this was because Ma had adopted Lee Teng-hui concept of the "new Taiwanese" that defined its national identify by its democratic system rather than the ethnicity –Chinese or Taiwanese-[28] (Huang & Li, 2010). Nonetheless, President Ma would have to recognize the economic interdependence between Taiwan and China. The economic relationship had reached such levels that in the minds of the people it would be very difficult to recognize the thin line between economic and political issues.

The economic path followed across the strait had been dynamic and with a high level of interrelation. The economic reforms pushed by Deng Xiaoping and that took place during 1979 in China, drove the attention of Taiwanese investment. As investment was restricted on those years, transactions had to be made from other points outside Taiwan, as it were the cases of Hong Kong or the Cayman Islands. After the ban was lifted in 1993, investment rose even more. From that point onward, the investment process would follow three principal stages.

The first stage took place in the early 1990's and was constituted by the migration of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with labor-intensive products. The second stage developed in the late 1990s when high tech Taiwanese firms relocated their assembly lines in the Yangtze River Delta region. The third stage started in 2005 when many service-oriented business began to settle their business in the coastal cities of China. (Wang & Tseng, 2015)

Therefore it is not strange to find that already in the early 2000s China accounted for over 42 percent of Taiwan's total approved outward investment, according to the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan. During the period from 1991 to 2008 the investment from Taiwan to China has spread to all areas reaching 60 percent of all the Taiwanese foreign investment. At the same time, the commodity export market has change from the U.S., as

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[28]   This point would be later discussed in the identity section.

principal buyer, to China. Hence, it is not strange that in 2007, just before Ma Ying-jeou was declare president, trade between China and Taiwan had reached a record high of $ 102.3 billion US Dollars (Wang & Tseng, 2015; BBC News, 2010; Lu, 2013). It was clear that although the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian governments' were characterized by political distance from Beijing, in terms of economy the cross-strait trade grew like never seen before.

2.2 Ma's tilting policies to China and the clashes with the Taiwanese identity

Since Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office in May 2008 Taiwan position towards the People's Republic of China changed to seek further dialogue and agreements. The change of policy came as relief for the PRC and the United States that had been dealing with the dubious position adopted by Chen Shui-bian. On one hand, that moment it seemed that the times of constrains and crisis in cross-strait relations would be replaced for a search of a real consent and harmonization of both sides. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it seemed that president Ma decided to belittle the strength the Taiwanese identity had been gathering during the DPP government. This would prove to be a serious mistake in the years to come.

Since Lee Teng-hui took the presidency in 1988, the process of building a Taiwanese identity[29] was put forward reverting the Chinese identity[30] traditionally enforced by the KMT. Lee Teng-hui aimed to reestablish the history of the aboriginal people of Taiwan,

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[29]   The Taiwanese identity promoted by Lee Teng-hui was of a "new-era Taiwanese", which was a citizen of the island nation of Taiwan and acknowledge himself as such (and also as the president did in his time) regardless of his/her ethnicity, culture, customs, language and religion. The main objective of President Lee was to avoid the PRC ventured and divided Taiwanese people through a united front strategy. (Hsiu-chuan, 2013)

[30]   The Chinese identity defined by Da-Chi Liao, Boyu Chen, and Chi-chen Huang is the idea of belonging to the Chinese culture, which is largely followed by those who are ethnically Han Chinese. The historical reference is the Yellow Emperor, which is regarded as the initiator of the Chinese civilization. During Chiang Kai-shek's retreat the indoctrination of the "Chinese identity" was a standard during 50 years. Any "Taiwanese identity" was oppressed following the same purpose. (Liao, Chen, & Huang, 2013)

and building on the idea that the people living in Taiwan should embrace this fact. In terms of policy, the democratization process brought by Lee with his acceptance of the victory of the Wild Lily movement[31] made logical the process of building a new identity, as there was no need of justifying the government by suppressing local culture. In terms of the development of the society, as time passed by the population was losing the strong ties with the mainland and the sons of those who originally came with Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, started to identify Taiwan as their new home. Therefore, as Lee Teng-hui noted in his reelection speech of 1996 (the first election held under a direct competition), he said: "we must encourage the concept of a New Taiwanese" (Danielsen, 2012).

The "New Taiwanese" could be interpreted, as Lee Teng-hui refer to himself in several occasions, as Taiwanese who is also Chinese. This concept not only denoted the set of ideas that were proper of President Lee Teng-hui but actually reflected the transition that was being lived in the Taiwanese society. In accordance to this new identity, the educational system started to adopt more history of Taiwan in the textbooks so the new generations were acquainted and appreciated this reality (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Education in Taiwan since 1932

Generation	Main education
First generation: Born before 1932	Hoklo received Japanese education; Mainlanders received Chinese education
Second generation: Born between 1933 and 1960	Chinese identity oriented education, with 6 years of compulsory education
Third generation: Born between 1961 and 1980	Chinese identity oriented education, with 9 years of compulsory education
Fourth generation: Born between 1981 and 1988	Implementation of "Getting to Know Taiwan" courses began in 1997

Source: (Liao, Chen, & Huang, 2013)

31   Students that seek a democratic rule in Taiwan made this social movement. President Lee invited students to presidential palace to listen to their requests. The victory of the movement came when President Lee proceeded to make the legal arrangements to build the current democratic rule that is lived in Taiwan. For further information please refer to the following link: http://myhero.com/hero.asp?hero=WLM_kshs_TW_2010_ul

Later on, when President Chen Shui-bian came to power in 2000 he change his approach toward identity to be more assertive on the breakup with the Mainland. Since the beginning of his mandate Chen refer to himself as "huaren" (華人), which entailed Chinese but had a much broader sense in its use, rather than a direct link of coming from the Mainland. Along with the new rhetoric came the structural changes sent a clear message to the population.

Hence, to assert the change names and symbols of the governmental institutions were modified. Such was the case of the post service that went from being called "China Post" to "Taiwan Post" or in the case of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall the name was changed to Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall and the military personal guarding the memorial was removed. Additionally, Chen tried in several occasions to use "Taiwan" instead of "Chinese Taipei" as the official name in the United Nations and other international organizations.

Finally, as seen in the previous section of this chapter, Chen Shui-bian constantly intended to push for independence and manage a state-to-state policy in the relations with the PRC (Danielsen, 2012; Corcuff, 2012). All of these variables had an effect on the population. Without surprise year after year of building the idea of a Taiwanese identity in the new generations created a new tendency that started to be reflected in the polls. Now the trend shows that the "Chinese" and the "Taiwanese/Chinese" identity has been ceding their places to the "Taiwanese" as it appears in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Identity in Taiwan

臺灣民眾臺灣人／中國人認同趨勢分佈 （1992～2014.12）
Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese
as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU(1992～2014.12)

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Acknowledging this new reality, President Ma would try to address the situation through oppression. Anticipating that changes in his policy, Ma decided to use new legal tools to make effective the transition. Such was the case when just a few months after Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency, on November 2008, the Parade and Assembly Act (集會遊行法), which allowed the government to crack down the protests, serve to stop in a rather violent way the one led by the DPP against the visit of Chen Yunlin (at the moment chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait). The crackdown showed the clear danger of the use of the Parade and Assembly Act, which led to a mobilization of the so called "seventh graders" (those Taiwanese citizens born during 1981-1991) to demand the modification of the act[32] and bring to justice those policemen who used excessive force in the clearing process. The mobilization would be called the "Wild Strawberry" movement in reference to the "Wild Lily Movement" and as a mockery to the derogative term "Strawberry generation" which was given to that generation of Taiwanese due to their softness and apparently lack of political interest. The movement that started outside the Executive Yuan on November 6 2008 in Taipei would spread to other cities like Tainan, Kaohsiung, Central Taiwan, and Hsinchu. Although the authorities tried to disperse the students in several occasions, in some using beatings as a resource, the students returned and to continue the sit-ins. Finally, the relentless spirit of the students would bring a resolution. On December 24 2008, the government decided to amend the Assembly and Parades Law, abolishing the need to obtain a permit before protesting, and rendering previously prohibited areas open for protests as long as protesters maintained a "safe distance". Yet, police was granted with new powers for handling protests (Swarthmore College, 2015). Thus, President Ma understood that repressing the population views through force would not deter the new generations of their goals and in order to keep shaping the policies, subtle strategies would have to be put in place.

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[32]   In concrete the students wanted to revoke the Law's requirement of attaining a permit before lawful protests, abolishing currently restricted protest areas, and clarifying the actions that police were allowed to take in order to enforce the law (Swarthmore College, 2015).

Therefore, Ma Ying-jeou continued pushing forward the idea that the Taiwanese identity was a subdivision of the Chinese culture. Already since the beginning of his presidency Ma Ying-jeou alluded to the term "ethnic Chinese" (中華 民族) and not "huaren" (華人). The word selection by President Ma would be accompanied by his auto-denomination as president of Taiwan and China, and later by presiding a ceremony in which he honored the Yellow Emperor, the ancestor of the Han Chinese. The change of discourse would be followed, like also did in the case of President Chen Shui-bian, with the alteration of the names of the postal service back to "China Post" and renaming the National Democratic Memorial to Chiang Kai-shek's Memorial Hall.

In terms of education it was decided that more emphasis has to be done on Chinese culture. In one hand, it was suggested by the KMT to double the time dedicated to history of Chinese culture. This has provoked a series of protests led by students[33]. Moreover, the KMT maintained a persistent use of the word Guo Yu (國語) when referring to the Chinese language instead of the broader term of Hua Yu (華語). In this way the new identity projected more resemblance to a Chinese culture part of China. Moreover, in the case of the Taiwan year Book 2009 the rhetoric changed with the one of 2006, which originally stated that Taiwan was an isolated island up to the seventeen-century, to now starting the history with the beginning of the Republic of China.

The projection of Taiwan in the international arena was also shifted. Taiwan ceased all attempts to obtain a membership in the United Nations and instead focus on becoming an observer at the World Health Organization (WHO). Though these steps seemed to understand Taiwan's international reality (PRC's veto would never allow that Taiwan would be a member of the UN), the new objective of just being an observer at the WHO would be equally unfeasible. This became painfully apparent when Taiwan was accepted as an observer but was excluded from the WHO Executive Board meeting in 2010 (Danielsen, 2012).

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[33] On July 5th 2015 took place the most recent one, when hundreds of high school students gathered outside the Ministry of Education to request the modification of China-centric perspective now use in the books and return the 2009 curricula, which was Taiwan-centric (Lin S. , 2015).

The conjunction of these past events in addition to the underperformance of the economy would create a "pressure cooker" effect. President Ma's plans for cross-strait relations, identity and the new international projection of Taiwan created discomfort and rejection in the Taiwanese society[34]. Since the friction emerged with these kinds of policies, an important part of the population started to sense a detriment in their capacity of expression and the channels to do so. Social unrest would emerge in this society that felt increasingly aggrieved by the government's policies. The confirmation of this would be seen when a new movement was created when the media outlet in Taiwan ran the risk of being silenced by a Taiwanese tycoon. (Chung, 2014; Hsu & Chang , 2014).

2.3 The Anti-Media monopoly movement

The Taiwanese media started to register a sharp decrease on freedom of press since 2009. In the population worry was triggered when the Taiwanese Tycoon Tsai En-meng[35] (蔡衍明) owner of Want Want Group[36] (旺旺中時媒體集團) started to increase his shares in Taiwanese media. In that year the group pioneered on the media market when it bought the China Times Group, which at same time owned Chung Tien Television, China Television Company and China Times newspaper. Soon after the purchase according to researcher

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[34]   President Ma's approval levels started to fall since 2008 from 68 percent approval to hit a minimum of 9 percent by the beginning of 2014 (Chung, 2014)

[35]   Is a pro-Beijing businessman with significant investments in China (Freedom House, 2014).

[36]   The company is a food manufacturer from Taiwan and it is the largest business of rice cakes and flavored milk in China. (Want Want China, 2015)

Yamada Ken-Ichi[37], the news presented by all the affiliated media organizations of the China Times Group became "warmer"[38] China (Yamada, 2014).

Two years later on October 2011 the group formally proposed its intention to acquire China Network Systems (an important cable television business) that provided a large market share with access to 1.09 million households. The cable television industry in Taiwan represents 85 percent of the whole household viewing. As a system operator of a cable company the channels offered could be manipulated to comply with what the company wants to offer.

This fact gathers prominence when it is considered that each operator can carry up to 100 channels from the total 288 channels available in Taiwan. From these, generally speaking 11 are news and 25 are general channels. The fear of the news channels was (as it can be observed in Figure 3 and 4, by the availability of operators and other sources of local news), if they do not provide news favorable to China this operator might not add them to the cluster of channels.

Figure 3. Structure of Taiwanese Media outlets and tendencies

	Newspapers	Televisions
Close to Kuomintang	· China Times · United Daily News	· China Television · Chung T'ien Television · TVBS · Eastern Television
Close to Democratic Progressive Party	· Liberty Times	· Formosa Television · Sanlih E-Television
Neutral	· Apple Daily	· Taiwan Public Television Service · Era Television

Source: (Yamada, 2014)

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[37]   Yamada Ken-Ichi is a researcher from the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Media Research and Studies.

[38]   Yamada Ken-Ichi provides examples of different articles talking about cross-strait relations presented by different media outlets, and in all the China Times Group depicts a positive and contrasting version to the other media outlets. (Yamada, 2014).

Figure 4. Press freedom in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Produced from the website of the Reporters Without Borders

Source: (Yamada, 2014)

If the acquisition followed through, it would leave the media structure in Taiwan in a complicated situation. Want Want's power had provoked a high level of worrisome in different social groups in Taiwan. In the process of the negotiation over the acquisition of China Network Systems students belonging to the "Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance" (反媒體巨獸青年聯盟) led by Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆) and Cheng Tsung-yen (陳宗延) decided to protest and request the National Communication Commission (NCC) to reject the procedure. Nevertheless, on July 25th 2011 the NCC approved the acquisition with the condition that China Times' presence in the television news market had to be limited to avoid monopolization.

The approval of the acquisition provoked rejection in the Taiwanese society. Among those opposing was the media expert and associate researcher at Academia Sinica associate research Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌). Immediately after the rejection became vocal, at the end of July 2012 Want Want China Times published a report accusing researcher Huang Kuo chang of organizing the students to participate in the protest (Shan, 2012). This led to a massive protest of the columnists working for Taipei Times, shutting down their blogs and even provoked that the deputy editor of the China Times resigned. After the incident an apology was made through China Times. Nonetheless, after this event, on August 2012, Tsai Eng-meng would decide not to follow the commitment issued by the NCC of limiting China Times presence in the news market. (Harrison, 2012)

The situation sparked the mobilization of the "Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance" (反媒體巨獸青年聯盟). This group along with the Association of Taiwan Journalists (台灣新聞記者協會) and other 30 student clubs of different universities in Taiwan took the streets in September 1st 2012 in the "Anti-Media Monopoly March" (反媒體壟斷 901 大遊行). During the protests online activism became crucial to spread awareness. A page was designed on Facebook to share videos and reports, to maintain a fluid discussion and a live feed of the recent developments. In addition the Association of Taiwan Journalists used their international links to make this movement known to the outside world. In this way they would increase the support from people in journalist and other communities from different countries. (Harrison, 2012; Poon, 2012) Unfortunately, Taiwanese authorities did not manage to address the problem.

The problematic would remain regardless of the mobilizations and Want Want Group would expand its intentions of further expansion when it announced in October 2012 the interest of also buying the branch in Taiwan of the Apple Daily group (Next Media) based in Hong Kong[39]. As CEO of the Apple Daily Group, Jimmy Lai, announced his interest to divest himself from the branch in Taiwan, a group of Taiwanese investors including Tsai Shao-chung (蔡紹中), son of Tsai Eng-meng, offered US $600 million to buy Next Media. As the proposition of the acquisition was formalizing it became apparent that by acquiring Next Media Want Want would also would acquire the Apple daily newspaper. This situation created a problem for the government regulating authorities as it entailed a jurisdictional overlapping.

Originally the Government Information Office of the Executive Yuan used to be in charge of media affairs. Nevertheless, with the creation of the National Communications Commission (NCC) in 2006, the organization had the broadcast media authority transferred to it. Therefore, the problem regarding Want Want Group's acquisition of the China

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[39] The Apple Daily Group had been labeled as anti-PRC when the CEO Jimmy Lai denounced China's Prime Minister Li Peng through one of his media outlets in Hong Kong. The neutrality of this company is clear and important for the readers in Hong Kong and Taiwan. (Yamada, 2014)

Network Systems was oversee by the NCC, but Want Want's intention of acquiring the Apple Daily newspaper was not. Thus, in case the acquisition materialized the NCC could not do anything about it, because it would be send to the Fair Trade Commission and treated in a different manner as if it were any other industry.

Therefore, activists decided make a quick mobilization using Facebook. Through this space activists invited advocates to download a PDF document called "Oppose Media Monopoly, Reject the Black hand of China, uphold freedom of press, I protect Taiwan in ___ '反對媒體壟斷、拒絕中國黑手、捍衛新聞自由、我在___守護台灣". The intention was to promote that advocates around the world showed photographs in different locations[40]. The protests continued but in this time the proper authorities would maintain their stand to arrange the situation according to their proceedings.

Thus, Apple Daily case was finally handled between the NCC and Taiwan's Fair Trade Commission. The NCC acknowledge that Want Want group had not followed the preconditions imposed by the commission that included having the owners disassociate themselves from the news operations of CtiTV, a Want Want television network, and establish a system to ensure the editorial independence of their other television holdings (Freedom House, 2014). The discussions over the acquisition of Next Media by different buyers did not materialized. When the deal was cancelled Next Media decided to sell its television section to ERA Communications. The NCC approved the transaction having ERA reducing 2 channels and out of 18 cable television stations controlled by the group[41].

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[40]   Within the pictures sent, a person holding a placard in favor of the movement in Tiananmen Square was included, which hold a strong message considering the past history lived in that place in 1989. (Harrison, 2012)

[41]   The events took place as follows: "In April 2012 the proposed buyout of the Taiwan assets of the Hong Kong–based Next Media Group (Apple Daily) had collapsed, after the consortium of buyers, most of them with significant business interests in China, submitted a notice to withdraw from the NT$17.5 billion (US$600 million) deal. Next Media Group's proposed sale included Apple Daily and Next Magazine, both known for their sensational but nonpartisan coverage of Taiwanese politics and critical reporting on the Chinese Communist Party. Amid a nationwide movement against concentration of media ownership the potential buyers, including Tsai Shao-tsung, reportedly withdrew to avoid antitrust scrutiny. After the deal was called off, Next Media decided to keep its print assets and sell its television arm to Lien Tai-sheng, chairman of Taiwan's ERA Communications. The NCC approved the NT$1.4 billion (US$47 million) buyout in November with preconditions, including that ERA must relinquish 2 channels out of the 18 cable television stations controlled or distributed by the group. Lien agreed to end the company's distribution of Formosa Television News by the end of 2014 and Sanlih E-Television (SET) News by the end of 2016. The NCC also requested that ERA and Next TV have separate operations and staff for their news

Want Want Group continued to be criticized by the manipulation of the media[42], along the request of the activists to have a law that prevents these monopolistic acts. This situation spawned one further mobilization on July 28th 2013. In this occasion students belonging to the "Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance" created a series of marches that would extend until September 1st 2013 gathering in the last march up to 100,000 people, according to estimates. The mobilization led to an initiative in the Legislative Yuan to create a new anti-monopoly media law. Nevertheless, KMT politicians that have been stalling the approval of the anti-monopoly media act[43]. (Yamada, 2014; Yuan, 2014; Freedom House, 2014; Lee Y. , 2013).

As seen the intention of monopolize the Taiwanese media-outlet by the pro-China tycoon would become one more problem to be added to the rising claims. This case would join the identity dispute, the tilting policies of President Ma, and the low level of acceptance of Ma's leadership. The bickering over the ECFA agreement would provide the opportunity for a big mobilization to take place.

channels. According to local media, several rounds of layoffs reportedly took place at Next TV, which was left with less than 100 employees following the sale." (Freedom House, 2014)

[42]   As the report of the freedom house states: "A graduate school student was targeted in January, after a photo taken by her of prominent American scholar Noam Chomsky was widely circulated online. Chomsky had been invited to hold a placard with the anti–media monopoly campaign's slogans, along with text that read in Mandarin Chinese, "Say no to China's black hands." Want Want's *China Times* published a series of reports accusing the student of manipulating Chomsky, as did the group's CtiTV news channel. In an official e-mail response, Chomsky denied that he had been misled and said he hoped the interpretation did not go beyond the issues concerning media monopoly and freedom of the press. CtiTV, which had published an interview with Chomsky, later issued an apology for mistranslating his clarifying statement." (Freedom House, 2014)

[43]   Until the writing of the present study the anti-media monopoly act has not been passed. (Yuan, 2014)

2.3 ECFA and its ratification process

President Ma started to depart from the promise of the "three noes" to Beijing, when he agreed to pursue the most comprehensive agreement in the history of Taiwan-China relation. President Ma gave the impression of now following the line of thought of rapprochement that ruled the KMT since Beijing created the ASL. In order to justify this new strategy in cross-strait relations, president Ma pointed to the massive proliferation of Free Trades Agreements (FTAs) in the Asia-Pacific region during 1998-2008, as "clear sign" that Taiwan had to catch up quickly before it got excluded from the international trade. This argument was based on the fact that in the same period of time Taiwan had only signed 4 symbolic FTA's with its Latin American allies that only accounted for less than 0.2% of Taiwanese exports, which did not provided a real benefit for its exports oriented economy[44] (Hwang, 2012). This idea spawn strong critics over the veracity of President Ma's claims.

President Ma defended that the only way to avoid exclusion was to get closer to the PRC and keep developing the "three links and four exchanges". Therefore, it was decided that SEF and ARATS would meet to begin the negotiations that would bring about the signature of 18 different agreements between the PRC and ROC[45]. Overall the agreements have the objective of opening direct air and sea transportation, and postal links in the strait. Additionally now more Chinese could visit Taiwan. Furthermore, the agreements set a new level of cooperation stretching to: judicial assistances, financial and banking businesses, agricultural products, food inspection and others. Fifteen new agreements were signed during these negotiations. The most important one would be the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that was signed on June 29, 2010 in Chongqing.

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[44] Sixty percent of the Gross Domestic Product of Taiwan comes from exports. (Hwang, 2012)

[45] The total number of agreements singed reached of 15 s and three memorandums of understanding (MOU) by May 10, 2011. (Hwang, 2012)

ECFA is divided into the following five chapters: 1) general principals, 2) trade and investment, 3) economic cooperation, 4) early harvest, and 5) various other provisions[46]. In these chapters it is contemplated that both parts are interested in liberalization of trade in goods, services and further investment. Due to its spectrum, ECFA has six sub-negotiations in the areas of trade in goods, trade in services, investment, dispute settlement, industrial cooperation, and maritime customs. Therefore, at the time of the signature in 2010, the only section that was finished was the one denominated "early harvest" (which is intended to liberalize certain goods and services). This section is constituted by a list of 539 goods that gradually lowered their tariff starting January 1, 2011 till January 2013, when they reached a zero tariff. The rest of the sections had to be negotiated, including the two most important ones, which are the dispute resolution mechanism[47] and the character of the agreement[48].

The signature of ECFA, a series of eight rounds of negotiations would bring about the signature of the "Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement" on August 9, 2012. One year later, the signature of the "Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement" will follow on June 2013. Shortly after the CSSTA would be sent for its ratification. This section of the agreement would generate the strongest reactions. In part this would be due to the sensitive topics it were addressed in the section and also because already different groups in the society did not agree in the way the ratification the agreements predating ECFA was handled.

The increasing level of concern about Ma's intentions started with the signature of the fourteen agreements and three MOU's preceding ECFA. The Executive Yuan (EY) allowed SEF and ARATS to agree on establishing effective date clauses that put into force the pre-

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[46]   For further information please refer to the Appendix that contains a complete summary of ECFA's five chapters.

