



**EFFECTS OF MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ON THE  
ADOPTION OF SAME-SEX PARTNER HEALTH BENEFITS BY  
CORPORATIONS**

Journal:	<i>Journal of Management</i>
Manuscript ID	JOM-14-0814.R3
Manuscript Type:	Original Research
Keywords:	Event History Analysis < RESEARCH METHODS, Institutional Theory (Sociology) < MACRO TOPICS, Diversity/Gender < MICRO TOPICS
Abstract:	<p>In this study, we draw upon a social movement perspective to examine how movements and institutional opportunity (political and cultural) influenced a Fortune 500 corporation's adoption of a controversial organizational practice – same-sex partner health benefits. Our results show, while a corporation's gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) employee resource group increased the rate of the corporation's benefits adoption, the effect of the GLBT employee resource group became weaker when the degree of resource concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations was high. Political opportunity derived from state legal environments and cultural opportunity derived from the tenor of moral legitimacy in leading national press coverage had little influence on the rate of benefits adoption. Further, the influence of a GLBT employee resource group on the rate of benefits adoption by its corporation became weaker when cultural opportunity, derived from increases in positive tenor of pragmatic legitimacy discourse used by movement and countermovement organizations in the press, was present. Accordingly, our study shows the complicated effects of movements within and outside corporations and cultural opportunity on the adoption of a controversial practice and reveals the importance of mobilizing structure (both internal and external movements) and cultural opportunity in the adoption.</p>

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

1

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50

**EFFECTS OF MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ON THE ADOPTION OF SAME-SEX PARTNER HEALTH BENEFITS BY CORPORATIONS**

You-Ta Chuang  
York University

Robin Church  
Ryerson University

Changya Hu  
National Chengchi University

51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

**Acknowledgements:** We are grateful to Kristina Dahlin, Tim Pollock, and Jung-Chin Shen for their comments on earlier drafts, and to Zoe Chan, Hoi-Yee Ding, Alex Edwards, Glory Keong, Mathulan Moorthy, and Ron Ophir for their data coding assistance.

**Corresponding author:** You-Ta Chuang, School of Administrative Studies, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M3J 1P3

**Email:** ychuang@yorku.ca

**ABSTRACT**

In this study, we draw upon a social movement perspective to examine how movements and institutional opportunity (political and cultural) influenced a *Fortune 500* corporation's adoption of a controversial organizational practice – same-sex partner health benefits. Our results show, while a corporation's gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) employee resource group increased the rate of the corporation's benefits adoption, the effect of the GLBT employee resource group became weaker when the degree of resource concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations was high. Political opportunity derived from state legal environments and cultural opportunity derived from the tenor of moral legitimacy in leading national press coverage had little influence on the rate of benefits adoption. Further, the influence of a GLBT employee resource group on the rate of benefits adoption by its corporation became weaker when cultural opportunity, derived from increases in positive tenor of pragmatic legitimacy discourse used by movement and countermovement organizations in the press, was present. Accordingly, our study shows the complicated effects of movements within and outside corporations and cultural opportunity on the adoption of a controversial practice and reveals the importance of mobilizing structure (both internal and external movements) and cultural opportunity in the adoption.

**Keywords:** social movements; same-sex partner health benefits; institutional opportunity; quantitative methods

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

**EFFECTS OF MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ON THE ADOPTION OF SAME-SEX PARTNER HEALTH BENEFITS BY CORPORATIONS**

In 1994 Alice McKeage and Rob Matras, employees at Ford in Dearborn, Michigan, risked their jobs and reputations and outed themselves to their employer, insisting that their status as GLBT people was as worthy of Ford's recognition as other specialized employee groups. A year later, GLOBE, a gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender employee resource group (GLBT ERG), was launched. Ten years later, Alice McKeage while receiving an award for her contributions to the GLBT community, said "One of the things that I'm thinking about right now is the 21-year-old back in 1969 who lost her family and her friends when they found out she was a lesbian. I'm exceedingly grateful and proud to be a member of this community. Thank you all so much." While introducing himself after her award, Ford Vice Chairman Allan Gilmour said, "I'm Allan Gilmour and I would like to introduce myself as a colleague of Alice." Gilmour told Alice regarding Ford, "You have made it a better place for many, many people." (Witkowski, 2004)

Since its launch, GLOBE has not only advocated GLBT employee issues for Ford employees but also participated in and sponsored national and local networking events organized by GLBT organizations such as Out at Work (or Not), a Chicago-based organization. Out at Work (or Not) regularly coordinated with other GLBT organizations to organize GLBT workplace workshops and summits in which they brought human resources professionals and GLBT employees together to discuss GLBT workplace issues. Out at Work (or Not) also allowed GLBT employees in organizations to use its resources (e.g., hotlines, newsletters) to recruit other employees to their GLBT employee groups (either formal or informal). It published newsletters to provide information on GLBT employee activities in organizations as well as networking and conference opportunities. Other advocacy organizations such as Human Rights Campaign, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and Out & Equal advocated for workplace equality in media and published

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

4

1  
2  
3 manuals/guidelines to help GLBT employees to establish ERGs. These events and activities not  
4  
5 only highlight GLBT workplace movement activities but also point to ways in which GLBT  
6  
7 workplace movements organized to mobilize for change. Yet, what changes have GLBT ERGs,  
8  
9 GLBT advocacy organizations, and collaboration between GLBT employees and GLBT advocacy  
10  
11 organizations made to organizations? More broadly, how do movements internal and external to  
12  
13 organizations lead to changes in organizational behavior?  
14  
15

16  
17 How social movements influence organizational behavior has recently begun to attract  
18  
19 considerable attention in organization studies. While prior organization studies have advanced our  
20  
21 understanding of the relationship between social movements and organizational behavior, important  
22  
23 limitations remain. Specifically, prior organization studies have focused primarily on the effect the  
24  
25 amount of movement resources had on organizations (e.g., King & Soule, 2007; Hiatt, Sine &  
26  
27 Tolbert, 2009). In so doing, the studies have implicitly assumed away the importance of mobilizing  
28  
29 structure in affecting movement outcomes. While movement resources are critical, the way  
30  
31 movements mobilize resources and coordinate activity are also important because having resources  
32  
33 do not necessarily lead to movement success (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007; McAdam, McCarthy &  
34  
35 Zald, 1996; Tilly, 1999). Specifically, mobilizing structure - organizational mechanisms, formal or  
36  
37 informal, through which activists coordinate activity to acquire and mobilize resources to engage in  
38  
39 collective action (McAdam et al., 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) – influence the capacity of  
40  
41 movement activists to overcome challenges associated with recruitment, resource access, and  
42  
43 mobilization to affect movement processes and outcomes (e.g., Ganz, 2000; Tilly, 1999). To  
44  
45 examine the effect of mobilizing structure on movement outcomes when the targets are  
46  
47 organizational practices shall advance our understanding of how movements influence  
48  
49 organizational behavior.  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55

56  
57 Furthermore, prior studies have emphasized only the effects of movements either internal or  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

external to organizations on organizational behavior. For example, some scholars showed that organizational behavior is influenced by employee mobilization efforts (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007; Kellogg, 2009, 2012; Lounsbury, 2001; Raeburn, 2004; Scully & Creed, 2005). Other scholars documented that changes in organizational behavior are influenced by activists in organizational fields that mobilize resources and employ various tactics to change institutional environments (Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine & Lee, 2009; Wijk, Stam, Elfring, Zietsma, & de Hond, 2013) and influence organizational practices (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010; McDonnell & King, 2013; Raeburn, 2004; Weber, Rao, & Thomas, 2009). But, organizations can face similar movement challenges from within and outside the organizations simultaneously. In examining either internal or external movements separately, their effects have been implicitly assumed to be independent of, or isolated from, each other. Yet, movement mobilization within organizations may be enhanced/facilitated by effective movement activity outside the organizations (Raeburn, 2004; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Soule, 2009). More importantly, if effective mobilization by external movements has potential to alter the perception of decision makers in targeted organizations on movement demands and to assist internal movements to attain their goals by helping to them overcome mobilization challenges, it is then theoretically valuable to explore how the relationship between mobilizing structure of internal movements and their goal attainment can be moderated by mobilizing structure of external movements.

Finally, the contingent factors that influence the effects of internal movements on organizational practices have not yet been fully explored. Though Kim and his colleagues (2007), King (2008), and Weber et al. (2009) explored how political opportunities within organizations helped activists mobilize resources to achieve their goals, there are opportunities outside organizations that may serve similar purposes (Soule 2009). Particularly, organizations manage their resource stability and survival by aligning their structures and practices with the institutional

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

6

1  
2  
3 environments' regulative systems, normative values, and cultural-cognitive beliefs (Meyer &  
4  
5 Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001). Changes in institutional environments are likely to facilitate or hinder  
6  
7 movement mobilization and affect organizations' incentives to concede to movement demands  
8  
9 (Raeburn, 2004; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence from  
10  
11 prior studies as to how opportunities in institutional environments shape the influence of internal  
12  
13 movements on organizational practices.  
14  
15

16  
17 To address these limitations, we investigate the role that internal movements in an  
18  
19 organization play in pressing the organization to adopt a controversial organizational practice and  
20  
21 how external movements enhance/facilitate the effect of internal movements on the organization's  
22  
23 likelihood of adopting the practice. We further examine how institutional opportunity derived from  
24  
25 changes in institutional environments moderates the effect of internal movements on the likelihood  
26  
27 of adopting the practice. We define movements as collective attempts by a number of actors to  
28  
29 challenge elements of institutional practices, justice, and resource distribution (McCarthy & Zald,  
30  
31 1977; Zald & Berger, 1978). Institutional opportunity refers to conditions derived from changes in  
32  
33 institutional environments that have potential to aid mobilization of internal movements (cf.  
34  
35 Raeburn, 2004). We examine two forms of institutional opportunity: political and cultural. Political  
36  
37 opportunity stems from changes in the regulative dimension of the institutional environment that  
38  
39 endorse the acceptance of a new practice by powerful actors, such as the state (cf., Meyer &  
40  
41 Minkoff, 2004). Cultural opportunity emerges from shifts in the cultural-cognitive dimension of the  
42  
43 institutional environment that endorse legitimacy of a new practice. The practice examined here is  
44  
45 the provision of same-sex partner health benefits in employee benefit packages – an important goal  
46  
47 in the GLBT workplace movements. Same-sex partner health benefits were a manifestation of the  
48  
49 emerging institution of equal treatment for GLBT employees and were in direct conflict with the  
50  
51 prevailing institution of workplace heterosexism (Chuang, Church, & Ophir, 2011; Ragins &  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

Cornwell, 2001). Prior case studies have described both GLBT employee activists and GLBT advocacy organizations as playing important roles in promoting GLBT equality in the workplace (e.g., Creed & Scully, 2000; Raeburn, 2004). This setting provides an opportunity to examine the effects of internal and external movements and institutional opportunity on the adoption of controversial practices.

Our analysis of the adoption of same-sex partner health benefits by Fortune 500 corporations reveals that mobilizing structures of internal GLBT employee activists and GLBT advocacy organizations, as well as institutional opportunity, exerted complex influences on a corporation's likelihood to adopt these benefits. Our results show that mobilizing structures of both the internal and external GLBT movements, specifically the presence of a GLBT ERG and resource concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations, mattered to the adoption of same-sex partner health benefits. Furthermore, contrary to our predictions, our analysis reveals that resource concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations and institutional opportunity decreased the difference in the rates of benefits adoption between corporations with and without GLBT ERGs. Having an internal mobilizing structure helps to reduce internal barriers to goal attainment of internal movements. Mobilization efforts of external movements and institutional opportunity both have potential to reduce internal barriers by increasing internal support and decreasing management's resistance to concede to movement demands. As such, the effect of internal mobilizing structure and that of external movements and institutional opportunity on movement outcomes may substitute each other. To that end, our analysis speaks to the importance of examining the contingent factors that influence the effect of internal movements on the adoption of organizational practices. More broadly, our study sheds light on the interactive influences of internal and external movements and institutional opportunity on organizational behavior.

**THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**



## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

8

1  
2  
3 From a social movement perspective, changes in organizational practices may result from  
4 resource mobilization by movement participants inside and outside organizations (Edwards &  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

From a social movement perspective, changes in organizational practices may result from resource mobilization by movement participants inside and outside organizations (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Soule, 2009; Zald & Berger, 1978). Movement participants invest time, effort, and resources to increase resource availability for collection action to press for such changes. The greater the resource availability for movements, the greater the potential the movements have to attain their goals. Yet, mobilizing structure movement participants have can greatly affect resource acquisition and mobilization. Hence, the effectiveness of resource mobilization stems from not only resource availability but also mobilizing structure (either formal or informal organizational mechanisms) that helps to overcome movement challenges (Ganz, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1999). Movement participants internal and external to organizations face similar challenges associated with resource acquisition and coordination of their activities; however, the key challenges they face may differ (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & Berger, 1978). For internal movements, employee's incentives to participate in movement activity can be driven by self-interested calculation of risks and benefits (Olson, 1965). Because of the power organizations have over their employees, such incentives can be affected by their fear of repercussions for movement participation. These in turn create challenges associated with recruitment and coordination of participant involvement. For external movements, when there is more than one movement organization, the organizations may have difficulties cooperating and coordinating their activities due to different preferences for movement processes and goals (McAdam, 1982) and calculation of risks and benefits (Olson, 1965). Thereby, movements internal and external to organizations may require different mobilizing structures to address their respective challenges and difficulties in order to enhance the effectiveness of resource mobilization.

While resource mobilization by movement participants influence movement outcomes greatly (e.g., Hiatt et al., 2009; Ingram & Rao, 2004; Ingram et al., 2010; McCarthy & Zald, 1977),

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

1  
2  
3 opportunity emerged from changes in political systems can help movements to alter elites' ability  
4  
5 and willingness to repress movements, decrease barriers and costs of mobilization, and increase the  
6  
7 chance of movement success (Eisinger, 1973; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; cf. Tilly, 1978). For  
8  
9 instance, Kim and his colleagues (Kim et al., 2007) documented that Korean universities were more  
10  
11 likely to switch to a direct voting system for presidential selection because weaker power of  
12  
13 governance in those universities provided opportunities for change. King (2008) examined the  
14  
15 political opportunity in the context of corporations' responses to boycotters' demands and found  
16  
17 that a corporation was more likely to concede to demands when it suffered a decline in reputation.  
18  
19 Weber and his colleagues (Weber et al., 2009) showed how anti-biotech movement activists  
20  
21 affected commercialization decisions of pharmaceutical firms by taking advantage of political  
22  
23 opportunity inside the firms. These studies show the emergence of internal political opportunity  
24  
25 exerted great influence on the relationship between movements and movement outcomes.  
26  
27  
28  
29

30  
31 Because opportunity can be derived from favorable changes in the environments of  
32  
33 organizations, internal forms of opportunity are not the only ones that can shape movement  
34  
35 processes and outcomes when the organizations are movement targets (Soule, 2009). Raeburn  
36  
37 (2004) described changes in state laws, other organizations' experiences, and values of diversity  
38  
39 promoted by human resource professionals as institutional opportunities to aid GLBT workplace  
40  
41 movement mobilization. Indeed, institutional theorists have long contended that regulative,  
42  
43 normative, and cultural-cognitive elements in the institutional environments in which organizations  
44  
45 are embedded govern their behavior and affect their resource stability (Scott, 2001). Changes in  
46  
47 these elements may influence organizations' incentives to adopt new practices (Chuang et al., 2011;  
48  
49 Raeburn, 2004). These changes can create favorable conditions for internal movement participants  
50  
51 to advocate for adoption of new practices by facilitating movement mobilization and reducing  
52  
53 management's resistance to such adoption. Thereby, institutional opportunity may moderate the  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

10

effect of internal movement mobilization on an organization's decision to adopt a new practice.

**MOVEMENTS IN CONTEXT: GAY AND LESBIAN EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE<sup>1</sup>**

The issue of sexual orientation has been regarded as one of the final frontier civil rights movements in the United States (Walters, 1994). Gay and lesbian employees have been marginalized or disadvantaged by the institution of workplace heterosexism, which refers to taken-for-granted behaviors and policies that discriminate against sexual minorities in the workplace (Chuang et al., 2011; cf. Herek, 1990; Ragins & Cornwell, 2001). Any organizational practice supporting the institution of equal treatment for gay and lesbian employees defies the institution of workplace heterosexism. While there are many policies manifesting workplace heterosexism (Raeburn, 2004; Ragins & Cornwell, 2001), our focus is one specific practice – same-sex partner health benefits. Such benefits were particularly salient and controversial because they recognized the identities of gay and lesbian employees and their committed long-term relationships. The benefits spurred considerable public debate in the 1990s.

The first employer to offer health benefits to gay and lesbian employees' partners was the Village Voice in 1982. Levis Strauss and Silicon Graphic Inc. were the first Fortune 500 corporations to offer same-sex partner health benefits in 1992. In 1993, five other Fortune 500 corporations, Microsoft, Oracle, Apple Computer, Harvey-Davidson, and Starbucks, followed suit. The numbers grew slowly over the next few years, and then grew rapidly (see Figure 1).

-----

Insert Figure 1 about here

-----

Both GLBT movements within corporations and in organizational fields sought equal treatment for GLBT employees. Gay and lesbian employee activists within corporations developed slogans such as "Out and Equal!" and "Out and Proud!" to enhance their identity and advocate for

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

11

1  
2  
3 their goals. Gay and lesbian employee activists pressed for the adoption of same-sex partner health  
4  
5 benefits on the basis of equal treatment. They argued that these benefits were a matter of equal pay  
6  
7 for equal work since benefits comprised a significant portion of compensation (Adams & Solomon,  
8  
9 2000). In some corporations, GLBT employee activists established employee resource groups  
10  
11 (ERGs) to better mobilize resources. GLBT ERGs serve many purposes for GLBT employees  
12  
13 including social gathering, legitimizing the group's identity, and seeking institutional resources and  
14  
15 recognition to reduce heterosexism. Notably, many ERGs provided confidential memberships to  
16  
17 those who had not disclosed their sexual orientations at work to help membership recruitment. To  
18  
19 enhance group identity, most ERGs developed names for their groups, such as HP Pride (Hewlett-  
20  
21 Packard), and Equal! (Lucent Technology). Some ERGs included the objective of the creation of  
22  
23 GLBT-friendly policies in the workplace in their charters. They also looked to ally with supportive  
24  
25 managers and to acquire executive sponsorships to legitimize their existence and to influence  
26  
27 corporate policies. Figure 1 shows the number of Fortune 500 corporations with ERGs and the  
28  
29 number of those corporations that started offering same-sex partner health benefits after the  
30  
31 founding of their ERGs.  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38  
39 There are a variety of local and national GLBT advocacy organizations (e.g., Human Rights  
40  
41 Campaign, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation,  
42  
43 and Equality Forum) that advocate for gay and lesbian equality. Part of this advocacy is directed  
44  
45 specifically at the workplace. GLBT advocacy organizations advocated that corporate policies were  
46  
47 essential to equality and that policies supportive of equality for GLBT persons could help  
48  
49 corporations increase productivity, enhance employee recruitment and retention, and expand  
50  
51 markets (Raeburn, 2004). Further, GLBT advocacy organizations worked directly with GLBT  
52  
53 employee activists to help them promote equality and establish ERGs in their corporations and  
54  
55 advocated the importance of such equality in achieving corporations' goals via their campaigns and  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

12

1  
2  
3 publications. GLBT advocacy organizations also organized workplace conferences and workshops  
4  
5 (e.g., Out & Equal's Annual Workplace Summit) in which they brought activists and allies together  
6  
7 to facilitate strategy development and exchange of experiences. GLBT employee activists – either  
8  
9 individually or as representatives of their respective GLBT ERGs – also attended the conferences  
10  
11 and workshops to acquire information and experience of GLBT employee activists in other  
12  
13 organizations on how to change their corporations (Creed & Scully, 2000; Raeburn, 2004).  
14  
15

16  
17 The gay and lesbian movement advocating for the institution of equal treatment in the  
18  
19 workplace has faced stiff opposition from anti-gay activists and religious conservatives contending  
20  
21 that same-sex partner health benefits represented a “special right” and attacked “family values”. For  
22  
23 example, to protest Apple’s adoption of same-sex partner health benefits, anti-gay activists in Texas  
24  
25 advocated against Apple’s proposed plant in Texas arguing that “One Apple today, takes family  
26  
27 values away!” The Southern Baptist Convention organized a boycott of Disney in 1996 accusing it  
28  
29 of abandoning its “family values” foundation when it decided to offer the benefits.  
30  
31  
32

**Movements Internal to Organizations**

33  
34  
35  
36 When organizational practices conflict with the interests of individuals in organizations, the  
37  
38 individuals may mobilize resources to challenge the practices (Zald & Berger, 1978). Awareness of  
39  
40 the conflict and motivation to engage in mobilization are driven, in part, by self-interested  
41  
42 calculation and mobilization activities of others (either within or outside organizations). When  
43  
44 movements take place within organizations, participants work together as organized collective  
45  
46 entities that voice grievance and try to change the organizations’ practices, whether or not the  
47  
48 participants end up successful, expelled or co-opted (Zald & Berger, 1978). Movement participants  
49  
50 risk punishment when they challenge those who occupy higher positions in their organizations  
51  
52 (Scully & Creed, 2005; Scully & Segal, 2002; Zald & Berger, 1978). They often try to form  
53  
54 coalitions with supportive managers to increase their access to institutional channels to attempt to  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

1  
2  
3 influence resource allocation and decision making processes (Zald & Berger, 1978). However, it  
4  
5 might be challenging for movement participants to form such coalitions due to their marginalized or  
6  
7 institutionally disadvantaged positions within organizations and legitimacy of their claims.  
8  
9

10 Prior studies have suggested that mobilizing structure plays an important role in generating  
11  
12 and mobilizing the resources necessary to engage in conflict to influence movement outcomes  
13  
14 (McAdam, et al., 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). A structure that strengthens recruitment of  
15  
16 participants, reduces challenges associated with coordination, and enhances involvement of  
17  
18 participants and allies can facilitate resource generation and mobilization, thereby increasing the  
19  
20 chance of movement success (Jenkins, 1983). To that end, movement participants with such a  
21  
22 structure may have several advantages over the atomistic masses, including administrative  
23  
24 efficiency, recruitment, and generation of movement tactics (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). For  
25  
26 example, Kim and his colleagues (2007) reported that when faculty councils existed within Korean  
27  
28 universities, they exerted great influence over change in the president selection systems in their  
29  
30 universities. The councils provided avenues that professors could use to have greater collective  
31  
32 bargaining power and voice grievances about the system. Hence, movement participants in an  
33  
34 organization with a structure that has potential to increase mobilization, compared to the ones  
35  
36 without a structure, will have a greater chance to achieve their movement goals.  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43 As for gay and lesbian movements in the workplace, we suggest that the presence of a  
44  
45 formal GLBT ERG within a corporation is a kind of mobilizing structure that can play a crucial role  
46  
47 in the adoption of the benefits by the corporation. Because gay men and lesbians are invisible  
48  
49 minorities, it was difficult for gay and lesbian employee activists to recruit others who were not  
50  
51 known to be gay or lesbian to participate in movement activity. Their stigmatized identity also  
52  
53 served as a roadblock for recruitment, forming coalitions with allies, and resource access in  
54  
55 corporations (Raeburn 2004). Difficulties in recruitment, coalition formation, and resource access  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

14

1  
2  
3 might create challenges associated with coordinating activity and mobilizing resources to attain  
4  
5 movement goals. To overcome such challenges, GLBT employee activists in some corporations  
6  
7 sought legitimacy of their identity and equal treatment in the workplace by pressing their  
8  
9 management to support the establishment of GLBT ERGs. Management support for creating formal  
10  
11 GLBT ERGs was driven, in part, by GLBT employee activists, external movement activity, and  
12  
13 evolving institutional environments towards GLBT equal treatment in the workplace (Raeburn,  
14  
15 2004; cf. Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014). The fact that a GLBT ERG exists could indicate  
16  
17 substantial management support for GLBT equality or be a symbolic response to evolving  
18  
19 institutional environments (Edelman, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Even if intended as only a  
20  
21 symbolic response by management, a formal GLBT ERG would still provide a structure that GLBT  
22  
23 employees could use to reduce some of the difficulties faced in recruitment and coordination as well  
24  
25 as resource mobilization. The creation of a formal GLBT ERG in a corporation was likely to lend a  
26  
27 certain degree of legitimacy to gay and lesbian identity in the corporation, which would help  
28  
29 recruitment through access to the corporation's communication channels (email and intranets) or  
30  
31 through tactical repertoires, such as workshops and social gatherings (Raeburn, 2004). This form of  
32  
33 mobilizing structure might have also served as a platform for GLBT employee activists and allies  
34  
35 from various positions in the corporation to share information and coordinate movement activity  
36  
37 and a channel for them to interact with other activists and allies outside the corporation. The  
38  
39 platform and channel, in turn, would help the employee activists develop strategies and mobilize  
40  
41 resources to fight for same-sex partner health benefits. Accordingly, we propose:

42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50 *Hypothesis 1: A corporation with a GLBT ERG, compared to ones without a GLBT ERG, will*  
51 *have a greater rate of same-sex partner health benefits adoption.*  
52

**Movements External to Organizations**

53  
54  
55  
56  
57 Movements external to organizations may help resource mobilization and goal attainment of  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

15

1  
2  
3 internal movements. Movements in organizational fields can shape institutional environments by  
4  
5 mobilizing resources to press for change in institutional arrangements (Hiatt et al., 2009; Ingram et  
6  
7 al., 2010; Raeburn, 2004). Changes in institutional arrangements have then potential to reduce  
8  
9 internal movement barriers to facilitate their goal attainment. Similar to internal movements,  
10  
11 however, effective mobilization of movements external to organizations is subject to mobilizing  
12  
13 structure the movements have. Particularly, when there is more than one movement organization  
14  
15 that pursues similar goals, movement organizations may face greater challenges associated with  
16  
17 cooperation and coordination due to their separated entities, differential availability of resources,  
18  
19 and a lack of formal organizational mechanisms among them (McAdam, 1982). These challenges  
20  
21 associated with cooperation and coordination can be derived from different preferences for  
22  
23 movement priorities and activities as well as resource allocation. The non-exclusive nature of  
24  
25 movement goals often generates an incentive for movement organizations to be free riders (Olson,  
26  
27 1965). Free-riding can hamper cooperation and coordination if movement organizations refuse to  
28  
29 contribute their resources to movement processes. To that end, the capacity of external movements  
30  
31 to mobilize resources is determined by the degree to which the movement organizations can  
32  
33 cooperate and coordinate activities (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). To realize mobilization potential  
34  
35 resulting from resource availability, a mobilizing structure that facilitates effective mobilization is  
36  
37 therefore required (McCarthy & Zald, 1973).

