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Epistemology and Cultivation in Jingying Huiyuan's
Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition
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It is a wide-spread impression that Buddhist epistemology (*pramāṇa-vāda*) never received any serious attention outside of the development of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Current scholarship clearly shows that Chinese textual sources in this field have been totally ignored, owing to the belief that they are unhelpful, if not perhaps entirely useless, for our understanding of Buddhist epistemology in its original form. According to this belief, all that we find of this particular aspect of Indian Buddhism in the Chinese heritage is the scholastic tradition of *hetu-vidyā* ("the science of reason"), and especially the early system of Dignāga (ca. 480-540), which was brought back to China by Xuanzang in the seventh century. Before Xuanzang, as Giuseppe Tucci noted nearly a century ago, there were also some Chinese translations of pre-Dignāga texts, which are only useful for reconstructing the early history of Buddhist logic in India.[1]

In this paper, however, I will demonstrate that the Chinese record preserves more than this. I will present a textual and doctrinal study of Jingying Huiyuan's 淨影慧遠 (523-592) *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition* (*San liang zhi yi* 三量智義, hereafter SLZY), a gem among early Chinese Buddhist epistemological treatises. I will aim to show that the

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Chinese reception of Indian Buddhist epistemology before the era of Xuanzang was far more significant than has been previously assumed.[2]

Before exploring Huiyuan's contribution, I will give a brief historical picture of the way that Buddhist epistemology was introduced from India to China during the fifth and sixth centuries. This picture will be drawn from two angles: first, a brief chronological sketch; and second, a topical reconstruction.

As far as the chronological background is concerned, it is important to look into Kumārajīva's (350-413) early fifth century translations of Āryadeva's *Śata-śāstra*, Qingmu's (青目 *Piṅgala*) *Commentary* on Nāgār-juna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, and the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*. In those early translations, Indian logic and epistemology was introduced to China for the first time. Some early materials relating to Buddhist logic and epistemology were also preserved in the last chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, where four methods of reasoning (*yukti*) were found. These texts were first translated in the first half of the fifth century.

Subsequently, before Huiyuan composed the SLZY, some other early Indian texts of logic and epistemology were also translated into Chinese. In 472, Jijiaye (吉迦夜) and Tanyao (曇曜) translated the *Upāyahṛ-daya-śāstra* (方便心論), the authorship of which is disputably ascribed to Nāgārjuna. In 538-541, *Gautama Prajñāruci (瞿曇般若流支) translated Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and co-translated with *Vimokṣa Prajñārṣi (毘目智仙) Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. In 542, Vimokṣa Prajñārṣi trans-lated Asaṅga's *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra* (順中論). In 550-569, Para-mārtha translated Vasubandhu's *Tarka-śāstra* (如實論), retranslated the same author's *Viṃśatikā*, and translated Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. It seems that most of those early translations were not accessible to Huiyuan. However, those materials provide us with useful sources to reconstruct the ways Chinese thinkers viewed Indian debates on some philosophical and religious topics. As we will see later, translation always

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implicitly embodies the pre-understanding of the recipient. Those early Chinese translations are no exception.

In order to present a topical background to the subject of the present study, I have chosen three topics that were pervasive in these early translation texts: first, theological issues, such as arguments for the existence of a soul (*ātman*, *puruṣa*) and cosmic creators (Īśvara, Viṣṇu); second, the metaphysical problem of the existence of the external world; and third, the relationship between epistemology and meditation, in which, as my study will show, Huiyuan is much more interested.

Theological topics

In Kumārajīva's translation of Qingmu's (*Piṅgala) *Commentary* on *MMK*, four means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) are employed for the first time to argue for the non-existence of the soul (*ātman*). The word *ātman* is either rendered by *wo* (我) or *shen* (神) in Chinese. It was through Kumārajīva's translation that Chinese readers came to know that belief in the *ātman* played a significant role in ancient Indian religions. For Indians, one achieves spiritual liberation only when the *ātman* is liberated from the cycle of rebirth. However, whether the *ātman* exists or not is an issue of debate between various Indian systems. A famous example can be found in the earliest record of Indian logic, the *Carakasaṃhitā*, where the five-step syllogism was used to argue for the eternity (*nitya*) of the soul (*puruṣa*) (Kajiyama, 1984: 11).

In Qingmu's *Commentary*, four *pramāṇa*s are used rather to argue *against* the *ātmavāda*. These *pramāṇa*s are mentioned as being: (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*); (2) inference (*anumāna*), which is subdivided into inference from effect to cause (**pūrvavat)*, inference from part to whole (**śeṣavat*) and inference from general correlation (**sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*); (3) analogy (*upamāna*); and (4) authority (*āptāgama*). Inference, analogy and authority are all said to function on the basis of perception. Qingmu argued that, given this epistemic priority of perception, and given that no one has seen a soul, there is no epistemic ground upon which know-

ledge of the existence of the soul could arise through the other three means of cognition.[3]

It is worthy of note that Kumārajīva rendered the Sanskrit term *pramāṇa* by *xin* (信), which literally means "trust", "warrant", and "assurance".[4] This rendering was replaced by *zhi* (智 *jñāna*, cognition) in later Chinese translations. Both *xin* and *zhi* refer to a certain form of mental state, which is considered the foundation of cognition. However, Kumārajīva's rendering preserves the early Chinese understanding of the meaning of *pramāṇa,* namely, that the means of knowledge must be trustworthy.

After Kumārajīva, logical arguments against the existence of a soul and a cosmic creator are also found in more detail in such early Buddhist logical texts as the *Upāyahṛdaya,* the *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra,* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya.*

Metaphysical topics

In addition to such theological issues, Buddhist philosophical schools, such as Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra, turned their attention to metaphysical questions: What is an existent (*dharma*)? Do existents possess essence or substance (*svabhāva*)?[5] Does the world exist independent of mind? In response to these questions, the Sarvāsti-vādin argues for a form of direct realism, while the Sautrāntika argues

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[3] See *Zhong lun* (中論), T30:1564.24a-24b.

[4] The word *xin* (信) in this context could be taken to mean "reliability", as testified by the use of the phrase *kexin* (可信) in Kumārajīva's translation.

[5] Jan Westerhoff distinguishes two usages of *svabhāva* in Mādhyamika philosophy: (1) *svabhāva* as essence and (2) *svabhāva* as substance. Essence-*svabhāva* refers to the specific property of an object by which it is distinguished from the other objects. Substance-*svabhāva* is employed as an ontological notion, meaning "primary existent" in the sense that it is free of causal law. It is the permanent foundation of impermanent phenomena. Westerhoff concludes that "The elaborate Mādhyamika criticism of the notion of *svabhāva* is directed against this stronger notion of substance-*svabhāva* rather than against essence-*svabhāva*." See Westerhoff, 2009: 19-29. However, I would like to emphasize that the ontological notion of substance-*svabhāva* should not be separated from the epistemological notion of essence-*svabhāva*.

for indirect realism. In contrast, the Mādhyamika claims that all objects are empty, in the sense of being void of substance, whereas the Yogācārin takes an idealist position, contending that existents should be understood as mental representations only. In India, these philosophical controversies were to be settled only on the basis of logical argument and epistemological justification. Even though the early Mādhyamikas questioned the legitimacy of logic and epistemology, they still needed to argue for their positions according to certain rules of dialectics. The best evidence of this fact can be found in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, a philosophical text that was translated, but unfortunately ignored throughout the entire history of Chinese Buddhism.

On the side of Yogācāra, Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* was first translated by Gautama Prajñāruci in 538-541. In this text, Vasubandhu employed four *pramāṇa*s to argue for idealism (*vijñaptimātra*) and against realism, by appealing to the same epistemological premise: "The existence and nonexistence [of objects] are to be determined by means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇavaśād astitvaṃ nāstitvaṃ vā nirdhāryate*).[6] That is to say, metaphysical questions with regard to the existence of external objects can be answered only through epistemological justification. As we can see from Huiyuan's writings, this typical Indian philosophical practice did not win much appreciation from early Chinese Buddhists.