[47]   Since the PRC and Taiwan were recognized as members of the WTO in December 11th, 2001 and January 1st, 2002 respectively, the PRC has denied using WTO's dispute resolution process with Taiwan as it would entail its recognition as an independent international person. (Hwang, 2012; The World Trade Organization, 2015; The World Trade Organization, 2015)

[48]   The discussion is centered over the nature of the agreement. Bearing in mind that both regimes do not recognize each other as independent sovereign countries, this agreement has yet to be defined if it is an interim agreement or an international one. The first case implies that Taiwan is a province of China, but in the second case Taiwan would be an independent and sovereign country. If defined as an international, for instance, the ECFA agreement has to be reported to the WTO. If not the PRC would have a "*de jure*" claim of the "one-China" policy and the ownership over Taiwan.

ECFA treaties without the Legislative Yuan's approval. Therefore, the sixteen pre-ECFA agreements would become effective following 7 to 90 days after their signature whether the Legislative Yuan had a copy or time to read them. As Jau-Yuan Hwang argues, the EY was moving along a not well-defined regulation, in which it is still not clear if the real duty of the LY is to provide its approval for these kind agreements or not (Democratic Supervision of Taiwan-China Agreements: On the ECFA and Beyond, 2012).

According to Juan-Yuan this problematic lies in a series of legal structural deficiencies defining the role of the LY. Juan-Yuan explains that in 1991 the constitution was amended to define China as "Mainland Area" and Taiwan as "Taiwan Area". In July 1992 the LY passed the Statue Governing Relations between the Taiwan and Mainland Area, also known as "Taiwan-China Relations Statute" or "TCR Statue". In the article 2 of this statute it is established that the Mainland is part of Taiwan but does not confers any further legal status for cross-strait agreements. This divided the opinion of those who think that cross-strait relations should be consider as "intra-China" (but do not explain which law to apply the on in the PRC or ROC), and others who think that these agreements are international. The Constitutional Court would have to intervene in 1993 just after the Koo-Wang talks in Singapore that led to the four initial treaties between the PRC and ROC. The Constitutional Court provided the interpretation No. 329 to establish the following:

> "Agreements concluded between Taiwan and mainland China are not international agreements to which this interpretation relates. It should also be noted that whether or not these agreements should be sent to the Legislation Yuan for deliberation is not include in this interpretation" (Hwang, 2012, p. 18).

Finally in May 1997 the LY would amend the TRC Statute to instate a congressional supervision. Therefore in article 5, paragraph 2 provided that any cross-strait agreement in case it required to amend laws or legislations it would be submitted to the LY for its discussion. In 2003 a revised version under DPP would rearrange the same article 5 and paragraph 2, but still leaving the description unclear as it appears here:

"Where the content of the agreement requires any amendment to laws or any new legislation, the administration authorities of the agreement shall submit the agreement through the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan for consideration within 30 days after the execution of the agreement; where its content does not require any amendment to laws or any new legislation, the administration authorities of the agreement shall submit the agreement to the Executive Yuan for approval and the Legislative Yuan for record, with confidential procedure if necessary" (Hwang, 2012, p. 19).

As Juan-Yuan argues, it seems the LY should intervene when agreements take place. Nevertheless, it is inconclusive when should an agreement amend the laws or legislations. Moreover, the power of the LY is still not well grounded and this was clear when in 2008 the Agreement on Air Transportation and Agreement on the Sea were signed by SEF and ARATAS. As Juan-Yuan argues, the situation became a clear reflection of what the article 95 of the TCR Statute states:

"The competent authorities shall request the consent of the Legislative Yuan before permitting direct business transactions or direct sea or air transportation between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, or permitting the people of the Mainland Area to enter into the Taiwan Area to work, and if the Legislative Yuan fails to adopt any resolution within one month after the request during its session, the consent is deemed granted" (Hwang, 2012, p. 20)

Therefore, the LY is compelled to adopt a resolution within a short period of time (considering the administrative work and negotiation process), but if it does not do so in the designated time it is completely irrelevant, because the agreements will by authorize anyway. Hence, EY limited to provide a copy of the pre-ECFA agreements on November 2008, which were going to take force less than a month. Nevertheless, the LY still provided a resolution on December 4, 2008. Although, there is one process that provides the LY an indirect say on the agreements, which is the amendment of the laws and legislations. If there are no amendments none of the agreements can be fully be enforced, as it happened with the Air Transportation and Sea Agreement case. The proper domestic and

taxation laws were not modified immediately. Unfortunately for those people worried about Ma's intentions, ECFA did include an effective date as it is stated in article 15, which reads as follows:

> "After the signing of this Agreement, the two Parties shall complete the relevant procedures respectively and notify each other in writing. This Agreement shall enter into force as the day following the date that both Parties have received such notification from each other" (Hwang, 2012).

In this case, the EY sent the document immediately after to the LY, but clearly if there was not a careful reading of the document, it could endangered Taiwan's position because it would immediately be enforced. The DPP side of the LY argued that more time was needed and at least a three-reading procedure had to be done. The KMT, based on the resolution No. 329, rejected the idea. The debate between DPP and KMT was strong, but at the end the KMT won establishing a two-reading procedure to approve ECFA. Finally, on August 17, 2010 it was approved, immediately after SEF notify ARATS and the agreement became officially active on September 29, 2010 (Hwang, 2012). Again, the EY pushed the LY through the KMT party in the LY to follow the desires of Ma's policy, which clearly reflected the lack of a division of powers and the erosion of the democratic process in Taiwan.

2.4 The CSSTA and the Sunflower movement

As it was seen in the previous chapter the ratification process of the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement would prove to be more complicated than it was expected. Since the beginning the DPP put forward the proposition that the agreement would not be approve if a three readings process or an item-by-item revision took place. Some KMT legislators, as

Chang Ching-chung (張慶忠), were willing to accept the DPP proposition and even go further to propose public hearings so the opposing parties and social groups could analize the agreement thoroughly (Democracy at 4 am, 2014). The struggle in the LY continued strong as more people in the KMT opposed and proposed a more expedite process, by "package", to avoid any more delays[49]. The DPP denounced the KMT's move of attempting to ratify the agreement by package as not transparent and undermining the democracy in Taiwan. Different groups in the society were already aware of the situation and the recently formed Black Island Youth Nation Front[50] decided to launch a demonstration on October 11th, 2013 to show this group's disapproval of the proceedings. The protestors gathered sixty thousand people to claim that the Ma's administration was using secretive methods to ratify its agreements with the PRC, which harmed Taiwanese democracy. (Duchâtel, 2014; Chu, 2014)

The movement rose quickly as it appealed to a large number of students and other people in the society. The reason why, was mainly because among peoples' concerns, students for instance, were facing others like economic constrains that could experience an increase with the CSSTA's ratification. This mobilization provided the opportunity for students who experienced economic problems to canalize their dissatisfaction of the situation. The major difficulties faced by the students already since several years were problems like: finding a first job, low and stagnating wages, and high prices of the real estate. For young adults in Taiwan these realities had been causing increasing constrain in their development. The Taiwanese government in order to respond to these problematic decided to put forward an economic plan to provide better opportunities. But the situation was complicated. People between 15-29 years old, were faced a 9.1 percent of unemployment since 2010. For this reason it was designed in 2011 "The Employment Promotion Policy For Youth" to

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[49] The negotiations of the CSSTA ended on June 2013 and the ratification process was deeply entangled even by October 2013. (Democracy at 4 am, 2014)

[50] This group was created by group of students from National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, National Cheng Kung University, Zhongshan University, Fujen Catholic University, etc., along with other student organizations in September 5th, 2013 in reaction to the signature of the CSSTA that could put in danger the future of the labor market of the youth and other parts of the society, as well as the sovereignty of Taiwan. (Chu, 2014)

coordinate universities and companies to link educational with labor objectives[51]. Nevertheless, although the policy was in place already two years by 2013[52] it did not generate the desired results, mainly because investment had followed an outer trend in Taiwan (as it was seen in the previous chapters). Furthermore, in the process of relocating factories and jobs in other countries, like China, local market had been largely affected. A regular poll conducted by the Ministry of Labor in Taiwan found that from a sample of 4,034 respondents the average wage was NT $ 28,925, with most of the interviewees working an average of 2.1 jobs lasting 1.6 years (Taiwan Ministry of Labor, 2012; Wei & Hsu, 2015; Taiwan Ministry of Labor, 2015).

Moreover, the stagnation of income not only puts in question the quality of life of young Taiwanese but when it is mixed with scarce building space and low interests rates in the real estate market, it contributes to high property prices. Since 2009 the inheritance tax was cut from 50 percent to 10 percent allowing rich people in and out of Taiwan to buy properties. The increasing prices have reached such level that Taipei city, for instance, is considered as one of the most expensive places in the world to obtain a property. Therefore, young students or young families have no prospect of owning any living space any time soon with the meager economic conditions they face. Thus, the situation had deepened the disappointment felt by the students toward the government's policies (Liu, 2014; Guilford, 2014; Haridasani, 2015). Into this context the CSSTA was introduced. It came to add more uncertainty to the one already lived in Taiwan. This situation would set the opportunity for a large mobilization to take place, as discomfort within the society started to spread in this and the other regards previously mentioned.

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[51] It was found by the government that the skills taught in school are incompatible with work requirements, making students unqualified for acquiring Jobs. Therefore, poverty within the youth has become a real problem. To compensate this situation, students aim to study more in their search of achieving better-paid jobs, which only contributes to decrease their career experience and the skills acquired in a professional environment. (Taiwan Ministry of Labor, 2012)

[52] The results obtained by the Ministry of Labor released in March 2015 are exactly the same to the ones found in 2013. For more information please visit: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201503250019.aspx

2.4.1 The Alliance and Leaders

Thus, the Black Island Youth Nation Front (BIYNF) leaders, that had become prominent due to its protests on October 2013, continue to spread awareness. Their goals were the following:

1) The rejection of the CSSTA.
2) The establishment of a monitoring mechanism for the Legislative Yuan to have more power and the society is more involve in cross-straits rectification processes. In this way it would be avoided the "under the table" rectification of agreements.
3) Promote awareness of how does this agreement could impact small and medium business, and the labor market for young adults in Taiwan. (Democracy at 4 am, 2014)

As the BIYNF gained support and more advocates from different groups and activists of the society it become increasingly apparent that there was the opportunity to create an alliance of groups. The evolving situation would derive in the creation of a coalition called the Black Island Youth Nation Alliance to unite all the different groups participating and increase the power of their claims. This union came to show that although each group seeks different objectives, they were united by stronger sentiments: democracy, identity and self-determination.

The coalition was integrated by long-standing groups. Within the alliance we can find that the outstanding groups were: Anti-media Monster youth league, Anti-nuclear Front, Anti-black box MAST Action Coalition, Citizens Action Coalition 1985, Earth Citizens Foundation, Taiwan Rural Front, Taiwan Association for Human Rights, Taiwanese Professors Association, Taiwan Labor Front, etc. The alliance came out, as McAdam and Tilly argue, as a snowball made by a series of unsolved aggravations produced by the government[53]. Therefore, the alliance had different spokesmen that represented their

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53   For further information please refer to: http://fareasternpotato.blogspot.tw/2014/03/does-sunflower-movement-have-exit.html?spref=fb

particular groups. From all representatives two would become the most prominent during the protests, and those were: Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting (Hioe, 2014).

These two rising leaders had already experience in previous movements providing them the recognition of the students on their ability to lead. On one hand, Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆) who is a 26 years old student from Tainan, graduated from the Department of political science at National Cheng Kung University and by 2014 he was a second-year student at the Department of political science at National Taiwan University (NTU). He started his activism back in 2008 when he participated in the Wild Strawberries movement and in 2012 he would become the leader of the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters. It would be in this organization where Lin Fei-fan would gain a lot of experience as organizer of different protests and leading people. He is largely recognized as "charismatic" and "level-headed" between his followers and his detractors, providing him with that special aura to deposit their confidence.

On the other, we have Chen Wei-ting that differs from Fei-fan's characteristics. Wei-ting (陳為廷) is a 24-year-old graduate student from Miaoli County that became a full activist during the protests held by the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters. Wei-ting's r is largely recognized for having a "brave", "hot-headed", "straightforward" and some times, "inappropriate" or "impolite" character. An example of Wie-ting's character that was largely quoted by the media is the reaction he took in September 2013, when he hit Miaoli County Magistrate, Liu Cheng-hung, with a flying shoe that he threw to express his anger for the demolition of homes in Dapu County. (Central News Agency, 2014) This combination of personalities between the two leaders will become a key factor at the time of leading the protests.

2.4.2 The Sunflower movement

As the discussions progressed in the Legislative Yuan by the end of February 2014, it was clear that the public hearings suggested by KMT's legislator Chang Ching-chung (張慶忠) were going to take place. After the hearings, that in March 11 -16 2014, the KMT tried to block the DPP to in another set of rounds of hearings to avoid the possible "boycott of freedom" the DPP planned to avoid CSSTA ratification. On March 16th, 2014 the situation evolve into a fight that would continue the following day, leading to a 30 seconds declaration of legislator Chang Ching-chung communicating that the CSSTA would pass to the Executive Yuan for final revision and approval. The announcement came although the Legislative Yuan or any other social party had not revised the agreement. The student activists following the developments gathered and decided to commence the civil disobedience by staging a sit-in outside the Legislative Yuan on March 18th, 2014. By 18:00 hours that day 500 students were already participating in the protests. By 21:00 hours under the command of Chen Wei-ting and Lin Fei-fan 200 students agreeing to occupy the building breached the blockade made by the police around the Legislative Yuan[54]. At 22:00 hours the two leaders would declare the occupation of the building that would last, as announced, until two things took place: 1) the president apologized for its secretive policies, and 2) further negotiations came from the side of the legislators and the president. As the days progressed and more people gathered inside and outside the LY, the objectives evolve to have the following concrete form:

1) We demand that Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) immediately void Legislator Chang Ching-chung's (張慶忠) announcement that the CSSTA has passed the committee stage.

2) President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) should begin with us dialogue and negotiations over:

   (a) The rejection of the CSSTA; and

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54   On the following days in Hong Kong lawmaker and activists Leung Kwok-hung led a group of 30 people to Taipei's representative office in Hong Kong to show his support. Other activists decided to fly to Taipei to join the sit-ins outside the Legislative Yuan. Other activists rose more than HK $3,000 in one day using Facebook, to also join the protests. This showed that several people in Hong Kong were paying attention and interested to participate in pro-democratic protests of Taiwan. (Wee & Tsang, 2014)

(b) Pass the bill for monitoring cross-strait agreements, and a promise to refrain from negotiating such agreements in lieu of the bill. If our demands are not met by noon on Friday, March 21, our protest will continue and we will begin our next round of action." (Democracy at 4 am, 2014)

Interestingly, the main objectives pushed by the Black Island Youth Front that were followed by the alliance managed to accommodate each group's individual message. Looking at the three points demanded, the claims are in regards of increasing a transparent and democratic process, but it does not immediately imply any perspective for to their approach. As it appears in Figure 5, the statistic provided by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, shows the ideas the population held against the CSSTA just before the protest.

Figure 5. Why the general public opposes the CSSTA

Source: (Guilford, 2014)

This figure provides a clear picture of what were the main ideas worrying the general population over the CSSTA. Therefore, as previously stated, the goals pursued by the Black Island Youth Front (BIYF) were appealing to all because it did not give a perspective more weight than another, because the main focus was to raise awareness and reject the secretive ways the ratification was being handled. In terms of completely satisfying their objections the BIYF covered 54 percent of the population that was anxious about Taiwan transforming into a "new Hong Kong", employment and job opportunities. Furthermore, it partially

covered the other 16 percent that was worried about the possible migration from the Mainland China, but it did not propose any objective to achieve a solution in this regard. The same can be argued in the case of people worried about housing and media. Nevertheless, at this point the most critical of all the objectives for the alliance, which could provide the space for "subsequent agendas" (migration, housing, media, etc.) without them losing their respective importance, was to break into the governmental process. In this way, if successful, all the respective levels of the government (starting from the Legislative Yuan to the Executive Yuan) would have to provide the opportunity of dialogue in the frame of the CSSTA, which provided the opportunity of the discussion of other objectives.

Additionally, the occupation of the LY provided the movement with an unmatchable leverage in the eyes of the society. The strategy adopted by the two leaders Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-tin provoked to draw the attention of all the media and the rest of the population that was not aware of what was happening in Taipei. Along with the usage of social networks and ads in international newspapers, the voice of the movement would extend beyond Taiwanese borders [55]. Therefore, in its peak the estimation of supporters participating in the sit-ins inside and outside the LY were around 500,000 people (Chen & Chen, 2014; Rowen, 2014).

The bold action of taking the building of the Legislative Yuan at the end provided the strength for the movement to acquire its goals. The repertoire of contention found in the Sunflower movement might not have shown a huge variety[56] but the targets were achieved with the strategies needed, as it seems the movement understood the huge distance of power between the state and the movement. Moreover, probably if students did not have taken the LY building they would not have had the opportunity of making the government

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[55]   In order to mobilize more constituents and appeal other people in the population the movement put in place a media campaign (dedicated to different sections of the society) that had different news blog and channel with live feed from the Legislative Yuan like the one called "Democracy at 4 am". In addition, it was put in place a system of money collection to finance adds in the local national newspapers as well as international ones, like it was the case with the New York Times report. Thence, awareness about the movement, the objectives and instructing the population about the CSSTA became available in Mandarin and English. (Democracy at 4 am, 2014)

[56]   The Sunflower movement used a combination of sit-ins and hunger strikes at the beginning. Nevertheless, hunger strikes were abandoned once the LY building was taken. Instead, the new tactic in the repertoire was to use large aggrupation of students to storm government buildings. There was a second attempt to use this strategy on the Executive Yuan building without success because the police was now aware that this could happen. (Rowen, 2014)

to change its stand on the subject. Following the pressure and threats of continuing the occupation the LY building, the government agreed to take a resolution in accordance to what was demanded. On April 2th, 2014, the Executive Yuan issued a proposition of a new bill to establish a supervisory mechanism consisting of four steps to follow by the Legislative Yuan and would also require the participation the population[57]. This bill was called Cabinet-sponsored Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (兩岸協議監督條例草案) (Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China (Taiwan), 2014; Lin, 2015)

Finally, after 24 days of occupation, on April 10th 2014 the activist vacated the Legislative Yuan building (Cole, 2014). This final step came as a response to the agreement reached with Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (KMT member), which would finally accept the demands of the movement stating on the public media that he would not hold any further inter-party negotiations on the CSSTA until the new overseeing legal mechanism was passed in the Legislative Yuan[58]. This statement provided the immediate victory of the movement. Nonetheless, the struggle would need to continue during the negotiations of the overseeing mechanism and when the consultation of the CSSTA will take place. Until the writing of this study the oversee mechanism has not been passed in the Legislative Yuan as negotiations keep ongoing. Therefore, the CSSTA discussions in the LY have been halted until the mechanism is in place. (Lin, 2015)

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[57] For further information please refer to the appendix to see the document.

[58] Wang Jin-pyng's promise to the movement came as an unpleasant surprise for President Ma, as it caught him out of guard that a party member would agree to this. Immediately Ma convened a meeting with KMT law members to see if there was the possibility to continue with the ratification process before the overseeing mechanism was in place. Afterwards, President Ma would declare that both could take place simultaneously. Nevertheless, this would not take place. Moreover, on February 10th, 2015 the Taipei District Prosecutors Office indicted the leaders and other 118 participants of the Sunflower movement on the charges of agitating the public and attacking police officials. The legal battle continues but these legal measures had been interpreted as a purge from the EY rather than the authorities excercising their power (Lin, 2015)

2.5 Understanding the Collective Action in Taiwan

The name Sunflower was acquired when a florist donated many sunflowers to the protestors and it became to symbolize the spirit of the alliance of student groups. Once the group had a symbol uniting it, songs came and particular clothing too[59]. The mobilization was evolving to a complete collective action that would be defined on its capability to achieve its goals and react to the authorities (as argued by McAdam's dynamic interactive model). Large mobilizations represented a big challenge for communication, logistics and security. In terms of communication the movement understood that efficiency was crucial so the mobilization could last and the unity maintained.

On one hand, through the use of Internet platforms like cool3c the movement launched live media, constant feedback of the situation and promoted other platforms to spread the needs of the movement. Most importantly, as McAdams suggests in his dynamic interactive model, previous experiences of the groups conforming the alliance has taught the organizers to beware of a government's attempt to shut down their networks. The group's system of communication resembled the one used by the United States army, which is based on multiple input nods that are protected by hidden nodes that pass the information to outer nodes (see Figure 5). This was achieved by the usage of different Internet platforms (Facebook, Line, etc.). In this way if the authorities tried to paralyze the movement's communication, they would not be able to locate the original source of information.

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[59] The outfit used by the Black Island Youth Nation Front, which was black T-shirt with a white impression of the island of Taiwan and black pants, became the outfit of the Sunflower movement. The only change the uniform suffered was that a sunflower replaced the logo of the island of Taiwan.

Figure 5. Method of communication adopted by the Sunflower movement.

Source: (資訊人眼裡的太陽花 （下） - 網狀民主運動的美麗與哀愁, 2014)

Thus, the message of why people were protesting was clear to the public. In addition, it provided the opportunity to easily spread the information regarding the implications of CSSTA and ECFA. Moreover, in terms of organizing the groups schedule a proper calendar for taking shifts at the Legislative Yuan was created and distributed online. Along it would come a map with all the details of the bathrooms and near convenience stores. Finally, to raise funds the Internet platform "flyingV" was used.

Additionally, Cheng Wei-ting was in charge of a team of English speakers, which had as main objective to make the movement global. The strategy was to contact media-outlets and other activists around the world so Wei-ting and Fei-fan had interviews to spread their claims (Democracy at 4 am, 2014). The idea of making global the movement would provide them such leverage, that the movement would succeed in defeating its natural weakness: lack of resources and advocates. In this way the movement managed to break the isolation and obtain the resources (funds raised reached the figure of NT $6,630,000) to finance articles in different magazines including the New York Times (Chen, Liao, Wu, & Hwan, 2014).

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On the other hand, the logistics witnessed during the mobilization were staggering. Like an army, advocates also need to be fed, be provided with water, a place to sleep, blankets, pillows, etc. All of this affects proportionally the moral of the people participating in a civil disobedience. This is what can make the difference between success and defeat. The employment of two principal characteristics made the Sunflower movement so prominent. First, in order to coordinate all the subgroups that had their particular claims, the following system was devised as an activist explained at the moment:

> "In this student movement, the protocol is defined by their determination and their tools. We can see that they used to belong to different independent groups that have different goals and demands. Nevertheless, they have the same protocol: against the "black box" secretive process behind the CSSTA. As a result, after some minor adjustments, these groups can be easily connected to each other.
> While there is major divergence in their opinions, what they likely do is separating their network. Therefore, they can keep their own opinions instead of changing their original goals. […] This kind of Internet democracy does not compromise easily. As a result, the conflict between the government and the protesters might be elongated." (Lin I.-f. , 2014)

Second, the message spread more advocates came. On one hand, this made possible for students to have inside the Legislative Yuan a medical center (with a constant visit of doctors), distribution table for snacks and goods, lawyers constantly assessing their situation, and even rooms for yoga and singing. On the other, outside of the Legislative Yuan the students in charge of the logistics and distribution received and store food, equipment (tents, blankets, extension cords, diesel generators, medical kids, etc.), messages, etc. (Chao, 2014). A complete chain with ranks of leadership overseeing different processes was created. During the protests the present author of this study had the opportunity to interview fellow students involved in the mobilization. They confirmed at the moment that trucks loaded with provisions arrived on a daily basis or more times a day.