38  
39 We propose that, when there is more than one relevant movement organization, the resource  
40  
41 concentration of movement organizations is an important, informal aspect of mobilizing structure  
42  
43 that influences cooperation and coordination among movement organizations. When resources are  
44  
45 concentrated in a small number of movement organizations, the difficulties associated with  
46  
47 coordination and cooperation can decrease for two reasons. First, when resources are held by a  
48  
49 smaller number of organizations, the need for and effort required for cooperation and coordination  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

16

1  
2  
3 can be reduced. The smaller number of organizations with abundant resources is able to set  
4  
5 movement priorities and engage in activities without working with so many other organizations.  
6  
7 Second, free-riding becomes less of a concern when resource concentration is high. Free-riding  
8  
9 from organizations with fewer resources would have less impact on movement activities as they  
10  
11 have fewer resources to contribute to movement processes (cf. Olson, 1965). Hence, resource  
12  
13 concentration among movement organizations can affect mobilization efforts of these organizations,  
14  
15 which in turn may influence the relationship between internal movements and their goal attainment.  
16  
17

18  
19  
20 Turning to gay and lesbian movements in the workplace, prior research suggests that the  
21  
22 diffusion of same-sex partner health benefits was driven in part by the local environment of the  
23  
24 state in which a corporation was headquartered (Chuang et al., 2011). State legislative systems and  
25  
26 societal attitudes and values toward lesbians and gay men differed between states (e.g., Loftus,  
27  
28 2001). Mobilization tactics and strategies required to alter such systems, attitudes and values are  
29  
30 likely to be state-specific. Thus, it is possible that the local GLBT advocacy organizations played  
31  
32 important roles in promoting equal treatment within workplaces within their states (Raeburn, 2004).  
33  
34 In most states there was more than one local GLBT advocacy organization. Though local GLBT  
35  
36 advocacy organizations shared the same overall goal – GLBT equality – they were likely to engage  
37  
38 in different activities. These organizations would then be required to coordinate and cooperate to  
39  
40 advocate for GLBT equality and to help gay and lesbian employee activists alter organizational  
41  
42 arrangements within their corporations (Tilly, 1999). A mobilizing structure that could reduce  
43  
44 difficulties associated with coordination and cooperation was more likely to emerge when resources  
45  
46 held by the organizations were concentrated among few organizations. The resources held by these  
47  
48 few organizations could also help them to settle different preferences for resource allocation and to  
49  
50 prioritize movement goals and activities.  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55

56  
57 To that end, the degree of concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

17

1  
2  
3 in the state of a corporation's headquarters would influence GLBT employee movements in two  
4  
5 ways. First, a high degree of resource concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations helped  
6  
7 the advocacy organizations to prioritize movement agenda, make movement claims and challenge  
8  
9 the institutional arrangements manifesting the institution of heterosexism in the social environment  
10  
11 of the state (cf. Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine & Lee, 2009). Any reduction in heterosexism in the state  
12  
13 would, in turn, help decrease mobilization barriers within workplaces located in the state by altering  
14  
15 management's willingness to repress internal movement activity. Second, and more directly, a high  
16  
17 degree of concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources could lead to easier  
18  
19 organizing of local activities (such as conferences and workshops) because of fewer difficulties  
20  
21 associated with coordination and cooperation. Such activities could facilitate information exchange  
22  
23 between external movement activists and GLBT employees and allow the GLBT employees to  
24  
25 learn from the advocacy organizations, and develop more effective movement claims and tactics  
26  
27 that they could then use to challenge existing heterosexist arrangements in their workplaces.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32

33  
34 Importantly, prior case studies suggested that GLBT advocacy organizations helped GLBT  
35  
36 employees press for increased equality in the workplace by providing information, knowledge, and  
37  
38 resources (Creed & Scully, 2000; Scully & Segal, 2002; Raeburn, 2004). This suggests the degree  
39  
40 of resource concentration among local GLBT advocacy organizations may positively moderate the  
41  
42 effect of a corporation's GLBT ERG on the benefits adoption. If more concentrated resources  
43  
44 among local GLBT advocacy organizations reduced difficulties with coordination and cooperation  
45  
46 among themselves, they could have more positive impact on management's perception of GLBT  
47  
48 equality issues and more easily organize activities that would facilitate exchange of information and  
49  
50 experiences between external GLBT activists and GLBT employees. A GLBT ERG aids internal  
51  
52 mobilization by reducing internal movement barriers, better coordinating activity, and serving as a  
53  
54 channel for acquiring external information and experiences. Compared with corporations without  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

18

1  
2  
3 GLBT ERGs, GLBT employee activists in a corporation with a GLBT ERG might be able to more  
4  
5 effectively coordinate with GLBT advocacy organizations as the ERG serves as a channel to  
6  
7 acquire information and experiences through the activities provided by these organizations.  
8  
9 Together with the positive change in the management's perception, it might be easier for GLBT  
10  
11 employee activists with a GLBT ERG, compared to those without a GLBT ERG, to press the  
12  
13 management to offer the benefits to partners of GLBT employees. Thus,  
14  
15

16  
17 *Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of having a GLBT ERG in a corporation on the rate of*  
18 *benefits adoption will be greater when the concentration of local GLBT advocacy*  
19 *organizations' resources is high.*  
20  
21

**Opportunities in Organizational Fields**

22  
23  
24 Opportunities that can facilitate mobilization of internal movements and alter elites' willingness to  
25  
26 repress employee activists' activity can arise in the institutional environments. Specifically,  
27  
28 institutional opportunity emerges from changes in the regulative or legislative elements (political)  
29  
30 and cultural-cognitive elements (cultural) of institutional environments. These political and cultural  
31  
32 opportunities can help internal movements to mobilize, shape the perception of management, and  
33  
34 help goal attainment (Raeburn, 2004; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).  
35  
36  
37  
38

39  
40 **Political Opportunity.** The legislative elements of institutional environments where  
41  
42 organizations are embedded constitute a form of political opportunity structure that influences  
43  
44 movement mobilization. Favorable changes in the legislative elements may provide movement  
45  
46 activists with political opportunity by altering elites' or policy makers' perceptions of movement  
47  
48 demands (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). When a controversial practice is in  
49  
50 conflict with a prevailing institution, changes favorable to the practice in the legal environment can  
51  
52 signal the endorsement of the legal environment of the practice. Though the changes can be due in  
53  
54 part to mobilization efforts by activists in organizational fields (e.g., Hiatt et al., 2009; Ingram &  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

Rao, 2004; Sine & Lee, 2009), such changes do endorse a certain degree of regulatory and normative legitimacy of the practice (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 2001). The changes have potential to positively influence the attitudes of managers and other organizational elites' attitudes toward the practice – reducing their resistance to, or increasing their acceptance of, the practice (e.g., Oliver, 1992; Reid & Toffel, 2009). The changes serve as political opportunity for employee activists to better mobilize resources and press for the adoption of the practice. Thus, it is possible that political opportunity emerged from the institutional environment can positively moderate the effect of internal movements on movement outcomes.

In the context of GLBT employees, we propose that increases in the number of states with a law forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation are a form of political opportunity for GLBT employee activists, and GLBT ERGs in particular. Though these non-discrimination laws did not require corporations to provide benefits to partners of GLBT employees, the laws do, however, signal a change in the legal environment's recognition of the institution of equal treatment for GLBT employees (Chuang et al., 2011; Raeburn, 2004). The increases in the number of laws thus provided a political opportunity that GLBT employee activists can use in acquiring more support and in their advocacy for equal treatment by emphasizing that equal treatment should include same-sex partner health benefits. A high number of non-discrimination state laws may already have brought management's attention to legal issues involving GLBT employees. GLBT employee activists in a corporation with a GLBT ERG, compared to those without a GLBT ERG, can build upon this awareness to more effectively advocate that equal treatment requires the provision of equal benefits. Thus, the effect of a GLBT ERG on the rate of benefits adoption would be greater when the number of state non-discrimination laws is high. Thereby, we propose:

*Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of having a GLBT ERG in a corporation on the rate of benefits adoption will be greater when the number of state non-discrimination laws is high.*

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

20

1  
2  
3       **Cultural Opportunity.** The cultural-cognitive dimension of the institutional environment  
4 provides meanings and values to organizational behavior (Scott, 2001). This dimension can  
5 constitute cultural opportunity structure that facilitates/constrains movement mobilization (Raeburn,  
6 2004). Cultural opportunity emerges when new meanings and values are expressed by movement  
7 activists, bystanders or elites that have potential to legitimize movement goals (Williams, 2007).  
8 While there are various forms of manifestation that reflect such meanings and values, the discourse  
9 in the press has been regarded as an important one that reflects evolving meanings and values in the  
10 institutional environment and attract attention from management (e.g., Chuang et al., 2011; Lee &  
11 Paruchuri, 2008). When a new organizational practice emerges in institutional environments, it can  
12 attract attention from proponents and opponents to contest its legitimacy (e.g., Lounsbury,  
13 Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003). Such contestation is likely to be more intense when the practice is not  
14 consistent with wider institutional meanings and values. The contestation of its legitimacy reflected  
15 in the press discourse can be a kind of cultural tool to help employee activists to make sense of the  
16 practice and to engage in mobilization to advocate for the adoption of the practice. Two types of  
17 legitimacy seem particularly relevant to shape movement mobilization and outcomes – pragmatic  
18 and moral (cf. den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested  
19 calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences. The audiences are likely to scrutinize  
20 organizational behavior to determine the practical consequences, for them, of any activity  
21 (Suchman, 1995). Moral legitimacy refers to a normative evaluation of the organization and its  
22 activities, which rests on judgments about whether the activity is "the right thing to do" (Suchman,  
23 1995). Hence, the discourse in the press that favors the pragmatic and moral legitimacy of a  
24 controversial practice can be a source of cultural opportunity that influences mobilization of internal  
25 movements within organizations.

26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57       Although discourse in the press exerts great influence on organizational behavior, not all  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

21

discourse attracts equal attention from decision makers in organizations (Lee & Paruchrui. 2008).

Lee and Paruchuri (2008) showed that the volume of discourse originating from other firms compared to that originating from journalists and analysts, had a stronger effect on a firm's market entry decision because firms were more likely to attend to others who were in similar situations and had experiences with making the decisions. In our context, we posit that the discourse of employers (organizations and companies) that have made decisions whether to adopt the practice may create a form of cultural opportunity and draw attention from management in corporations that have yet to make the decision. Specifically, a form of cultural opportunity emerged when the tenor of discourse used by other employers in the press became more positive with regards to pragmatic legitimacy of the same-sex partner health benefits. Management in a corporation would likely take this discourse as a signal that the employers that decided to offer the benefits viewed it as a sound business decision. The more positive tenor of pragmatic legitimacy can benefit a GLBT ERG by: 1) enhancing its ability to acquire support; 2) incorporating the practical implications of benefits adoption into its mobilization tactics to persuade its management to provide the benefits; and 3) having management's resistance to the benefits already reduced and its understanding of positive, practical implications of the adoption already increased. In contrast, when a more negative tenor of pragmatic legitimacy discourse of other employers appeared in the press justifying their non-adoption decisions, no such cultural opportunity would emerge. Management would likely take this discourse as a signal that other employers did not view the benefits as a sound business decision. A GLBT ERG would have greater difficulties in gathering support, would not be able to incorporate the practical implications of benefits adoption into its mobilization tactics, and would have to overcome a negative opinion that management may already have drawn based on the more negative tenor of pragmatic legitimacy.