Topics on epistemology and meditation

Now we come to Huiyuan's SLZY which can be viewed as an example showing interest in the relationship between epistemology and meditation. In contrast to the persistence of Indian Buddhist philosophers in engaging in theological and metaphysical debate, Huiyuan clearly does not show interest in the practice of logic and epistemological analysis. His writing style shows itself more in favor of hermeneutic exegesis than argumentation. In his exegesis, moreover, he places great stress on the meditational context in which he believes epistemology is properly to be situated. By "meditational context", I mean that he refers to the stages of

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[6] Also see Xuanzang's translation of the *Viṃśatikā*: 諸法由量刊定有無. T31:1690.76b.15.

meditational cultivation as explained in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* and Yogācāra texts. According to those early texts, various stages of meditation practice correspond to various levels of mental experience, which are depicted according to the system of the three realms (*tridhātu*). That is, mental experience at the level of the desire-realm (*kāmadhātu*) is considered different from that in the form- and formless realms (*rūpadhātu, ārūpyadhātu*). Accordingly, when we analyze perception, we have to differentiate the various forms of perception in accordance with the various levels of mental experience that can be observed at the various stages of meditational practice.

Similarly, Huiyuan contends that when we are doing epistemological analysis, we have to ascertain the meditational stage at which the object is discerned. Our mental experience, including perception and inference, depends upon the various levels of mental development. Hence, perception and inference cannot be conceived as something universal and unchanging. In this regard, Huiyuan is more concerned with cognitive variation in mental cultivation than with the *a priori* conditions of knowledge as they might be conceived, for example, in Kantian epistemology.

Huiyuan did not have any knowledge of Dignāga's system. Rather, he attempted independently to derive an understanding of Buddhist logic and epistemology from pre-Dignāgan sources. It will be illuminating, therefore, if we strategically place Huiyuan and Dignāga side by side, to see the different paths they took in confronting the same tradition of *hetu-vidyā*.

The most apparent difference between the two thinkers is that Dignāga admits two means of valid cognition only (i.e., *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*), while Huiyuan admits three (adding *āgama* to Dignāga's two). Dignāga accepts only two means of cognition, perception and inference, for the reason that the object itself only presents two aspects to cognition, namely, the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Dignāga argues that no third means of cognition can be accepted

because ontologically, there is no other aspect of the object, beside the particular and the universal, that could serve as the object of cognition.[7]

On the other hand, Huiyuan contends that each of the three means of cognition has both the particular (*shi* 事) and the universal (*li* 理) as objects of cognition. That is, perception is directed at both the particular and the universal as the object of cognition; and the same is also true for inference; and for authoritative teaching. At first sight, this theory looks to be totally at odds with Dignāga's system. How can this be explained? In order to explain Huiyuan's theory of cognition, I suggest that we should look into his ontology of the *prameya*, which takes both *li* and *shi* as the object of each means of cognition.

Text, author, and context

The text under study is Huiyuan's *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition* (SLZY), a chapter in his magnum opus, *A Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (*Dasheng yizhang* 大乘義章 = DSYZ). As recorded in Daoxuan's 道宣 (596-667) *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* (*Xu gaoseng zhuan* 續高僧傳), Huiyuan composed DSYZ in fourteen fascicles, and the text consists of two hundred and fifty-nine entries in five categories of doctrine: (1) the Canon; (2) Foundational Doctrine; (3) Defiled Dharmas; (4) Purified Dharmas; and (5) Miscellaneous Dharmas. Daoxuan describes this text as follows: "The essentials of the Buddha's teaching are all laid out here, for scholars who want to grasp the gist of the teaching" (T50: 2060.491c).

However, the genre of DSYZ, that is, Mahāyāna Abhidharma, was not invented by Huiyuan. Rather, it can be traced back to the writings of Kumārajīva, who is said to have authored a text with the same title in three fascicles. The same title of "compendium" (*yizhang*) was also seen in many works by Huiyuan's contemporaries, such as Fashang (法上, 495-580) (T50:2060.485c), Shi Lingyu (釋靈裕, 518-605) (T50:2060.497c), Shi Tanwuzui (釋曇無最, d.u.) (T50:2060.624c), Shi Daobian (釋道辯, d.u.) (T50:2060.471c) and Shi Baoqiong (釋寶瓊, 504-584) (T50:2060.479c). This

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[7] This is exactly why Candrakīrti took issue with Dignāga in the opening chapter of the *Prasannapadā*.

shows that the genre of the Mahāyāna compendium was widely adopted by Chinese Buddhists during the fifth and sixth centuries, in order to systematize their understanding of the Dharma.[8]

Within the overall structure of DSYZ, SLZY is included under the category of Purified Dharmas. The SLZY can be considered an independent work, but this does not mean that it does not need to be properly contextualized within the historical process of the scriptural transmission of DSYZ as a whole. As we can see from the SLZY itself, Huiyuan composed this chapter by citing from various early translations of Indian texts, such as:

(1) *Xiangxu jietuo rulai suozuo suishun liaoyi jing* (**Saṃdhinirmocanatathā-gatakṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārtha-sūtra* 相續解脫如來所作隨順了義經), translated by Guṇabhadra (394-468) in the middle of the fifth century. This text can be identified as the last chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, where four methods of reasoning (*yukti*) are discussed, placing it among the oldest materials in Buddhist logic and epistemology. It is also important to note that the problem of the three *pramāṇa*s is found in the same context as the four *yukti*s.

(2) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Pusa dichi jing* 菩薩地持經), translated by Dharmakṣema (曇無讖) in 418. Huiyuan also refers to a passage on the four *yukti*s which appears in this text.

(3) The **Satyasiddhi-śāstra* (*Cheng shi lun* 成實論), translated by Kumārajīva in 411-412.

(4) Āryadeva's *Śataka-śāstra (*Bai lun* 百論), also translated by Kumārajīva.

(5) The **Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (*Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論), translated by Daotai (道泰) and Buddhavarman (佛陀跋摩) in 425-427.

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[8] The popularity of *yizhang* in the sixth-century Dilun school can be seen in the newly discovered Dunhuang manuscripts. See Aoki, *et al.*, 2012.

Doctrinal analysis

In the SLZY, Huiyuan lays out an exposition of the three *pramāṇas* in the scholastic style. The essay as a whole is divided into three sections: (1) "Exposition of terminology", which defines the meaning and usage of the three *pramāṇas*; (2) "Examination of characteristics", which gives further clarification; and (3) "Analysis in accordance with the ranks of cultivation", where issues of *pramāṇa* are placed in the context of meditative cultivation. The first two sections are often combined, as in many other entries in the DSYZ.

Instead of presenting Huiyuan's doctrine of *pramāṇas* within his own hermeneutic framework, I will focus on Huiyuan's epistemology as it relates to ontology and meditation. For Huiyuan, epistemology and ontology will make no sense if they are not placed within the context of meditation. Hence, it is the main aim of this paper to demonstrate that only when the context of epistemology and meditation has been properly exposed are we able to fully understand the soteriological project in the early stage of Chinese Buddhist logico-epistemology.

In the first section of SLZY, Huiyuan elucidates the meaning of the *pramāṇas*, treating *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āptāgama* respectively. In this discussion, he refers to Guṇabhadra's translation of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, Dharmakṣema's translation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and Kumārajīva's translation of the **Satyasiddhi-śāstra.* Based on these early texts, Huiyuan uses the term *liang* (量, "measure of cognition"), which is the Chinese rendering of *pramāṇa*, to refer to "the specific capacity of the discerning mind which apprehends the specific aspect of the object" (慧心取法，各有分限，故名為量; SLZY, T44:1851.670c7-8). That is, the mind with the various functions of discernment (*prajñā*), which is none other than the mind of cognition, apprehends specific aspects of the object of cognition. It is also called "*prajñā*-mind" (*huixin* 慧心) due to its capability to cognize with certainty at the stage of seeing (*darśana-mārga*) (DSYZ, T44:1851.642b, 672c). Once again, we note that by referring to the various stages of meditation the analysis of cognition is clearly conducted within the context of cultivational practice.