Moreover, it was acknowledged by some Taiwanese students at the National Taiwan University that the post office in the university was largely use as a point to send provisions to the movement in the Legislative Yuan. This is a reflection of the high level of interrelation of the movement's advocates with their university's groups. As Rachel Lee, volunteer in crowd-control and supply division during the Sunflower movement, stated: "[t]here were lots of doubts about whether students could hold a sophisticated and rational political movement because students are branded as hot-headed. This was why one of our priorities was to be organized and comprehensive." (Hsu J. W., 2014) In order to maintain updated the needs for supply the platform of Google documents was used.

Finally, security came as the third crucial point to be able to maintain the occupation. It was crucial for students inside the Legislative Yuan to have control over the building and the surrounding areas. Hence, it was decided to install a system of cameras in hallways and various sections outside the building. This provided not only a clear idea of the location of the police but also avoided abuses by the authorities when clashing with other students. In this manner the movement was able to mobilize their advocates to the exact spots where clashes were taking place. Furthermore, these cameras served also to provide a live feed from the LY through the site: 0th Sunflower Digital Camp (Lin I.-f. , 2014). Finally, there was a team in charge of producing news every 15 minutes using the messaging system of "Line". This created a complete control of the situation.

It is clear that the Sunflower movement was a complete articulated entity that ran under clear objectives, communication, logistics and security. The use of technology became crucial for it to extend its reach locally and globally. In this way the group managed to overcome the natural barrier faced by collective actions: lack of material and human resources. Principally the organizational system used during this protest provided the opportunity to fully exploit the occupation of the Legislative Yuan and erect the path that would lead the movement's victory. All together these elements were combined to show the worthiness, unity, the numbers, and commitment of the leaders and their constituencies (WUNC) that lasted for 24 days. The principal message sent to all the Taiwanese was: the government will listen to the people's demands and make the proper adjustments. This event would open a new ground in the cross-strait relations between PRC and Taiwan that

would never seemed possible before. It seems that from this point onward the Taiwanese society will have to be included in the cross-strait relations' discussion and decision-making process.

Nowadays, one year after the lessons learned was several. For students it was clear that they could organize themselves and be heard by the government. This provided a strength and hope for the despair and apathetic posture the youth had towards politics. On the side of government, as it was mentioned, it was engraved the idea that young Taiwanese can organize and must be considered when executing policies because they prove to have a strong leverage. The effect of this mobilization was so strong that, as it will bee seen in the survey applied in the present study, their fears of self-determination, sovereignty and rejections of the PRC and lessons empowering students will reverberate to this day.

Conclusion

In this section the study provided the elements to understand the context that led to the creation of the Sunflower movement. Clearly this movement inherit past claims of others that kept seeking further democratization, reaffirm the Taiwanese identity and assert Taiwan's self-determination. As McAdam argues, movements tend to be a recollection of aggravations and the Taiwanese case proved not to be exempt from this norm. In fact, due to this reason the organizers of the Sunflower movement managed to achieve the alliance with other groups and achieve such a large number of followers. But most importantly the organizers managed to lead the movement into a victory, which granted the confidence of student and activists in Hong Kong.

The Sunflower movement created a precedent in the history of Taiwan. Not only impacted Taiwanese students and other sectors of the society on local claims, but it opened a new reality in cross-strait relations: Taiwanese society has a say in them. This idea broke the traditional concept addressing cross-strait relations, which were seen as high politics

between governments, and landed to the reality of a true democracy where the society is also involved.

Along the present chapter it was seen that the real reasons why the movement reach the level it did was because of the economic and political changes lived in Taiwan. As it was shown the companies in Taiwan started to depend more and more on China. This led to an outer flow of investment and business relocation that end up affecting the economy's growth and the job market. Thus, high unemployment rates and low salaries were faced by the new Taiwanese generations. In addition, the change of policies chosen by President Ma would collide with the ones set by the previous administrations. Therefore, the new policies of President Ma created sense of rejection because the population, in particular students, perceived this change as threatening their identities and their country's future.

This fact led to the great coalition that took the Legislative Yuan for 24 days. The alliance first aimed to stop the CSSTA to be ratified. As the situation evolved the groups seemed to be separated by their particular objectives. This was never completely true because all groups had their own space to object the government in their particular terms but in the overall, to achieve these goals, they all needed themselves. Nevertheless, the students leading the movement, who became more prominent than the rest, seemed to stir to a different set of goals empowering only students and assert particular claims only related to the students' needs. Hence, the democratic objectives of the movement turned into focusing of the satisfaction of the youth. One year after, the activism keeps latent in students' minds.

Finally, two elements need to be differentiated: identity vs. cross-strait relations. During the mobilization it was clear that the identity of Taiwanese society united the groups for a common concern that was related to a cross-strait relations topic. The idea of identity got entangled with the objectives followed by this mobilization making it confusing to discern. The fact is that identity is threat by cross-strait relations when Taiwanese politicians and negotiators agree on terms that put in danger Taiwan's sovereignty and future as de facto state. This creates the fear of a loss of identity as it is based on the idea of an independent

island. Now, it has to be understood that negotiators, politicians, the president and legislators, are not the only ones to have a say on this matter for this reason.

This groundbreaking concept in cross-strait relations would also provide further interest for activists in Hong Kong to have a developing a relationship with their Taiwanese counterparts. From this relationship activists in Hong Kong would learn how to create a strong and lasting collective action.

Chapter 3 Hong Kong's Case

The present section of the study will have the purpose of understanding the socio-political context lived in Hong Kong that originated the protests on September 28, 2014. Therefore, this section will be structured as follows. First, it would be analyzed the political structure in Hong Kong to understand the origins of the problem. Thus, it would be understood why does the system provided the opportunity for the society to create a collective action. Second, it would be shown that the democratic movement in Hong Kong has been evolving since the beginning of twenty first century. Third, the study will provide evidence of the creation of a "Hong Konger" identity and how does this fact contributed to the collective action seen in the past September 2014. Fourth, the study will address the specific causes that sparked the past demonstrations.

Fifth, it will be provided a brief analysis of who are the leaders of the OCLP movement and the principal student groups (Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students) that were involved in the past protests. Sixth, the study will provide the time sequence of the evolution of the protest pointing out the most important events (considered within the guidelines of the present study). Seventh, the collective action will be analyze using McAdam's dynamic interactive model to understand the movement's endurance and maintenance of its claims. Finally, the study will expose the reasons why the movement received such level of diffusion and support in Taiwan. Let us proceed to the analysis.

3.1 Political structure in Hong Kong

The roots of Hong Kong's present political system and disagreements are traced to the return of Hong Kong to the PRC. The process of Hong Kong coming back to the PRC was sensitive not only for Hong Kongers having doubts about the new future of being integrated to the communist regime of the PRC, but also for Beijing, Britain and the world. First, in the case of the people in Hong Kong reality was changing as they were becoming

increasingly worried about Beijing's civil rights violation. The three classes, as identified by Beijing, –bourgeoisie, middle class and workers – had different objectives. Most clearly it was the middle class that hold more doubts and distrust about the return of Hong Kong to the PRC. Their most immediate concerned was about the future of their rights. This seemed paradoxical as it can be argued that during colonial the population was never included in political decisions.

Originally during the colonial time people in Hong Kong did not enjoyed democracy and they were conceived as an "economic animal" that do not care about politics but economic stability. The British to avoid massive riots, as the one seen in 1978 (Yik-Yi Chu, 2010), instated a system of "consultation" in which through polls measured the position of the population in regards of the policies that were put in place. Nevertheless, politics and political decisions were made by a selected group of leaders, which were appointed by the colonial government, excluding completely any participation of the society. The main link of the British rule was with the upper-business-class that provided that economic stability and growth that kept the colony under control. Thus, Hong Kong achieved the impressive economic development that is its current its distinctive mark.

Second, the People's Republic of China government was aware of the importance of handling this matter in regards of the positive image Beijing wanted to project to Hong Kongers and internationally. For the Mainland this complicated process, as Cindy Yik-yi Chu argues, started since the Kuomintang (國民黨) government moved to Taiwan. A long the decades there were several attempts to increase the relations with Hong Kong's elite to acquire a Communist influence. Hong Kong was key in the Mao era when the Communist regime in the Mainland China was isolated from the world in 1960's, as it served as primary point of unofficial trade to maintain foreign currency flowing to China. As decades went by, as Yik-yi Chu argues in her interesting perspective, the PRC made use of a "united front scheme" to increase its influence in Hong Kong. What this scheme entails is described as follows. The PRC renewed their efforts by using Hong Kong's Xinhua media outlet as *de facto* representative office of the PRC. Therefore, it was not strange to find that

by 1983 Xu Jiatun[60] would be appointed as director of Hong Kong's Xinhua media outlet. Xu would confirm this peculiar "image" of HK Xinhua news, as he revealed in an announcement to communicate the headquarters' relocation to Wanchai. Xu claimed that the "[company was] more than a news agency" (Yik-Yi Chu, 2010). Thence, in 1983 Xu will recommend to the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee in Hong Kong the following:

> "… [W]e should employ our 'resources' to cultivate a group of pro-China capitalists in Hong Kong and Macao. China's enterprises in Hong Kong needed not to be afraid of criticisms [of locals of the alignment with the PRC], and should contribute to this directive. Moreover, [they] had to make use of the 'resources' form the mainland –these were even larger 'resources'- in order to secure the hearts of the people and contribute toward the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong." (Yik-Yi Chu, 2010, p. 54)

Xu believed that cultivating pro-China capitalists and alleviate the business concerns, which were the key to do politics in Hong Kong, would favor the PRC in the unification process. This was right in the reality of the business class, but as there were also a worker and middle class striving for different objectives. The worker class was aiming to improve their working and living conditions, which to certain extend were linked with economic growth and prosperity. This task did not seem difficult for Beijing to ensure. Nevertheless the middle class' position was independent to the economical factor. As Xu would find out, and later Deng Xiaoping would suggest too, the middle class was clearly objecting the return of the PRC. This section of the society was looking for more opportunities of the advancement of political reform. Deng understood this and had determined that the "Four Cardinal Principals"[61] would not apply to Hong Kong. Therefore, already by 1982 Liao

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60   Xu Jiatun was a member of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, who had the respect of top ranking officials and could have a direct communication with Beijing top leaders. This was his principal distinction and contrast with the previous directors of the HK Xinhua news, which complied more with a diplomat's profile: spoke Cantonese and had a diplomatic background. Despite of not having these skills and experience, his contribution would be key for Beijing to address Hong Kong's return.

61 Deng Xiaoping established the principals in a speech in 1979, to determine the new political trajectory the PRC was going to pursue after the Mao era. These are:
1. We must uphold the socialist road.
2. We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat.
3. We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party.

Chengzhi, Beijing's spokesman on Hong Kong and Macao Affairs was the first ranking official that started to use publicly the term "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong". This idea led to the incorporation of the system originally proposed to Taiwan, "one country two systems"[62]. Thence it was decided that various groups would participate in the drafting of the Basic Law taking place from 1985 to 1990 between the PRC and Britain.

Beijing dictated that the people in Hong Kong should conform the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) and Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC). In this way, people from Hong Kong would be included and in this way appeasing the middle class that was pushing forward for more political participation. Nonetheless, the question that was in the air was, who would be people to conform these committees? HK Xinhua would be in charge of selecting the group of people that would follow Deng's and Xu's guideline of those "patriot people"[63]. Therefore, for the BLDC was decided in June 18, 1985 that it would be chosen 59 members, out of which 23 would come from Hong Kong and the rest of the Mainland China. From these 23 spots only 2 were reserve for pro-democracy and pro-Taiwan people and the rest of the members belonged to the elite, which included: industry, manufacturing, media, and "8 big capitalists"[64]. For the 57 original members of the BLCC, the people conforming it would come from industrial and business sector, labor and grassroots associations, religious persons, foreigners and BLDC members.

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4. We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. (Joseph, 2014, p.180)

[62] This idea was based on the 8 points put forward by Deng Xiaoping in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 for the reunification of Taiwan to the rest of the country. Then as Hong Kong unification approached with their characteristically difficulties seen here, it was decided to integrated to Hong Kong. This case will be relevant and further explained later in this study when we address the Taiwan case. (Yik-Yi Chu, 2010)

[63] It was identify by Deng that those only the people that wanted the reunification with the PRC.

[64] Between these people it can be found:
1) Sir Pao yue-kong famous shipping magnate and former chairman of the Worldwide Shipping Group and Kowloon Wharf
2) David Li, vice chairman of the drafting committee, and director and chief manager of the Bank of East Asia with close connections with China.
3) Cha Chi-ming, renowned industrialist and permanent adviser to the board of directors of Yan Chai Hospital.
4) Louis Cha, Ming Pao's publisher, which is one of the most important newspapers in Hong Kong.
5) Cheng Ching-fun, director of the Chinese Manufacturers' Association and managing director of Daqing Petroleum.
6) Lau Wong-fat, former chairman of the Heung Yee Kuk, an advisory body to the government representing a small new territories population.
7) Li Ka-shing, chairman of Cheung Kong Holdings and one of the most prominent tycoons in Hong Kong.
8) Wong Po-yan, chairman and managing director of United Oversea Enterprises and honorary president of the Chinese Manufacturers' Association. (Yik-Yi Chu, 2010)

The BLCC would be reconstituted to reach the total number of 71 members (which included new: industrialists, businessman and professionals) and these would be called the Business and Professional Group (BPG). This group of people would propose that an electoral college would select a chief executive (head of the administrative region) from among three candidates proposed by a nomination committee. Furthermore, the proposed committee would consist of 20 members selected by the Electoral College integrated by 600 members. The BPG group, which would later grow again to be consisted by 89 members, proposed that businessman and professionals persons would integrate the Electoral College in its majority. Through this proposition, which would be known "Model of Eighty-Nine" because of number of the BPG, pro-democracy members would be reduced in the Electoral College and would not pose a "threat". The threat came on the claim that the people in Hong Kong did not understand democracy and that instating a large group that propose it, would only result in a big problematic. Finally, the number of members of the Electoral College would increase to a total membership of 800, following the previous guideline, and a Legislative council, Executive council and Judiciary body would be suggested to integrate the complete system.

Parallel to this process the PRC kept in close contact with the British administration to achieve an international peaceful and organize image of the handover. The process was not without disagreements, it was clear that Britain's leaders would try to extend their power in the region. A clear example of this was when Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing to arrange a possible extend of the period of power over Hong Kong. This of course would not lead to the desired result, as Beijing would only limit the discussion to the continuous negotiation of the Basic Law.

The differences in the trajectory of the handover provided frictions that were clearer on the verge of the handover. During this period the PRC maintained the so-called "megaphone politics", in which any mayor disagreement with the political decisions in Hong Kong were communicated through Xinhua media outlet. The clashes between Britain and the PRC would be constant until the last day governor Chris Patten was in power, due to his constant push for democratic reforms before the handover.

As negotiations of the Basic Law draw into conclusion in 1989 the incident at Tiananmen Square would set a big challenge to the PRC international image. First, Xu Jiantun would be destitute as director of the Xinhua news for supporting and allowing workers to participate in the pro Tiananmen protest in Hong Kong. Second, people in Hong Kong that were increasingly accepting in a positive light the handover, would completely move again to a negative stand on the return to the PRC. Third, the social groups (businessmen, industrialists, professionals, etc.) participating in the negotiation of the Basic Law and even pro-China political parties got together briefly, united by the fear and opted to push forward for a more democratic regime. It seems that Beijing was in a big trouble. Therefore, the decision, as it was expected, was that the Basic Law final adjustments would manage between PRC and Britain negotiators. By 1990 the new constitution would see the light. As years passed, Beijing regained the confidence of the businessman, tycoons and large number of population in Hong Kong, leaving the road clear for the handover in 1997 (Yik-Yi Chu, 2010).

The final government model chose by Beijing end up resembling the "Model of Eighty-Nine". Right now Hong Kong has a political system consisted of: Chief Executive (CE), Executive Council (ExCo), Legislative Council (LegCo) and Judiciary body. The Chief Executive is the head of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and accountable to the Central People's Government. In the Annex I of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Basic Law it is stated the term and election process. The CE will serve a term of 5 years, and his/her election will be made by an Election Committee constituted as follows:

Industrial, commercial and financial sectors	300
The professions	300
Labor, social services, religious and other sectors	300
Members of the Legislative Council, representatives of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the	300

National People's Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	

(Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee, 2015)

Furthermore, no less than 150 members of the Election Committee may nominate candidates for the office of CE jointly. Each member can nominate one candidate and the CE will be selected through a secret ballot following the rational of one-person-one-vote. In point 7 of the Basic Law Annex I, is clearly stated that if there is the need to amend the process of selection of the CE it shall be done so through a two-third majority of the Legislative Council and the consent of the CE, which in turn will report to the National People's Congress for its approval.

The powers vested on the LegCo are of a complete legislative body entitled to legislate laws and procedures[65]. As stipulated in the in Annex II of the Basic Law, the LegCo is integrated by 70 members and elected for 4 years terms (art.69). From these 60 members 35 will represent functional constituencies and the other 35 will represent geographical constituencies. The District Council appoints the representatives of the functional constituencies. Register voters in turn elect the District Councilors. The geographical constituencies are elected by direct vote. In the LegCo, like any other legislative body, has a president, which is selected by its members.

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[65]   Article 72 of the Basic Law states that the LECO functions are:
a) Enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law;
b) Examine and approve budgets introduced by the government;
c) Approve taxation and public expenditure;
d) Receive and debate the policy address of the Chief Executive;
e) Raise questions on the work of the government;
f) Debate any issue concerning public interests;
g) Endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court;
h) Receive and handle complaints from Hong Kong residents;
i) If a motion initiated jointly by one-fourth of all the members of the Legislative Council charges the Chief Executive with serious breach of law or dereliction of duty and if he or she refuses to resign, the Council may, after passing a motion for investigation, give a mandate to the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal to form and chair an independent investigation committee. The committee shall be responsible for carrying out the investigation and reporting its findings to the Council. If the committee considers the evidence sufficient to substantiate such charges, the Council may pass a motion of impeachment by a two-thirds majority of all its members and report it to the Central People's Government for decision.
j) To summon, as required when exercising the above-mentioned powers and functions, persons concerned to testify or give evidence. (Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee, 2015)

On the other hand, the ExCo the Executive Council according to article 55 of the Basic Law is constituted as follows:

> "Chief Executive shall appoint members of the Executive Council from among the principal officials of the executive authorities, members of the Legislative Council and public figures. At present, the membership of the Executive Council comprises the 15 Principal Officials appointed under the Accountability System and 15 non-officials. Members' appointment or removal is decided by the Chief Executive. Members of the Executive Council have to be Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with no right of abode in any foreign country." (Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee, 2015)

Finally, all the courts in Hong Kong exercising the judiciary power, integrate the Judiciary body. These comprise: the Court of Final Appeal, the High Court, district courts, magistrates' courts and other special courts shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The High Court shall comprise the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance.

In 1997 Hong Kong returned to the PRC but the transition became complicated as the Asia financial crisis and SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) affected Hong Kong. Hong Kongers started questioning the ability of the government to address these problems as the economic crisis increased and SARS, initially handled with secrecy, was not contained. Beijing took action. To address the financial problems it was decided to launch the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which would also integrate more Hong Kong with the PRC. In the case of SARS as cases started to disappear the oddity and unrest provoked by the pandemic dissipated. With the creation of CEPA Beijing would assure the economic interdependence (hence political proximity) between Hong Kong and the PRC. (Chow, et al., 2012) The question that remains in the air was: would this appease all the society in Hong Kong?

3.2 Building a pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong

On July 1ˢᵗ 2003, a big protest would create an important social change in the Hong Kong society, creating the opportunity to search for coherent democracy. The study conducted by Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan in their book "Media, Social Mobilization and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong" (2011), provide us with the evidence of how since the 2003 a chain of collective actions took place due to accumulated grievances. These movements would provide the "know-how" in the development of a pro-democracy movement.

In 2003 there was a mass gathering of 500,000 people that would become the second largest in the history of Hong Kong[66]. This was the result of a coalition called Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) that was formed by 42 diverse groups in the end of 2002. The reason why groups like the Catholic Church gathered partner up with people supporting Gay rights, for instance, was because all were all concerned with the national security legislation at the moment. The main concern lay on the article 23 of the Basic Law that states:

> "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies." (Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee, 2015)

These organizations feared that the article would be used to prohibit their gatherings or that it would provide the legal action for Beijing to start a "witch hunt" the organizations. This was the political opportunity that provided the space for the formation of the group.

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66   The first largest protest took place during the colony in 1979. For more information please refer to: Yik-Yi Chu, C. (2010). *Chinese Communists and Hong Kong Capitalists: 1937-1997.* New York, New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan .

Nevertheless, there were challenges in the unity of the CHRF group posed by the diversity of believe, but most of all due to the lack of a serious leadership structure. There was not a clear leader and preferred decision-making. The mobilization that this collective action achieved was limited to one day of protest[67] and eventually would have to stop the civil disobedience as different objectives rose dividing the CHRF. The group would have to retreat from further activities as media managed to show to the public the serious lack of coherence of the group.

CHRF mobilization in 2003 lacked real objectives or mechanisms to obtain them. Still, the government did not adopt a harsh perspective of the article 23. It was clear for the government in Hong Kong that the society was increasingly concern about the political process and conservative approaches would generate a reaction. But no one really knew if this was "one occasion event" or it would be echoed in the future.

The lessons drawn from the 2003 movement would serve to guide further protests the following years as they emerged in July 1st 2004, December 4th 2005, July 1st 2006 and 2007. The most immediate lesson from 2003 was that clear objectives were needed. In the following occasions the collective actions gathered to request direct elections of the CE by 2007 and LegCo in 2008 but again did not possessed any clear objectives or methods of negotiation. In July 1st 2004, 200,000 people gathered to request direct elections of the CE by 2007 and LegCo 2008. The National People's Congress rejected this proposition the same year, triggering further protests. On the following year 2005, after the protests of July 1st when 30,000 people requested the direct elections of CE, on December 4th 2005 100,000 people went to the streets to pressure the government on a clear time table for the instauration of direct elections of the CE and LegCo. The following two years July 1st 2006 and 2007, an approximate of 50,000 people rallied both years to sustain claim of the direct elections. At this moment it was clear that protesting for increasing population participation in the political process had become a continuous process that has been building in the society. Even though that at that moment a unity with pro-democracy political parties

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67   The authors presume that the fact that was a holyday commemorating the Tiananmen events was the key factor to actually achieve the numbers of people that was not properly organized. (Lee & Chan, 2011)

seemed the logical step for these collective actions to "institutionalize" their claims, people in the protests rejected the idea of "politicizing"[68] their claims.

In light of this evolving events, Beijing reacted cautiously by not provoking any strong response but rather dismissing it in due time. It was clear that the PRC government was interested to not destabilize the system of "one country two systems"[69] and putting in question the "high degree of autonomy" by instating a strong reaction to the protests. Instead Beijing remained confident of the "patriots" controlling the political process in Hong Kong. Beijing would play a double game by encouraging the idea of a real "two system" in which Hong Kong actually enjoyed a democratic tendency. Therefore, since October 2003 Premier Wei Jiabao had expressed that Hong Kong needed further democratization. The situation led to a strong debate in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, in 2004 when an interpretation of the law of the direct elections of CE by 2007 and LegCo in 2008 Beijing stepped in. In this way confirming that the game was just an illusion to appease the democratic movement. The PRC government recurred to its "megaphone politics" by republishing in the media Deng Xiaoping's speech stating that Hong Kong had to be ruled by "patriots". This provided the ground for National People's Congress interpretation of the law and rule out the elections on the proposed years 2007 and 2008, triggering other demonstrations.