Similarly, when discourse with a more positive tenor of moral legitimacy used by other

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

22

1  
2  
3 employers justifying their adoption decisions appeared in the press, it is likely that management in a  
4  
5 corporation would take this as a signal that those employers valued the moral principles associated  
6  
7 with the benefits. A GLBT ERG can use such discourse to enhance its ability to acquire greater  
8  
9 support and in its efforts to persuade its management to provide the benefits. As management's  
10  
11 resistance to the benefits may have already been reduced and its understanding of moral values  
12  
13 associated with benefits adoption may have already been enhanced by the more positive tenor of  
14  
15 moral legitimacy, it would be easier for a GLBT ERG to persuade its management to provide the  
16  
17 benefits. In contrast, when discourse with a more negative tenor of moral legitimacy used by other  
18  
19 employers justifying their non-adoption decisions appeared in the press, no such cultural  
20  
21 opportunity would emerge. Management's attention would still be drawn but its resistance to  
22  
23 offering the benefits could increase as it may not view providing the benefits as the right thing to  
24  
25 do. A GLBT ERG would have greater difficulties in gathering support and developing mobilization  
26  
27 tactics. A GLBT ERG would also have to overcome a negative opinion that management may  
28  
29 already have drawn based on the discourse used by other employers. Thus, we hypothesize:

30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36 *Hypothesis 4a: The positive effect of having a GLBT ERG in a corporation on the rate of*  
37 *benefits adoption will be greater when the tenor in the press about pragmatic legitimacy of*  
38 *the benefits used by other employers is more positive.*

39  
40  
41 *Hypothesis 4b: The positive effect of having a GLBT ERG in a corporation on the rate of*  
42 *benefits adoption will be greater when the tenor in the press about moral legitimacy of the*  
43 *benefits used by other employers is more positive.*

44  
45  
46 In addition to the discourse of other employers, the discourse of movement and  
47  
48 countermovement organizations can influence employee activists' ability to influence  
49  
50 organizational policies. Movement and countermovement organizations can use the press as a mean  
51  
52 to contest the legitimacy of a controversial practice (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; cf. Benford &  
53  
54 Snow, 2000). Since movement and countermovement organizations have the potential to mobilize  
55  
56 resources to influence resource stability of corporations (e.g., Ingram et al., 2010; King, 2008; King  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

23

1  
2  
3 & Soule, 2007), their discourse contesting the legitimacy of the benefits may attract corporations'  
4  
5 attention and influence their adoption decisions (cf. Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; King, 2008). Cultural  
6  
7 opportunity therefore emerges when the discourse is predominately in favor of the practice. The  
8  
9 employee activists can use this cultural opportunity to facilitate mobilization and to further  
10  
11 influence management to adopt the practice (Raeburn, 2004).  
12  
13

14  
15 In the context of same-sex partner health benefits, GLBT advocacy organizations and  
16  
17 countermovement organizations contested the benefits on grounds of both pragmatic and moral  
18  
19 legitimacy and mobilized resources to influence corporations in their decisions to offer the benefits  
20  
21 to the same-sex partners of their employees. To the extent that GLBT advocacy organizations and  
22  
23 countermovement organizations had potential to influence corporations' resource stability, the tenor  
24  
25 of discourse used by those organizations may moderate the relationship between internal  
26  
27 movements and the rates of benefits adoptions by their corporations. Specifically, when the tenor of  
28  
29 the discourse related to the pragmatic legitimacy of the benefits used by GLBT advocacy  
30  
31 organizations and countermovement organizations is positive, management in a corporation would  
32  
33 take this as a signal that the potential benefits (e.g., improved recruitment, retention, etc.) would  
34  
35 outweigh the potential costs of the benefits should they decide to offer them. Pragmatic legitimacy  
36  
37 discourse with a positive tenor can benefit a GLBT ERG by enhancing its ability to acquire support  
38  
39 and by using the potential benefits of adoption to persuade its management to provide the benefits.  
40  
41 Management's resistance to the benefits may already have been reduced and its understanding of  
42  
43 positive, practical implications of the adoption increased. Likewise, when the tenor of moral  
44  
45 legitimacy discourse related to the benefits made by GLBT advocacy organizations and  
46  
47 countermovement organizations in the press is positive, management may take this as a signal that  
48  
49 their decision to adopt the benefits would be received with more support than opposition. A GLBT  
50  
51 ERG can use such discourse to enhance its ability to acquire support and build upon the moral  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

24

principles articulated by movement organizations into its efforts to persuade its management to provide the benefits. It would be also easier for a GLBT ERG to persuade its management to provide the benefits since management's resistance to the benefits may have already been reduced and its understanding of the moral values related to the benefits adoption may have already been improved by the positive tenor of the moral legitimacy discourse. Thus,

*Hypothesis 5a: The positive effect of having a GLBT ERG in a corporation on the rate of benefits adoption will be greater when the tenor in the press about pragmatic legitimacy of the benefits used by movement and countermovement organizations is more positive.*

*Hypothesis 5b: The positive effect of having a GLBT ERG in a corporation on the rate of benefits adoption will be greater when the tenor in the press about moral legitimacy of the benefits used by movement and countermovement organizations is more positive.*

**METHODS****Data and Sample**

Our sample consists of all corporations ever listed on the *Fortune 500* between 1990 and 2002. This period covers initial adoptions of same-sex partner health benefits by *Fortune 500* corporations (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Chuang et al., 2011). Before 1994, Fortune reported the rankings of manufacturing and services separately. Thus, for the years between 1990 and 1993, we re-ranked the corporations based on total sales and selected those ever ranked within the top 500. We obtained financial data from the *COMPUSTAT* database for the period between 1990 and 2002.

**Dependent Variable**

We compiled the adoption data from two major sources: the *HRC WorkNet* database and the *Factiva* media database. *HRC WorkNet*, maintained by *Human Rights Campaign*, provides comprehensive coverage of benefits adoption in *Fortune 500* corporations from 1999 to 2003. We searched *Factiva* to identify the corporations in our sample that offered the benefits prior to 1999. Combining these two sources, we were able to identify 216 corporations that had adopted the benefits by the end of 2003. After excluding the missing data<sup>2</sup>, we transformed data on the

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

remaining 933 corporations into annual spells. We coded 1 for the year when a corporation started to offer the same-sex partner benefits to its employees, 0 otherwise; we excluded corporations from the analysis after they adopted the benefits, yielding a data with 9,358 corporation-annual spells.

**Independent and Control Variables**

All our independent and control variables were lagged one year for the analysis to avoid simultaneity problems and to ensure proper causal inference.

**Presence of a GLBT ERG.** To test Hypothesis 1 – the presence of a GLBT ERG would increase a corporation’s rate of benefits adoption – we made great effort to determine if our sampled corporations had GLBT ERGs and the year the ERG was established. Specifically, the *HRC WorkNet* database documented corporations with a GLBT ERG and their contact information. We also obtained a list of GLBT ERGs from *National Gay and Lesbian Task Force* that provided contact information for each ERG which we used to ask for the founding years of their groups. In addition, we asked our informants in our interviews and some conference participants to identify if our sampled corporations had GLBT ERGs and their contact information. In total, we identified 82 corporations in our sample in which ERGs were established prior to 2003 and had not adopted the benefits at the time the ERGs were established. We then constructed a time-varying *Presence of GLBT ERG* dummy variable. Support of the hypothesis will require a positive coefficient estimate for *Presence of GLBT ERG*.

**Concentration of Local GLBT Advocacy Organizations’ Resources.** Hypothesis 2 proposed a positive moderating effect of the concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations’ resources on the effect of a GLBT ERG on a corporation’s rate of benefits adoption. We obtained the financial statements of local GLBT advocacy organizations from the *National Center for Charitable Statistics*, which has documented information on all registered charitable organizations since 1989. In each year, we extracted the amount of donations received by each local organization

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

26

1  
2  
3 that specified its primary activity as advocacy for GLBT equality to construct the concentration of  
4  
5 the local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources. Donations are material resources that can be  
6  
7 deployed to facilitate, and cover costs of, future mobilization (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007). The  
8  
9 amount of donations received by an advocacy organization is also an indicator of its access to  
10  
11 resources and its prior mobilization efforts. We used Herfindahl index to capture the degree of  
12  
13 *Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources* by summing the square of the  
14  
15 proportion of each GLBT advocacy organization's donations over the total donations of all GLBT  
16  
17 advocacy organizations in the state of a focal corporation's headquarters in a given year. The higher  
18  
19 this measure, the more concentrated the local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources. To test the  
20  
21 moderating effect of the concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources on the  
22  
23 relationship between a corporation's GLBT ERG and the adoption of benefits stated in the  
24  
25 hypothesis, we created an interaction term, *Presence of GLBT ERG x Concentration of local GLBT*  
26  
27 *advocacy organizations' resources*. Hypothesis support requires a positive coefficient estimate of  
28  
29 this interaction term.  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 **Political Opportunity.** We obtained the information on the year a state enacted a law  
37  
38 forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation from the *HRC WorkNet* database. The first to  
39  
40 enact such a law was the District of Columbia in 1977. It was followed by Wisconsin and  
41  
42 Massachusetts in 1982 and 1989, respectively. By the end of 2002, 14 states had enacted such laws.  
43  
44 We constructed *Number of state non-discrimination laws* by counting the number of state non-  
45  
46 discrimination laws in effect in a given year. To test the interaction effect stated in Hypothesis 3, we  
47  
48 created an interaction variable, *Presence of GLBT ERG x Number of state non-discrimination laws*.  
49  
50 A positive coefficient estimate will be evidence to support the hypothesis.  
51  
52  
53  
54

55 **Cultural Opportunity.** The data used to construct cultural opportunity stemming from  
56  
57 press coverage of the benefits between 1990 and 2002 were drawn from the top three circulating  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

27

1  
2  
3 newspapers in the United States: *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, and *The Wall Street Journal*.

4  
5 We retrieved full-text articles from both *Factiva* and *Lexis-Nexis* databases. We identified 586  
6  
7 relevant, non-duplicated articles, using search strings that we developed to capture the variation in  
8  
9 terminology and alternative names related to same-sex partner health benefits<sup>3</sup>.

10  
11  
12 The article is the level of analysis in most prior studies (e.g., Chuang et al., 2011; Pollock &  
13  
14 Rindova, 2003). However, since an article can contain more than one legitimacy statement and our  
15  
16 theoretical interest rested upon legitimacy statements deployed by various actors, we coded the  
17  
18 articles at the argument level. We defined an argument as a statement made by an actor expressing  
19  
20 his/her evaluation in support or refutation of any aspect of the benefits. Two authors then followed  
21  
22 Suchman's (1995) definitions of pragmatic and moral legitimacy and coded the arguments in each  
23  
24 article with an inter-coder reliability of .71 (Cohen's kappa=.71). The inconsistent codings were  
25  
26 discussed and consensus was reached. Examples of coded arguments are "... because the benefits  
27  
28 will make recruitment and retention of workers easier..." (positive pragmatic legitimacy argument),  
29  
30 "Despite talks with its gay and lesbian caucus, Xerox Corp., decided against coverage because of  
31  
32 cost" (negative pragmatic legitimacy argument ), "...[benefits] are a matter of equal pay for work"  
33  
34 (positive moral legitimacy argument ), and "...some of Commins' employees complained [the  
35  
36 benefits] endorse "antifamily lifestyles" (negative moral legitimacy argument). In 586 articles, we  
37  
38 coded 274 legitimacy statements (148 moral and 126 pragmatic). We also coded the legitimacy  
39  
40 statements according to the party making the argument into two categories: employers (i.e.,  
41  
42 arguments made by spokespersons or management of organizations or companies) and movement  
43  
44 and countermovement organizations (e.g., Human Right Campaign, The American Civil Liberties  
45  
46 Union, The American Family Association, Southern Baptist Convention). Figure 2 presents the  
47  
48 distribution of total coded pragmatic and moral legitimacy statements in the observed time period.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

-----  
 Insert Figure 2 about here  
 -----

To capture the differential of positive and negative legitimacy, we adopted the measure of the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Janis & Fadner, 1965). As prior studies suggested (e.g., Deephouse, 2000), this measure has many useful properties, such as (1) a range between -1 and 1; (2) a meaningful zero point when there are equal numbers of positive and negative arguments; (3) an increase/decrease in the coefficient when the number of positive/negative arguments increases. Specifically, we constructed *Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by other employers*, *Tenor of moral legitimacy by other employers*, *Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations*, and *Tenor of moral legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations* by using the following formula:

$$[P2 - PN]/Total2 \text{ if } P > N; 0 \text{ if } P=N, \text{ and } [PN - N2 ]/Total2 \text{ if } N>P, \quad (1)$$

where P is the number of positive legitimacy arguments , N is the number of negative legitimacy arguments. We then further created four interaction terms to test Hypotheses H4ab and H5ab. To support the hypotheses, positive coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are required.