Perception

The first means of cognition is named *pratyakṣa*, which is rendered in Chinese by *xian* (現), with various connotations. In Huiyuan's own words, *pratyakṣa* is defined either as the immediate cognition (*xianzhi* 現知) of existents, or as the cognition of present existents (*xianfa* 現法).[9] Here we see the difference between Huiyuan's interpretation and Indian etymological exegesis. In India, as Masaaki Hattori points out, both the Naiyāyikas and Dignāga agreed that *pratyakṣa* is so named either because it is closely connected with (*prati*) each sense faculty, or because it is the function of each sense faculty (*akṣa*) toward (*prati*) its object. That is, *pratyakṣa* literally means what immediately appears to the sense faculty.[10] Although Indian etymological exegesis of this sort would have been beyond Huiyuan's knowledge, it is not surprising to see that his interpretation is not too far from the conventional Indian etymology of *pratyakṣa* as "direct apprehension" (*sākṣātkārijñāna*) (Chattopadhyay, 2007: 81-82).

   Huiyuan further analyzes perception into two types. The first type of perception is cognition of a particular ("fact", "thing", *shi* 事), while the second type is cognition of a universal ("truth", "principle", *li* 理). Here we see the most striking peculiarity in Huiyuan's theory of knowledge, for he brings a pair of Sinitic notions, *li* and *shi*, to bear upon the theory of *pramāṇa*. As we will see below, the terms *li* and *shi* play a central role in Huiyuan's doctrinal system. Now, we have to bear in mind that this usage is not confined to Huiyuan's theory of knowledge; basically, this pair of ontological concepts was used by Chinese Buddhists to account for the theory of the Two Truths. In the context of SLZY, however, it is quite certain that the term *li* refers to the "universal" and the term *shi* refers to the "particular", as generally used in Indian epistemology. At

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[9] In other chapters, the term *xianfa* (現法) is taken to mean the object of *pratyakṣa* (*xianzhi* 現智), which is immediately present to perception. See *DSYZ*, T44:1581.642c, 756c.

[10] 現現別轉，故名現量 (NMukh, 3b.17) *akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam* (*pratyakṣa* is so named because it occurs in close connection with [*prati*] each sense faculty [*akṣa*]); Nyāya: *akṣasyâkṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam* ("*Pratyakṣa* is the function of each sense-organ [*akṣa*] toward [*prati*] its object") (Hattori, 1968: 76-77).

this point, we have to be cautious; reading Chinese phrases by merely tracing back to the Sanskrit "origin" is not enough, because we might lose the subtle nuances of terms that have been shaped by Chinese semantic contexts.

Huiyuan first treats perception as cognition of *shi* (the fact/thing, i.e. the particular), defining it as "cognition without the aid of inference and verbal testimony". It is obvious that this definition of *pratyakṣa* merely distinguishes it from the other means of valid cognition. Comparison shows that at least on the surface, this definition is reminiscent of Dignāga's definition in PS (V).I.3c-d: "Perception is free from conceptual construction, the association of name, genus, etc." (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ nāmajatyādiyojanā*) (Hattori, 1968: 25; Steinkellner, 2005), in which "free from conceptual construction" can be taken to match Huiyuan's "without the aid of inference", and "free from the association of name, genus, etc." corresponds to Huiyuan's "without the aid of verbal testimony". The difference is that Huiyuan was not as well-informed as Dignāga about the grammarians' and epistemological interpretations of *kalpanā* (conceptual construction).

Huiyuan goes on to define another aspect of perception as cognition of *li* (the universal), claiming that perception of *li* (the universal) occurs in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) only, while perception of *shi* (the particular) can occur in any realm and at any time. Now, the question arises: Why have these epistemological issues been brought into relation with the scheme of the *tridhātu*?

In answering this question, we should bear in mind that Huiyuan was quite well versed in Abhidharma literature. According to the Abhidharma teaching, the *tridhātu* system corresponds to various mental states, which are achieved in accordance with various levels of meditation; the various modes of contemplation take place at particular stages on this gradated path of practice. Huiyuan illustrates the perception of *li* by citing a passage from the **Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (translated by Buddhavarman and Daotai) which refers to the stage of *laukikāgra-dharma* (世第一法) just preceding the entry into the outflow-free *darśana-mārga*.[11] In the

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[11] The stage of *laukikāgra-dharma* belongs to the mundane realm, whereas the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) belongs to the trans-mundane realm.

stage of *laukikāgra-dharma* (and in three other stages, viz. *uṣmagata*, *mūrdhan*, and *kṣānti*) the practitioner is trained to contemplate sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the Four Noble Truths. In regard to the truth of suffering, for instance, four aspects of phenomena are taken as the objects of contemplation: that they are impermanent (*anitya*), suffering (*duḥkha*), void (*śūnya*), and selfless (*anātmaka*).[12] These sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths are also called "general marks" (*zongxiang* 總相) in the **Vibhāṣā*, whereas the nature of specific phenomena, such as the nature of *rūpa*, *vijñāna*, etc., is called "particular marks" (*biexiang* 別相).[13]

In the DSYZ, Huiyuan characterizes the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths as *li* (the universal), while characterizing individual object as *shi* (the particular), as can be seen in his exposition of the ten forms of knowledge (*jñāna*):

> According to the Abhidharma, "knowledge of suffering" refers to knowing the universal (*li* 理) comprising the four aspects of suffering by means of understanding (*prajñā*) with outflow (*sāsrava*). "Knowledge of the cause of suffering" refers to knowing the universal comprising the four aspects of the cause of suffering. "Knowledge of cessation" refers to knowing the universal comprising the four aspects of cessation. "Knowledge of the path" refers to knowing the universal comprising the four aspects of the path..." Dharma knowledge (*dharma-jñāna* 法智) and inferential knowledge" (*anvaya-jñāna* 比智) refers to knowing the universal (*li*) of the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths by means of the understanding without outflow. "Conventional knowledge" (*saṃvṛti-jñāna* 等智) refers to knowing either

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[12] Cf. Hirakawa, 1990: 210. The meaning of *ākāra* in this context is subject to various interpretations. Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti explains "*ākāra*" as "the mode of comprehending activity of the mind" which "results in a resemblance or reflection of the object in the mind". See Dhammajoti, 2007: 581; cf. Wayman, 1984: 117-127.

[13] **Abhidharmavibhāṣā*: "'Contemplation of the particular mark' is named for contemplation of the mark of form as form, up to contemplation of the mark of consciousness as consciousness, and contemplation of the mark of earth as solidness, up to contemplation of the mark of wind as fluidness. 'Contemplation of the general mark' is named for contemplation of the sixteen holy marks" (T28:1546.40a22-25). 別相觀者觀色是色相，乃至觀識是識相，觀地是堅相，乃至觀風是動相，是名別相觀。總相觀者十六聖行觀，是名總相觀.

the universal or particular [aspect] of all existents with outflow. Four types of mind in the stages of warmth (*uṣmagata*), etc., and the rest of conventional knowledge, which take the universal of the Noble Truths as the object of knowledge, are called "knowing the universal" (*zhi li* 知理), while the other types of knowledge are called "knowing the particular" (*zhi shi* 知事).[14]

It should be noted that Huiyuan here employs the Sinitic concepts, *li* and *shi*, to interpret these Abhidharma doctrines. The term *li* is used to refer to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths as the universal characteristics of phenomena, while *shi* refers to phenomena which can be further defined by their different natures. *Li* and *shi* refer respectively to the two aspects of the object of meditation, the "universal" (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and the "particular" (*svalakṣaṇa*), as can be demonstrated by comparison of Huiyuan's treatment with Vasubandhu's account of the four methods of mindfulness in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*.[15] (Although the categories of universal and particular are applied to the analysis of the object of meditation in the Abhidharma literature, it seems that a theoretical account of corresponding parallels between the universal

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[14] *DSYZ*: 依如毘曇，以有漏慧知彼苦下四行之理，名為苦智。知彼集下四行之理，名為集智。知彼滅下四行之理，名為滅智。知彼道下四行之理，名為道智。以無漏慧知彼四諦十六行理，名法比智…以有漏慧知一切法，若理若事，名為等智。煖等四心及餘等智緣諦理者，名為知理，餘名知事 (T44:1851.760a-b). For the ten forms of knowledge, see Dhammajoti 2007: 319-322.