Thence, the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong has been evolving from the claims first made in 2003 to specific and constant objectives in the succeeding events. Although the political opportunities (direct vote for CE and LegCo) were closing with the interpretation of the National People's Congress that rule out the possibility, the people continue the pressure. This came although, as Lee and Chan tell us, without clear propositions of how to achieve their goals, but rather they were more reliant on the succession of the events and the numbers they gathered. As it was seen in this section,

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68   During the conduction of different surveys Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan found that people perceived negatively the involvement of political parties in protests. As they recount, people perceived that politicians would only twist a noble cause to obtain support and push other agendas. (Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong, 2011)

protest continue their periodicity on a year basis with a group that maintain large numbers of members, showing the that the core group identifying with the claims is important. This "identification" of this challenge would converge with the rise of an identity in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2011).

3.3 Identity in Hong Kong

Identity in Hong Kong is a topic that troubles citizens in the HKSAR as well as the citizens of the rest of Mainland China. Hong Kong's history has asserted a problematic in the context of building an image of a single country united by the same ideas and cultural believes. In the past Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom for 156 years, and much of the western culture had been mixed and assimilated by the people living there. With the return of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China in 1997 the problem became clear. Many Chinese started to arrive to Hong Kong first as tourists, later to buy real estate. In the later stages pregnant women went to the hospitals to have their children there and achieve the residence. Finally, more and more people were arriving in search for jobs in Hong Kong.

The shock of the massive movement marked even further the cultural differences. People in Hong Kong started to reject the "Mainlanders", who they perceive as rude and with cultural traditions that are distasteful to the Hong Kongers. The mixture of inequality[70], rapid increase of real-estate prices[71], cooption of the media-outlet[72] and the loss of the dominance

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[70] Nowadays Hong Kongers are confronted with harsh economic realities. The Gini coefficient has increased by the years locating it at 0.539 by 2011. Hence, the top 1 percent of the population in Hong Kong has increased their wealth separating them more and more from the rest of the population. Around 19 percent of the population (1.3 million of people) lives under the poverty line. Life quality has lowered to a historical minimum (taking as base year 2002) to 25.76 points in 2013. Finally, Hong Kong's economy has become more dependent of Chinese imports but its exports to the rest of China have been reducing. (Chen L. , 2014)

[71] Like Taiwan Hong Kong also suffers from staggering real-estate prices due to the land scarcity and the increasing population of Chinese moving from other cities within the PRC. Nevertheless, the problem in Hong Kong is greater as only 50 percent of the population owns the home they are living in, in comparison with Taiwan where 85 percent does. This was result from the decision taken by the government in 1997 to stop the home ownership scheme (HOS) policy to provide an aid for people in Hong Kong to own their houses (Ang, 2015).

of Cantonese over Mandarin in all the aspects of the daily life, has built even further frictions. As shown in a poll made to 6,100 people in 2013 by the South China Morning Post, the PRC's government reached such level of unpopularity in Hong Kong to the extent that 90 percent of the people voting would rather return to be a colony of the United Kingdom than continue being part of the Mainland China (South China Morning Post, 2013). Beijing couldn't just wait until this sentiment grew into a bigger problem.

The PRC's had already detected this rising problematic at the beginning of 2012, when officials began to put in practice a plan to reverse the tendency. The strategy was to implement the "moral and national education" intended for all schools in Hong Kong. As it was expected, the people in Hong Kong immediately rejected this measure. They criticize the curriculum, which was loaded with nationalism and provides a favorable perspective of the role of Communist Party. An estimate of eight thousand protesters rejecting this measure went to the streets marching from Victoria Park to the government's headquarters in a series of protests that would take place from July 29th 2012 till September 8, 2012. On September 8th 2012 the group of protestors reached a hundred thousand and managed to pressure the Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, to postpone the application of this measure until 2015[73] (Bradsher, 2012; Fang, 2012)

Now the friction between the state and the people had reached the level where subtleties had vanished and the counterparts had clear stands of their intended plans. As it is shown in Figure 1, 2 and 3, which contains the latest results of the poll gathered from December

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[72]   Media-outlets and information sources in Hong Kong has been losing objectivity and become more pro-PRC. Now the only media resource in Hong Kong completely independent from China is the Apple Daily. According to a report presented in "The Guardian", the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region controls: two newspapers (Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao), three magazines, and three main local bookshop chains (Joint Publishing, Commercial Publishing and Chung Haw Books) with 51 outlets around Hong Kong. This has created warmer news to Beijing and those books that the authority does not agree on are put on the corners of the stores or simply not available. As Professor Michael of the University in Hong Kong says: "At the university, in schools, and in the press, often you do not know whom you are dealing with. Are Chinese state-owned enterprises part of the government? Are they pure business interests? This may never be tested, even in Hong Kong. The real problem, though, is that our local government does not defend our autonomy. Rather, they lecture Hong Kong on how to behave to please the central authorities." (Sala, 2015)
[73]   The new curriculum had the clear objective of "brainwashing" people in Hong Kong. Among the changes in the educational system devised by the PRC was the inclusion of the book called "The China Model", which describes the Communist party as "progressive, selfless, and united". Furthermore, the book criticizes the multiparty system of Hong Kong and diminishes the events of the Tiananmen Square and Cultural Revolution. (Fang, 2012)

2012 to June 2014 by the Hong Kong University, the PRC citizen identity has been continuously losing ground[74].

Figure 1. Identity in Hong Kong: More Hong Kongers or PRC's citizens?

	Date of survey		14-17/12/12		10-13/6/13		9-12/12/13		6-12/6/14		Latest change	
Sample base[9]		669-696		657-684		564-660		611-705		--	
Finding		Finding		Finding		Finding		Finding and error[10]		--	
Strength rating of being "Hongkongers"	Identity index of being "Hong- kongers" [11]	8.43[12]	81.7[12]	8.13[12]	78.2[12]	7.87[12]	75.6[12]	7.99 +/-0.16	78.2 +/-1.5	+0.12[12]	+2.6[12]
Importance rating of being "Hongkongers" [11]		8.12[12]		7.71[12]		7.54		7.83 +/-0.17		+0.29[12]	
Strength rating of being "citizens of PRC"	Identity index of being "citizens of PRC" [11]	6.39[12]	62.4[12]	6.11[12]	59.0[12]	6.08	58.2	5.95 +/-0.24	57.0 +/-2.3	-0.13[12]	-1.2[12]
Importance rating of being "citizens of PRC" [11]		6.29[12]		5.90[12]		5.81		5.70 +/-0.24		-0.11	

Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)

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[74]   The responses were retrieve from the polls that were made to 1,017 Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong citizens aged 18 or above, selected randomly from residential telephone directories

Figure 2. Hong Konger per age.

Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)

Figure 3. Hong Konger**,** Asian, Global Citizen, Chinese or PRC Citizen?

香港市民「身分認同指數」
Identity Indices of Hong Kong People

Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)

The evolution of these events clearly shows a civil group that is becoming organized and posing a strong opposition to the PRC's government. As professor Malte Kaeding argues, during the first decades of the colony there were no signs a local distinction between Chinese people in Hong Kong and the Mainland. After the Second World War briefly a "sojourner mentality" (refugees or economic migrants that had made sufficient money that wanted to return to the Mainland) emerged but was ended when the border was closed in 1950. From that moment onward the new generations lacked the first hand experiences of the PRC that allowed Hong Kong to develop its own sense of identity and political culture (Kaeding, 2011).

Nowadays, it can be identified that the group rejecting the status of being a citizen of the PRC could foster a communality of interests, responding to the "voluntary participation". As Kaeding argues identity in Hong Kong follows an ethno-cultural approach that is integrated by: economic development, popular culture and education, the influence of western values and the market, cultural memory, civic identity, political identity and civic

values[75]. In this case the identity of "Hong Konger" serves this purpose. Furthermore, in terms of pluralism, looking at the identity reflected in polls, it is clear the people supporting this group come from different economic strata and ages, but those who are more numerous are the young generations.

Lastly, we find a negative character towards the PRC. Being "Hong Kongers" means to be strongly united by the idea of the territoriality and language, which clearly describes the motivation to differentiate themselves from the rest of the PRC citizens. The idea behind of "Hong Konger" is to create a clear identification system, to differentiate people and allow the rejection of what is called the "mainlandisation" of Hong Kong.

Thus, it can be found that there is a strong correlation between the theory and the facts. Identity or "we-ness", as McAdam points out, has been crucial to contribute not only for the unity of the group but also for the search of a different political configuration of the territory (Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 , 1999). From all of this, the question that rises is: could a sector of the society serve as platform to propel collective actions looking to achieve particular objectives like the OCLP?

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[75]   Kaeding argues in that thanks to economic development a transformation in identity of a "Hong Kong Man" (Chinese but with western values) with a sense of sophistication and superiority was possible. In terms of pop culture and education, it was characterized by a non-interventionist attitude during the colony. Therefore, it focused on the "Hong Kong" way of life (by creating the concept "Hong Kong Person") and "othering" Mainlanders as different. In this way the Hong Kong identity was built upon the idea of a Chinese identity detached from its context as Hong Kong history was completely absent of school curriculum. In regards of "western values and the market" Kaeding explains, that the mixture of western (most prominent basic individual rights) and global values, along with the rapid economic growth help shape this "market mentality" that does not subscribes to the idea of "belonging to a nation". Hence, "patriotism" is based on the "individual" loyalty to the state. Moreover, in terms of "cultural memory" the 2003 the mobilization of opposing the national security law marked the appearance of a civic awareness. In this moment, as Kaeding explains, the people in Hong Kong start to understand their unity and building upon the idea that there is a Hong Kong community and it became apparent when it became threaten in 1997 by the unification with the PRC. This showed Hong Kongers "civic identity". As Kaeding explains, the myth that people in Hong Kong were apathetic for political process was proved wrong. Kaeding argues that what created the confusion was the "utilitarianistic familism" that consisted on individuals putting first their families' interests and materialistic concerns before the society. But all this changed since 2003. Therefore, Kaeding explains that in regards of "political identity" Hong Kongers interest can be trade to 1960s, when the protests of 1966 marked a new trend of serious talks regarding local issues. This led to the colonial government to change its stance by 1970s ceding to the social pressure. By 1980s the colony had instated relative openness, freedom and the concept of rule of law, the protection of human rights and stability.
Thence, Kaeding explains that their "civic values" when reunification with the PRC took place Hong Kongers self-confidence felt shattered and at the same time a senses of superiority emerged in regards of the Mainland. This unleashed a stronger sense of connection with the city and their duties. Finally, this would reflect on the "political ritual and protests", as it was seen that stronger social and political participation as a unified actions could build on the identity. It was in this way, as Kaeding argues, that identity in Hong Kong evolved composed by these different elements. (Kaeding, 2011)

The author of the present study argues that this is affirmative. The concept of identity has such level of interrelation with self-determination[76] for the society that it can accommodate collective actions that appeal to these precepts. In this particular case, the democratic vote plays that key role. Figure 4 retrieves the responses of a recent survey conducted to 1,017 Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong citizens, showing the desired level of democratic participation of the sample.

Figure 4. Desired level of the Universal suffrage in Hong Kong

Q3 [new question] In 2017 CE election, if the ultimate political reform proposal from the Central and SAR governments allows one-person-one-vote in CE election, but rejects the pan-democrats from participation, would you: (read out first two options in randomized order)

	May 2014 (Fifth round)	
	Freq	Percentage
Accept the proposal in order to allow one-person-one-vote in CE election	566	57
Oppose the proposal in order to keep status quo in political system	279	28
Don't know/ Hard to say	156	16
Total	1002	100

Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)

Although the question is contradictory to certain level, as it leaves outside of the equation a pan-democratic alliance to participate in the election, nonetheless, the results shows that the society wants further participation in their political system. Therefore, this section of the population will support a collective action that is seeking this objective and has not political ties. To be able to understand this, let us proceed to address the first the context that brought about the OCLP movement and its developments.

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[76] The present author argues that identity and self-determination are interrelated due to particular manner in which the Hong Kong identity has emerged. In all instances serve to become part from a group that has different characteristics than the rest. It is, as it is also in the case of Taiwan, a method to mark the differentiation from the rest of China. Therefore, it seeks to be maintained and the element threatening its existence is the reunification with the rest of the PRC.

3.4 Electoral Reform

The whole idea of having a universal suffrage can be traced back to the decade of 1980's. As seen previously, at the beginning in 1980 all Hong Kong had a pro-democracy conformed by two activists out of the 59-member of the Basic Law Committee. When Hong Kong was returned to the PRC, the new system of the Basic Law established a multi-party system well distributed to avoid majorities. Despite the structure, alliances were forged and democrats united with those of the pro-establishment business sector.

The regime created prioritized over the business section of the society up to 2004. On that year the democrats gained popular support of a group of 500 thousand people marching against the national security law that was looked in Hong Kong as a threat to the civil rights. This marked the beginning of a new era.

In the elections of 2007 and 2008 democrats assembled strong alliances and managed to make a strong request: universal suffrage. This was obviously rejected by Beijing, but the pressure was such that the democrats managed to obtain, at least, a promise of universal suffrage by 2017.

In 2009 the political situation in Hong Kong was growing more and more turbulent. In that year it was unilaterally determined by pro-democrats that by the elections of 2012 there would be direct suffrage. The Civil Party (CP) and the League of Social Democrats (LSD), put in place a *defacto* political reform. This "*defacto referendum*" stated that in order to have a trail of democracy five pro-democracy legislators should resign and re-contest for their seats to force an election. Though the intention was to have complete democracy by 2012, Beijing representatives had still to give their approval.

When the talks came between pro-democracy representatives of Hong Kong and Beijing representatives, the latter party managed to segment the ideas of the democratic movement. The PRC's representatives approach the pro-democracy movement and divide it into hard-liners and soft-liners. From this blown the pro-democracy parties will not be able to recover. Therefore, in the light of these events the now leaders of the OCLP began to

articulate several ideas since 2012 to create a civil movement that will put in motion political discussion with the government.

Finally in August 2014 Beijing passed a reform defining the terms of this "universal suffrage". It was defined that the Chief Executive (CE) (clearly pro-Beijing) will select the Nomination Committee, to verify if the candidates to CE are pro status quo (pro-PRC). Hence, as intended, this fact destroyed the concept of universal suffrage. The people would react and now they would find a group to canalize their demands: the OCLP (Li A. , 2014).

3.5 Leaders of OCLP, Scholarism and HKFS

The OCLP movement has three principal leaders, which are: Benny Tai Yui-ting, Chan Kim-man and Chu Yiu-ming. Interestingly Chan Ki-man and Benny Tai Yiu-ting have no history of being activist. In fact they are professors at the Hong Kong University. Benny Tai Yiu-ting is a 50-year-old man, who has been a law professor in the University of Hong Kong since 1990s, and has a reputation of a "calm scholar". Chan Kin-man, who is 55 years old, and is a former sociology professor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who has studied China's civil society since 1990s. On the other hand, Chu Yiu-ming, age 70, is a Baptist Minister of Chai Wan Baptist Church, chairman at the Hong Kong Democracy Development Network and human right activist. Yiu-ming has been a pro-democracy activist for decades and he even participated in the operation of rescuing students after 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. (Kaiman, 2014) The main characteristic of the OCLP group is the orderly manner in which they handle the OCLP group, their guidelines and their clearly asserted goals that are contained in in their "manual" displayed in their official website.

Ironically, the OCLP would not be the initiator of the protests but rather the supporter of two student activists groups: Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS). Joshua Wong Chi-fung leads "Scholarism" and their principal ally is Alex Chow Yong-kang of HKS. As the name suggests these groups accommodate very young leaders. On one

hand, Joshua Wong Chi-fung (age 17 years old) founded Scholarism in 2011. The group is integrated by different high schools in Hong Kong and they first gathered to protest Beijing-backed proposal to implement "patriotic education" in the schools. At the time he managed to mobilize near 120,000 people. Chi-fung is portrayed by Beijing as an "extremist" due to his enthusiasm as a leader that is capture by his following statement "You have to see every battle as possibly the final battle" (Kaiman, 2014).

On the other hand, Alex Chow Yong-kang (age 24) is a sociology student and general secretary of the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS). This organization is Scholarism's closest collaborator. On July 2014 Yong-kang organized also a sit-in, just after Beijing made the electoral reform, but ended quickly with the arrest of up to 500 people. (Kaiman, 2014)

This interesting combination of characteristics would leave clear marks in the evolution of this collective action. As initially intend the movement would search to create a dialogue with the government to have a constant flow of opinions going in between. The principal agenda of the OCLP group was to bring about a coalition that will bring democratic reforms to Hong Kong (讓愛與和平佔領中環., 2015).

Hence, when the movement saw no space for dialogue but to launch a civil disobedience, they did so with the characteristics desired by the leaders of the OCLP. As to show the real intention of the democratic movement (for the sake of all Hong Kong) the plan was named "Occupy Central with Love and Peace". In addition, this would also show the people of Hong Kong that the group wanted to protect their rights and reaffirm the idea of acting as a bridge in between. Nevertheless, the plan for occupying the central on late September was not completely originated by this group, as previously stated, but rather by the unraveling events (Li A., 2014).

3.6 The demonstrations

As the sentiment of being cheated by the PRC government rose, Hong Kongers, even soft liners, were considering expressing the betrayal through some sort of civil disobedience. As the events unraveled the OCLP announced that they would also address the situation through a civil disobedience according to a "manual" (讓愛與和平佔領中環, 2015)[77]. The intention was to avoid any provocation and maintain the nonaggressive behavioral line the group had always defended. Nevertheless, there were other groups, like the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism that had more confrontational tactics in mind.

On September 26 students decided to go to Tamar Park and the Central Government Offices in the surroundings to protest. As more students joined in the protests, the 17-year-old Joshua Wong, leader of the Scholarism high school democracy group, led a group in front of the offices of the Central Government. Their intention was to take the building, in what it seemed a strategy learned from the Sunflower movement. There the police surrounded the group and arrested Joshua. As students and other civilian gathered behind the fences requesting the immediate liberation of Joshua, the police tried to disperse the crowds by shooting pepper spray. As the plan did not worked out the citizens and students remained shouting remarks such as: "Release the students!" "The students are innocent!" "Shame on the police! " (Li A. , 2014)

The following morning the leaders of the OCLP arrived at the square they found out that thousands of people had come to support the students. This created a pressure for the OCLP to launch their plan of civil disobedience. On September 28 Benny Tai announced that the OCLP was going to be launch. This action had a negative effect on the students and civilians protesting, because they perceived the resolution as a political opportunity of the group. Hence, they decided to leave and not participate in the OCLP protest.

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[77] Following the order characterized by the OCLP leaders, they were consulting with the population since 2013 how was the more suitable way to launch the civil disobedience. Certainly at the moment the population did not agree with their claims or methods. The level of approval of the group within the population was very low as it was shown in the tracking poll conducted by the Hong Kong University since 2013. (University of Hong Kong, 2014)

On September 29, with just few thousands of people supporting the demonstrations, the police decided to finally clear out the area by closing all exists and forcing demonstrators to go through police lines. The OCLP and HKFS reported this to the citizens, (which in this case appealed to their sense of community due to their identity as Hong Kong citizens) and thousands arrived only after two hours of the first report. From this moment the protest would grow to one of the biggest demonstrations in the Hong Kong's recent history (Li A. , 2014).

Since that moment the demonstrators stated their clear objectives and aims. Their ultimate goal is to achieve open candidacy for the Chief Executive (CE) post and its direct election from the population by 2017. The idea behind the direct election is to break the power of the committee conform by the tycoons, oligarchs and pro-Beijing figures. The second demand they had, was the resignation of the current CE Leung Chun-ying, as he had favored Beijing in electoral reform of the past August. The protestors officially do not recognize the figure of Leung Chun-ying as they reject his election through the Electoral College[78] (Iyengar, 2014).

3.7 Understanding the Collective Action in Hong Kong

Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement follows clearly the methodology described by McAdam's dynamic interactive model. Since the government in Beijing put in question the possible elections of Chief Executive via direct vote, the leaders created specific protocols. The leaders of this group made a "manifesto" and a "manual of disobedience" available in their official site[79]. In their "manifesto" this group clearly declares that their objective is to "strive for the election of the Chief Executive by universal

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[78] As mockery the protestors refer to the CE Leung Chun-ying as "689", for the total of votes he received from the Electoral College that to their perspectives only follows the interests of the tycoons, oligarchs and pro-Beijing figures.
[79] For further information please Access: http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/eng

and equal suffrage in 2017" (讓愛與和平佔領中環., 2015). Furthermore, in their "manual of disobedience" the leaders declare that they are a nonviolent movement. As they argue, violence only provokes more violence and fear hence they reject it. This manual establishes that their members must strictly follow the non-violence principle.

Furthermore, although the OCLP movement was organized, had clear objectives and behavioral guidelines, the rise of its popularity fluctuated (see Figure 5). In fact what made the OCLP group gain stronger support was the triggering fact that the police started clashing with the students. This led people following the students to join the OCLP, when it became clear that the students were allied with the group. This fact increased the size and reach of the mobilization.

Figure 5. Universal suffrage via OCLP?

Q4 There have been suggestions to fight for the implementation of universal suffrage for the Chief Executive election in 2017 in Hong Kong via the "Occupy Central with Love and Peace" movement. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this suggestion?

		April 2013 (First round)	July 2013 (Second round)	October 2013 (Third round)		January 2014 (Fourth round)		May 2014 (Fifth round)		Changes
		Percentage	Percentage	Freq	Percentage	Freq	Percentage	Freq	Percentage	Percentage
Very much agree	)Agree	9)25	15)32	119)253	12)25	105)254	10)25	89)245	9)24	-1)-1
Quite agree		16	17	134	13	148	15	156	15	--
Half-half		18	13	114	11	120	12	113	11	-1
Quite disagree	) Disagree	21)51	21)46	224)552	22)55	253)584	25)57	208)567	21)56	-4)-1
Very much disagree		30	25	328	33	332	33	359	36	+3
Don't know/ Hard to say		7	9	86	9	59	6	84	8	+2
Total		100	100	1016	100	1017	100	1008	100	

Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)

Moreover, just like the Sunflower movement, this movement would gain its representative symbol (umbrella) when the police began removing people by force. During first sit-ins the security forces clashed the students several times, for protection some of the members used their umbrellas. The movement readapted their "interpretation process" through their attribution of "threat" and created a collective identity by taking the umbrella a distinctive garment and tool of the group. Thus, they implemented a "new repertoire" (an anti-gas-

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shield) to create an "innovative collective action" against the "environment uncertainty" to keep a "sustained contention". From this fact the symbol of the movement would emerge.

One additional element attached to the meaning of the umbrella would come from 2003 the movement. At that time the umbrella was also used as a symbol, when holding it with the arm completely stretch above the head, which was linked to the statue of liberty created by Chinese students in the Tiananmen Square in 1989. Thus, in the recent protests all these elements converged into the real meaning of the umbrella (讓愛與和平佔領中環, 2015; Li A., 2014)

It would be through this symbol along with the outfit (black and yellow), also accompanied by a yellow ribbon providing the sense of mourning for democracy, which would express a clear sense of unity among the group (Kaiman, 2014). All together these elements, as Tilly mentions, showed the worthiness, unity, the numbers, and commitment of the leaders and their constituencies (WUNC) that lasted from September 28 till December 14, 2014 (Buckley, 2014).

In regards of the goals pursued there are several factors to take into account. The principal goal of the protestors has turn from a medium to a long-term objective threatening its maintenance. Beijing accepted to postpone the date of the election of the CE by 2017 to dwindle the political opportunities leading to a big challenge from the OCLP, Scholarims and HKS. Nevertheless, as McAdam argues, at the end this could be manageable if the union behind the group is the Hong Konger identity.

Thence, following this criterion, it can be argue that the rising identity[80] of Hong Konger, which is in direct contrast with the PRC's control over the territory, provides the collective actions a clear opportunity to keep pushing democratic claims. The additional challenge would be to propose a coherent method to achieve this goal that might lead to two possible

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80   This idea of the rising identity is based on the facts presented previously and also the demographics of the segment of the population that identify as Hong Konger, which are the young generation.

outcomes: a) a political alliance with pro-democratic parties or, b) the creation of a new political party to "institutionalize" the claims.