**Control Variables.** As we have 6 interaction terms of a GLBT ERG with the concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources and political and cultural opportunities, we included their main effects in the analysis. In addition, the total number of press articles mentioning the benefits, whether or not they contained arguments, could attract management's attention influencing their decisions of adoption (e.g., Chuang et al., 2011; Lee & Paruchuri, 2008; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Thus, we included the total number of press articles mentioning the benefits in each year (*Number of press coverage articles*) to control for its effect on adoption. We also included other corporation-specific and environmental control variables to rule out alternative

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

1  
2  
3 explanations of benefits adoption. First, prior research suggests that firm performance may  
4  
5 influence benefits adoption (Chuang et al., 2011) and make a firm vulnerable to activism (King,  
6  
7 2008). Thus, we included *Return on assets* to control its effect on the rate of benefits adoption.  
8  
9  
10 Second, we included *Number of employees* (in thousands) a corporation had in a given year. Gay  
11  
12 and lesbian employees were estimated to account for 4% and 17% in the U. S. workforce  
13  
14 (Gonsiorek & Weinrich, 1991). Thus, the more employees there are, the greater the likelihood there  
15  
16 will be larger numbers of gay and lesbian employees, leading to a greater likelihood of a  
17  
18 corporation adopting the benefits. Third, we controlled for the effect of *Total assets* on adoption.  
19  
20  
21 Larger corporations' practices are likely to attract attention from various stakeholders and the  
22  
23 public, which in turn may affect their rate of adoption compared to smaller corporations. We further  
24  
25 grouped the corporations into seven industries based on the 2-digits of their primary SIC codes. We  
26  
27 then included six industry dummy variables to control for industry-specific idiosyncrasies that may  
28  
29 influence corporations' adoption decisions: (1) mining, utilities, and construction; (2)  
30  
31 manufacturing; (3) wholesale and retail trade; (4) transportation and warehousing; (5) information  
32  
33 technology; and (6) financial, real estate, and insurance. Corporations outside the six industries  
34  
35 were collapsed into the reference group for the analysis.  
36  
37  
38  
39

40  
41 We also included several variables, shown in previous research to have effects, to control  
42  
43 for environmental impact<sup>4</sup>. First, past research has found labor market conditions have significant  
44  
45 impact upon human resources practices in organizations (e.g., Ingram & Simon, 1995). We  
46  
47 obtained *Industry unemployment rate* from United States Department of Labor Bureau to control for  
48  
49 the effect of labor market conditions on the adoption. Second, a corporation's GLBT movements  
50  
51 could be influenced by the GLBT movements of other corporations (Raeburn, 2004). Therefore, it  
52  
53 is possible that ERGs in other corporations could influence the likelihood of another corporation's  
54  
55 benefits adoption. Therefore, we included two measures to control for such influences (*Number of*  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

30

1  
2  
3 *ERGs within state* and *Number of ERGs within industry*). Third, institutional theory suggests the  
4  
5 benefits adoption could be driven by mimetic isomorphism (e.g., Chuang et al., 2011; Raeburn,  
6  
7 2004). Thus, we included *Number of adoptions within state* (measured by the number of adoptions  
8  
9 by others within the state of a corporation's headquarters) and *Number of adoptions within industry*  
10  
11 (measured by the number of adoptions by others within the same industry) to control for their  
12  
13 effects on the rate of a focal corporation's adoption. Fourth, size of a movement and resources held  
14  
15 by movement participants exert great influence on movement outcomes (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).  
16  
17 Therefore, we included the number of local GLBT advocacy organizations (*Number of local GLBT*  
18  
19 *advocacy organizations*) and their resources (*Local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources*, with  
20  
21 logarithmic scaling) in our sample to control for their effects and also helped to control for the  
22  
23 differential effect of local GLBT activism across states on the rate of benefits adoption. We also  
24  
25 controlled for resources of national GLBT advocacy organizations by including the donation  
26  
27 amounts received by the organizations, *National GLBT advocacy organizations' resources*  
28  
29 (logarithmic scaling). Fifth, we included a time-varying dummy variable to indicate if the focal  
30  
31 corporation headquarters' state legislative system prohibited discrimination based on sexual  
32  
33 orientation (*Presence of state's non-discrimination law*) to control for the local state legal  
34  
35 environment on benefits adoption. Finally, Figure 2 suggests that the total number of legitimacy  
36  
37 arguments first increased in the period between 1990 and 1994, then fluctuated in the period  
38  
39 between 1995 and 1999, and declined after 1999. This is due, in part, to the shift in focus of the  
40  
41 press coverage on GLBT issues to the debate on the legal definition of marriage. Thus, we used the  
42  
43 period, 1990-1994 as the reference period to construct two time period dummy variables, *1995-*  
44  
45 *1999* and *2000 – 2002* to control time period effects of press attention to the benefits on the rate of  
46  
47 benefits adoption.

**Analysis**

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

31

1  
2  
3 Since our dependent variable is the adoption rate of same-sex partner health benefits by a  
4 corporation when it was at risk of adoption in a given year, we estimated a Cox model, where the  
5 hazard rate of adoption was modeled as the product of a specific baseline hazard rate and an  
6 exponential function of time-varying covariates:  
7  
8  
9  
10

$$h(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\beta X_t) \quad (2)$$

11  
12  
13  
14 where  $h(t)$  is the hazard rate of adoption at time  $t$ ,  $h_0(t)$  is a (possibly time-dependent) nuisance  
15 function that is not estimated,  $X_t$  is a vector of time-varying covariates at time  $t$ , and  $\beta$  is the vector  
16 of coefficients corresponding to the covariates. The Cox model is preferred here because we did not  
17 know the exact timing of adoption within the spells and because we had “tied” events, that is, years  
18 in which more than one corporation adopted the benefits (Allison, 2004). The Cox model also  
19 releases us from making assumptions about the form of duration dependence in the hazard rate and  
20 allows us to estimate the hazard function without a priori constraints on functional forms. Further,  
21 we used the Breslow method to handle “tied” events as we had a relatively small number of “tied”  
22 events in comparison to the overall number of corporations at risk in any given year (Allison,  
23 2004). To account for state-specific unobserved heterogeneity, we clustered corporations based on  
24 the state in which their headquarters were located. The models reported below do not violate the  
25 proportional assumption of the hazard functions in the Cox model (Allison, 2004).  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43 However, each corporation might have had a different propensity to have a GLBT ERG.  
44 Specifically, the establishment of a GLBT ERG in a corporation can be driven by management’s  
45 support for GLBT equality, management’s response (either substantial or symbolic) to changes in  
46 institutional environments toward GLBT issues in the workplace, or organizational GLBT friendly  
47 culture (Briscoe, et al., 2014; Edelman, 1992; Raeburn, 2004). Therefore, our hazard rate analysis  
48 might be subject to endogeneity biases. To mitigate such biases, we employed the two-stage  
49 procedures suggested by Heckman (1979) and Hamilton and Nickerson (2003) to first estimate the  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

32

inverse Mills ratios (using the results from the probit model of the probability of management to have an ERG in place). We then included the ratios in our hazard rate analysis to correct the biases. For the probit model specification, we used the following variables that have potential to influence a corporation's propensity to establish a GLBT ERG. First, management in a larger corporation might be more attentive to changes in institutional environments, which in turn could influence its propensity to allow a GLBT ERG in the corporation. We thus included *Number of employees* and *Total assets* in the model. Second, institutional theory suggests that management's response to changes in institutional environments could be driven by regulatory and mimetic forces (e.g., Scott, 2001). As such, we added *Presence of state's non-discrimination law*, *Number of state non-discrimination laws*, *Number of ERGs within state* and *Number of ERGs within industry* to the model. Third, we included *Number of local GLBT advocacy organizations*, *Total resources of local GLBT advocacy organizations* and *Total resources of national GLBT advocacy organizations* to estimate their effects on the probability since external movements might influence management's propensity to establish a GLBT ERG (Raeburn, 2004). Finally, we also included industry dummy variables in the model to control for industry-specific idiosyncrasies and culture that may influence the management's propensity. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. Correlations among theoretical variables are within a reasonable range (below .30). We conducted VIF tests to ensure there was little threat of multi-collinearity in our model estimation.

-----  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here  
-----

**RESULTS**

Model 1 in Table 2 reports the result of the probit model of a corporation's probability to have a GLBT ERG in place<sup>5</sup>. Models 2-9 in Table 2 report maximum-likelihood estimates of the

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

rate of a Fortune 500 corporation's adoption of same-sex partner health benefits. Model 2 includes all control variables as the baseline and inverse Mills ratios estimated from Model 1 specification. In each of the Models 3 to 7, we included theoretical variables in order of our theoretical discussion and then derived a full model, Model 8. *Presence of a GLBT ERG* becomes non-significant in Model 8 which may be due to the inclusion of six interaction terms involving *Presence of a GLBT ERG* that increases the degree of multicollinearity between *Presence of a GLBT ERG* and the interaction terms (the VIF index of *Presence of a GLBT ERG* is 25.17 in the model). Accordingly, in Model 9, we removed four non-significant interaction terms in Model 8.

Hypothesis 1 posited that a corporation with a GLBT ERG would increase its rate of benefits adoption. The positive coefficient estimate of *Presence of a GLBT ERG* in Model 9 ( $\beta = 2.28, p < .001$ ) provides support for the hypothesis. It suggests that an internal GLBT mobilizing structure, such as a formal employee resource group, significantly helped gay and lesbian employee activists press their corporation to offer health benefits to their partners quicker. Specifically, a corporation's rate of benefits adoption was 9.77 times faster ( $=\exp(2.28)$ ) if it had a GLBT ERG. Hypothesis 2 suggested that a positive moderating effect of the concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources. The significant coefficient estimate of the control variable, *Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources*, in Model 9 showed that the positive main effect of mobilizing structure of external movements on the benefits adoption ( $\beta = 1.14, p < .001$ ). Specifically, an increase in one standard deviation of *Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources* increased a corporation's rate of benefits adoption by a factor of 1.49 ( $=\exp(1.14 \cdot .35)$ ). However, the negative, significant coefficient estimate of *Presence of GLBT ERG x Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources* in Model 9 fails to support Hypothesis 2 ( $\beta = -1.54, p < .01$ ). It suggests that the positive effect of having an internal mobilizing structure (i.e., GLBT ERG) was stronger when resources were less concentrated within

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

34

1  
2  
3 the external movements.

