

COLONIAL RULE AND ALIEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CHINESE IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

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I

The establishment of colonial regimes in Southeast Asia in the last three centuries and a half brought into existence a large class of alien intermediaries. In the Philippines, the Dutch Indies, the British Borneo and French Indochina, the Chinese from South China nearly monopolized this role. In Malaya and Burma, they shared it with the Indians, with the Chinese predominating in the former, and the Indians in the latter.

There were many differences, of course, among the colonial powers in their socio-economic backgrounds, their political ideologies and administrative policies, and in the degree of economic development of the colonies as well as in the times when the colonies were first established. These differences, as might be expected, were reflected in the roles played by the alien entrepreneurs, and in the kinds of treatment they received at the hands of the colonial rulers. But there existed also a similar pattern of development which can be discerned. Broadly speaking, the alien elements were initially welcome to help develop the natural resources, and to provide essential services as artisans and middlemen. With the passage of years, however, the colonial authorities became worried about their increasing numbers and economic power. Strong measures of restrictions, expulsions, and even general massacres then were applied. The decimation of the entrepreneurial class soon convinced the authorities that they could not do without it, and the aliens were encouraged to come back. After some years, the same game repeated. Throughout most of the colonial period in Southeast Asia the Chinese were tolerated as an indispensable evil rather than a natural and integral part of the national economy. As much as possible, they were segregated from the native population.

This paper will focus on the economic roles and general conditions of the Chinese

middlemen in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial rule. Very similar pattern of development can be observed in the Spanish Philippines.

The Indonesian archipelago was mentioned in Chinese literature as early as the Han period in the first century of the Christian era. Tribute missions sent by local princes to China were recorded in subsequent dynastic histories. A Chinese Buddhist monk, Fa Seng 法顯, visited West Java in 414 A. D. on his way back from Ceylon. In A. D. 671 another famous pilgrim, I Tsing 義淨, studied Buddhism in the Buddhist kingdom Shrivijaya on Sumatra. The Yen Mongol emperor dispatched a Chinese fleet in 1292-1293 to try to subdue a Javanese rival. The local conditions of the archipelago were well known to the Chinese then.

The following is a Chinese description in Ming time of some Chinese settlements in Majapahit empire on East Java:¹

Majapahit is the place where the king lives..... Homicide is a daily occurrence. Chinese copper coins of various dynasties are freely used as the medium of exchange. In Tuban there are about one thousand families under the governance of two chiefs. Many Chinese from Kwangtung and Changchow (Fukien province) live here A half day walk from Tuban is the New Village, by the natives called Gersik. It is a gravel beach. When the Chinese settle here, they call it the New Village. The chief is a Cantonese. The population is about one thousand families. Foreigners from different tribes frequent the place to trade. Gold, all kinds of precious stones and foreign goods are sold here. About twenty *li* south of the New Village is Sarabaja A chief has under him about one thousand families of the natives. Some Chinese also live here

The Chinese community on Java was called the New Village in contradiction to the older settlement in Shrivijaya on Sumatra. When Shrivijaya was destroyed by Majapahit forces, a Chinese named Liang Tao-ming 梁道明 established himself on the northern part of the country and called help from the Ming Emperor. Many other outstanding personalities and their activities can be found in Chinese records.

The above pertains to the pre-colonial period. It was, however, the Dutch colonial rule and policies which were mainly responsible for the immigration of the two million and a half Chinese in Indonesia today. Dutch policies also determined the economic roles to be played by the Chinese, and, indirectly at least, shaped their peculiar social structure and their relationship with the natives. As the Dutch colonial policies in the Indies can be quite neatly divided into three distinctive stages, this paper will simply follow them to show how their changing policies might affect the alien entrepreneurs.

II

The Dutch first reached the Indies in 1596; the Dutch India Company was founded in 1602; the city of Jacarta was besieged and taken in 1619 with the help of some Chinese mercenaries. Upon its ruins and the surrounding swamp the Dutch built the stone city of Batavia, using mostly Chinese labor and skill. "Without the Chinese workmen," a Dutch historian puts down, "Batavia could not have been built."² Having established its foothold, the Company faced the problem of peopling the islands in order that the natural resources could be exploited. In 1623 ex-Governor and the founder of Batavia, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, left instructions with the new governor-general and the Council of the Indies, in which are to be found the following statements:³

A very great number of people is necessary for the inhabiting of Batavia, the Moluccas, Amboynas, Banda More money is requisite, to send great returns into the Netherlands No people in the world do us better service than the Chinese As trade cannot be gotten by friendly means, it is requisite by this present monsoon to send another fleet to visit the coast of China and take prisoners as many men, women, and children as possible If the war proceeds against China an especial foresight must be used to take a very great number of Chinese, especially women and children, for the peopling of Batavia, Amboyna, and Banda The ransom of the Chinese to be set at sixty ryals apiece; but by no means you must not suffer any women to return to China, or any other part out of the Company's jurisdiction, but with them to people the same.