As seen in the past June 18, 2015 Beijing followed through with the only option it could consider: give Hong Kong residents the right to vote but only for those pro-Beijing candidates. Therefore, legislators and citizens rejected the "reform" provided by the PRC on that same day. Moreover, the increasing attempts of the Chief Executive to sell the idea that pro-democracy legislators and activist are provoking that the majority of people would not have right to vote has further infuriated the society. Although the large protest that paralyzed Hong Kong took place more than 9 months ago, the society keeps demanding democracy, defending their identity and requesting self-determination. (The Guardian, 2015)

3.7 Diffusion and support of the OCLP movement in Taiwan

In January 13, 2014 pro-democracy groups of students and politicians from Hong Kong and Taiwan gathered in Taipei to held talks during the weekend. This marked the first real approach between both communities. Advocates from both sides pursue similar interests and share the same enemy: PRC. The increasing force of the PRC in terms of economy, military and world prominence, made possible the approach of both sides. From the encounter both sides understood that they have things in common in their fight against the PRC's oppression. Unfortunately the discussion of the meeting was hardly mentioned by the media. (Sui, 2014)

The implications of this meeting are very significant in the relations between these two societies. For those theorizing about the "Hongkongisation of Taiwan", like Professor Malte Philipp Keading, this reunion could be regarded as a cornerstone in their mutual recognition of claims. In his paper "Challenging Hongkongisation: the role of Taiwan's social movements and perceptions of post-handover Hong Kong", Keading provide us with the elements to define the "Hongkongisaiton of Taiwan", that can be defined as "[t]he

strategic co-option [of the Beijing leadership of] …[c]apitalists who rely on the Mainland market or production, and who favor intimate relations with the Chinese regime [under a united front scheme]" (Kaeding, 2014). This "united front scheme" Keading's work mentions is linked to the description presented by Professor Yik-yi Chu in the case of Hong Kong (here found in the beginning of this chapter, in the section of "Political structure in Hong Kong"). The approach entails that the PRC targeted the elites (business community, industrialists, etc.) to create a pro-Beijing social and economic elites. In addition, pro-Beijing unions and a wide array of social groups were created to support the new elites.

Therefore, following this line of thought Keading argues that there are four points[81] that summarizes the PRC increasing influence in Taiwan: economic, political discourse, media and united front's targeting students. (Kaeding, 2014)

The first three points can be corroborated. As it was appreciated previously in the chapters of the present study, the economy and political discourse in Taiwan has been indeed strongly tilting towards the PRC. Therefore, it can be traced that the PRC has directly (economic dependene of Taiwan on the PRC) or through Taiwanese capitalists (read: media case) and pro-union Taiwanese politicians (KMT), permeated different levels of the Taiwanese society.

Finally, the fourth point Keading mentions is the united fronts seeking influence students. Keading proposes that Beijing has tarjeted politically active students and union members by united front agents to be invited to organised trips to Mainland China, in the promise of prestige and using their curiosity. Kaeding defents that Chinese agents has gain access and prestige in Taiwanese political institutions to slowly influence the student population.

Nonetheless, the author of the present study does not agree with the effectivity of this perspective. The reason behind this disagreement lies on what Professor McAdam calls: "we-ness". Identity in the Taiwanese society, and also Hong Konger society, has become

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[81] In his study，Kaeding support himself on professor's Wu Jieh-min (a political economy researcher at Academia Sinica) three main areas of influence and adds the additional element of "united front", to argue that the PRC's influence in Taiwan is taking place in this manner.

the main pillar behind the rejection of the return of Taiwan to the rest of China. Therefore, this tool of influence has proven rather inefective and actually sparked further repudiation[82].

Thence, the similarities provoked by the "China factor", has driven both societies to seek mutual aid. After the reunion between Hong Kong and Taiwan activist of January 13th, the Sunflower movement would take the streets and the Legislative Yuan on March 2014 and then achieving its victory. During the time of the occupation, as Lin Fei-fan would confirm to the Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong students attended the demonstrations. Through this involvement, Hong Kong students and activists witnessed the process and logistics of the Sunflower movement.

The pressure felt by the students make a movement that provided hope in the search of democracy, defend their identity and proclaim their self-determination, created a movement that impacted also people in Hong Kong. The victory open the possibility to continue building the relationship between activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan that started with the meeting in January. After the Sunflower movement, other activists from Hong Kong would continue the learning process by contacting Lin Fei-Fan and other participants of the movement to acquire more training to organize, mobilize, and improve their advocate's moral.

The transmission of these ideas and lessons acquired during the Sunflower movement between parties continued on the eve of the scheduled resolution of the PRC in regards of the election of the Chief Executive. When the PRC's rejection on allowing the society to choose and directly elect the Chief Executive was made public, the students groups along with the OCLP agreed to take action through a civil disobedience. Therefore, it was planned that in October 1st 2014 the OCLP would organize massive sit-ins in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, as the events unveiled the protest had to be launch prior to that date, as the

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82   Further supporting data of this stand will be provided in chapter 4 when the study addresses the results found in the questionnaire applied to the Taiwanese students.

police detained the student leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung along with others when trying to enter an administrative building.

At the same time the Hong Kong and Macau student organization in Taiwan, which was planning to show its support by organizing sit-ins in Taipei's Liberty Square, had to quickly adjust to new events. In response Taiwanese activists, organizations and students helped the Hong Kong and Macau student organization to quickly gather a group of people, which surprisingly reached 4,000 protesters, on Sunday's night September 28, 2014 (Hsu J. W., 2014). That night Taipei's Liberty Square saw a mixture of supporters conformed by Hong Kong and Macau students from abroad, Taiwanese students and Taiwanese from other social strata.

On that day reporter Cindy Sui from BBC news conducted interviews to the people gathered there, revealing that it was clear to all the idea that they needed to support the fight for democracy in Hong Kong. Among the Taiwanese people interviewed and others showing their support, many had placards with the slogan that read: "Today Hong Kong tomorrow Taiwan" (Sui, 2014). That day was revealed to the world that the cross-national diffusion of the claims between Hong Kong and Taiwan was really strong. Interestingly, when analyzed, the diffusion followed the three key points argued by David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford: 1) the transmission of both claims were and are of interest for both sides; 2) both share structural characteristics (being the most important democracy, particular identity, self-determination and the rejection of the PRC) that constitute the basis of mutual identification; and 3) both were and are linked together "relationally" through social networks (made between activists and other sectors of the society), and "non-relationally" through social media. Therefore, the demonstration of support would not be limited to a single demonstration.

Activists distributed the message to keep supporting Hong Kongers' struggle. Through Facebook people changed their profile picture to a yellow ribbon that now had become another symbol of the Hong Kong movement. The support would also expand into other areas. Such was the case when in November 14th 2014 Taiwanese soccer fans followed the call to show their support for Hong Kongers in the qualifier round between Taiwan and

Hong Kong of the East Asia Cup in Taipei. Several hundred Taiwanese fans pull out yellow umbrellas. Fans in one row of the stands held up 14 yellow umbrellas displaying lyrics from Hong Kong band Beyond's hit song "Glorious Years" from the 1990s: "Hold on tight to freedom in the wind and rain. We have the confidence to change the future" (風雨中抱緊自由、自信可改變未來). (Pan, 2014)

Thus, that day the mutual recognition of both sides transcended Doug McAdam's dynamic interactive model to reach new paradigm that followed Robert D. Putman's ideas of rejecting a foreign opportunity political structure. (Alternative Types of Cross-national Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena, 2009; Hsu J. W., 2014; Kasoff I. E., 2014; Wen, 2014)

Conclusion

Through the present chapter it was exposed the socio-economic and political context that led to the creation of the social movement in Hong Kong. Like in the case of Taiwan, in Hong Kong the singularities found in the political structure is largely responsible for creating the opportunities for activists to oppose. Hong Kong complexities have confused several specialists. An example of this is the misinterpretation that people in Hong Kong was or is interested in politics. The assumption comes from a lack of understanding of the realities found in the society's consciousness (identity and self-determination).

As seen the process of building a democratic movement was slow. The large mobilizations seen in 2003 and the ones that followed were unable to be maintained because lacked objectives, but most importantly, sense unity. As the objectives defended by activists became clear and aligned with the developing awareness of the Hong Konger identity, (this unit of people different from the citizens of the PRC), the success of a collective action became more real. Additionally, with the learning process and support achieved from

Taiwanese activists, all the elements started to converge. This led to the mobilization of September 28th 2014.

Finally, the support seen in Taiwan as the mobilization in Hong Kong took place, confirmed that the approach between these two societies had reached a new level. Both sides understand the magnitude of the threat they are facing and the difficulties that entails as the PRC's power rises. Thus, both sides acknowledge that remaining alone against this challenge means defeat. Therefore, as it was seen in the meeting on January 13th 2013, a new era in the relations between these two societies emerged. Their search to defend their respective identities, democracies and self-determination, made both sides to seek the creation of a stable relationship.

Chapter 4 Comparison of the Movements and Questionnaire analysis

The present chapter will be dedicated to the comparison of both social movements to clarify their differences and similarities. First, it will be presented the differences between the groups. Second, the similarities will be provided so the reader can understand what the common ground between the social movements is. Third, the study will present the results of the questionnaire and the information will be analyzed to draw conclusions on the findings. Through this method the study will state clearly to the reader what were the key points making feasible the collaboration between sides. Without further due let us proceed to the analysis.

4.1 Differences and Similarities

As seen so far in the current study, there are different political opportunities structures that led to the creation of the social movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. When analyzing each movement in their respective contexts it may seem that both are different from each other, without having a vast array of elements connecting them. Nevertheless, despite their particularities, collaboration has taken place. To be able to understand this cooperation more clearly firstly the present section will expose the contrasting areas marked between groups and secondly the common grounds.

4.1.1 Differences

The areas of discrepancy found between each social movement ranges from the political to the social realms. As the context plays a crucial role in the creation of the political opportunities structure, it is important to consider it. In Figure 1 it can be observed the differences lived in the context of each case.

Figure 1. Context differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan

Context difference	
Political System: One country two systems (Never experienced democracy)	Political System: Democracy since 1996
Sovereignty: Never	Sovereignty: De facto since 1949
Government's relation with the PRC: Intra-state relation between two different governmental systems	Government's relation with the PRC: As two independent and sovereign regimes that are increasing ties
Growing Identity in the Youth: Apart from the Mainland	Growing Identity in the Youth: Independent from the Mainland

The political government "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong has created very particular challenges. As previously mentioned, people in Hong Kong were depicted as "economic animals", which meant they were not interested in politics as long as the economy was working. This was true all along the British rule that with the aid of polls and the common law (which granted civil rights), the people remained under control. Nevertheless, the change of regimes provoked the rejection of the maintenance of this system.

Looking at Taiwan, its political process had followed a very different trend. Taiwan emerged as a democracy almost two decades ago. Moreover, democracy in Taiwan has been characterized by a strong activism. Social movements in Taiwan achieved political changes and continue to be key to obtain them. Therefore, both societies had different political experiences and different perspectives regarding activism.

Sovereignty is another key element differentiating both. Hong Kong has never experience sovereignty until its recent reunification with the PRC came and the "one country, two system" formula was offered. This opened an opportunity for people in Hong Kong to seek exploit the idea and obtain a real degree of sovereignty.

In the case of Taiwan, the fact that the KMT regime maintained a control over the island since 1949, created a real sense of territorial independence and sovereignty. As years passed by it was clear that Taiwan was sovereign from any influence from the PRC and the construction of independent island nation was possible too. Therefore, Taiwanese youth do

acknowledge Taiwan as independent and sovereign country. Thus, sovereignty process in both cases originated from very particular processes.

Furthermore, the governments' relation with the PRC is one of the most important elements. In the case of Hong Kong, the status in which Hong Kong and Beijing deal with each other can be framed as an inter-state fashion, similar to a federation (tending more to centralization). Thence, Hong Kong is subject to the mandate in Beijing, because it was never independent since the beginning. Bluntly it was the dangers of an economic destabilization due to a social confrontation in this powerhouse, which led the PRC to decide not to affect it by pushing forward a frontal political harmonization with the rest of the China.

In contrast, Taiwan and PRC relations are hold between different independent regimes. The civil war in China that witness the clashes between the Communist and Nationalists, led to the demise of the KMT rule in almost all of China. The KMT redoubt was Taiwan. From that moment onwards, as seen in the preamble dedicate to cross-strait relations, the negotiation in both sides was intended to reach a possible peace or an agreement. Time made the situation evolve from two regimes seeking control of a unique territory, into two regimes exercising a *de facto* power in two different territories. Thus changing the nature of their societies. The international recognition of the PRC and the loss of the ROC, made situation even more complicated. Although since Lee Teng-hui Taiwan policy was to reassure its stance as a country, nowadays, the KMT regime has a posture of harmony and possible reunification. Nonetheless, the clear independence between both regimes is clear.

The relationship with the PRC has generated a very different evolution of identity in both cases. As stated in previous chapters, people in Hong Kong were trapped between two realities: never truly belonging PRC and a "New Chinese men" with western values. Nevertheless, the fear of going back to the PRC allowed people to start identifying themselves better the rising identity of "Hong Konger". In essence to be a "Hong Konger" means to be a born Cantonese-speaking citizen of Hong Kong, according to the definition provided by the of the Hong Kong University polls (University of Hong Kong, 2014). In

reality, it has a different status from the one held by the PRC citizenship. Thus, the Hong Konger identity, determines a separation between the citizens there and the rest of China.

In Taiwan, identity has a strong stronger sense of separation with the PRC. Nowadays, Taiwanese identity has a strong connotation of independence and self-determination attached to it. At times the Taiwanese identity transcends ethnicity and links more with the civic aspect of belonging to the ROC. Clearly Taiwanese identity comes as an element that counterpoises any idea of attachment to the PRC. Therefore, the difference in identity between Taiwan and Hong Kong is that in Taiwan identity has a deterministic sense of complete independence from the PRC, and in Hong Kong tends to mark a difference.

Now that contextual differences have been enunciated, the study can proceed to show the differences between the movements. In Figure 2 it can be appreciated what are the particularities of each movement.

Figure 2. Differences between the Social Movements

Differences	
Hong Kong	Taiwan
1) Want the right to nominate and elect the Chief Executive	1) Inclusion of the society in cross-strait agreements
2) Resignation of Chief Executive. Leung Chun-ying	2) Pass the bill for monitoring cross-strait agreements
3) Build a democratic system	3) Improvement of the economic equality, while avoiding complete dependence of the PRC.
4) Self-determination within the realm of "one country, two systems"	4) Self-determination within Taiwanese sovereignty
5) Related claims	5) Independence as country
	6) Alliance of different claims

All claims in each movement are subject of their particular reality and each has their level of complexity. In the case of Hong Kong the first three points are very explicit on what their goals are. Nevertheless, from the fourth to the fifth point the claims become more and

more complex. Self-determination within the realm of "one country, two systems" it is a goal that is pointed out by the present author based on the guidelines issued by the OCLP movement's official site. The determination of this goal in this manner is due to the fact that the movement does not seek revolution but rather a democratic claim. Although it can be argued that within the movement there are several radical advocates that would prefer seek a revolution or independence.

Finally, by "related of claims" it must be understood that in Hong Kong the democratic movement has been evolving since 2003. Although the movement of 2003 was largely focused on the claim of freedom of assembly, seeking the direct election of the Chief Executive, democracy and self-determination have been the ones constantly demanded. This would be the most contrasting difference with the movement in Taiwan.

In the particular case of Taiwan demands attend other needs. Until recently the society has raised the voice to be upfront in the discussion of cross-strait agreements and empowering the Legislative Yuan's position in these deals. Thus, the first and second points only apply to the Taiwanese reality.

Moreover, the third point, "improve the economic equality while avoiding dependence of the PRC", refers to fear that Taiwanese sovereignty is at stake. The interdependence between Taiwan and China poses a big question for the Taiwanese society if whether or not this will provoke Taiwan to succumb to the PRC[83]. This can be argued, only interests the Taiwanese society.

The fourth point makes refers to the fact that a large percentage of the Taiwanese society sees Taiwan's government as a complete sovereign entity capable to rule the territory. Therefore, the fifth point must not come as a surprise when it proposes that the independence of Taiwan has to be defended. Again, this is a matter of inner discussion that largely appeals to Taiwanese. Finally, the sixth point marks the last and one of the most important differences between the movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In Taiwan the

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[83] More details about this fact will be shown and discussed in the questionnaire's results.

collective action of the Sunflower movement managed to consolidate all the claims in Taiwan (ranging from anti-nuclear protests to the rejection of media monopolization and ECFA) into a big and organize protest with clear objectives. That has yet not seen in Hong Kong.

4.1.2 Similarities

Despite of the differences lived in each context there are important factor that has and could drive these two groups further together. The factors uniting both groups are not all completely similar. In fact, the core elements of their particular problematic each group can find similarities. To understand this Figure 3 provides us with the elements found in both cases.

Figure 3. Similarities between the Social Movements

Similarities	
Hong Kong	Taiwan
Objectives: Activist seeking cross-border reach to increase their strength	Objectives: Activist seeking cross-border reach to increase their strength
Anti-PRC integration sentiment	Anti-PRC integration sentiment
Movements claims:	Movements claims:
1) Democratic / Self-determination	1) Democratic / Self-determination
2) Further participation of the society in the political structure: better represented	2) Further participation of the society in the political structure: better represented
3) Improvement of the political processes	3) Improvement of the political processes
4) Pro-PRC government	4) Government's tilting policies toward the PRC
5) Economic interdependence with the PRC	5) Economic interdependence with the PRC
6) Rejection of pro-PRC education	6) Rejection of pro-China education
Growing Identity in the Youth: Hong Konger	Growing Identity in the Youth: Taiwanese
Young population recognition of the Taiwanese struggle? Yes	Young population recognition of the Taiwanese struggle? Yes

The first point is crucial as it makes reference to all social movements' reality: resources are scarce. As seen at the beginning of this study social movements have a constant struggle for human and economic resources. To reduce the trouble transcending borders is crucial. The meeting that took place in January 13, 2014 in Taipei between activists of Hong Kong and Taiwan would serve as the first real intention to acquire further communication across the strait. After the meeting, the Sunflower movement would be provided with the opportunity to try to overcome these obstacles with a well-structured logistic that would focus on international outreach. The strategy, learned from past experiences like it was the case of the anti-media monopoly movement for instance, would provide the tools to push forward

its claims against the state. As activists of Hong Kong collaborated and saw the process taken in the Sunflower movement, it was understood that international reach was the only way to create an opportunity to achieve their claims.

The second point "anti-PRC sentiment" is one of the most important. Although this argument is central for both sides to seek each other's aid, it would be a mistake to consider it as the only reason why cooperation has emerged between sides. Nonetheless, it is the threat posed by the PRC the main reason why the mobilization in both sides took place. In this regard, the Sunflower movement provided Hong Kong activists the opportunity to learn from their experiences. Then after, when the OCLP movement took place activists and other people in the Taiwanese society provided and showed their support. In this way when the media covered the event immediately linked the situation with Taiwan and vice versa. The intention behind this diffusion of support was to let the world know that the ultimate goal is to avoid repression from the PRC. Thus, the international media (commonly depicting in the West the PRC as a human rights violator) would reinforce the image of the PRC's "malignant" nature and its oppressive objectives towards Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The third point suggests that the movement's claims share similar objectives in regards of the political process lived in their respective countries. Both movements have a democracy nature and seek self-determination within their respective particularities. Likewise, both movements want the society to be more involved in the political structure by being better represented. For the case of Taiwan implies the avoidance of secretive agreements, empowering the society and Legislative Yuan to have a voice in the approval of cross-strait agreements. In the case of Hong Kong this means to be able to propose and directly elect the head of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Chief Executive). These common demands (to increase democracy and accountability) provide the opportunity for activists in both sides to request a constant improvement of the political process.

Point number four shows us that in Hong Kong and Taiwan the governments have a positive approach towards the PRC. In the case of Hong Kong this is, as seen in the previous chapters, the product of a meticulous approximation by Beijing. Therefore, the current government is pro-PRC. In the case of Taiwan it follows a different criteria but at

the end the present government seeks rapprochement with the PRC. This has triggered rejection in both societies, because in both the new generations do not really desire the approximation.

In the fifth point it can be found another key problematic found in both cases. As it was observed in previous chapters, there is a pro-Beijing elite in Hong Kong that co-opts political power and freedom of speech (as it is the media outlets). Moreover, the arrival of citizens of other areas of the Mainland has provoked the rise of real-estate prices, job scarcity and over cramming of the city. Therefore, Hong Kongers challenge this situation, as conditions are no longer favorable for them.

In the case of Taiwan the increasing economic dependence with the PRC provides the ground for people to feel worried about the future. It is clear that Taiwan depends from the PRC and that the ECFA agreement has allow it to grow. Although, the government is seeking to increase the free trades agreements Taiwan has with other countries[84], this has proven to be a slow process. Furthermore, the failure of defining jurisdiction of the different governmental entities created problems like the one observed with the media outlet. Overall, Taiwanese find the economic interdependence worrisome. Not only because they oppose the damaging results of an open market economy, but rather by the fact that increasing Chinese tycoons or state owned companies' stakes in Taiwan, can create the opportunity for the PRC to penetrate and control local political structures. The clear example is the case of the Taiwanese media outlet.

Point number six refers to identical claims regarding education. In the case of Hong Kong the PRC is exercising its power to modify education to provide a "friendlier" perspective of what is the Communist Party and its success. The intention of modifying the educational curriculum in 2012 created rejection among the society that led to a collective action.

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[84] In 2013 Taiwan signed an FTA with New Zealand and Singapore. These two new FTAs added to the previous five it had with: Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. Although in the short term Ma's policy have impacted negatively the country on the long run seeks to avoid the PRC obstruction in the international arena that Taiwan has suffered since 1979. In this way Taiwan could have more opportunities to sign more FTAs. (Hsiu-chuan, Ma blames China for FTA gap , 2014)

Although, the measure was not stopped it managed to be delay until 2015, meaning that soon talks will start (Fang, 2012).   In Taiwan's case, the KMT push forward the modification of the curriculum to reduce the time students study history of Taiwan and focus on China. On July 5th 2015, hundreds of high school students gathered to reject the new tendency found in the books and request the return of the curricula used in 2009 (pro Taiwanese history) (Lin S. , 2015). This perverse type of manipulation provides both movements the bases to challenge and reject these dispositions, to avoid that future generations are "brainwashed" and lose their identity.

Identity has been the key element that has provided an understanding between both sides. As McAdam tells us it is important to perceive a "threat" (PRC) but in fact it is also the "we-ness" that it is largely responsible for creating the political opportunities structures. In retrospective, if people in Hong Kong had never gone through this process of identification using elements provided by the colonial regime, the reunification with the PRC, would probably not generated the level of rejection now lived.

Therefore, when specialists found incredible the idea that people in Hong Kong now tended to be more interested in creating a democracy, they were not considering that identity plays this important role. Whether this fact is largely recognized or not people in Hong Kong have different traditions brought by the colony and this has created a contrasting difference with the rest of the Mainland. This is why when the protests came people who were not activists or real advocates joined to protect students because they felt the need to assist and support them as fellow Hong Kong citizens.

The same argument applies for Taiwan. The rise of the Taiwanese identity is the main element behind the social movement. Therefore, it must not be strange that the movement is concern about the future of the cross-strait relations, which can actually end the conception of that identity. This idea serves to seek more representation of the elements integrating it. Hence, through the "we-ness" the Sunflower movement managed to accommodate all different ranges of claims into one strong group. Leaders of all the groups acknowledge that without the existence of an independent Taiwan (threatened by CSSTA and the secretive measures used by the government) all of their claims would never take place.

Moreover, this idea was also supported because the alliance understood the reach they could obtain locally and globally if all worked together. This was so clear to all that even now, more than one year after the protest, one of the principal messages the present author found repeatedly among students while conducting the survey was: students felt the movement showed them the power of the will behind their identity and that even the government had to comply with it.