[15] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, VI: "Verse: In order to practice mindfulness for contemplation that is based on the accomplished state of concentration, one contemplates one's own body, feelings, thoughts and concepts in terms of particular and universal. Comment: One practices the four kinds of mindfulness for *vipaśyanā* when he has accomplished the supreme *śamatha*. How does one practice the four kinds of mindfulness? Answer: One contemplates the universal aspect and the particular aspect of body, feelings, thoughts and concepts. 'The particular' refers to the specific nature (*svabhāva*) of body, feelings, thoughts and concepts. 'The universal' refers to the fact that: (1) all conditioned objects are by nature impermanent; (2) all defilements are unsatisfactory by nature; and (3) all objects are by nature empty and non-self." 頌曰：依已修成止 為觀修念住 以自相共相 觀身受心法 […] 論曰：依已修成滿勝奢摩他。為毘鉢舍那修四念住。如何修習四念住耶。謂以自共相觀身受心法。身受心法各別自性名為自相。一切有為皆非常性。一切有漏皆是苦性。及一切法空非我性名為共相 (T29:1558.118c).

and inference, on the one hand, and the particular and perception, on the other, appeared no earlier than the age of Dignāga's epistemology.)

In his account of Buddhist epistemology, Huiyuan clearly states that each object of cognition consists of both *li* and *shi*. It is commonly granted that *shi* refers to existents (*dharmas*) categorized as *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*. As to *li*, according to Huiyuan's classification of the teachings (*panjiao* 判教), the Vaibhāṣikas hold that *li* refers to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, while the Sautrāntikas, Mādhyamikas and Tathāgatagarbha thinkers each hold different theories.[16] (Huiyuan also investigates the ontology of *li* and *shi* in his analysis of the Twofold Truth. We will come back to this issue later.[17]) In the context of the clas-

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[16] *DSYZ*: "In the fourth section [of the exposition], the realm of the object will be examined first and then the exposition of cognition will follow. The object [of cognition] consists of two kinds: the thing/particular (*shi*) and the principle/universal (*li*). 'The thing/particular' refers to the aggregates (*skandha*), realms (*dhātu*), bases (*āyatana*), and so forth. As for the principle/universal, there is no fixed theory. According to the Abhidharma, the sixteen holy aspects are named principle/universal. The sixteen holy aspects are explained above in detail. Under the category of suffering, there are four subcategories: suffering [itself], impermanence, emptiness, and no-self. Under the category of the arising of suffering, there are four [subcategories]: the cause [of suffering], the gathering [of karmic fruits], coming into existence, and conditions. Under the category of cessation, there are four [subcategories]: cessation [itself], calming, sublimity, and detachment. Under the category of the path, there are four [subcategories]: the path [itself], accordance [with correct principle], trace, and vehicle. According to the *Satyasiddhi*, the principle/universal (*li*) means that all objects are linguistic designations for all that arises with causes and conditions, i.e., all things that are empty of self-nature. According to the Mahāyāna teachings, the principle/universal refers to the twofold truth: 'conventional truth' refers to that which exists in causes and conditions, whereas 'ultimate truth' refers to that which does not exist in causes and conditions. 'Principle/universal' also refers to the one principle of reality, i.e., the nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, which is neither existence nor nonexistence. This is the exposition of the object of cognition." 第四門中辨其境界，後約智論。境別有二。一事、二理。陰界入等，名之為事。理則不定。依如毘曇，十六聖行，名之為理。十六聖行，廣如上辨。苦下有四，謂苦、無常、空與無我。集下有四，因集有緣。滅下有四，滅止妙出。道下有四，道如迹乘。若依成實說，一切法因緣假有，無性之空，方名為理。大乘法中因緣有無名二諦理，非有非無如來藏性為一實理。境別如是（T44:1581.760a).

[17] *DSYZ*: "As to the principle/universal and the thing/particular, the distinction of phenomena into *skandhas*, *dhātus*, and *āyatanas* is designated as conventional truth,

sification of teachings Huiyuan analyzes different accounts of the various modes of perception that occur at the different stages of meditation:

(1) the Vaibhāṣika Theory: "'Perception' is named for the vividness of perception in the realm of desire only. In the realm of desire, there are two kinds of perception. The first is called 'perception detached from desire', while the second is called 'direct perception by oneself'."

(2) the Sautrāntika Theory: "According to the teaching in the *Satyasiddhi*, perception is analyzed into two types in terms of time: The first type of perception refers to the contemplation of the non-substantiality of *prajñapti* right at the initial stage of practice, which is conducted during the present moment before the Realization of Truth (*dṛṣṭa-satya*, *jiandi* 見諦). The second type of perception refers to intuition of the principle of emptiness (*kongli* 空理) in the existents of the past, the present and the future, which occurs after the Realization of Truth."

(3) the Mahāyāna Theory: "Perception is analyzed in terms of the four stages of meditation.

i) "At the initial stage of meditation, perception refers to the seeing of the *tathatā* of present existents in the realm of desire.

ii) "At the subsequent stage of meditation, perception refers to either the seeing of the *tathatā* of existents in the realm of desire in the past, the present and the future, or to the seeing of the *tathatā* of present existents in the three realms.

iii) "At the completion of meditation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of the *tathatā* of all existents by the practitioner himself in all three time-periods.

iv) "At the cessation of meditation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of all existents in the three time-periods during

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whereas the principle as the general characteristics of the sixteen holy aspects is taken as the ultimate truth" 言理事者，陰界入等事相差別說為世諦，十六聖行通相之理以為真諦 (T44:1581.484a).

the stage of awakening (*bodhi*), whether by oneself or by others."

In the above account, the theory of perception is further explained according to the classification of teachings. Although each teaching has its own theory of perception, they all agree in analyzing perception in terms of the stages of meditation, which are arranged according to different teachings.

Inference

Huiyuan defines "inference" as "knowing *dharma*s through analogical reasoning (*pidu* 譬度)". Nothing about this definition looks peculiar. What is peculiar is that, unlike Dignāga, Huiyuan once more includes *both* the universal/principle (*li*) and the particular/thing (*shi*) as the object of inference. As in the above exposition of perception, Huiyuan explains the inferential cognition of the particular first, claiming that it is the cognition of existents that are known through inference in any realm and any time. Then, Huiyuan proceeds to explain the inferential cognition of the universal, using the hermeneutical framework of the classification of teachings. (1) According to the Abhidharma, inference refers to cognition of the universal (*li*) of the Four Noble Truths in the upper realms (the realm of form and the formless realm) only. (2) According to the *Satyasiddhi, inference refers to the cognition of the non-substantiality of conventional existents (*prajñapti*, *jia* 假) in the past and the future, which takes place before the path of insight. (3) According to Mahāyāna doctrine, inference can be further analyzed in accordance with the three progressive stages of meditation. In the process of cultivation, the practitioner is trained to inferentially cognize Suchness (*tathatā*) either in other realms, or in other time-periods, through his knowledge of truth in the realm of desire. In the final state of enlightenment, by contrast, one does not need any inference to cognize the truth; one intuitively perceives the truth. In short, for Huiyuan, inference is mainly conceived as the means for cognizing Suchness (*tathatā*), which is the same as *li*, during the progressive course of cultivation.

Huiyuan goes on to analyze the method of inference into three types: (1) The first type of inference is called "analogy from the same species". That is, through knowing one item in a given category, one analogically knows the rest of the items in the same category. (2) The second type of inference is called "giving a case of lower quality in order to know other cases of higher quality". For instance, one uses copper as an analogy for those who have never seen gold. (3) The third type of inference is called "giving a case of higher quality in order to know other cases of lower quality". For instance, one uses gold as an example for those who have never seen copper. Another example is that in the scriptures, the hypothetical case of a king being sentenced to death is taken as an example for knowing neither the existence nor the non-existence of supreme *nirvāṇa*.[18]

Under the first type of inference, "analogy from the same species", Huiyuan lists three sub-types, which are adopted from Qingmu's (青目 *Piṅgala) account of *pramāṇa* theory as preserved in the *Zhong lun* (*Commentary* on *MMK*). (In the SLZY, Huiyuan obviously mistakes Āryadeva's *Śata-śāstra* for Qingmu's *Zhong lun*.) The three sub-modes of inference are listed as follows:

(1) Inference from part to whole (**śeṣavat*, *rucan* 如殘). For instance, one can infer the saltiness of the water of the entire ocean by tasting the saltiness of a single drop. For another instance, one can infer that all existents are characterized by suffering, impermanence, emptiness and no-self, by cognizing these same characteristics in one existent.

(2) Inference from effect to cause (**pūrvavat*, *ruben* 如本). For instance, when one sees the smoke from a fire, he knows that there must be fire whenever there is smoke.