4  
5 Turning to our two sets of hypotheses on the effects of political and cultural opportunities on  
6 the relationship between a corporation's GLBT ERG and the rate of benefits adoption by the  
7 corporation, the coefficient estimates of *Presence of GLBT ERG x Number of state non-*  
8 *discrimination laws* are not significant in Models 5 and 8. It suggests that the number of state laws  
9 did not have effects on the rates of benefits adoption between corporations with and without ERGs.  
10  
11

12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17 Regarding the effects of cultural opportunity stated in Hypotheses 4ab and 5ab, in Models 6  
18 – 9 only the coefficient estimate of *Presence of GLBT ERG x Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by*  
19 *movement and countermovement organizations* is significant but negative ( $\beta = -0.40, p < .05$  in  
20 Model 9), failing to support the hypotheses. Together with the results of the main effects of cultural  
21 opportunity variables, these suggest the impact of legitimacy tenor used by other employers and  
22 movement and countermovement organizations in the press on the rate of benefits adoption  
23 exhibited a complicated pattern. Specifically, the tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by other employers  
24 had an independent positive effect on the rate of benefits adoption ( $\beta = .85, p < .05$  in Model 9).  
25  
26 The effect of the tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations  
27 negatively moderated the influence of internal mobilizing structure (i.e., an GLBT ERG) on the rate  
28 of benefits adoption. However, the tenors of moral legitimacy by both other employers and  
29 movement and countermovement organizations exerted no influence on the rate of benefits  
30 adoption in the observed period.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46

47  
48 To better appreciate the significant interaction effects reported in Model 9, we plotted  
49 interaction graphs. Because our hazard rate of adoption was estimated based on an exponential  
50 function, we transformed the correspondent coefficients in Model 9 into an estimated multiplier of  
51 the rate to reflect the multiplicative effect of variables on the rate of a corporation's benefits  
52 adoption. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the moderating effects of resource concentration of local  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

1  
2  
3 GLBT advocacy organizations' resources (solid line) and the tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by  
4  
5 movement and countermovement organizations (dash line) on the relative multiplier of the rate  
6  
7 between corporations with and without ERGs. We used the mean and the mean  $\pm$  .5 s.d. of  
8  
9  
10 *Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources* and *Tenor of pragmatic*  
11  
12 *legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations* to estimate the relative multipliers of  
13  
14 the rates by using the correspondent coefficients in the model 9. As shown in the solid line, an  
15  
16 increase in 1 s.d. in *Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources* decreases the  
17  
18 relative rate from 8.47(=  $\exp(2.28+1.14*(.26-.17)-1.54*(.26-.17)/\exp(1.14*(.26-.17))$ ) to 5.01. These  
19  
20 suggest that the degree of concentrated resources held by local GLBT advocacy organizations  
21  
22 decreased the relative effect of an ERG on a corporation's rate of benefits adoption and that the  
23  
24 presence of an ERG had a stronger influence on the corporation's rate of benefits adoption when the  
25  
26 degree of resource concentration among local GLBT advocacy organization was low.  
27  
28  
29  
30

31  
32 -----  
33  
34 Insert Figure 3 here  
35  
36 -----  
37

38  
39 The dashed line in Figure 3 shows the moderating effect of the tenor of pragmatic  
40  
41 legitimacy used by movement and countermovement organizations. An increase in 1 s.d. in the  
42  
43 tenor of pragmatic legitimacy decreases the relative rate to 8.07 from 10.27. Together with the  
44  
45 results of the main effects of cultural opportunity, our analysis here offers a more fine-grained  
46  
47 examination of the relationship between cultural opportunity of press discourse and internal  
48  
49 movement mobilization. Specifically, it was the tenor of pragmatic legitimacy used by other  
50  
51 employers, and movement and countermovement organizations in the press discourse that  
52  
53 aid/hinder employee activists to help management understand practical implications of benefits  
54  
55 adoption. Though the legitimacy used in other employers' justification of their adoption decisions  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

36

1  
2  
3 exerted independent influence on benefits adoption, the positive tenor of legitimacy expressed by  
4  
5 movement and countermovement organizations mattered more when a mobilizing structure of  
6  
7 internal movements such as an ERG was lacking. Importantly, the results from both interaction  
8  
9 effects imply that a mobilizing structure for internal movements is more crucial for pressing for  
10  
11 change when employee activists are faced with difficult conditions such as a lack of effective  
12  
13 mobilization of external movements and negative sentiment on the practical implications of their  
14  
15 movement goals for their organizations.  
16  
17  
18

19  
20 The effects of other control variables are worth mentioning. *Number of local GLBT*  
21  
22 *advocacy organizations* had a positive effect on the rate of benefits adoption. However, total assets  
23  
24 of national GLBT advocacy organizations had no effect. The positive effect of *Presence of state's*  
25  
26 *non-discrimination law* suggests a state's legal environment presented political opportunity for  
27  
28 activists to use as institutional resources to advocate for the benefits adoption.  
29  
30

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

31  
32  
33 How movements exert influence on organizational behavior has been documented in  
34  
35 organization studies. Most attention in recent studies has been on understanding how the effect of  
36  
37 movements on organizational behavior is shaped by the amount of movement resources and  
38  
39 activities, the independent effects of movement activities inside or outside organizations, and  
40  
41 opportunity within organizations (e.g., Hiatt et al., 2009; Ingram et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2007;  
42  
43 Lounsbury, 2001; McDonnell & King, 2013; Raeburn, 2004). Nevertheless, we know little about  
44  
45 how mobilizing structures of movements internal and external to organizations jointly influence  
46  
47 organizational practices and little about how institutional opportunity may alter the relationship  
48  
49 between internal movements and an organization's decision to adopt a new practice. Exploring  
50  
51 these questions is important because mobilizing structure plays an important role in shaping  
52  
53 mobilization and movement outcomes and organizations often face simultaneous mobilization  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

37

1  
2  
3 efforts by individuals and groups both within organizations and within organizational fields. As  
4  
5 well, institutional environments have potential to provide opportunity to facilitate mobilization to  
6  
7 put pressure on the organizations. Hence, our study makes several important contributions to the  
8  
9 literature on social movements and organizations.  
10

11  
12 First, with few exceptions, most studies of resource mobilization have emphasized the  
13  
14 strength of mobilization, measured by the number of advocacy organizations or the numbers of their  
15  
16 members (e.g., Hiatt et al., 2009; Ingram & Rao, 2004; Sine & Lee, 2009) and mobilizing tactics  
17  
18 (e.g., Soule, 2009). However, scholars from traditional social movement literature have cautioned  
19  
20 us that resources do not necessarily enhance mobilization and lead to movement success (e.g.,  
21  
22 Ganz, 2000; Tilly, 1999). As suggested by McCarthy and Zald (1977), a structure that promotes  
23  
24 participant recruitment, increases resource access, reduces cooperation and coordination challenges,  
25  
26 and enables generation of movement tactics is crucial for movement processes and outcomes. Our  
27  
28 study revealed the role of mobilizing structure in influencing a corporation's decision to adopt  
29  
30 same-sex partner health benefits. For internal movements, because participants may be punished by  
31  
32 corporations and may have limited access to institutional resources (Raeburn, 2004; Zald & Berger,  
33  
34 1978), participant recruitment and coordination of participant involvement are particularly difficult.  
35  
36 A formal structure (such as a GLBT ERG established within a corporation) that has potential to  
37  
38 reduce such difficulties is critical for movement processes and outcomes. For external movements,  
39  
40 when there is more than one movement organization with the same or similar agenda, movement  
41  
42 organizations face different challenges such as cooperation and coordination to engage in political  
43  
44 contest (cf. Tilly, 1999). A structure that can reduce cooperation and coordination challenges is  
45  
46 critical to achieving collective goals (Olson, 1965). Our analysis – the effect of the concentration of  
47  
48 resources held by local GLBT advocacy organizations on the rate of benefits adoption – sheds light  
49  
50 on this possibility.  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

38

1  
2  
3 Second, we built upon the notion of institutional opportunity put forward by Raeburn (2004)  
4  
5 by examining how various forms of institutional opportunity shaped outcomes of internal  
6  
7 movements in organizations. Thus far, studies have examined the effects of opportunity (political  
8  
9 opportunity) derived from changes in the internal environment of organizations on movement  
10  
11 outcomes (King, 2008; Kim et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2009). Though our study showed political  
12  
13 opportunity derived from changes in the regulatory element of institutional environments did not  
14  
15 aid internal movements in attaining their goals, our treatment of cultural opportunity derived from  
16  
17 discourse in the press revealed interesting and complicated effects. While prior studies show actors  
18  
19 in organizational fields engage in discourse activity to contest organizational arrangements (e.g.,  
20  
21 Lounsbury et al., 2003), little is known about which actors and which kind of discourse can help to  
22  
23 legitimize movement claims and provide employee activists with opportunity to better mobilize  
24  
25 resources for change. Our results revealed the differential effects of types and sources of press  
26  
27 discourse on the rate of benefits adoption. Our analysis showed that, while movement and  
28  
29 countermovement organizations focused more on contesting moral legitimacy of same-sex partner  
30  
31 health benefits (as shown in Figure 2), such contestation had no impact on the rate of benefits  
32  
33 adoption. In contrast, it was the self-interested calculation of pragmatic legitimacy that enhanced  
34  
35 cultural-cognitive understanding of the benefits, which then influenced corporations' decisions to  
36  
37 offer the benefits. The tenor of pragmatic legitimacy of the benefits in the press derived from prior  
38  
39 employers' adoption decisions reduced the financial uncertainty of the benefits, which in turn  
40  
41 influenced the rate of benefits adoption by corporations. The tenor of pragmatic legitimacy voiced  
42  
43 by movement and countermovement organizations altered the effect of a GLBT ERG on the rate of  
44  
45 benefits adoption by its corporation.  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53

54  
55 Third and importantly, while the results of our interaction hypotheses were contradictory to  
56  
57 what we had predicted, they are valuable findings for the literature on social movements and  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

39

1  
2  
3 organizations. Social movement scholars contend that favorable conditions/opportunity facilitate  
4  
5 movement mobilization and the attainment of movement goals by reducing barriers to mobilization  
6  
7 in the form of increases in support from bystanders and decreases in resistance of powerful actors  
8  
9 (e.g., McAdam et al., 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Snow, 2007). It is not clear, however, how the  
10  
11 effect of internal mobilizing structure on goal attainment is influenced by external favorable  
12  
13 conditions/opportunity. Having an internal mobilizing structure can reduce internal barriers to goal  
14  
15 attainment. Favorable external conditions/opportunity may also reduce some of these internal  
16  
17 barriers by, for example, altering the perception of decision makers of movement demands;  
18  
19 substituting some mobilization efforts of an internal mobilizing structure. Nevertheless, having such  
20  
21 a structure can be crucial for movement participants in attaining their goals when the favorable  
22  
23 external conditions/opportunity are not present (cf. Tilly 1999). Our results speak to this complexity  
24  
25 – the difference in the rates of benefits adoption between corporations with and without GLBT  
26  
27 ERGs reduced as resources of local GLBT advocacy organizations became more concentrated and  
28  
29 the tenor of pragmatic legitimacy in the press became more positive. These findings are  
30  
31 theoretically important and meaningful because they shed light on the varied effects of movement  
32  
33 activities on movement outcomes and their contingencies (Soule, 2009; Tilly, 1999). Broadly, prior  
34  
35 studies focused on the effects of internal or external movements and the moderating effect of  
36  
37 internal political opportunity on organizational behavior (e.g., Kim et al., 2007; King, 2008;  
38  
39 McDonnell & King, 2013). Our focus on mobilizing structures (both internal and external) and  
40  
41 institutional opportunity provides an additional, valuable explanation of the relationship between  
42  
43 social movements and organizations.  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51

52  
53 This study has limitations, which are opportunities for future research. Our research design  
54  
55 and data did not permit an exploration of the tactics deployed by participants of internal and  
56  
57 external movements. We wonder if the tactics of internal movements differed from each other and  
58  
59  
60



## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

40

1  
2  
3 whether those differences accounted for differences in outcomes (Soule, 2009). Since movement  
4  
5 participants within organizations tend to bear the risk of job security (Scully & Segal, 2002; Zald &  
6  
7 Berger, 1978), we wonder if the tactics of internal movements systematically differed from external  
8  
9 movements. Our study shows that a formal structure of internal movements has a very strong effect  
10  
11 on movement outcomes, but this formal structure was not necessary nor did it make movement goal  
12  
13 attainment inevitable. Not all formal structures actually facilitate movement mobilization (Ganz,  
14  
15 2000). Informal structures such as networks of relationships can aid resource mobilization (e.g.,  
16  
17 Kellogg, 2009; Raeburn, 2004). It is possible that both formal and informal movement structures  
18  
19 exist in organizations. Untangling the roles played by formal and informal movement structures  
20  
21 within organizations, the effects that they have on each other, and their relative effects can provide  
22  
23 a more complete and nuanced understanding how collective action within organizations influence  
24  
25 organizational behavior.  
26  
27  
28  
29

30  
31 Further, recent studies have suggested that organizations vary in their internal political  
32  
33 systems that produce different forms of political opportunity with differential access by movement  
34  
35 participants (Kim et al., 2007; Raeburn, 2004; Weber et al., 2009). Future research into the effects  
36  
37 various forms of internal political opportunity exert on intra-organizational movements (mediating  
38  
39 or/and moderating) can advance our understanding of internal movement mobilization processes  
40  
41 and outcomes. Our treatment of the mobilizing structure of external movement organizations  
42  
43 showed its importance to the adoption of organizational practices. Due to data availability, we were  
44  
45 unable to examine the effect of the mobilizing structure of countermovement organizations. Future  
46  
47 research into the role of the mobilizing structure of countermovement organizations and its  
48  
49 influence, relative to that of movement organizations, on movement processes and outcomes is  
50  
51 warranted. Our attention to cultural opportunity derived from press coverage of organizational  
52  
53 practices added a valuable modification to the literature on media, organizations, and movements by  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