Together Hong Kong and Taiwan can excel if both recognize that their identity and claims are valid. To be able to know if people in Hong Kong support Taiwanese, the present study retrieves the following two questions made in a survey to Hong Kongers by the Hong Kong University. The two questions touch upon the views of citizens of Hong Kong over Taiwanese independence and their confidence over the reunification between Taiwan and China. These two question are important because:

1) The first question retrieves the perspective of Hong Kongers over the "independence" which is highly interrelated to the Taiwanese identity. Thus, the question asks the perspective of people of Hong Kong if they support or not that people in Taiwan identify themselves as independent.
2) The second question that requests citizens of Hong Kong to provide their level of "confidence" over Taiwan reunifying without major problems or if their struggle for sovereignty might difficult things. Hence, the question measures the level of recognition of the power of the Taiwanese society and government to remain sovereignty and resist unification.

(As the interests of the present study is to evaluate the responses of Hong Kong's new generation, the ages to be considered while in the following questions would be of those citizens between the ages of 18 to 29 years old)

Figure 4. Hong Kongers' view over the Taiwanese independence.

Date of survey: 9-12/3/2015		18-29	30-49	50 or above	Overall Sample
View on the Taiwan independence issue[10]	Oppose	35+/-9% (37)	47+/-6% (110)	65+/-6% (184)	53+/-4% (331)
	Support	**51+/-10% (54)**	40+/-6% (94)	21+/-5% (58)	33+/-4% (207)
	Don't know / hard to say	15+/-7% (16)	13+/-4% (32)	14+/-4% (39)	14+/-3% (87)
	Total	100% (107)	100% (236)	100% (282)	100% (625)

Source: (香港大學民研究所計劃, 2015)

Figure 5. Confidence of the Hong Kong population of Taiwan's reunification with the PRC

| Date of survey: 9-12/3/2015		18-29	30-49	50 or above	Overall Sample
Confidence in cross-strait reunification[11]	Yes	17+/-7% (20)	20+/-5% (47)	42+/-6% (119)	29+/-4% (187)
	No	**77+/-8% (93)**	72+/-6% (170)	41+/-6% (117)	59+/-4% (380)
	Don't know / hard to say	6+/-4% (8)	8+/-4% (20)	17+/-4% (47)	12+/-3% (74)
	Total	100% (121)	100% (237)	100% (284)	100% (641)

Source: (香港大學民研究所計劃, 2015)

It is clear in the results shown here that most of the Hong Kong youth do support the independence and have no confidence on the reunification. In regards of the independence of Taiwan, although the result just barely surpasses half of the population, just 35 percent is against it. Despite the polarization found in the results, it can be said that this is the direct recognition that half of the population has a resolute recognition over Taiwanese seeing themselves as independent nation. To support this idea, let us refer to Figure 5, which provides a different angle of the same problem but in this case the results are more positive.

In terms of the confidence level shown in the question regarding cross-strait reunification, it

is clear that those people between 19 and 29 years old do not agree with the reunification of Taiwan. This can tell us that this generation does believe that Taiwan can struggle to maintain its sovereignty. It also can be said that this generation does recognized that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent entity.

Finally, to understand why the opinions of this section of the population matters, in Figure 6 it can be found Hong Kong's demographics. Although the population in Hon Kong has a medium of 44 years, the Hong Kongers between 18 and 29 years old, which reflect an increasing pro-Taiwan tendency, will soon replace the majority of the aging population. Therefore, we it can be expected that the current approach between Hong Kong and Taiwan may expand to new levels as this generation accesses different places within their society and political structure.

Figure 6. Population distribution in Hong Kong

Source: (PropGod Services Limited, 2015)

In the case of Taiwan, the survey conducted for the present study shows that Taiwanese students how took the survey do recognize Hong Kongers' claims and their identity. In Figure 7 and 8, it can be appreciate the responses provided by 460 students of three universities in Taiwan. As it can be appreciated, without doubt students in Taiwan are completely supportive of the democratic movement in Hong Kong. From the all the sample 82.8 percent (+/- 4.5) of the students completely agreed or agreed (31.6 percent and 51.2 percent respectively) that they do feel empathy for the democratic struggle of Hong Kongers. In regards of identity, 91.5 percent (+/- 4.5) completely agreed or agreed (49.1 percent and 42.4 percent respectively) that the Hong Konger identity is real and should be

defended. The results are impressive, as it can be said that clearly taking the survey have a sense of communion with their Hong Kong counterparts.

Figure 7. Taiwanese students' recognition of Hong Kongers' democratic claims.

I felt empathy (the feeling that you understood and share the emotions) for the protestors in Hong Kong (OCLP) in their struggle against the antidemocratic regime.

我對香港的佔中運動當中示威者對抗反民主政權的舉動有所共鳴(表示您能了解而且有相同情緒)。

完全同意	105	31.6%
同意	170	51.2%
沒意見	43	13%
不同意	12	3.6%
完全不同意	2	0.6%

Source: (Questionnaire, 2015)

Figure 8. Taiwanese students' recognition of the Hong Kongers' identity.

I believe that the identity of "Hong Kongers" (those people who are born citizens of Hong Kong and speak Cantonese), is real and should be respected and defended.

我相信「香港人」的身分(香港人此指在香港出生且說廣東話者)是實質的而且應該被尊重與捍衛。

完全同意	226	49.1%
同意	195	42.4%
沒意見	27	5.9%
不同意	6	1.3%
完全不同意	6	1.3%

Source: (Questionnaire, 2015)

Along this section we have been able to see that despite the differences there are more elements uniting both movements. There are several points of intersection between the movements from which three can be said are the crucial ones: 1) the search for international

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reach, 2) the threat provided by the PRC, and 3) their identity. This has led to the mutual recognition between the young generations, which are struggling in overall similar grounds.

4.2 Questionnaire results and analysis.

The present section will be dedicated to show the results of the data obtained by respondents of the survey. First, it will present the demographics of the sampled used in the present survey. Second, the results of the question set to trace the meaning of "being Taiwanese" will be provided, along with a description of the process of its formulation. Third, the results showed in this section will seek to provide the reader the information about readership, sources of information, and show the impacts of both social movements in the Taiwanese students taking the survey. Fourth and final, the present author will provide his interpretation and analysis of the survey's data. Let us proceed to the analysis.

4.2.1 Demographics

The data collection was conducted via Google documents from June 3th to July 1st 2015. The total number of respondents was 460 students from a total population of 55,893 students. The three universities considered in the present study were: National Taiwan University (172), National Taiwan Normal University (142) and National Chengchi University (142). The maximum level of confidence achieved in the present survey was 95 percent, with a confidence interval (error) of 4.55 percent. From the 460 respondents 285 were women and 175 men. The participants were between the ages of 19 to 30 years old[85]. It was also asked the identity of the interviewees. The options provided to the interviewees were the following: Hakka, Min-nan, Mainlander, Aboriginal, Foreigner, Taiwanese, Don't know, other. The "Taiwanese" option of was added as valid but after the respondents were

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85   Despite the explanation provided with the survey, there were a few cases in which the respondents exceeded the targeted age. Nonetheless, the overall results were not affected.

asked to select the meaning from a series of definitions provided by the survey. This was handled in this fashion due to the ambiguity behind the Taiwanese identity.

The option "other" was provided as many Taiwanese students taking the survey or their respective parents felt they had overlapping identities. The most common cases came from those who wanted to clarify that they were ethnically "Min-nan" but they also felt "Foreigner" or "Min-nan" and "Hakka" but they felt "Taiwanese".

The following graphics show the respondents per university and gender.

大學

國立臺灣大學	172	37.4%
國立臺灣師範大學	142	30.9%
國立政治大學	142	30.9%

性別

男	175	38%
女	285	62%

The standard age of the respondents was 22.5 years old as most of them were between the ages of 19 and 23 years old.

Respondents' Age

$y = -0.0044x + 22.579$
$R^2 = 0.04479$

The students were request to select their identity and the results were the following ones.

我是

客家	19	4.13%
閩南	100	21.74%
中國大陸	8	1.74%
原住民	5	1.09%
外國人	11	2.39%
臺灣人	285	61.96%
不確定	23	4.99%
別的	10	2.17%

Please select the option that is closer to what you define the identity of being Taiwanese:

請選擇下列選項中比較接近您所認為身為台灣人身分的定義

a) Ta
   or other ethnicity historically found in the island of Taiwan that speaks Mandarin, Hokkien, or other of the Austronesian languages found there, and follows a culture which encompasses old and new costumes from the different ethnic groups and religions that exist together in the area. **214** 46.5%

b) Taiwanese is a born citizen in the territory controlled by the Republic of China regardless of his/her ethnicity, culture, customs, language and religion.

   43 9.3%

c) Taiwanese are the Aboriginal tribes that were the original settlers of the island of Taiwan, which have a different culture, customs and language from the Chinese culture.

   2 0.4%

d) Taiwanese is a born or nationalized (by marriage, immigrate, etc.) citizen living in the territory controlled by the Republic of China regardless of his/her ethnicity, culture, customs, language and religion.

   139 30.2%

e) Taiwanese is a born citizen in the territory controlled by the Republic of China that is ethnically Han Chinese, Aboriginal, or other ethnicity historically found in the island of Taiwan that speaks Mandarin, Hokkien, or other of the Austronesian languages found there, and follows a culture which encompasses old and new costumes from the different ethnic groups and religions that exist together in the area.

   62 13.5%

This particular question resulted in one of the most difficult formulations in the entire survey. The reason why this was challenging is because Taiwanese identity is rather ambiguous. Hence, before launching the survey the author of the present study conducted a pre-survey to locate some perspectives on the idea of "being Taiwanese". The responses of the people interviewed in this initial assessment, which were all students, varied largely. What was clear was that the idea of ethnicity was mixed with the idea of identity. From the 20 students that were interviewed in this initial

assessment, 12 said that "Min-nan" and "Hakka" ethnicities conforms the modern Taiwanese. The rest of the students would not have a clear the idea and would respond for instance that their family members are "Hakka" or "Min-nan" but they also felt Taiwanese.

Additionally, in a survey descriptions provided could not be long otherwise the respondents would have complications in selecting intricate answers, thus affecting the results. To address the challenge the present author referred to professor's Malte Philip Keading theoretical framework regarding national identity (Identity Formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong - How much difference, how many similarities?, 2011). Keading's framework identifies three key perspectives in the discussion of national identity, which are: ethno-cultural nationalism, multi-ethnic nationalism and political or state nationalism.

National identity is a complex term that has generated several theoretical approaches. As Malte Philip Keading argues, the discussion rounds over two perspectives: the essentialist (primordial) and constructivist approaches. The first argues that national identity refers to certain bloodline, language, race and territory, and poses a great level of "coerciveness". The second, as the names "constructivism" entails, argues that identity views the nation as an "imagined political community" that points at its invention and creation refusing any "primordialism"[86].

Therefore, national identity lies between the ethnical and civic identity definitions. On one hand, Kaeding tell us that professor Anthony D. Smiths argues that the ethnic model takes the community of birth, native culture (including endemic languages), traditions and customs as the most important elements. On the other, the civic model makes reference to the legal and political aspect of the society that has a set of rights, duties, common civic culture, ideology and historic territory (Kaeding, 2011). Nevertheless, there are civic and ethnic elements contained in the definitions on different levels.

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[86]   Primordialism means that nations are ancient and natural phenomena. (Kaeding, 2011)

Kaeding provide us with the definitions of the three most common discourses found in the Taiwanese case:

1) Ethno-cultural nationalism: […] […T]he Taiwanese identity is based on specific historical experiences and perceived cultural differences between the Taiwan people and mainland Chinese[.T]he focus is on the colonial past of the island and its long separation from the China.

2) Multi-ethnic nationalism: […] [T]he Taiwanese nation is a harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation of four ethnic groups, the Mainlanders, the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the aborigines.

3) Political or State nationalism: […] [T]he foundation of a Taiwan nation is in line with the institutions of a liberal state. The rise of the Taiwan identity is seen as directly connected to its geographical and political separation from China and its subsequent democratic development. (Kaeding, 2011)

Supported on these ideas, the options that appear in the survey were formulated and presented to the students for their selection.

As it can be appreciated the option that was most selected was the one that corresponds to "multi-ethnic nationalism". It is clear that most Taiwanese students taking the survey feel more comfortable to see themselves as a community that has a set of particular ethnic groups, in a specific territory with singular cultural, linguistic and religious configurations, encompassed all together in this notion of being "Taiwanese". This answer is immediately followed by the response that adheres to the mixture of "political or state nationalism criteria" and "ethno-cultural nationalism". From all the respondents, 30.2 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed that Taiwanese identity that is more inclusive (as it also combines "nationalized citizens") and has a direct link to the sovereignty of the Taiwanese state. Hence, defined in this manner: Taiwanese are all who were born or nationalize Taiwan's citizens regardless of their ethnicity, culture, customs, language and religion.

The third most selected option accounting for the 13.5 percent (+/- 4.5) of the respondents is the one that mixes "multi-ethnic nationalism" and "political or state nationalism". This is

an interesting option because the intention of this proposition was to measure if Taiwanese students taking the survey found more appealing an idea that provided equal level of strength to ethno-cultural and state nationalism. Finally, the two least selected options were a variant of "political or state nationalism" (only considering born citizens) and "ethno-cultural nationalism". The first with only 43 votes (9.3 percent [+/- 4.5]) defends that to be Taiwanese is to be a born citizen in the territory of the Republic of China. The second is the least appealing because it talks about the "native culture" that refers only to the aboriginal tribes of Taiwan.

### 4.2.2 Measuring the impacts of cross-strait movements in Taiwanese students.

The rest of the questions in the survey conducted had the objective of measuring the following information.

1) Students source of information. Most of the students prefer to obtain their information from Internet sources.

In the following question please select from 1 to 5 in order of importance (being 1 most important and 5 less important) the option that best reflects your opinion. Which of the following sources you most frequently use to obtain news?

Television
電視 [請問以下您利用不同管道獲得新聞來源的重要性 （1代表最重要，5代表非常不重要）]

1	74	16.1%
2	110	24%
3	130	28.3%
4	84	18.3%
5	61	13.3%

Printed news
報紙 [請問以下您利用不同管道獲得新聞來源的重要性 （1代表最重要，5代表非常不重要）]

1	58	12.7%
2	122	26.6%
3	131	28.6%
4	103	22.5%
5	44	9.6%

Internet
網路 [請問以下您利用不同管道獲得新聞來源的重要性 （1代表最重要，5代表非常不重要）]

1	195	42.4%
2	64	13.9%
3	41	8.9%
4	79	17.2%
5	81	17.6%

Friends and Family members
朋友或家人 [請問以下您利用不同管道獲得新聞來源的重要性 （1代表最重要，5代表非常不重要）]

1	45	9.8%
2	142	30.9%
3	147	32%
4	103	22.4%
5	22	4.8%

2) Readership. As Tilly mentions it is important for the population to be informed in order to be aware of the developments of their surroundings. Without readership activism would not take place.

How often do you read the news?
請問您多常獲取新聞資訊？

Daily basis	**305**	66.3%
Five times a week	**60**	13%
Four times a week or less	**38**	8.3%
Three times a week or less	**50**	10.9%
I don't follow the news	**1**	0.2%

3) Opinion the reliance of the media in regards of cross-strait relations.

This specific question was made to see if the students in Taiwan trust the media currently after the controversial situation lived during the Anti-media monopoly Movement. Only 7 percent (+/- 4.5) completely agreed and 40 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed that the media has now a Pro-China tendency. Therefore, currently students see media outlets less politicized.

Do you believe that currently the news media outlet in Taiwan have become Pro-China?
**請問您是否同意此說法：「目前台灣媒體立場已變得親中。」**

完全同意	**35**	7.6%
同意	**184**	40%
沒意見	**75**	16.3%
不同意	**151**	32.8%
完全不同意	**15**	3.3%

Interestingly, in the following question students largely identify as not reliant the information coming from the media outlets in terms of cross-strait relations. The results are conclusive 27 percent (+/- 4.5) completely disagree and 57 percent (+/- 4.5) disagree that they can obtain objective information from this source.

I believe that I can trust media outlets in Taiwan to obtain objective information about Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan.
請問您是否同意此說法：「如果我要了解關於兩岸關係的客觀消息，我可以相信台灣媒體。」

完全同意	2	0.4%
同意	36	7.8%
沒意見	36	7.8%
不同意	262	57%
完全不同意	124	27%

4) Interest in social movements taking place in China and Taiwan.

From the 460 students interviewed, 20 percent (+/- 4.5) of the students completely agreed in having interest for the democratic movements taking place within the PRC. Moreover, 53 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed of having interest. The results shows that most of the students do have an interest on social movements happening in the PRC and the ones that do not are very low.

I feel interest for democratic movements (protests) taking place in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
請問您是否同意此說法：「我對在中華人民共和國發生的民主運動（抗議）有興趣。」

|		
完全同意	92	20%
同意	244	53%
沒意見	73	15.9%
不同意	41	8.9%
完全不同意	10	2.2%

In the case of Taiwan 38 percent (+/- 4.5) completely agreed to have interest for the democratic movements taking place there and 45 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed on the same regards. Again, the interest of students in collective actions is very high.

I feel interest for democratic movements (protests) taking place in Taiwan.
請問您是否同意此說法：「我對在台灣發生的民主運動（抗議）有興趣」

完全同意	**176**	38.3%
同意	**209**	45.4%
沒意見	**40**	8.7%
不同意	**29**	6.3%
完全不同意	**6**	1.3%

5) Acquaintance with the OCLP movement and its claims.

From the 460 students interviewed 332 (72 percent) recognized that they do know what does the OCLP is. From those who knew the movement, 283 (85 percent) knew the OCLP main objectives.

I know what the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement is.
我知道甚麼是「讓愛與和平佔領中環運動」

是	**332**	72.2%
否	**128**	27.8%

I have a clear idea of what are the main objectives of the OCLP movement
我清楚此運動的主要目標為何

是	**283**	85.2%
否	**49**	14.8%

126

6) Measuring the level of support and empathy for the OCLP movement found in Taiwanese students taking the survey.

From the group of students that knew the OCLP movement, 33.1 percent (+/- 4.5) (N=110) completely agreed that is important for the Taiwanese society to be informed about the mayor protests taking place in the PRC like the OCLP movement. 55.7 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed on the same regard and only 10 and 6 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed and completely disagreed on this respect.

I believe that is important for the Taiwanese society to be informed about major protests taking place in the PRC, like the OCLP movement of last September 2014 in Hong Kong.
我相信瞭解在中國所發生的抗議運動對台灣社會來說是重要的，例如2014年九月在香港所發生的讓愛與和平佔領中環運動。

完全同意	110	33.1%
同意	185	55.7%
沒意見	21	6.3%
不同意	10	3%
完全不同意	6	1.8%

Taiwanese students taking the survey completely agreed in a 31.6 percent (+/- 4.5) (N=105) and agreed on a 51.2 percent (+/- 4.5) (N=170) that they felt empathy for struggle of Hong Kongers. This is crucial as it shows that these Taiwanese students see a strong connection between them and the Hong Kong society.

I felt empathy (the feeling that you understood and share the emotions) for the protestors in Hong Kong (OCLP) in their struggle against the antidemocratic regime.
我對香港的佔中運動當中示威者對抗反民主政權的舉動有所共鳴(表示您能了解而且有相同情緒)。

完全同意	105	31.6%
同意	170	51.2%
沒意見	43	13%
不同意	12	3.6%
完全不同意	2	0.6%

In this question it was requested that these students provided their opinion towards other Taiwanese students that showed their support during the OCLP movement. The result shows that the majority agrees with this behavior, as 20.5 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 68) completely agreed and 44.6 percent (+/- 4.5) (N=148) agreed. But most important few were the ones that completely disagreed or disagreed with this behavior, with 3.6 and 5.7 percent (+/- 4.5) respectively.

I agree with the Taiwanese students that felt the need to openly supported the OCLP movement taking place in Hong Kong, and assisted the sit-ins at Taipei's Liberty Square, wore symbols, promoted their message, etc.,
我同意台灣學生需要以行動支持香港的佔中運動，例如在台北的自由廣場靜坐運動、穿戴象徵運動的標誌、提倡他們的訊息等

完全同意	68	20.5%
同意	148	44.6%
沒意見	85	25.6%
不同意	19	5.7%
完全不同意	12	3.6%

The students were request to provide their views on supporting social movements in the PRC with money and other items, for the final purpose of bringing democracy to the PRC. The result obtained is slanted, showing the lack of consensus whether collective action in the PRC might be a successful endeavor or not.

I believe that supporting democratic movements taking place in the PRC with donations of money, clothes, food, etc. could help bring democracy in the PRC.
我相信以捐衣物、食物、金錢等行動支持在中國所發生的民主運動，有助於將民主精神帶入中國。

|		
完全同意	31	6.7%
同意	177	38.5%
沒意見	119	25.9%
不同意	114	24.8%
完全不同意	19	4.1%

7) Acknowledgement of the Hong Konger identity as valid and worth defending.

From the 460 students interviewed 49 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 226) completely agreed and 42 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 195) agreed with the proposition. This confirms that these Taiwanese students not only feel empathy for Hong Kongers' democratic struggle, but also understand their identity entails and agree that must be defended.

I believe that the identity of "Hong Kongers" (those people who are born citizens of Hong Kong and speak Cantonese), is real and should be respected and defended.

我相信「香港人」的身分(香港人此指在香港出生且說廣東話者)是實質的而且應該被尊重與捍衛。

|		
完全同意	226	49.1%
同意	195	42.4%
沒意見	27	5.9%
不同意	6	1.3%
完全不同意	6	1.3%

8) Opinion on the economic dependency of Taiwan on China.

The following question was made to detect if these Taiwanese students do feel a connection between their career opportunities and the cross-strait relations. This question comes to indirectly measure if they see a real connection between ECFA, CSSTA, etc. and their "particular" realities.

By "particular" realities the author of this study refers to the fact that students are performing different studies that will lead to a wide range of careers (politicians, doctors, dentists, etc.), and this fact might serve for them not to see a real connection with these topics. As it can be appreciated, most of the respondents answered that they do believe cross-strait relations have a strong impact for their futures career.

I believe that the cross-strait relations between PRC and Taiwan do have a strong impact on the options I will have for my future career.
我認為兩岸關係對我的未來工作有強烈的影響。

完全同意	162	35.2%
同意	213	46.3%
沒意見	54	11.7%
不同意	29	6.3%
完全不同意	2	0.4%

The following proposition provides an insight of what is the mindset of the Taiwanese students taking the survey regarding developing further economic ties with the PRC. Needless to say, all political initiatives that come in this area will experience strong opposition from the students.

I believe that increasing the economic dependency of Taiwan on China puts in danger Taiwan's: democracy, identity and self-determination.
我認為台灣對中國貿易依賴度的增加會使台灣的民主、身分地位與自主權定權受到威脅

完全同意	176	38.3%
同意	223	48.5%
沒意見	28	6.1%
不同意	27	5.9%
完全不同意	6	1.3%

9) The Sunflower's movement awareness campaign of ECFA and CSSTA on Taiwanese student.

The following proposition's aim was to show the importance of the Sunflower movement's diffusion system within the Taiwanese student population. As it can be appreciated it was very important the movement's campaign to explain what was ECFA and CSSTA. More than three quarters of the population (73.9 percent +/- 4)

did not know what where the agreements about until the Sunflower started its diffusion campaign.

It was until the Sunflower movement took place that I became aware of what were the implications of the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) and Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) for the economy of Taiwan.
一直到太陽花學運，我才了解兩岸服務貿易協議(CSSTA)與兩岸經濟合作架構協議 (ECFA)對台灣經濟的可能造成的影響。

完全同意	111	24.1%
同意	229	49.8%
沒意見	54	11.7%
不同意	56	12.2%
完全不同意	10	2.2%

The following proposition was made to confirm the stand of Taiwanese students taking the survey, regarding ECFA's positive outcome. Previously it was observed that the majority of the students agree that further development of the economic relations with the PRC is a risk for Taiwan. Nevertheless, in this case, 40 percent (+/- 4.5) of the students (N= 186) agree that there is a positive side of this agreement. Although the results do not show a clear tendency, it challenges the conception that for the most part Taiwanese students taking the survey rejected ECFA.