(3) Inference from common relation (**sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, *gongxiang bizhi* 共相比知). For instance, someone observes the movement of a man from the east to the west. When he similarly observes the movement of the sun in the sky from the east to the west, he then analogically

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[18] That is to say, the impossibility of characterizing *nirvāṇa* is similar to the impossibility of prosecuting the King for a capital crime.

infers that the sun also moves, like human beings. For another instance, someone observes the impermanence of material form (*rūpa*) by observing the production and destruction of that [same] material form. He then infers the impermanence of conception, feelings, volitions, etc., by observing the production and destruction of these same elements.

We know that the above three sub-types of inference, as recorded in the oldest Chinese translations of Indian texts, namely the *Zhong lun*, the *Upāyahṛdaya* (*Fangbian xin lun* 方便心論) and the *Suvarṇasaptati-śāstra* (*Jin qishi lun* 金七十論), are also found in parallel sources in the *Nyāya-sūtra*s and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (Ui, 1944: 71-72; Katsura, 1998: 36-39; Potter, 1977: 184, 223, 242; Jhā, 1983: 153-155). Although there is some discrepancy and inconsistency of interpretation among these texts, it is quite certain that the old theory of inference found in the early Chinese translations was inherited from pan-Indian logical sources which were accepted in common by the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas and the Sāṃkhyas.

Authoritative teaching

The third means of valid cognition is authoritative teaching (*āptāgama*). Unlike Dignāga, who incorporated *āgama/śabda* as part of the inference, Huiyuan still holds fast to the independent value of authoritative teaching handed down from the tradition. He defines "authoritative teaching" as "that by which one knows profound *dharma*s that it is beyond one's own capability to learn". By means of this third *pramāṇa* of authoritative teaching, one is, once again, able to know both *li* and *shi*; and once again, *li* and *shi* are viewed in the theoretical framework of the Two Truths. Knowledge of *shi*, whether acquired by perception, inference, or authoritative teaching, belongs to the conventional realm. On the other hand, knowledge of *li* belongs to the trans-conventional realm.

In terms of its application, Huiyuan emphasizes that authoritative teaching (*āgama*) allows us to penetrate the most profound teachings, such as the teaching of Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha*, which is regarded by Huiyuan as the most profound teaching. It seems that Huiyuan

endorses the value of authoritative teaching simply for the reason that he wants to make sense of the seemingly unfathomable thought of *tathāgatagarbha*.

Concluding remarks

How did Huiyuan contextualize his understanding of *pramāṇavāda* with the very limited sources available in sixth-century China? As probably the first Chinese scholar-monk to systematize Indian Buddhist epistemology, Huiyuan did not construct his knowledge of *pramāṇavāda* by means of hermeneutic speculation only. In his efforts at systematization, rather, he relied upon the textual and doctrinal sources available to him. Huiyuan arranges those Buddhist doctrines, ranging from Abhidharma to Yogācāra, and from Madhyamaka to Tathāgatagarbha, according to a peculiarly Sinitic mode of classification (*panjiao*). In this regard, Huiyuan can be counted as one of the pioneers in creating a Buddhist hermeneutics of reading and practice. Unlike Dignāga, who attempted to lay down logic and epistemology as the *universal foundation* for all Indian philosophical systems, including Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Huiyuan rather attempted to demonstrate that epistemology is relative to the various stages of intellectual and spiritual cultivation. Everything, including cognition, is condition-dependent. Hence, perception for the beginner in the path of mental cultivation is naturally different from perception for the practitioner at an advanced stage. The same is true for inference and authoritative teaching. For Huiyuan, then, *pramāṇa*s are indeed *instruments* to soteriological ends. They cannot be taken as autonomous domains and universal disciplines, as we see logic and epistemology are treated as modern academic fields of inquiry. In this sense, Huiyuan did preserve the authentic intent of Indian Buddhist epistemology.

The most striking feature of Huiyuan's *pramāṇa* theory is that it brings into epistemological discourse the ontological categories of *li* and *shi* ("particular" and "universal", but with special Chinese overtones). Huiyuan's application of this hermeneutics of *li* and *shi* to the epistemological enterprise might appear to make for a classic proof-case for the theory of Sinification; he might be regarded as simply looking at Indic materials through a Sinitic lens. On such an interpretation, the on-

tological terminology of *li* and *shi*, which are deliberately employed by Huiyuan as equivalents to the notions of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, would constitute strong evidence in support of the theory of Sinification. However, before we jump to this conclusion, we should carefully examine Huiyuan's ontology of *li* and *shi* in detail.

To anticipate my conclusion, Huiyuan's *pramāṇa* theory can be seen as the result of a dialectical interplay between Sinification and Indianization. The main reason we might ascribe Huiyuan's project to Sinification is the fact that he adopts typical Sinitic terms, especially *li* and *shi*, equivalents of which had never been seen in Indian Buddhist systems. However, as we have seen in detail above, Huiyuan is justified in employing the notions of *li* and *shi* by his move in viewing the problem of *pramāṇa*s within the context of the progressive course of meditation as described in the Abhidharma literature. *Li* refers to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, while *shi* refers to the individual object of meditation. In virtue of this move, instead of reading Indian literature through a Sinitic lens, Huiyuan arguably reads conversely: that is, he reframes the semantics of *li* and *shi* in the terms of an Indian Buddhist context. As we have seen above, the categories of *li* and *shi* and the categories of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are taken to be compatible with each other. This is, then, a case of Indianization.

On the other hand, the phenomenon of Sinification did take place at the level of the very basis of Huiyuan's hermeneutical project, namely, the framework of *panjiao*, or "classification of teachings". If we do not take Huiyuan's hermeneutical project of *panjiao* into account, we cannot properly understand the theory of *pramāṇa*s in SLZY. That is to say, Huiyuan's theory of cognition should be viewed from the perspective of his ontology.

As can be seen in the chapter on the Two Truths (*erdi* 二諦) in the DSYZ, Huiyuan deals with the problem of the ontological relationship between *li* and *shi*, or between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, within the hermeneutical framework of *panjiao*. He examines the relationship between *li* and *shi* in four Buddhist schools. Briefly, according to Huiyuan's account, the relationship between *li* and *shi* is treated by the Sarvāstivādins as indeterminate; on the one hand, they are identical, because *li* is the ontological principle of the variety of phenomena (*shi*); on the other

hand, however, they are different, because phenomena (*shi*) are not unconditioned existents. For the Sautrāntikas, *li* and *shi* are conceived as both identical and different; they are differentiated, because *shi* exists as convention (psycho-linguistic construction, *prajñapti*), and is therefore not ultimately empty in the sense of *li*. For the Mādhyamikas, *li* and *shi* are regarded as completely identical. Finally, for the Tathāgatagarbha school, the relationship between *li* and *shi* is conceived in terms of *ti* (體 substance) and *yong* (用 function). Ontologically, principle (*li*) serves as the transcendental ground of phenomena (*shi*). The relationship between *li* and *shi* is also conceived to be both identical and different on the Tathāgatagarbha interpretation (DSYZ, T44:1851.485).

We might be tempted to speculatively identify the Sinitic and the Indic ways of thinking with ontological and epistemological thinking respectively. If we adopt this view, then Huiyuan's system demonstrates the feasibility of creatively weaving both Sinitic ontology and Indic epistemology into one system. This possibility may provide a clue toward an answer to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, namely: Is it justifiable for both *li* and *shi* to be taken as the object of cognition for each of the *pramāṇa*s, namely, perception, inference and authoritative teaching?

The seeds of a resolution of this apparent difficulty may lie in the fact that, quite apart from factors proper to Indic systems, *li* and *shi* are always considered by Huiyuan as ontologically both identical and different. For Dignāga, however, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa* (or *li* and *shi*) should be kept strictly separate, because according to the theory of the Two Truths that he adopted from the Abhidharma, *svalakṣaṇa* is conceived as ultimately real, while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is conceived as merely *prajñapti-sat*.[19] This means that according to Huiyuan's classification, Dignāga would be considered as still belonging to the lowest rank of teaching, namely the teaching of *svabhāva* (*li xing zong* 立性宗), while Huiyuan considers his own position to be the final teaching, that of disclosing reality (*xian shi zong* 顯實宗). For Huiyuan, the enterprise of

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[19] Dan Arnold contends that Dignāga "retains the basically Ābhidharmika notion of the 'two truths'" as a basis for the ontological separation of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Arnold, 2005: 23.

epistemology should be taken only as a step on the path to the full dis-
closure of ontological reality.