41

1  
2  
3 shedding light on the differential effects of legitimacy and actors. However, cultural opportunity is  
4  
5 not limited to discourse in the press and legitimacy of a new practice (Williams, 2007). Future  
6  
7 research exploring other forms of cultural opportunity, and their effects, is warranted to enhance our  
8  
9 understanding of how cultural opportunity influences the effect of internal movement mobilization  
10  
11 on organizational response to movement demands. To this end, we see great opportunities to  
12  
13 “mobilize” social movement theses to attain a better understanding of organizational behavior.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

For Peer Review

## REFERENCES

- Adams, J. S., & Solomon, T. A. 2000. *Domestic Partner Benefits: An Employer's Guide*. Washington, DC: Thompson Publishing Group.
- Allison, P. 2004. Event history analysis. In M. Hardy, A. Bryman, (Eds.), *Handbook of Data Analysis*: 369-386. London: Sage.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. 2000. Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 611-639.
- Briscoe, F., & Murphy, C. 2012. Sleight of hand? Practice opacity, third-party responses, and interorganizational diffusion of controversial practices. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 553-584.
- Briscoe, F., Chin, M. K., & Hambrick, D. C. 2014. CEO ideology as an element of the corporate opportunity structure for social activists. *Academy of Management Journal*, 57: 1786-1809.
- Briscoe, F., & Safford, S. 2008. The Nixon-in-China effect: Activism, imitation, and the institutionalization of contentious practices. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 460-491.
- Chuang, Y.T., Church, R., & Ophir, R. 2011. Taking sides: The interactive influences of institutional mechanisms on the adoption of same-sex partner health benefits by Fortune 500 corporations, 1990-2003. *Organization Science*, 22: 190-219.
- Creed, W. E. D., & Scully, M. 2000. Songs of ourselves: Employees' deployment of social identity in workplace encounters. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 9: 391-412.
- Creed, W. E. D., Scully, M. A., & Austin, J. R. 2002. Clothes make the person? The tailoring of legitimating accounts and the social construction of identity. *Organization Science*, 13: 475-496.
- Deephouse, D. L. 2000. Media reputation as a strategic resource: An integration of mass communication and resource-based theories. *Journal of Management*, 26: 1091-1112.
- den Hond, F., & de Bakker, F. G. A. 2007. Ideologically motivated activism: How activist groups influence corporate social change activities. *Academy of Management Review*, 32: 901-924.
- Edelman, L. B. 1992. Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: organizational mediation of civil rights law. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97: 1531-1576.
- Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. 1997. The legal environments of organizations. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23: 479-515.
- Edwards, B., & McCarthy, J. D. 2007. Resources and social movement mobilization. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements*: 116-

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

- 1  
2  
3 152. MA: Blackwell.
- 4  
5 Eisinger, P. K. 1973. The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. *American Political*  
6  
7 *Science Review*, 67: 11-28.
- 8  
9 Gamson, W.A., & Meyer, D. S. 1996. Framing political opportunity. In D. McAdam, J. D.  
10  
11 McCarthy, & M. N. Zald, (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political*  
12  
13 *Opportunities, Mobilization Structures, and Cultural Framings*: 275-290. NY: Cambridge  
14  
15 University Press.
- 16  
17 Ganz, M. 2000. Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of  
18  
19 California Agriculture, 1959–1966. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105:4, 1003-1062.
- 20  
21 Gonsiorek, J. C., & Weinrich, J. D. 1991. The definition and scope of sexual orientation. In J. C.  
22  
23 Gonsiorek, & J. D. Weinrich (Eds.), *Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy*:  
24  
25 1-12. Newbury Park: Sage.
- 26  
27 Hamilton, B. H., & Nickerson, J. A. 2003. Correcting for endogeneity in strategic management  
28  
29 research. *Strategic Organization*, 1: 51-78.
- 30  
31 Heckman, J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. *Econometrica*, 47: 153-161.
- 32  
33 Herek, G. M. 1990. The context of anti-gay violence: Notes on cultural and psychological  
34  
35 heterosexism. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 5: 316-333.
- 36  
37 Hiatt, S. R., Sine, W. D., & Tolbert, P. S. 2009. From Pabst to Pepsi: The deinstitutionalization of  
38  
39 social practices and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. *Administrative Science*  
40  
41 *Quarterly*, 54: 635-667.
- 42  
43 Ingram, P., & Rao, H. 2004. Store wars: The enactment and repeal of anti-chain-store legislation in  
44  
45 America. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110: 446-487.
- 46  
47 Ingram, P., Yue, L. Q., & Rao, H. 2010. Trouble in store: Probes, protests, and store openings by  
48  
49 Wal-Mart, 1998-2007. *American Journal of Sociology*, 116: 53-92.
- 50  
51 Ingram, P., & Simon, T. 1995. Institutional and resource dependence determinants of  
52  
53 responsiveness to work-family issues. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38: 1466-1482.
- 54  
55 Janis, I. L., & Fadner, R. 1965. The coefficient of imbalance. In H. Lasswell & N. Leites  
56  
57 Associates, (Eds.), *Language of Politics*. 153-169. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- 58  
59 Jenkins, J. C. 1983. Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements. *Annual*  
60  
*Review of Sociology*, 9: 527-553.
- Kellogg, K. C. 2009. Operating room: Relational spaces and microinstitutional change in surgery.  
*American Journal of Sociology*, 115: 657-711.

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

44

- 1  
2  
3 Kellogg, K. C. 2012. Making the cut: Using status-based countertactics to block social movement  
4 implementation and microinstitutional change in surgery. *Organization Science*, 23: 1546-  
5 1570.  
6  
7  
8 Kim, TY., Shin, D., Oh, H., & Jeong, Y. C. 2007. Inside the iron cage: Organizational political  
9 dynamics and institutional changes in Presidential selection systems in Korean universities,  
10 1985- 2002. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 52: 286-323.  
11  
12 King, B. G. 2008. A political mediation model of corporate response to social movement activism.  
13 *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 395-421.  
14  
15 King, B. G., & Soule, S. A. 2007 Social movements as extra-institutional entrepreneurs: The effect  
16 of protests on stock price returns. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 52(3): 413-442.  
17  
18 Lee, G.K., & Paruchuri, S. 2008. Entry into emergent and uncertain product-markets: The role of  
19 associative rhetoric. *Academy of Management Journal*, 51: 1171-1188.  
20  
21 Loftus, J. 2001. America's liberalization in attitudes toward homosexuality, 1973 to 1998.  
22 *American Journal of Sociology*, 66: 762-782.  
23  
24 Lounsbury, M. 2001. Institutional sources of practice variation: Staffing college and university  
25 recycling programs. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46: 29-56.  
26  
27 Lounsbury, M., Ventresca, M., & Hirsch, P. M. 2003. Social movements, field frames and industry  
28 emergence: A cultural-political perspective on US recycling. *Socio-Economic Review*, 1: 171-  
29 104.  
30  
31 McAdam, D. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*.  
32 Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
33  
34 McAdam, D., J. D. McCarthy, & Zald, M. 1996. Introduction. In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy &  
35 M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*: 1-20. Cambridge, UK:  
36 Cambridge University Press.  
37  
38 McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. 1977. Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial  
39 theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82: 1212-1241.  
40  
41 McDonnell, M., & King, B. 2013. Keeping up appearances: Reputational threat and impression  
42 management after social movement boycotts. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58: 387-419.  
43  
44 Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. 2004. Conceptualizing political opportunity. *Social Forces*, 82(4):  
45 1457-1492.  
46  
47 Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and  
48 ceremony. *American Sociological Review*, 83: 440-463.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

- 1  
2  
3 Oliver, C. 1992. The Antecedents of deinstitutionalization. *Organization Studies*, 13: 563-588.
- 4  
5 Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 6  
7 Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. 2003. Media legitimation effects in the market for initial public  
8 offerings. *Academy of Management Journal*, 46: 631-642.
- 9  
10 Raeburn, N. C. 2004. *Lesbian and Gay Workplace Rights: Changing Corporate America from*  
11 *Inside Out*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- 12  
13 Ragsin, B. R., & Cornwell, J. M. 2001. Pink triangles: Antecedents and consequences of perceived  
14 workplace discrimination against gay and lesbian employees. *Journal of Applied Psychology*,  
15 86: 1244-1261.
- 16  
17  
18 Reid, E. M. & Toffel, M. W., 2009. Responding to public and private politics: Corporate disclosure  
19 of climate change strategies. *Strategic Management Journal*, 30: 1157-1178.
- 20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60
- Schneiberg, M., & Lounsbury, M. 2008. Social movements and institutional analysis. In R.  
Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby, (Eds.), *The Handbook of Organizational  
Institutionalism*: 50-72. London: Sage.
- Scott, W. R. 2001. *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Scully, M., & Creed, W. E. D. 2005. Subverting our stories of subversion. In G. F. Davis, D.  
McAdam, W. R. Scott, & M. N. Zald, (Eds.), *Social Movements and Organization Theory*:  
310-332. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Scully, M., & Segal, A. 2002. Passion with an umbrella: Grassroots activists in the workplace. In  
M. Lounsbury & M. J. Ventresca, (Eds.), *Research in the Sociology of Organizations: Social  
Structure and Organizations Revisited*: 19: 125-168. Oxford: JAI.
- Sine, W. D., & Lee, B. H. 2009. Tilting at windmills? The environmental movement and the  
emergence of the U.S. wind energy sector. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54: 123-155.
- Soule, S. A. 2009. *Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility*. NY: Cambridge University  
Press.
- Suchman, M. C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of  
Management Review*, 20: 571-611.
- Tilly, C. 1978. *From Mobilization to Resolution*. Reading, MA: Addition Wesley.
- Tilly, C. 1999. From interactions to outcomes in social movements. In M. Giguni, D. McAdam, &  
C. Tilly, (Eds.), *How Social Movements Matter*: 253-270. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press.

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

46

- 1  
2  
3 Walters, D. K. H. 1994. The last frontier: On civil rights' cutting edge, gay and lesbian managers  
4 often face choice between openness and ambition. *Los Angeles Times*. November 27, Part D,  
5 Page 1.  
6  
7  
8 Weber, K., Rao, H., & Thomas, L. G. 2009. From streets to suites: How the anti-biotech movement  
9 affected German pharmaceutical firms. *American Sociological Review*, 74: 106-127.  
10  
11 Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEOs' long-term incentive plans.  
12 *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39: 367-390.  
13  
14  
15 Wijk, J. V., Stam, W., Elfring, T., Zietsma, C., & de Hond, F. 2013. Activists and incumbents  
16 structuring change: The interplay of agency, culture, and networks in field evolution.  
17 *Academy of Management Journal*, 56: 358-386.  
18  
19  
20 Williams, R. H. 2007. The culture context of collective action: Constraints, opportunities, and the  
21 symbolic life of social movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi, (Eds.), *The*  
22 *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*: 91-115. MA: Blackwell Publishing.  
23  
24  
25 Witkowski, D. 2004. *Alice McKeage recognized at Affirmation Big Bash*. Retrieved from  
26 <http://www.pridesource.com/article.html?article=7212>  
27  
28  
29 Zald, M. N., & Berger, M. A. 1978. Social movements in organizations: Coup d'état, insurgency,  
30 and mass movements. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83: 823-861.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## FOOTNOTES

1. To better appreciate the context of our setting, we conducted interviews with individuals involved with ten GLBT movements in their corporations, attended five GLBT workplace conferences and forums, and reviewed publications and press articles related to GLBT issues in the workplace.
2. 52 corporations were excluded from the final sample because of missing data: the number of employees, financial data (i.e., total assets and return on assets), the year they adopted benefits, or the year their GLBT ERGs were founded.
3. The search strings we developed to retrieve articles include: same-sex benefits, domestic partner benefits, DP benefits, opposite sex benefits, same-sex partners, same-sex relationship, (same-sex) and benefits, (gay or lesbian or transsexuals) and (benefits) and (employees), (same-sex union) and (benefits), (domestic partner) and (benefits), (homosexuals) and (partner benefit), and (sexual orientation) and (benefits).
4. We could not control for the size of the GLBT population or for the number of same-sex couples since no reliable annual data are available.
5. As shown in Model 1 in Table 2, the probability of a corporation having an ERG was driven by its size (*Total assets*), the establishment of ERGs in other corporations (*Number of ERGs within state* and *Number of ERGs within industry*), *Total resources of local GLBT advocacy organizations*, and *Number of state non-discrimination laws*. The significant coefficient of inverse Mills ratios suggests in Model 2 that our specification of Model 1 captured the factors that affected both the establishment of an ERG and the likelihood of benefits adoption. Most of these variables that are significant in Model 1 become non-significant in Models 2-9. The inverse Mills ratios became non-significant after we entered theoretical variables (Models 2-9). These suggest that our analysis is less likely subject to endogeneity biases.



MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Theoretical and Control Variables

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 Presence of a GLBT ERG	.06	.25	1.00															
2 Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources	.26	.35	.25***	1.00														
3 Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by other employers	.06	.51	-.02*	-.03*	1.00													
4 Tenor of moral legitimacy by other employers	.53	.58	-.01	.02*	.03*	1.00												
5 Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations	.17	.60	.01	.00	.24***	-.16***	1.00											
6 Tenor of moral legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations	-.08	.54	-.03*	-.05**	-.04**	.05**	.11***	1.00										
7 Number of press coverage articles	45.58	20.67	.02*	.03*	.21***	-.25***	.40***	-.40***	1.00									
8 Return on assets	.03	.11	.05**	.07***	-.01	-.02*	-.01	.01	.01	1.00								
9 Number of employees	28.69	62.39	.13***	.19***	-.01	-.01	.02*	.00	.03*	.03*	1.00							
10 Total assets	10.78	31.08	.13***	.13***	-.01	-.02*	.03*	-.03*	.03*	-.03*	.32***	1.00						
11 Mining, utilities, and construction	.10	.30	-.05**	.04**	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	-.02*	-.10***	-.03*	1.00					
12 Manufacturing	.51	.50	.01	-.12***	.01	.00	.00	.02*	-.01	.06***	-.08***	-.17***	-.34***	1.00				
13 Wholesale and retail trade	.14	.35	-.03*	.07***	-.01	-.01	.00	-.01	.01	.00	.11***	-.09***	-.14***	-.41***	1.00			
14 Transportation and warehousing	.05	.21	.08***	-.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.01	.07**	-.02*	-.07***	-.22***	-.09***	1.00		
15 Information technology	.05	.21	.04**	-.01	.01	.00	-.01	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	-.08***	-.23***	-.09***	-.05**	1.00	
16 Finance, real estate, and insurance	.10	.30	.02*	.09***	.00	.01	-.01	-.01	.01	-.05**	-.06**	.41***	-.11***	-.34***	-.14***	-.07***	-.07***	1.00
17 Industry unemployment rate	5.53	1.35	-.09***	-.08***	.25***	.23***	-.28***	.09***	-.14***	-.03*	-.02*	-.20***	.09***	.00	.13***	-.05**	.03*	-.25***
18 Number of ERGs within state	4.18	4.10	.11***	.13***	-.06***	-.02*	.06***	-.10***	.07***	.01	.00	.13***	-.03*	.02*	-.05**	-.01	.04**	.09***
19 Number of ERGs within industry	20.95	16.44	.05***	-.07***	-.09***	-.03*	.13***	-.11***	.08***	.04*	-.08***	-.04**	-.37***	.83***	-.37***	-.18***	-.19***	-.09***
20 Number of adoption within state	2.19	4.88	.03*	.04**	-.10***	-.05**	.16***	-.04**	.00	-.02*	-.01	.09***	.00	.00	-.01	.00	-.01	.03*
21 Number of adoption within industry	10.20	14.12	.04**	-.01	-.17***	-.08***	.26***	-.07***	.01	-.02*	-.02*	.05**	-.19***	.35***	-.13***	-.12***	-.06**	.00
22 Number of local GLBT advocacy organizations	4.89	6.26	.07***	.06***	-.04**	.00	.05**	-.07***	.07***	.00	-.02	.12***	.00	-.03*	-.05**	.00	.04**	.10***
23 Total resources of local GLBT advocacy organizations	10.27	5.32	.09***	.33***	-.07***	-.01	.06***	-.11***	.12***	.00	.00	.09***	-.04**	.05**	-.04**	-.05**	.01	.07***
24 Total resources of National GLBT advocacy organizations	15.97	.93	.01	.03*	-.18***	-.11***	.12***	-.05**	-.12***	-.04**	.04**	.04**	.02*	.01	.02*	-.01	-.03*	-.04**
25 Presence of state's non-discrimination law	.22	.41	.04**	.06***	.00	.01	.02*	-.09***	.09***	.01	-.04**	-.01	-.04**	.07***	-.01	-.05**	-.03*	.00
26 Number of state non-discrimination laws	9.40	2.91	.04**	.06***	-.14***	-.08***	.30***	-.39***	.41***	-.01	.04**	.07***	.01	-.01	.02*	.00	-.02*	-.02*
27 1995-1999	.40	.49	.04**	.03*	-.27***	-.25***	.19***	-.21***	.23***	.05**	.02*	.05**	.00	-.02*	.01	.01	.00	.01
28 2000-2002	.17	.37	.01	.03*	-.18***	-.02*	.15***	-.08***	-.04**	-.04**	.04**	.03*	.02*	.01	.01	-.01	-.03*	-.04**

Note: N=9,358  
\* p < .05  
\*\* p < .01  
\*\*\* p < .001

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

Table 2

Models of the Adoption of Same-Sex Partner Health Benefits by Fortune 500 Corporations, 1990-2003<sup>a</sup>

Theoretical variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
H1(+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG			1.34*** (.15)	2.08*** (.23)	-.16 (1.09)	1.43*** (.14)	1.56*** (.17)	1.09 (1.25)	2.28*** (.27)
H2 (+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG x Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources				-1.45*** (.48)				-1.38** (.51)	-1.54** (.49)
H3 (+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG x Number of state non-discrimination laws					.13 (.09)			.11 (.12)	
H4a (+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG x Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by other employers							-.23 (.33)	.20 (.47)	
H4b (+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG x Tenor of moral legitimacy by other employers							-.17 (.14)	-.05 (.17)	
H5a (+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG x Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations							-.36* (.17)	-.55* (.29)	-.40* (.20)
H5b (+)									
Presence of a GLBT ERG x Tenor of moral legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations							.37 (.26)	.31 (.33)	
Control variables									
Concentration of local GLBT advocacy organizations' resources		1.30*** (.20)	.91*** (.20)	1.15*** (.20)	.94** (.19)	.92*** (.20)	.89*** (.20)	1.14*** (.20)	1.14*** (.20)
Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by other employers		.77 (.50)	.88* (.50)	.86* (.49)	.88* (.51)	.94* (.50)	.89* (.52)	.85* (.50)	.85* (.51)
Tenor of moral legitimacy by other employers		-.18 (.27)	-.19 (.24)	-.14 (.24)	-.18 (.25)	-.15 (.25)	-.20 (.24)	-.13 (.24)	-.14 (.24)
Tenor of pragmatic legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations		.11 (.38)	.14 (.41)	.15 (.41)	.12 (.41)	.13 (.41)	.19 (.39)	.24 (.39)	.24 (.39)
Tenor of moral legitimacy by movement and countermovement organizations		.14 (.10)	.12 (.20)	.10 (.20)	.12 (.20)	.11 (.20)	.08 (.20)	.07 (.19)	.10 (.20)
Number of press coverage articles		3.00E-03 (.01)	1.00E-03 (.01)	1.00E-03 (.01)	1.00E-03 (.01)	1.00E-03 (.01)	2.00E-03 (.01)	2.00E-03 (.01)	2.00E-03 (.01)
Return on assets		.69** (.22)	.57* (.27)	.58* (.29)	.56* (.28)	.57* (.27)	.59* (.27)	.60* (.30)	.59* (.29)
Industry unemployment rate		.03 (.10)	.07 (.09)	.08 (.09)	.06 (.09)	.07 (.09)	.07 (.09)	.08 (.09)	.08 (.09)
Number of adoption within state		-.05 (.05)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.04 (.04)
Number of adoption within industry		.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)
Number of employees	2.00E-03 (2.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (1.00E-03)	1.00E-03* (1.00E-03)	2.00E-03* (1.00E-03)	2.00E-03* (1.00E-03)	2.00E-03* (1.00E-03)	2.00E-03* (1.00E-03)	2.00E-03* (1.00E-03)	2.00E-03* (1.00E-03)
Total assets	.02** (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)	1.00E-03 (3.00E-03)
Mining, utilities, and construction	.53 (1.89)	-.50 (.51)	-.48 (.50)	-.48 (.49)	-.51 (.51)	-.50 (.51)	-.49 (.51)	-.48 (.50)	-.47 (.49)
Manufacturing	-2.75 (2.07)	2.47 (1.32)	1.82 (1.17)	1.62 (1.17)	1.83 (1.19)	1.87 (1.17)	1.91 (1.16)	1.73 (1.17)	1.76 (1.15)
Wholesale and retail trade	.34 (1.85)	-.05 (.39)	-.16 (.38)	-.14 (.38)	-.16 (.38)	-.16 (.38)	-.16 (.38)	-.14 (.38)	-.14 (.38)
Transportation and warehousing	1.68 (1.88)	.25 (.46)	.37 (.44)	.46 (.43)	.41 (.44)	.37 (.44)	.37 (.43)	.45 (.42)	.42 (.43)
Information technology	1.11 (1.88)	1.11* (.46)	1.10** (.38)	1.13** (.37)	1.13** (.37)	1.09** (.37)	1.11** (.37)	1.13** (.37)	1.10** (.37)
Finance, real estate, and insurance	-.84 (1.91)	1.56* (.61)	1.42* (.56)	1.39* (.54)	1.42** (.55)	1.43** (.55)	1.45** (.56)	1.42** (.53)	1.43** (.54)
Number of ERGs within state	.15* (.06)	-.05 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.03 (.05)	-.03 (.05)
Number of ERGs within industry	.09*** (.02)	-.08* (.04)	-.07 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.07 (.04)	-.07 (.04)	-.07 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.06 (.04)
Number of local GLBT advocacy organizations	-.06 (.04)	.11*** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.08** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.08** (.03)	.08** (.03)
Total resources of local GLBT advocacy organizations	.10* (.04)	-.02 (.05)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Total resources of National GLBT advocacy organizations	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)
Presence of state's non-discrimination law	.11 (.37)	.34** (.16)	.37* (.15)	.43* (.15)	.38* (.15)	.36* (.15)	.37* (.15)	.42** (.15)	.41** (.15)
Number of state non-discrimination laws	.38*** (.07)	.18 (.19)	.32 (.21)	.33 (.20)	.30 (.21)	.32 (.20)	.31 (.20)	.28 (.18)	.30 (.21)
1995-1999		1.65** (.47)	1.82** (.49)	1.80** (.49)	1.80** (.49)	1.81** (.50)	1.85** (.49)	1.84** (.49)	1.84** (.49)
2000-2002		.85 (.85)	1.98* (.92)	1.96* (.90)	1.94* (.91)	1.94* (.92)	1.98* (.90)	1.94* (.88)	1.94* (.89)
Inverse Mills ratios		.44* (.22)	.13 (.21)	.08 (.20)	.12 (.21)	.14 (.20)	.15 (.20)	.10 (.18)	.12 (.18)
Constant	-17.36** (2.01)								
Yearly corporation spells	9358	9358	9358	9358	9358	9358	9358	9358	9358
Wald chi-square	299.1								
Log pseudolikelihood		-1255.04	-1227.05	-1224.07	-1226.26	-1226.59	-1224.44	-1221.70	-1222.92
Likelihood ratio test (df)			55.9(1)***	5.9(1)**	1.6(1)	.9(2)	5.2(2)*	10.7(6)	8.2(2)**
Versus nested model			vs M2	vs M3	vs M3	vs M3	vs M3	vs M3	vs M3

a. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the probability of a corporation to have an ERG. The dependent variables in Models 2-9 are the hazard rates of the adoption of same-sex partner health benefits. Standard errors (in parentheses) are the robust estimator corrected for state.

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .01$

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

## MOVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITY

50

Figure 1

Trajectories of the Cumulative Adoptions of Same-Sex Partner Health Benefits and GLBT  
Employee Resource Groups in *Fortune 500* Corporations, 1990-2003





Figure 2

Total Numbers of Pragmatic and Moral Legitimacy Arguments in the Press, 1990-2002<sup>a</sup>

a. Our data reveal that movement and countermovement organizations used more moral legitimacy arguments than pragmatic ones to contest the legitimacy of same-sex partner health benefits (yearly mean of moral arguments, 2.61 versus yearly mean of pragmatic arguments, 1.63;  $p < .02$ ). In contrast, employers used more pragmatic legitimacy arguments than moral ones to justify or elaborate the rationale for their decisions (not) to offer health benefits to partners of their lesbian and gay employees (yearly mean of pragmatic arguments, 5.07 versus yearly mean of moral arguments, 2.84;  $p < .025$ ).

Figure 3

The Moderating Effects of Concentration of Local GLBT Advocacy Organizations' Resources and Tenor of Pragmatic Legitimacy by Movement and Countermovement Organizations on the Relationship between Internal Movements and the Rate of Benefits Adoption