I believe that the ECFA agreement with the PRC can help improve Taiwan's slowing economy.
我認為兩岸經濟合作架構協議 (ECFA)能幫助台灣的遲緩的經濟發展。

|		
完全同意	22	4.8%
同意	186	40.4%
沒意見	124	27%
不同意	109	23.7%
完全不同意	19	4.1%

10) Their desire for reunification with the rest of China in a hypothetical situation.

The following proposition was made for the purpose of finding out if Taiwanese students taking the survey rejected unification with the PRC on the base of political system, civil rights oppression, etc. Therefore, this hypothetical scenario was put in

place to see if some sense of communion with their peers in the mainland (as it has been in the case of Hong Kong) transcended the types of government. The results are conclusive with 41.1 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 189) these Taiwanese students completely disagreed and 38.3 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 176) disagreed of unifying with the rest of China. This can be translated as a big challenge for any political force that tries to move against this idea. Taiwanese students taking the survey see in Taiwan an island nation that is no longer part of any other territory.

If the PRC held the same political system as Taiwan (democracy, elections, liberty of speech, liberty of communication, etc.) I would agree on Taiwan becoming part of the PRC.
如果中國實施與台灣相同的政治制度(民主、選舉、言論自由、通訊自由等)，我就會同意台灣是中國的一部分。

完全同意	15	3.3%
同意	39	8.5%
沒意見	41	8.9%
不同意	176	38.3%
完全不同意	189	41.1%

11) Their position on Hong Konger and Taiwanese activists working together to reject China.

When asked their opinion about the cooperation between activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, 18.7 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 18.7) completely agreed and 58.7 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 270) agreed that is important for democratic reforms in Hong Kong, and Taiwanese democracy and sovereignty. This question serves to proof that students understand and see a potential benefit in the case that activists of both societies expand their cooperation.

I believe that further cooperation between Hong Kong students activists and Taiwanese students activists could be important to achieve democratic reforms in Hong Kong and maintain Taiwanese democracy and sovereignty from the PRC.
我相信香港參與佔中的學生與響應此活動的台灣學生之間更進一步的合作，能促進香港的民主改革以及維繫台灣的民主與主權。

完全同意	86	18.7%
同意	270	58.7%
沒意見	52	11.3%
不同意	38	8.3%
完全不同意	14	3%

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12) Their position on Taiwanese and Hong Kong society working together to preserve democracy, civil rights and sovereignty.

From all the respondents 76.5 percent (+/- 4.5) completely agreed and agreed (22.6 percent and 53.9 percent respectively) that is important to collaborate with the Hong Kong society to maintain Taiwan's democracy, identity and self-determination.

I believe that in order to defend and maintain Taiwan's democracy, identity, self-determination and human rights, from being oppressed by the PRC it is important to partner up (work together) with other societies in the same situation, like the Hong Kong society, which is struggling to keep these precepts alive.
我認為在中國人民共和國的壓迫下，為了捍衛及維護台灣的民主、認同、自主權以及人權，與其他相同處境的國家或地區一起合作是極為重要的，例如不斷與中國政府捍衛上述權利的香港。

完全同意	104	22.6%
同意	248	53.9%
沒意見	63	13.7%
不同意	38	8.3%
完全不同意	7	1.5%

13) Finally it was ask to the students to provide their perspective if an error in cross-strait relations could actually convert Taiwan into a new Hong Kong.

The purpose of this last question was to provide additional proof that in the minds of Taiwanese students taking the survey the idea of "one country, two systems" it is very clear.

Therefore, becoming a "new Hong Kong" serves as an important "connector" or "trigger" for students to make an immediate link the "one country, two system"(originally intended to Taiwan) and revives their knowledge of the experiences Hong Kongers have lived.

I believe if the cross-strait relations are not handle carefully Taiwan could increase the chances of becoming a "New Hong Kong" ("New Hong Kong" means to be integrated to the PRC in the way of "One country, two systems" in the way is now in place in Hong Kong)
我相信假使兩岸關係未妥善處理的話，台灣變成「新香港」的機率將提高。(「新香港」代表著被中華人民共和國以一國兩制的方式統合，就像現在香港的處境。)

完全同意	104	22.6%
同意	248	53.9%
沒意見	63	13.7%
不同意	38	8.3%
完全不同意	7	1.5%

Let us summarize what was seen along the present survey. The survey was created to measure the level of readership, quality of information, interest in the social movements, recognition and knowledge of the Hong Kong situation, and measure students' self-awareness of their environment in relation to social movements. Along the survey it was corroborated that in fact there is an important feeling of connection between Taiwanese students taking the survey and the Hong Kong society. The results provided an important insight in how do Taiwanese students taking the survey perceive themselves and their counter parts in Hong Kong in regards of increasing mutual cooperation. Furthermore, it was proved that McAdam's model based on identity and expanded to an international level in a Robert Putman's scenario (in which societies can be of mutual reference) is possible. Social movements' collaboration and connection between two societies in different countries has taken place, can be further developed not yet seen.

In the section dedicated to the media it was clear that the most use source of information is the Internet. Family and friends, printed news and television immediately followed. The readership of news was high with the majority of respondents following the news on a daily bases or five days a week. By this it can be implied that students are constantly increasing their knowledge of different events and in the future case another mobilization takes place, this part of the society would be informed about it and most probably, as it will show later, participating in some degree.

Moreover, opinions regarding the pro-PRC tendency found in the media were divided. Although 7.6 percent (+/- 4.5) and 40 percent (+/- 4.5) of the respondents completely agreed and agreed that this is the case, 16.3 percent of the respondents decided not to respond. This came in addition to the 3.3 and 33.8 percent (+/- 4.5) of students who completely disagreed and disagreed with the proposition. Thence, students do not sense media outlet is pro-China bias.

Students' perspective was completely different in the case of the reliance of information regard cross-strait relation. When students were asked about the reliance of the cross-strait information provided a conclusive position (27 percent (+/- 4.5) completely disagreed and 57 percent (+/- 4.5) disagreed) labeling the information of the media outlet as: not trustworthy.

Furthermore, when asked their interest on social movements in China and Taiwan students were largely interested. The 73 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed (23 percent completely agreed and 50 percent agreed) on the fact that they feel interested in social movements in China. In the case of Taiwan the number ascended to 83 percent (+/- 4.5) (38.3 percent completely agreed and 45.4 agreed). This is important because, on one hand, in the case of Taiwan they recognize the level of importance these groups have for the society and their democracy. On the other hand, students recognize the importance protests in the PRC has, which vindicates the presence of the perceived threat the PRC system has for Taiwan.

Following this line of thought, the students were immediately asked if they knew about the OCLP movement. More than three quarters knew what was and what their claims were. Most importantly, the ones that knew felt "empathy" for the movement. In this particular case the present author provided a clear definition of empathy so no element remained loose and students that completely agreed or simply agreed, clearly knew on what basis. This feeling is crucial to detect a sense of communion between the two sides or in other words, to clearly establish the causation link between Taiwanese students taking the survey and people in Hong Kong. The results are clear 31.6 percent (+/- 4.5) of the respondents completely agreed on and 51.2 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed on experiencing the feeling. In total

82.8 percent (+/- 4.5) (N= 275) of the 332 students (72 percent of the 460 students interviewed) that knew about the movement experienced a degree of connection with the struggle of the people in Hong Kong.

Nevertheless, when asked about agreeing with their fellow students in showing support for the OCLP movement, the number lowered to 65.1 percent (+/- 4.5). The reason for this number to lower is because 25.6 percent (+/- 4.5) prefer neither agree nor disagree (N= 85) to the proposition than rather opposing it. The numbers of those opposing this proposition amounted only for 5.6 percent (+/- 4.5) completely disagreeing (N= 19) and 3.6 percent (+/- 4.5) disagreeing (N= 12).

Finally, to close the connection experience by Taiwanese students taking the survey for the Hong Kong society and activists, the survey changes the focus and approaches the connection through local events. Therefore, it was requested for respondents to provide their opinions on regards of:

1) Economic interdependence between the PRC and Taiwan,
2) Their position within this reality (when asked if their career is influenced by cross-strait relations),
3) The possible negative impacts of interdependence between Taiwan and the PRC,
4) The impact of the Sunflower movement diffusion campaign awareness in regards of CSSTA and ECFA,
5) The possible positive effects of the ECFA agreement,
6) The definition of the Taiwanese identity,
7) The hypothetical case of returning to the PRC,
8) Students' opinions in regards of both societies collaborating,
9) And lastly, if Taiwan could become a new Hong Kong.

The objective of asking all respondents to provide their positions' in all of these instances was for: a) asses their stance of local developments and b) see if by recollecting these situations they could make a connection between local issues and the cross-border issues of

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another community. As it was shown, even before this section, is that students do recognize as important to create a stronger link of collaboration between Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Conclusion

Through the present chapter it was presented the differences and similarities of the social movements and the results of the survey. The study provided evidence that even though contrasts are evident between both sides, there is a common ground to be found. The core ideas behind each social movement in fact are not so different. Both social movements find in the PRC a clear threat, have an identity that makes a distention from the rest of China, and seek self-determination. This fact would be confirmed in the survey.

The results of the survey proved that Taiwanese students taking it feel empathetic, support and understand Hong Kongers claims, and their identity. This confirms that there is a sense of communion found in these Taiwanese students towards their counter parts in Hong Kong. Therefore, it does exist the ground for activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan to reach Taiwanese students of these universities and obtain their support. By the same token, this confirms that McAdam's dynamic interactive model based on identity in a Robert D. Putman case of cross-border of two societies using each other as reference, has taken place between Taiwan and Hong Kong and could be further developed.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

Throughout the present study it has been provided elements to prove that Taiwanese students taking the survey do agree that is important to create a stronger link of cooperation with Hong Kong. The present study proved that claims from democratic movements taking place in Hong Kong and Taiwan have been acknowledged and inspired each other's societies as it was propose in this study's theoretical framework. Taiwanese students taking the survey do possess a clear recognition of Hong Kongers identity, democratic goals and self-determination. Moreover, these particular goals, as it was argued in this study, were responsible in the generation of the movements in both countries. As McAdam proposes, the collective actions in both cases found their unity in their respective identities "we-ness", which at the same time were motivated by the threat of the PRC, thus creating the political opportunity structures.

In terms of particular cases, Taiwan presented a range of circumstances in which the historical nature of the state created the political opportunities structures. The history of the cross-strait relations, and the ambiguity and lack of definition of the relationship between the ROC and the PRC, provoked the opportunities for activist in Taiwan to challenge the government. On one hand, the economic interaction between the both sides was never halted. In fact, although was restricted, the economic interdependence kept increasing. The recognition of the increasing economic relationship between both sides by President Ma Ying-jeo, came through the application of a policy that tried to create transparency and accountability in this realm, but clearly collided with politics.

On the other hand, the political realm had never completely change since conversations restarted between the sides in 1979. As President Ma used his position and the legal loopholes of the *de facto* nature of the government, young generations in Taiwan feared the worst. The change of gears in cross-strait relations by President Ma, in this frontal rapprochement, created a cloth in the collective consciousness of the society that would convulse Taiwan.

As it was seen, during President Ma's tenure there was a change in the administration's approach on identity in Taiwan. At first the speeches entail a new way of perceiving Taiwanese as "ethnic Chinese" (中華 民族) and at the same time there were changes in striking a balance in the education's curricula in between Taiwan and China. These developments came to create a clear misunderstanding with the population of Taiwan, most importantly students, who had developed a strong Taiwanese identity. Nowadays, the Taiwanese students taking the survey and an increasing part of the population identify themselves as an independent nation, conformed by different ethnic groups but to no civic attachments to the rest of China. In addition to this, the loopholes in the legal system provoked that all the series of clashes between the students and the government converged into the CSSTA ratification problem. This was the reason why the Sunflower movement burst and was propelled by a group of people that had very different objectives. Their unity, as McAdam argued, stems from their identity that is also contradicts any close relation with the PRC.

In the case of Hong Kong, it was also the historical process of the formation of government that created the political opportunity structures. The handover of Hong Kong to the PRC made possible, as Kaeding argues, for Hong Kongers to become more aware about their identity as a community, and as society that was Chinese but did not resembled to the rest of the citizens in the PRC. This reality along with the increasing political activism that Hong Kong had been experiencing, most clearly gaining momentum in 2003, created an ascending spiral that would seek its expression through democratic collective actions.

Thus, the case of Hong Kong shows a community constantly searching to find clear objectives and union. At the beginning, as it was seen, the collective action emanating from the 2003 protests (2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007), were loosely guided by the CHRF or the sub leaderships emanated from this alliance. Nevertheless, the objectives would become clearer as the variables constantly pursuit became apparent throughout the years: seek democracy by allowing the society to designate and directly elect the Chief Executive.

This factor would converge with the "Hong Konger" identity. As more people within the society started to see themselves as part of this community, they began to assert its sense of

self-determination. Hence, this allowed activists pushing for democratic claims to gain access to a larger pool of advocates. From this point onward a collective action seeking to pursue these goals would have a better opportunity in gaining more support and increasing its leverage over the government. Exactly for these reasons, the collective action that took place on September 2014 acquired the level of support it did. As seen, although the OCLP's popularity fluctuated, the clashes with the police trigger a larger mobilization. The force used by the policy to oppress the student activists and others, would play a crucial role because in the mind of the population it was Beijing (the repressing force) silencing the activists. Hence, this provoked the outrage and sense of shock around the world.

As the world read the news of clashes taking place in Hong Kong, the OCLP mobilized to reach out support. In Taiwan the aid that the Hong Kong Macau Student Association received from Taiwanese activist, helped them to launch a strong support in Taipei Liberty Square. The mobilization helped distribute the message all around the island and made possible further public support even weeks after the civil disobedience began in Hong Kong. Following this pattern of behavior, the principal goal of the present study was to measure if this sentiment shown by the students had developed a mature and conscious level of recognition and empathy for the democratic struggle of the people in Hong Kong.

Thus, to measure these elements a survey was designed to see the impacts on the Taiwanese students of the selected universities. The main objective of the questionnaire was measure if students' did actually had developed a mature and conscious level of recognition and empathy for Hong Kongers identity, democracy and self-determination. Moreover, the period of time that had passed since the demonstrations (7 months) served as key element to increase the level of accuracy of the maturity of this union. Therefore, as it was shown in the results of the survey, it was corroborated that Taiwanese students taking the survey do see a connection between their objectives (having a democracy, reaffirming their identity and maintain self-determination), and the ones that the people in Hong Kong have (propose and directly elect the Chief Executive, reaffirming their identity and maintain self-determination).

Therefore, this answers the questions raised at the beginning of the present study:

1) Taiwanese students taking the survey do feel empathy and communion for the OCLP's movement democratic and self-determination claims.

2) Taiwanese students taking the survey do recognize the idea that there is a "Hong Konger" identity and support it.

3) Taiwanese students taking the survey do agree with the idea that cooperation between student of Hong Kong and Taiwan can propel each other's claims.

4) Taiwanese students taking the survey do believe that is important for both Taiwanese and Hong Kongers to support each other's claims to increase the power/intensity/to be more feasible.

As the results showed, 76.5 percent (+/- 4.5) of Taiwanese students taking the survey agreed and completely agreed (53.9 percent and 22.6 percent respectively) that it is important to work together with the Hong Kong society to maintain these precepts alive.

In addition to this, students provided a conclusive response with 77.4 percent (+/- 4.5) completely agreeing and agreeing (18.7 percent and 58.7 percent respectively) that further collaboration between activists should take place. Moreover, more than three quarters of the students knew about the movement in Hong Kong and what were their claims. Most importantly, the ones that knew felt empathy for the movement. The results showed that 31.6 percent (+/- 4.5) of the respondents completely agreed and 51.2 percent (+/- 4.5) agreed on experiencing that feeling. In total 82.8 percent (N= 275) of the 332 students that knew about the movement (72 percent of total population of 460 students interviewed) experienced a degree of "empathy" with the struggle of the people in Hong Kong.

Nevertheless, when assessing students' views on their fellow students actively supporting the Hong Kong movement agreement lowered. To assess the difference between action and agreement two questions were crucial for this study. First, students were requested to provide their opinions if they agreed with other students that showed support for the Hong Kong movement. The results showed that 65.1 percent (+/- 4.5) (20.5 percent completely

agreed and 44.6 percent agreed) with 25.6 percent of the students (N= 85) neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Second and final, it was asked their perspective if supporting movements in the PRC with money, clothes, food, etc. could help bringing democracy to the PRC. Numbers dropped, having a total of 45.2 percent (+/- 4.5) between those respondents completely agreeing (6.7 percent) and just agreeing (38.5 percent). Those students not providing an opinion represented the 25 percent (+/- 4.5) of the responses, and those disagreeing and completely disagreeing accounted for the 24.8 and 4.1 percent (+/- 4.5) respectively. In this regard we can see although the first question had more than 50 percent of positive responses, the second one challenges the conviction that assisting a collective action with recourses could help transform the political structure of the PRC. Therefore, when applied to the case of Hong Kong, it could be said that Taiwanese students taking the survey will show the same level of doubt.

The following figure exemplifies how different groups with different ideologies, claims and objectives, integrated both movements. Their particularities found in the groups integrating both social movements provide a key understanding of how some have a more radical approach to the situation. In the case of Hong Kong the OCLP seeks self-determination by the formula "One Country, two systems" but Scholarism and HKFS have a tendency to reject this formula. Instead they are seeking for independence. In the case of Taiwan we can find a similar situation. At the beginning Black Island Youth Nation was interested in seeking transparency in the government's negotiations and ratification of the agreements with the PRC, but with the alliance more radical groups, like those seeking Taiwan's independence, suggested their arguments as a unique form to solve the government's pass behavior and Taiwan's continuous economic dependence on the PRC.

It is clear that although unity was achieved in both movements it should be consider that there are more neutral and radical approaches. As mentioned at the beginning of this study, this situation is common ground in social movements and is an inner element that threats their stability. Nonetheless, the identity factor found in all the groups integrating both social movements allowed them to remain united. This reflects how identity can unite groups seeking to address local claims and boost them to achieve an organization that can also deals with international threats.

Figure 1. Identities, Claims and Objectives of the groups integrating the movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Hong Kong	Leaders	Ideologies Claims and Objective	Taiwan	Leaders	Ideologies Claims and Objective
Occupy Central with Love and Peace movement (OCLP)	Benny Tai Yui-ting, Chan Kim-man & Chu Yiu-ming	- Ideologies: Pro-Democracy Peaceful resolution Identity of Hong Konger Hong Kongers' self-determination - Claims: PRC threat to Hong Kong's democracy PRC threat to Self-determination - Objectives: Seeki election of the CE Destitution of the present CE Sovereignty within One-Country two systems	Black Island Youth Nation Front (BIYNF)	Lin Fei-fan & Chen Wei-ting	- Ideologies: Maintain Taiwan's sovereignty and independence Taiwanese Identity - Claims: Government in Taiwan is threating democracy, Taiwanese sovereignty and independence with black box politics. Agreement with the PRC threats Taiwan's economy Agreement with the PRC threats Taiwan's sovereignty and independence. Current government tilting to China. - Objective: Create a legal base to increase the LY's power on cross-strait agreements Create a legal base to increase the society's voice in cross-strait agreements Seek Taiwan's economic independence by rejecting the PRC.
Scholarism	Joshua Wong Chi-fung				
Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS)	Alex Chow Yong-kang	- Ideologies: Pro-Democracy Identity of Hong Konger Hong Kongers' self-determination - Claims: PRC threat to Hong Kong's democracy PRC threat to Hong Kong's identity PRC threat to Self-determination - Objectives: Seek election of the CE Seek destitution of the present CE Seek real sovereignty of One-Country two systems tending to Independence Seek to change pro-China education curricula	Black Island Youth Nation Alliance (BIYNA) (Anti-media Monster Youth League (AMYL); Anti-nuclear Front ; Anti-black box MAST Action Coalition; Citizens Action Coalition 1985; Earth Citizens Foundation ; Taiwan Rural Front; Taiwan Association for Human Rights; Taiwanese Professors Association; Taiwan Labor Front, etc.)	(Prominent leaders) Lin Fei-fan & Chen Wei-ting	- Ideologies: Maintain Taiwan's sovereignty and independence Taiwanese Identity Particular ideologies: Anti-nuclear energy, change pro-China curricula, economic problems of students and other sectors of the society, Human Rights, Taiwan independence, etc. - Claims: Black Box Politics undermines democracy in Taiwan Society excluded from cross-strait relations Current government tilting to China. - Objectives: Create a legal base to increase the LY's power on cross-strait agreements Create a legal base to increase the society's voice in cross-strait agreements Pass the Cabinet-sponsored Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (兩岸協議監督條例草案)

Moreover, from the statistics presented by the Hong Kong University it was traced that also that the new generation of Hong Kongers are increasingly supportive of Taiwanese situation and claims. It was seen that half of the Hong Kong youth do supports Taiwanese independence and 77 percent do not believe that reunification with the PRC could be possible. Thence, considering the number of Taiwanese students surveyed that agree with the union and being in the disposition to cooperate, it can be expected that the union between social movements could be excel by their respective societies.

The approach seen between activists and the societies of these two nations reveals a new level of awareness share by both sides. Both sides understood that both have to collaborate together in order to acquire more support and surpass the resources shortage they naturally have by having this relational proximity. Thus, when challenging local threats and transnational ones (PRC), both have better opportunities to maintain the fight even if directly confronted by this threat. This comes as the product of the similarities found in the core of their struggle against the PRC and their goal: democracy, reaffirming their identity and maintain self-determination. In the hope that the current study can contribute to the international community by shedding light on this evolving reality, the present author believes that the present work could lead to further and more detailed analyses.

5.1 Limitations of the study and grounds for future studies.

During the creation of the present study there were several obstacles presented in its creation. Principally this analysis was subject of time constrains that limited it in three principal areas: selection of universities considered to apply the survey, the size of the sample used for the survey, and expertise in producing a precise tool (questionnaire) to retrieve students perspectives in this particular topic. The time reserved for the present study (6 months) contributed as the major limitation for the study to consider taking a sample of all the population of Taiwanese students. Instead it was decided to focus on three universities. Hence, the situation impacted on the size of the sample, which was minor, but still provided a high level of confidence.

The expertise in the creation of a questionnaire to measure students' opinions on topics that are not commonly found, also pose an important challenge. The present author followed the guidelines found in other questionnaires, nonetheless, due to the particularity of the research, most of the inquiries had to be formulated accordingly. For example, the present author found challenging the process of formulating the definition of the Taiwanese identity. Although the framework was laid and the perspectives clearly defined, to be able to provide 5 propositions (following a Likert scale guideline) that were concise and include all the elements, was an important obstacle.

Moreover, the clear limitations found in the present study is the need for further assessment on the stands of the Hong Kong youth toward Taiwan claims and struggle. Even though the present study took base in two important results provided by the survey of the Hong Kong University, to have clear picture further analysis is required.

Due to the fact that the study addresses two social movements with their respective backgrounds, in occasions only the overviewing certain situations, there might be elements not considered in the analysis. The same can be argued in terms of their respective contexts. Therefore, the present author would like to clearly state that the present study

helped explain the question that led to its creation, but further consultation of additional sources should be considered to have a complete knowledge of each particular case.

Future studies can concentrate on the developments in the collaboration between activists of both sides. The increasing arrangements between both sides are crucial to understand what the new steps are taken for increasing both movements strength. In this way the present study could serve to encourage researchers in this area to have a background of the students' views regarding this relation and their disposition of supporting future mobilizations.