Appendix: English translation of Huiyuan's *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition*

大乘義章　　*Treatise on the Meanings of the Great Vehicle*
遠法師撰　　Dharma Master Yuan

三量智義三門分別（釋名義一　辨相二　就位分別三）
Threefold Analysis of the Three Means of Valid Cognition (Exposition of Terminology, Examination of Characteristics, and Analysis According to the Ranks of Cultivation)

第一釋名　　*1　Exposition of terminology*

> 三量之義出於《相續解脫經》中。慧心取法，各有分限，故名為量。
> 量別不同，一門說三。一是現量，二是比量，三是教量。《地持》《成
> 實》，亦有此相。《地持》說言，現智、比智及從師同聞。《成實論》
> 言，見、聞及比，猶此三矣。

The meaning of the three means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is found in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*.[20] These are termed "means of valid cognition" because each [aspect of] cognitive mind apprehends the specific aspect of objects. Regarding the number of the means of valid cognition, there are different theories. One theory holds that it [i.e., the means of valid cognition] can be divided into three types: (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference (*anumāna*) and (3) scripture (*āptāgama*). This typology is also seen in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the **Satyasiddhi-śāstra.* In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, [the three means of valid cognition are named as] perceptual knowledge (*xianzhi* 現智), inferential knowledge (*bizhi* 比智) and [the knowledge of] hearing from the teacher (*cong shi tong wen* 從師

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[20] In the *Xiangxu jietuo rulaisuozuo suishunchu liaoyi jing* 相續解脫如來所作隨順處了義經 (**Saṃdhinirmocanatathāgatakṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārtha-sūtra*), trans., Guṇabhadra, three types of *pramāṇa* are listed: perception (*xianqianliang* 現前量), inference (*biliang* 比量), and testimony (*xinyanliang* 信言量) (T16:679.679b5-6).

同聞).[21] According to the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, the three are called "seeing" (*jian* 見), "hearing" (*wen* 聞) and "inferring" (*bi* 比).[22]

> 言現量者,現知諸法,名為現量。又知現法,亦名為現。於中分別,
> 有其二種。一者知事,二者知理。言知事者,隨在何時何處法中,
> 不因比度,不藉他言,而能知者,同名現量;事相麁近,隨在何時
> 何處之中能現知故。言知理者,毘曇法中,就處分別,知欲界法,
> 名之為現。

Regarding perception (*pratyakṣa*), it is so named because [it refers to] the *immediate* cognition of objects. It is also named "perception" (*xian* 現) for the reason that it refers to cognition of *present* objects (*xianfa* 現法). Perception can be further analyzed into two types: (1) cognition of the particular/thing (*shi* 事), and (2) cognition of the universal/principle (*li* 理). Regarding "cognition of the particular/thing", the cognition of objects in any time and any place without the aid of reasoning and verbal testimony is also named "perception", because the characteristics of the particular/thing are coarse and near (i.e., observable), and can be immediately perceived anytime and anywhere. In terms of "cognition of the universal/principle", according to the Abhidharma theory of place (*chu* 處), "perception" is so named because it refers to the cognition of objects in the realm of desire.

> 以何義故,知欲界法,偏名為現?《毘婆沙》云:得正決定必在欲
> 界,要先見於欲界苦等,後見上界。良以欲界法麁易見,故先見之。
> 先見分了,故偏名現。上界不爾,故知上界不名為現。又復行者於
> 欲界苦有二現見:一、離欲現見,以離欲道現照知故;二、自身現
> 見,欲界之苦身現覺故。於上界苦但有一種,離欲現見,身不在彼,
> 不覺知故。如兩擔物,一則自擔,二使人擔。於自所擔,有二現見:
> 一知是物,二知輕重。知欲界苦,其狀似此。於他所擔,但有一種

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[21] *Pusadichi jing* (菩薩地持經 *Bodhisattvabhūmi*), trans. Dharmakṣema (T30:1581.893a).

[22] *Chengshilun* (成實論 *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*), trans., Kumārajīva: "Question: What is the distinction between seeing, hearing, comprehension, and knowing? Answer: There are three reliable sources (*xin* 信 = *pramāṇa*). Seeing is termed 'perception' (*xian zaixin* 現在信). Hearing is termed 'testimony' (*xin xiansheng yu* 信賢聖語). Knowing is termed 'inference' (*bizhi* 比知). Comprehension is termed the discernment of the three reliable sources of cognition." 問曰:見聞覺知,有何差別?答曰:有三種信。見名現在信,聞名信賢聖語,知名比知,覺名分別三種信慧 (T32:1646.304a).

知物現見，不知輕重，上界如是。以知欲界，其二現故，偏名為現。
上界唯一，故不名現。

In what sense is "perception" specifically named for the cognition of objects in the realm of desire only? It is stated in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (T28:1546.10c, 303c) that correct certainty (*samyaktvaniyata, zhengjueding* 正決定) must be attained in the realm of desire. A practitioner is able to perceive [suffering and so forth] in the upper realms only after he has perceived suffering and so forth in the realm of desire. One perceives the objects in the realm of desire first, for the reason that they are coarse and easy to perceive (i.e., observable). "Perception" is so named specifically due to the vividness of initial perception. Due to the lack of vividness in the upper realms, knowledge in the upper realms is not named "perception".

Further, the practitioner has two types of perception of suffering in the realm of desire: The first is called "perception detached from desire" (*li yu xianjian* 離欲現見) for the reason that [suffering] is immediately cognized in the path of detaching from desire. The second is called "direct perception by oneself" (*zishen xianjian* 自身現見) for the reason that suffering in the realm of desire is perceived by oneself. Regarding suffering in the upper realms, there is only one type of perception, that which is detached from desire, because the physical body is not in that [i.e., pain]. This is just as there are two ways of carrying an object: one way is to carry the object yourself, while the other way is to ask someone to carry the object for you. With respect to an object that you are carrying yourself, there are two forms of perception: one is perception of the object, while the other is perception of its weight. The situation when we cognize suffering in the realm of desire is similar to this. As for an object that is being carried by someone else, there is only one form of perception, i.e., perception of the object, without the awareness of its weight. The same is true in the upper realms. Accordingly, perception is so named for two types of perception [i.e., perception detached from desire and perception by oneself] in the realm of desire. Since there is only one type of perception in the upper realms, it is therefore not named "perception".

《成實》法中，約時分別。彼現有二，一據修始，見諦已前，現在
時中，觀假無性，名之為現。二據修成，見諦已上，三世法中，現
見空理，同名為現。大乘通就時處分別，義釋有四：一據修始，唯
於欲界現在法中見諸法如，名為現量。欲界現法易觀察故。二者修
次，或於欲界見三世如，或於三界見現在如，同名現量。三者修成，
於自分中現見三世一切法如，悉名現量。四據修息，到菩提時現見
三世一切諸法，皆名現量。不簡自分他分之別。故《地持》言：諸
佛如來於一切法現知見覺，現量如是。

According to the teaching in the *Satyasiddhi, perception is analyzed into two forms in terms of time: The first form of perception refers to the contemplation of the non-substantiality of *prajñapti* right at the initial stage of cultivation, which is conducted during the present moment before the [the moment of] Insight into the Truth (*jiandi* 見諦). The second form of perception refers to intuition of the Principle of Emptiness (*kongli* 空理) in the objects of the past, the present and the future, which occurs after the Realization of Truth. This is also termed "perception".

According to the Mahāyāna exposition in terms of time and place, perception refers to that which takes place at four stages:

(1) At the initial stage of cultivation, perception refers to seeing present objects as they are (*tathatā*) in the realm of desire, for it is easier to investigate present objects in the realm of desire.

(2) At the subsequent stage of cultivation, perception refers either to seeing the *tathatā* of objects in the realm of desire in the past, the present and the future, or to seeing the *tathatā* of present objects in the three realms.

(3) At the completion of cultivation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of the *tathatā* of all objects by the practitioner himself in all three time-periods.