As previously stated, further assessment of the views' of young Hong Kongers in regards of an increasing cooperation with Taiwanese activists and the society needs to be done. The present study pointed out that the statistics available show that there is a tendency in young Hong Kongers to agree with Taiwan's status of independence and sovereignty. This starting point could provide the grounds for further analysis by making a survey consulting the new generation of Hong Kongers that match the age description used in the present study to do a comparison.

Finally, studies could also concentrate on the development of these two identities as recognition of both sides grows. As shown in this study both identities share elements and a common threat. The encompassing objectives of activists and identities, is a step never seen in contemporarily in two different Chinese societies rejecting the PRC.

Appendix

Questionnaire

The present questionnaire has the purpose to consult the opinion of Taiwanese students about their position on the protests that took place in Hong Kong last September 2014. Furthermore, the questionnaire will retrieve the opinions of this event in relation with social movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The information collected is confidential and it will only be used for the present study that will be presented at the National Chengchi University.

該問卷的目的為了解台灣學生對於去年 9 月在香港發生雨傘運動的意見。此外，該問卷想了解對這個運動的看法連同對 ECFA（兩岸經濟合作架構協議）的態度。收集的信息是保密的，只會被用於本研究。 本研究將在國立政治大學提交。

University: 大學

Age: 年齡

Gender: 性別:　　Feminine 女　　Masculine 男

Parent's ethnicity:　　　父母的族群

Mother 媽媽	Father 爸爸
Taiwanese Hakka: 客家	Taiwanese Hakka: 客家
Min-nan: 閩南	Min-nan: 閩南
Mainlander: 中國大陸	Mainlander: 中國大陸
Aboriginal: 原住民	Aboriginal: 原住民
Foreigner: 外國人	Foreigner: 外國人
Don't know: 不確定	Don't know: 不確定

I identify myself as:

Taiwanese Hakka: 客家
Min-nan: 閩南
Mainlander: 中國大陸
Aboriginal: 原住民
Foreigner: 外國人
Don't know: 不確定

Media

1) In the following question please select from 1 to 5 in order of importance (being 1 most important and 5 less important) the option that best reflects your opinion. Which of the following sources you most frequently use to obtain news?
請問以下您利用不同管道獲得新聞來源的重要性 （1 代表最重要，5 代表非常不重要）

    1) Television 電視
    2) Printed news 報紙
    3) Internet 網路
    4) Friends and Family members 朋友或家人

Please select the option that better reflects your habit.
2) How often do you read the news?
請問您多常獲取新聞資訊?

    a) Daily basis 每天
    b) Five times a week 每週五次
    c) Four times a week or less 每週四次
    d) Three times a week or less 每週三次以下
    e) I don't follow the news 從不

From the following questions, please select the option that reflects better your opinion.

3) Do you believe that currently the news media outlet in Taiwan have become Pro-China?
請問您是否同意此說法：「目前台灣媒體立場已變得親中。」

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

4)

I believe that I can trust media outlets in Taiwan to obtain objective information about Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan.
請問您是否同意此說法：「如果我要了解關於兩岸關係的客觀消息，我可以相信台灣媒體。」

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1
Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Complete Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

Democratic Protests

Please answer the following propositions by selecting from 1 through 5 (being 1: I completely agree; and 5: I completely disagree) according to the level that you think these reflect your opinion.
請問以下您利用不同管道獲得新聞來源的重要性 （1 代表最重要，5 代表非常不重要）
5) I feel interest for democratic movements (protests) taking place in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
請問您是否同意此說法：「我對在中華人民共和國發生的民主運動（抗議）有興趣。」

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1

6) I feel interest for democratic movements (protests) taking place in Taiwan.

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1

>Please answer yes or no to the following questions. If your answer is "no" to any of the questions in number 7 please go directly to question number 12.
請根據下列問題回答是或否。如果您在第七題的答案為"否"，請直接跳至第十二題回答問題。

7) I know what the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement is.
我知道讓愛與和平佔領中環運動是什麼?

a) Yes   b) No
a) 是 b)否

8) I have a clear idea of what are the main objectives of the OCLP movement
我清楚此運動的主要目標為何

a) Yes   b) No
a) 是 b) 否

9) I believe that is important for the Taiwanese society to be informed about major protests taking place in the PRC, like the OCLP movement of last September 2014 in Hong Kong.

我相信瞭解在中國所發生的抗議運動對台灣社會來說是重要的，就像 2014 年九月在香港所發生的讓愛與和平佔領中環運動。

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意

5	4	3	2	1

10) I felt empathy (the feeling that you understood and share the emotions) for the protestors in Hong Kong (OCLP) in their struggle against the antidemocratic regime.
我對香港的佔中運動當中示威者對抗反民主政權的舉動有所共鳴(表示您能了解而且有相同

情緒)。

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1

11) I agree with the Taiwanese students that felt the need to openly supported the OCLP movement taking place in Hong Kong, and assisted the sit-ins at Taipei's Liberty Square, wore symbols, promoted their message, etc., last September 2014
我同意台灣學生需要以行動支持香港的佔中運動，例如在台北的自由廣場靜坐運動、穿戴相爭運動的圖像、提倡他們的訊息等 2014 年 9 月

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1

12) I believe that supporting democratic movements taking place in the PRC with donations of money, clothes, food, etc. could help bring democracy in the PRC.
我相信以捐衣物、食物、金錢等行動支持在中國所發生的民主運動，有助於將民主精神帶入中國。

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1

13) I believe that further cooperation between Hong Kong student activists and Taiwanese student activists could be important to achieve democratic reforms in Hong Kong and maintain Taiwanese democracy and sovereignty from the PRC.
我相信香港參與佔中的學生與響應此活動的台灣學生之間更進一步的合作，能促進香港的民主改革以及維繫台灣的民主與主權。

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意

5	4	3	2	1

Identity

14) Please select the option that is closer to what you define the identity of being Taiwanese:
請選擇下列選項中比較接近您所認為身為台灣人身分的定義

a) Taiwanese is a born citizen of the island of Taiwan that is ethnically Han Chinese, Aboriginal, or other ethnicity historically found in the island of Taiwan that speaks Mandarin, Hokkien, or other of the Austronesian languages found there, and follows a culture which encompasses old and new costumes from the different ethnic groups and religions that exist together in the area.
台灣人是在台灣出生的公民，種族上屬於漢民族、原住民或在台灣島上過去歷史曾出現過的民族，且口中文、閩南語、或是其他曾在台灣出現的南島語系，並且遵循在此地存在新舊習俗、不同族群與宗教融合的文化。

b) Taiwanese is a born citizen in the territory controlled by the Republic of China regardless of his/her ethnicity, culture, customs, language and religion.
台灣人指的是在中華民國控制下的領土出生的公民，不論他/她的種族、文化、習俗、語言及宗教。

c) Taiwanese are the Aboriginal tribes that were the original settlers of the island of Taiwan, which have a different culture, customs and language from the Chinese culture.
台灣人指的是原本就居住在台灣的原住民，他們擁有不同於中華文化的文化、習俗和語言。

d) Taiwanese is a born or nationalized (by marriage, immigrate, etc.) citizen living in the territory controlled by the Republic of China regardless of his/her ethnicity, culture, customs, language and religion.
台灣人是出生或歸化(透過婚姻或移民等等)居住在中華民國控制下的領土的公民，不論他/她的種族、文化、習俗、語言和宗教。

e) Taiwanese is a born citizen in the territory controlled by the Republic of China that is ethnically Han Chinese, Aboriginal, or other ethnicity historically found in the island of Taiwan that speaks Mandarin, Hokkien, or other of the Austronesian languages found there, and follows a culture which encompasses old and new costumes from the different ethnic groups and religions that exist together in the area.
台灣人是出生在中華民國控制下的領土的公民，種族上屬於漢民族、原住民或是過去歷史曾在台灣島上出現過的民族，且口中文、閩南語、或是其他曾在台灣出現的南島語系，並且遵循在此地存在新舊習俗、不同族群與宗教融合的文化。

15) I believe that the identity of "Hong Kongers" (those people who are born citizens of Hong Kong and speak Cantonese), is real and should be respected and defended.

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我相信「香港人」的身分(香港人此指在香港出生且口廣東話者)是實質的而且應該被尊重與捍衛。

Completely Agree 完全同意	Agree 同意	Neither Agree or Disagree 沒意見	Disagree 不同意	Completely Disagree 完全不同意
5	4	3	2	1

Taiwan-China Relations 兩岸關係

Please answer the following propositions by selecting from 1 through 5 (being 1: I completely agree; and 5: I completely disagree, marker are different from what the following Likert scale) according to the level that you think these reflect your opinion.
請依據你的感受程度回答下列問題，程度由一到五 (1: 完全不同意 5: 完全同意)

16) I believe that the cross-strait relations between PRC and Taiwan do have a strong impact on the options I will have for my future career.
我認為兩岸關係對我的未來工作有強烈的影響。

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

17) I believe that increasing the economic dependency of Taiwan on China puts in danger Taiwan's: democracy, identity and self-determination.
我認為台灣對中國貿易依賴度的增加會使台灣的民主、身分地位與自主權定權受到威脅

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

18) It was until the Sunflower movement took place that I became aware of what were the implications of the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) and Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) for the economy of Taiwan.
一直到太陽花學運，我才了解兩岸服務貿易協議 (CSSTA) 與兩岸經濟合作架構協議 (ECFA) 對台灣經濟的可能造成的影響。

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

19) I believe that the ECFA agreement with the PRC can help improve Taiwan's slowing economy.
我認為兩岸經濟合作架構協議 (ECFA)能幫助台灣的遲緩的經濟發展。

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

20) If the PRC held the same political system as Taiwan (democracy, elections, liberty of speech, liberty of communication, etc.) I would agree on Taiwan becoming part of the PRC.
如果中國實施與台灣相同的政治制度(民主、選舉、言論自由、通訊自由等)，我就會同意台灣是中國的一部分。

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

21) I believe that in order to defend and maintain Taiwan's democracy, identity, self-determination and human rights, from being oppressed by the PRC it is important to partner up (work together) with other societies in the same situation, like the Hong Kong society, which is struggling to keep these precepts alive.
我認為在中國人民共和國的壓迫下，為了捍衛及維護台灣的民主、認同、自主權以及人權，與其他相同處境的國家或地區一起合作是極為重要的，例如不斷與中國政府捍衛上述權利的香港。

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

22) I believe if the cross-strait relations are not handle carefully Taiwan could increase the chances of becoming a "New Hong Kong" ("New Hong Kong" means to be integrated to the PRC in the way of "One country, two systems" in the way is now in place in Hong Kong)
我相信假使兩岸關係未妥善處理的話，台灣變成「新香港」的機率將提高。(「新香港」代表著被中華人民共和國以一國兩制的方式統合，就像現在香港的處境。)

Completely Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree
5	4	3	2	1

ECFA Agreement Summary:

Chapter 1 General Principles

Article 1 Objectives

The objectives of this Agreement are:

1. To strengthen and advance the economic, trade and investment cooperation between the two Parties;
2. To promote further liberalization of trade in goods and services between the two Parties and gradually establish fair, transparent and facilitative investment and investment protection mechanisms;
3. To expand areas of economic cooperation and establish a cooperation mechanism.

Article 2 Cooperation Measures

The two Parties have agreed, in consideration of their economic conditions, to take measures including but not limited to the following, in order to strengthen cross-Straits economic exchange and cooperation:

1. Gradually reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in a substantial majority of goods between the two Parties;
2. Gradually reducing or eliminating restrictions on a large number of sectors in trade in services between the two Parties;
3. Providing investment protection and promoting two-way investment;
4. Promoting trade and investment facilitation and industry exchanges and cooperation.

Chapter 2 Trade and Investment

Article 3 Trade in Goods

1. The two Parties have agreed, on the basis of the Early Harvest for Trade in Goods as stipulated in Article 7 of this Agreement, to conduct consultations on an agreement on trade in goods no later than six months after the entry into force of this Agreement, and expeditiously conclude such consultations.
2. The consultations on the agreement on trade in goods shall include, but not be limited to:
   (1) modalities for tariff reduction or elimination;
   (2) rules of origin;
   (3) customs procedures;
   (4) non-tariff measures, including but not limited to technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
   (5) trade remedy measures, including measures set forth in the Agreement on

Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the Agreement on Safeguards of the World Trade Organization, and the safeguard measures between the two Parties applicable to the trade in goods between the two Parties.

3. Goods included in the agreement on trade in goods pursuant to this Article shall be divided into three categories: goods subject to immediate tariff elimination, goods subject to phased tariff reduction, and exceptions or others.

4. Either Party may accelerate the implementation of tariff reduction at its discretion on the basis of the commitments to tariff concessions in the agreement on trade in goods.

Article 4 Trade in Services

1. The two Parties have agreed, on the basis of the Early Harvest for Trade in Services as stipulated in Article 8, to conduct consultations on an agreement on trade in services no later than six months after the entry into force of this Agreement, and expeditiously conclude such consultations.

2. The consultations on the agreement on trade in services shall seek to:
   (1) gradually reduce or eliminate restrictions on a large number of sectors in trade in services between the two Parties;
   (2) further increase the breadth and depth of trade in services;
   (3) enhance cooperation in trade in services between the two Parties.

3. Either Party may accelerate the liberalization or elimination of restrictive measures at its discretion on the basis of the commitments to liberalization in the agreement on trade in services.

Article 5 Investment

1. The two Parties have agreed to conduct consultations on the matters referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article within six months after the entry into force of this Agreement, and expeditiously reach an agreement.

2. Such an agreement shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
   (1) establishing an investment protection mechanism;
   (2) increasing transparency on investment-related regulations;
   (3) gradually reducing restrictions on mutual investments between the two Parties;
   (4) promoting investment facilitation.

Chapter 3 Economic Cooperation

Article 6 Economic Cooperation

1. To enhance and expand the benefits of this Agreement, the two Parties have agreed to strengthen cooperation in areas including, but not limited to, the following:
   (1) intellectual property rights protection and cooperation;
   (2) financial cooperation;

(3) trade promotion and facilitation;

(4) customs cooperation;

(5) e-commerce cooperation;

(6).discussion on the overall arrangements and key areas for industrial cooperation, promotion of cooperation in major projects, and coordination of the resolution of issues that may arise in the course of industrial cooperation between the two Parties;

(7) promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises cooperation between the two Parties, and enhancement of the competitiveness of these enterprises;

(8) promotion of the mutual establishment of offices by economic and trade bodies of the two Parties.

2. The two Parties shall expeditiously conduct consultations on the specific programs and contents of the cooperation matters listed in this Article.

Chapter 4 Early Harvest

Article 7 Early Harvest for Trade in Goods

1. To accelerate the realization of the objectives of this Agreement, the two Parties have agreed to implement the Early Harvest Program with respect to the goods listed in Annex I. The Early Harvest Program shall start to be implemented within six months after the entry into force of this Agreement.

2. The Early Harvest Program for trade in goods shall be implemented in accordance with the following rules:

   (1) the two Parties shall implement the tariff reductions in accordance with the product list and tariff reduction arrangements under the Early Harvest stipulated in Annex I, unless their respective non-interim tariff rates generally applied on imports from all other WTO members are lower, in which case such rates shall apply;

   (2) the products listed in Annex I of this Agreement shall be subject to the Provisional Rules of Origin stipulated in Annex II. Each Party shall accord preferential tariff treatment to the above-mentioned products that are determined, pursuant to such Rules, as originating in the other Party upon importation;

   (3) the provisional trade remedy measures applicable to the products listed in Annex I of this Agreement refer to measures provided for in subparagraph (5) of paragraph 2 of Article 3 of this Agreement. The safeguard measures between the two Parties are specified in Annex III of this Agreement.

3. As of the date of the entry into force of the agreement on trade in goods to be reached by the two Parties pursuant to Article 3 of this Agreement, the Provisional Rules of Origin stipulated in Annex II and the provisional trade remedy measures provided for in subparagraph (3) of paragraph 2 of this Article shall cease to apply.

Article 8 Early Harvest for Trade in Services

1. To accelerate the realization of the objectives of this Agreement, the two Parties have agreed to implement the Early Harvest Program on the sectors and

liberalization measures listed in Annex IV. The Early Harvest Program shall be implemented expeditiously after the entry into force of this Agreement.

2. The Early Harvest Program for Trade in Services shall be implemented in accordance with the following rules:

(1) each Party shall, in accordance with the Sectors and Liberalization Measures Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Services in Annex IV, reduce or eliminate the restrictive measures in force affecting the services and service suppliers of the other Party;

(2) the definition of service suppliers stipulated in Annex V applies to the sectors and liberalization measures with respect to trade in services in Annex IV of this Agreement;

(3) as of the date of the entry into force of the agreement on trade in services to be reached by the two Parties pursuant to Article 4 of this Agreement, the definitions of service suppliers stipulated in Annex V of this Agreement shall cease to apply;

(4) in the event that the implementation of the Early Harvest Program for Trade in Services has caused a material adverse impact on the services sectors of one Party, the affected Party may request consultations with the other Party to seek a solution.

Chapter 5 Other Provisions

Article 9 Exceptions

No provision in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prevent either Party from adopting or maintaining exception measures consistent with the rules of the World Trade Organization.

Article 10 Dispute Settlement

1. The two Parties shall engage in consultations on the establishment of appropriate dispute settlement procedures no later than six months after the entry into force of this Agreement, and expeditiously reach an agreement in order to settle any dispute arising from the interpretation, implementation and application of this Agreement.

2. Any dispute over the interpretation, implementation and application of this Agreement prior to the date the dispute settlement agreement mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article enters into force shall be resolved through consultations by the two Parties or in an appropriate manner by the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee to be established in accordance with Article 11 of this Agreement.

Article 11 Institutional Arrangements

1. The two Parties shall establish a Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), which consists of representatives designated by the two Parties. The Committee shall be responsible for handling matters relating to this Agreement, including but not limited to:

(1) concluding consultations necessary for the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement;

(2) monitoring and evaluating the implementation of this Agreement;

(3) interpreting the provisions of this Agreement;

(4) notifying important economic and trade information;

(5) settling any dispute over the interpretation, implementation and application of this Agreement in accordance with Article 10 of this Agreement.

2. The Committee may set up working group(s) as needed to handle matters in specific areas pertaining to this Agreement, under the supervision of the Committee.

3. The Committee will convene a regular meeting on a semi-annual basis and may call ad hoc meeting(s) when necessary with consent of the two Parties.

4. Matters related to this Agreement shall be communicated through contact persons designated by the competent authorities of the two Parties.

Article 12 Documentation Formats

The two Parties shall use the agreed documentation formats for communication of matters arising from this Agreement.

Article 13 Annexes and Subsequent Agreements

All annexes to this Agreement and subsequent agreements signed in accordance with this Agreement shall be parts of this Agreement.

Article 14 Amendments

Amendments to this Agreement shall be subject to consent through consultations between, and confirmation in writing by, the two Parties.

Article 15 Entry into Force

After the signing of this Agreement, the two Parties shall complete the relevant procedures respectively and notify each other in writing. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day following the date that both Parties have received such notification from each other.

Article 16 Termination

1. The Party terminating this Agreement shall notify the other Party in writing. The two Parties shall start consultations within 30 days from the date the termination notice is issued. In case the consultations fail to reach a consensus, this Agreement shall be terminated on the 180th day from the date the termination notice is issued by the notifying Party.

2. Within 30 days from the date of termination of this Agreement, the two Parties shall engage in consultations on issues arising from the termination.

This Agreement is signed in quadruplicate on this 29th day of June [2010] with each Party retaining two copies. The different wording of the corresponding text of this Agreement shall carry the same meaning, and all four copies are equally authentic.

Annex I: Product List and Tariff Reduction Arrangements Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Goods

Annex II: Provisional Rules of Origin Applicable to Products Under the Early Harvest for

Trade in Goods
Annex III: Safeguard Measures Between the Two Parties Applicable to Products Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Goods
Annex IV: Sectors and Liberalization Measures Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Services
Annex V: Definitions of Service Suppliers Applicable to Sectors and Liberalization Measures Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Services

Chairman   President Straits Exchange
Foundation   Association for
                                    Relations Across the Taiwan Straits

Source: (USC US-China Institute, 2010)

Draft bill on cross-strait agreement supervision

Frank Response to Public Demand, Special Law for Supervision of Cross-Strait Agreements Proposed

In response to the public's demand for supervision of cross-strait agreements and national security concerns in the negotiation process, the government deems necessary a more open and transparent process to strengthen communication with congress and the public. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has therefore established a "four-stage external communication and consultation mechanism" and a "national security review mechanism" under the existing regulatory framework of the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. Moreover, in reference to the intent of Judicial Yuan interpretations, stipulations under the Exercise of Legislative Powers Law, and the precedent of international and cross-strait agreement procedures, the MAC has formulated a special draft law for the supervision of cross-strait agreements. The MAC-formulated draft Statute for the Processing and Monitoring of Agreements between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area has been approved by the Executive Yuan and submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review on April 3, 2014. The focal points of the bill include the following:

1. Existing congressional oversight procedures under the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (the "Cross-Strait Act")

The 2003 amendment to the Cross-Strait Act added seven new provisions (Article 4, Article 4-2, Article 4-3, Article 4-4, Article 5, Article 5-1, and Article 5-2) incorporating a congressional monitoring mechanism where two different procedures were stipulated for the monitoring of cross-strait agreements. Depending on whether or not legal amendments were required, cross-strait agreements would be submitted to the legislature for review or for record, respectively. All cross-strait agreements must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan either for review or record, whereby congress may comprehensively monitor all cross-strait agreements; at the same time, the executive branch shows full respect for congressional oversight.

2. Four-stage communication and consultation with the legislature and the public

The legislation specifies that executive organs shall, when conducting institutionalized cross-strait negotiations, communicate and consult with the legislature and the public at the four stages of "formation of negotiation issues," "operational communication on negotiation issues," "before the agreement signing" and "after the agreement signing" to realize congressional and public supervision over the cross-strait negotiation process and agreement content, as well as to build public support for institutionalized cross-strait negotiations.

3. Agreements will only be negotiated and signed after a national security review

The legislation establishes standard operating procedures for national security assessments on cross-strait negotiation issues. It requires the competent authorities for the agreements to report negotiation issues and content first to the Executive Yuan for an interagency review and later, to the National Security Council for a second review. Follow-up negotiations and signing of the agreement may only proceed upon assurance that the cross-strait agreements reviewed would not endanger national security.

4. Specifying congressional procedures for cross-strait agreements

The special law has also made references to the Exercise of Legislative Powers Law, intention of Judicial Yuan interpretations, and the precedent of Legislative Yuan proceedings; it includes submission procedures, consistent with that of foreign agreements, for cross-strait agreements to the Legislative Yuan for review or record.

5. Specifying negotiation principles, confidentiality obligations and recusal obligations

The special law also stipulates principles for cross-strait negotiations (parity, dignity, reciprocity, ensuring national security, etc.), as well as the confidentiality obligations and recusal obligations of negotiation participants.

6. Referencing the essence of various versions while adhering to constitutional principles

There are currently several proposed draft versions for supervision of cross-strait agreements. The MAC has studied in detail each version and proposed supervisory rules that correspond to constitutional stipulations and the uniformity of power and responsibility, and which also functions most effectively. For example, the MAC affirms the concepts of public communication and regular review in the public's version of "Draft Bill Regulating the Signing of Cross-Strait Agreements", and have included the concepts into the government version draft in a manner consistent with the constitutional system and practical operations.

Legislation on the processing and monitoring of cross-strait agreements should be consistent with the constitutional system and should take into account the requirements of negotiations. The MAC has formulated a constitutional, pragmatic and feasible legal

system for the processing and monitoring of cross-strait agreements while balancing the need to protect the public's right to know and with consideration to negotiation requirements. The Legislative Yuan is urged to complete the legislation as soon as possible so as satisfy to the public's demands for strengthened congressional oversight.

Source: (Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China (Taiwan), 2014)

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