(4) At the cessation of cultivation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of all objects in three time-periods during the stage of awakening (*bodhi*), either by oneself or by another. Hence it says in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that the Buddhas are directly aware of all *dharmas*.

Thus is explained perception.

言比量者，譬度知法，名之為比。於中分別，亦有二種。一者知事，二者知理。言知事者，隨在何時何處法中比度而知，悉名比量。言知理者，毘曇法中，約處分別，知上二界四諦之理，名為比量。《成實》法中，約時分別，見諦已前，過未法中，觀假無性，名為比量。大乘通就時處分別，義釋有三：一據修始，以彼欲界現在法如，比知他界他世法如，名為比量。二據修次，或以欲界三世法如，比上二界，或以三界現在法如，比知過未，名為比量。三據修成，以自分中所知三界三世法如，比他分中未所見處三界三世一切法如，名為比量。以何義故不說修息？到菩提時，無復比故。然此比量，經中亦名譬喻量也。通釋是一，於中分別，同類相比，名為比量；異類相比，名譬喻量。

As to inference, it refers to the knowing of *dharmas* through analogy and reasoning, which can be analyzed into two kinds: (1) knowing the particular/thing and (2) knowing the universal/principle. Regarding "knowing the particular/thing", knowing objects anytime and anywhere through reasoning is named "inference". Regarding "knowing the universal/principle", according to the Abhidharma theory of place, "inference" is so named because it refers to reasoning that knows the universal aspect of the Four Truths in the two upper realms. According to the *Satyasiddhi*'s analysis in terms of time, inference refers to the contemplation of the non-substantiality of *prajñapti* in the objects of the past and the future right before the [the moment of] Insight into the Truth.

According to the Mahāyāna exposition in terms of time and place, inference refers to that which takes place in three stages:

(1) At the initial stage of cultivation, inference is named for that which analogically knows the *tathatā* of objects in other realms and time-periods by knowing the *tathatā* of present objects in the realm of desire.

(2) At the subsequent stage of cultivation, inference is named either for that which analogically knows [the *tathatā* of objects in the three time-periods] in the two upper realms through knowing the *tathatā* of objects in the three time-periods in the realm of desire, or for that which analogically knows [the *tathatā* of objects] in the past and the future through knowing the *tathatā* of objects in the present in all three realms.

(3) At the completion of cultivation, inference refers to analogically knowing the *tathatā* of all objects in the three realms and the three time-periods, which has not been realized by others, through one's own knowledge of the *tathatā* of objects in the three realms and the three time-periods.

[Question:] For what reason is the cessation of cultivation not included [in the Mahāyāna exposition of inference]? [Answer:] It is because there is no inference at the stage of awakening. However, according to the *sūtra*s, inference is also called "analogy" (*upamā*, *piyu liang* 譬喻量). Generally speaking, both are the same. On further analysis, however, inference is named for inferring analogically between members of the same species, while analogy is named for inferring analogically between members of different species.

言教量者，有法玄絕，自力不知，藉教以通，名為教量。於中分別，
亦有二種：一者知事，二者知理。於世諦中，藉教知者，名為知事。
二諦理中，藉教知者，名為知理。此之教量法中亦名信言量也。通
釋是一，於中分別，法隣自分，藉言入者，名信言量。法大玄絕，
依教知者，名為教量。有人就此分量為四：現量為一，比量為二，
教量為三，信言為四。此亦無傷，但非經論名義如是。

Regarding teaching (*āgama*) as a means of valid cognition, this refers to those teachings by which one knows profound *dharma*s that it would be beyond one's capacity to learn on one's own. It can be further analyzed into two forms: (1) knowing the particular/thing (*shi*) and (2) knowing the universal/principle (*li*). The knowledge of the particular/thing refers to the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) which is attained through teachings. The knowledge of universal/principle refers to those universals/principles of the Two Truths which are attained through teachings.

Teachings in this sense are also called "verbal testimony" (*xinyan liang* 信言量). Generally speaking, these two are the same. If we analyze more precisely, "verbal testimony" refers to those words by which one is led to apprehend *dharma*s that are close to one's own [knowledge], while "authoritative teaching" refers to that by which one is led to know profound and unfathomable *dharma*s. Accordingly, some classify means of valid cognition into four types: (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) autho-

ritative teaching and (4) testimony. Although this classification does no harm, it is not the way the scriptures and treatises define things.

次辨其相　　*2　Analysis of characteristics*

現量可知，比量有三：一、同類相比。相似之法，以此比餘。如《百論》中，義別有三：一者如殘，如人海中取一滴水，嘗之知鹹，則知餘者一切皆鹹。亦如有人於一法中見苦、無常、空、無我等，知餘皆爾，如是一切。二者如本，如人先曾見火有煙，後見餘煙，必知有火。亦如有人曾見諸法無常故苦，後見法苦，必知無常。如是一切。三共相比知，如似人見從東至西人有行動，類天上日從東至西，當知亦動²³。亦如有人見色生滅，色性無常，後見其餘想受行等，有生滅故，性亦無常。如是一切。此三合為同類比也。二、以劣比勝，如國無金，用鍮比之。亦如經中以世虛空不生不滅比況佛性。如是一切。三、以勝比劣，如國無鍮，將金比之。亦如經中以大涅槃非有非無，譬王殺罪。如是一切。此後兩門通釋，亦是共相比也，少分同故，比量如是。

First, perception, which requires no further analysis.

Second, inference is of three types:

(1) Analogy from the same species. That is, by knowing one example in a category of similar objects, one analogically knows the remaining objects. As is pointed out in *The Treatise in One Hundred Verses* (**Śata-śāstra*, *Bai lun* 百論), there are three such modes of inference:²⁴

i)   The first mode is called "inference from part to whole" (**śeṣavat*, *rucan* 如殘).²⁵ For instance, someone infers the saltiness of the water of the entire ocean by tasting the saltiness of a single drop. For another instance, someone infers that all objects are characterized by suffering, impermanence, emptiness and non-self by cognizing [these same characteristics] in one object.

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²³ This form of analogical reasoning is found in Vaiśeṣika. Cf., Takemura 1986: 7.

²⁴ Huiyuan misidentified the textual source. The correct source is seen in Kumārajīva's translation of *The Middle Treatise* (*Zhong lun*), T30:1564.24b.

²⁵ Cf. Schuster, 1972.

ii) The second mode is called "inference from effect to cause" (*pūrvavat, *ruben* 如本). For instance, when someone sees the smoke that comes from a fire, he knows that there must be fire whenever there is smoke, and so on for all objects. For another instance, when someone knows that all objects are characterized by suffering because they are impermanent, he comes to know that a certain object must be impermanent when he sees that the same object is characterized by suffering, and so on for all objects.

iii) The third mode is called "inference from common relation" (*sāmānyatodṛṣta, *gongxiang bizhi* 共相比知). For instance, someone observes a man moving from the east to the west. He then analogically infers (*lei* 類) that the sun must also move, because he has also observed the sun shift its position in the sky from the east to the west. For another instance, someone observes the impermanence of material form (*rūpa*) by observing the production and destruction of the [same] material form. He then infers the impermanence of conception, feeling, volition, etc. through observing the production and destruction of these same elements; and similarly for all cases.

The above three modes are named "analogy from the same species".

(2) The second mode of inference is called "giving an example of lower quality for other cases of higher quality". For instance, one uses copper as an analogy for those who have never seen gold. Another instance is that in the scriptures the Buddha-nature is made known by using the analogy of the non-production and non-destruction of space; and similarly for all cases.

(3) The third mode of inference is called "giving an example of higher quality for other cases of lower quality". For instance, one uses gold as an example for those who have never seen copper. Another example is that in the scriptures, the fact that supreme *nirvāṇa* neither exists nor does not exist is taken as a case similar to the case of a king being sentenced to death ; and similarly for all cases.

The last two modes of analogy are also subsumed under the general category of "analogy between two parties", for both parties share a common feature. Thus is explained the inference.

次辨教量，義別有三：一、異時法，藉教以知，如過未法不現見故，因說方知。二、異處法，藉教以知，如他方事不現見故，因說乃知。三者、同時同處之法，藉教以知，如說身中如來性等。教量如是。此教量中所知不定，或深勝法，藉教方知，如彼佛性涅槃道等。或中間法，藉教方知，如苦集等。或麁淺法，藉教方知，如世間中難識事等(此二門竟)。

Third, the teaching as a means of cognition can be analyzed into three types:

(1) Objects in another time can be known through teaching. For instance, the objects of the past and the future can be known only through teaching, because they are not directly perceived.

(2) Objects in another place can be known through teaching. For instance, objects in another place can be known only through hearsay, because they are not directly perceived.

(3) For that which exists in the same time and the same place, teachings can also be required for cognition, such as when it is explained that the nature of the Tathāgata [exists] in the body.

Thus is explained the teaching as a means of cognition.

That which is known by the teaching as the means of cognition varies in nature. Some profound *dharma*s can only be known through the teaching, such as Buddha-nature, *nirvāṇa*, the path, etc.[26] Some *dharma*s of middling quality, such as suffering, the causes of suffering, etc., can [also] be known only through the teaching. Some superficial and coarse *dharma*s, such as points in the mundane world that can be known only with difficulty, can [also] be known only through teaching.

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[26] "Indeterminate" (*buding* 不定) means "not determined in time and place".

次就位別　*3　Analysis* [*of* Pramāṇa] *in terms of the rank of cultivation*

位謂習種、性種、解行、十地、佛地。於此位中，辨義有三。一、
開始合終，習種為一，性種為二，解行已上合為第三，同觀如故。
於此門中，或以三位共望一法以辨三量。所謂望於解行已上所觀之
法，習種望彼，是其教量。在彼玄絕，藉教知故。性種望彼，是其
比量。位分相鄰，可比知故。解行已上，望自所得，是其現量，現
證知故。或以一位別望三法以辨三量。習種還望自所證法是其現量，
現證知故。望性種地所證之法是其比量，位分相鄰，可比知故。望
解行上所證之法是其教量，法玄絕故。向前門中教淺現深，於此門
中現淺教深。或以三位別望三法。向前三位自望所得皆是現量，是
則現量是通深淺。

"Rank" refers to [the rank of cultivation attained by]: (1) the *gotra*
formed by learning (*xizhong* 習種, *samudānītaṃ gotram*); (2) the *gotra*
formed by nature (*xingzhong* 性種, *prakṛtisthaṃ gotram*); (3) determinate
comprehension [of the trans-mundane path] (*jiexing* 解行, *adhimukti-
caryā*); (4) the ten stages (*bhūmi*); and (5) the stage of Buddhahood. There
are three ways of analyzing the meaning [of *pramāṇa*] in terms of rank-
ing.

First, the five ranks can be re-arranged into three. The rank of the
gotra formed by learning and the rank of the *gotra* formed by nature
remain unchanged, while Ranks 3, 4 and 5 are combined as one, for all of
the [last] three take *tathatā* as the object of contemplation. According to
this mode of ranking, on one interpretation, the three *pramāṇa*s can be
explained with reference to an object [of contemplation] common to [all]
three ranks [Ranks 1, 2 and 3-5 respectively]. That is to say, from the
perspective of the *gotra* formed by learning [Rank 1], the object of con-
templation in Ranks 3-5 is taken as [the object known through] the
teaching as a means of cognition, because it is so profound that it can be
apprehended only through teaching; from the perspective of the *gotra*
formed by nature [Rank 2], the object of contemplation in Ranks 3-5 is
taken as the [object known through the] inference as a means of cog-
nition, because that rank is close to the next rank and can know it by
inference; [whereas] from the perspective of determinate comprehen-
sion and beyond [Ranks 3-5], their own object of contemplation is taken

as the [object perceived by] perception as a means of cognition, because it is directly perceived.

On an alternate interpretation, the three *pramāṇa*s can be explained with reference to viewing separately three [different] objects [of contemplation] from the perspective of a single [given] rank. That is to say, the *gotra* formed by learning reflectively views by perception the object which it directly perceives itself, because it is directly perceived; [the same *gotra*] views by inference the object perceived by the *gotra* formed by nature, because the ranks are close to each other, and [that object] therefore can be known by analogical inference; [the same *gotra*] views by means of the teaching the object perceived by determinate comprehension and beyond [i.e., Ranks 3-5], for the object is profound and unfathomable. [Similarly], as the stage of cultivation advances, the teaching becomes shallower, while perception deepens;[27] however, in this stage, perception is [yet] shallow, while the teaching is deep.

On yet another interpretation, [the three *pramāṇa*s can be explained with reference to] separately viewing three objects of contemplation from the perspective of the three [re-arranged] ranks of cultivation. From the perspective of the advanced three ranks, [the object attained at each stage itself respectively] is [known by] perception. Accordingly, perception [in the three ranks] is common to all ranks of cultivation, whether shallow or profound.

二、開中間以合初後。如《地持》說，習種性種，合之為一，種子同故。解行為二，初地已上合為第三，同證如故。於此門中亦得三位共望一法，望初地上所證之法，種性位中是其教量，解行比量，地上現量。亦得一位別望三法，亦得三位別望三法。類上可知。

In the second analysis, the first two ranks and the last two ranks are combined as one respectively, while the middle is left unchanged. As is mentioned in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (T30:1581.888a), the rank of the *gotra* formed by learning and the rank of the *gotra* formed by nature are combined as one [rank], because they are equally rooted in seeds. [According to this re-arrangement,] *adhimukti-caryā* is the second rank. The

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[27] That is to say, the portion of knowledge as a whole attained by direct perception grows ever larger, while the portion attained through the teaching dwindles.

first *bhūmi* and beyond are combined as the third rank, because they all perceive *tathatā*. According to this mode of analysis, also, the same object of contemplation can be viewed from the [perspective of all] three ranks; from the perspective of the rank of the *gotra*s, the object perceived in the first *bhūmi* and beyond is [known] by the teaching as the means of cognition; from the perspective of the rank of *adhimukti-caryā*, [it is known] by inference as the means of cognition; and from the perspective of the rank of the *bhūmi*s, it is [known] by perception as the means of cognition. As explained in the above analysis, the objects of the three ranks can also be viewed from the perspective of each particular rank respectively; or the three objects [of contemplation] can be viewed from the perspective of each of the three stages of cultivation respectively.

三、合始開終。種性解行,合之為一,信地同故。十地為二,佛地為三。於此門中亦得三位共望一法,望佛所證,地前名教,相去玄絕,信教知故;地上名比,以自所得,上比佛故;佛地名現,現證性故,亦得一位別望三法,地前還望地前之法是其現量,望地上法是其比量,望佛所得是其教量,以玄絕故。亦得三位別望三法,皆是現量,同現見故。三量如是。

In the third analysis, the first [three ranks] are grouped as one, while the last [two] are left unchanged. The ranks of the *gotra* and the rank of *adhimukti-caryā* are combined as one, because they belong alike to the stage of faith; the ten stages belong to the second [rank]; and the stage of Buddhahood to the third [rank]. According to this mode of analysis, also, the same object of contemplation can be viewed differently from the perspective of each of the three ranks. From the viewpoint of the preparatory rank [i.e., the rank prior to the ten stages], at the rank before the [ten] stages, the realization at the stage of Buddhahood is termed "teaching", because it is so profound and unfathomable that it can only be known through faith in the teaching. At the rank of the [ten] *bhūmi*s, what is realized by the Buddha is termed "inference", for it is analogically known through what is realized [in the *bhūmi*s]. At the rank of Buddhahood, [what is realized by the Buddha] is named "perception", because the nature [of *dharma*s] (*dharmatā*) is directly realized. The object of contemplation in each of the three ranks can be also viewed from the viewpoint of each particular rank. From the viewpoint of the

rank prior to the ten stages, the object of cognition in that same rank is [known by] perception as a means of cognition, the object of cognition in the rank of ten *bhūmi*s is [known by] inference as a means of cognition, and the object of cognition in the rank of Buddhahood is [known by] the teaching as a means of cognition, because it is so profound and unfathomable. Also, the objects of cognition in the three ranks can be viewed separately from the viewpoint of each of the three ranks as [known by] perception as a cognitive means, because they are all directly cognized. Thus are explained the three means of cognition.

Abbreviations

DSYZ   *Dasheng yizhang* (大乘義章) T1851
MMK   *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*
NMukh   *Nyāyamukha*
PS   *Pramāṇasamuccaya*
SLZY   *Sanliang zhiyi* (三量智義) T44:1851.670c-672a

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