In the early seventeenth century the Dutch periodically infested the coast of China and dragged on board their ships as many Chinese as they could lay their hands on. They were sold as indentured labourers in Batavia for sixty rix dollars per head.⁴ Piratical raids were also practised upon Chinese shipping. Several such exploits were recorded by Dutch historians. Coen also employed fairer means to achieve his end by holding out inducements to Chinese living in the neighboring Indonesian kingdom of Bantam to remove themselves to Batavia. In fact, the Chinese flocked to Batavia in such great numbers that it soon became no longer necessary to practise man-hunting or to subject the Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, etc. to labor services.

Governor-General Coen set out in a letter to the Company what he considered

to be a wise policy for the settlement. The Company, he said, should limit its trade to that of "a mighty wholesale dealer; the burghers should be active as middlemen, whereas retail trade should be left to the Chinese, retailers who in this connection, and even as merchants, far exceeded ours in ability."⁵

As it turned out, the most important economic role of the Chinese was that of middlemen between the East India Company and the native population. They collected the products which the Company needed and distributed the textiles which the Company imported. As artisans they provided all kinds of services which a developing economy demanded. Outside the city they struck into the forests and began to cultivate pepper, sugar canes, and market vegetables. They set up sugar mills which were driven by oxen or water as in China. The number of sugar refineries in the vicinity of Batavia increased to 130 in 1710.⁶

A Chinese merchant, So Bencon 蘇鳴崗, was by Coen appointed the first Chinese Captain. He supervised the Chinese affairs and acted as a comprador of the Company. An office was specially built for him. In time such ranks as Majors and Lieutenants were also created to administer the civil and lesser criminal cases among the Chinese. An eighteenth century Chinese traveller and long resident of the Indies gave his impression of the Captain system in the following words:⁷

The Chinese rich merchants and great traders amass inexhaustible wealth, whereupon they give bribes to the Hollanders and are elevated to the ranks of Great Captain, or Boedelmeester, Secretary, Choo-kat-Tat, and such like appellations, but all of them take the title of Captain (or Capitan). When the Chinese quarrel or fight they represent their cause to the Captain, before whom they make a low bow without kneeling, and refer to themselves as "juniors". The rights and wrongs, with the crooked and straight of the matter are all immediately settled either by imprisonment or flogging without giving the matter a second thought. With respect to flagrant breaches of the law and grave crimes, however, together with marriages and deaths, reference must invariably be made to the Hollanders.....

In the second half of the seventeenth century, on account of the Manchu conquest of China, many people from Fukien province set sail in their junks to settle in the South Seas. By 1700 A. D., 10,000 Chinese were reported to live in, or in the neighborhood of, Batavia.⁸ By 1733 their numbers already increased to 80,000 in the district of Batavia, though legally only one hundred immigrants were allowed with each ship coming to Java.⁹ It was inevitable that among the new immigrants some came without means of existence and became beggars and a menace to law and order. The colonial government under Valckenier began to stiffen its immigration

policy in 1733. Chinese were forbidden to go wandering in search of work; the keeping by them of *waroengs* (small shops) in the interior was no longer allowed; and many were deported to Banda, Ceylon, or the Cape of Good Hope to work in cinnamon gardens, and this often after long imprisonment in Batavia. "The regulation was carried out with gross unfairness: greedy officials seized Chinese long resident in Java in order to squeeze money out of them under threat of deportation."¹⁰

In 1740 a rumour went out that a number of the deportees were thrown overboard as soon as their ships were out of sight of Java. The whole Batavian Chinese community was in a panic. Many Chinese, fearing to meet the same fate, went out to the countryside to form roaming gangs. Governor-General Valckenier then recommended in the Council that the town of Batavia be cleared of the Chinese. The decision was carried out in October, 1740, and for a week massacre and plunder went on unchecked. 10,000 Chinese were reported to have lost their lives. The most pitiful part of the carnage was that 500 ordinary prisoners in the jail were knifed by special order of the governor, and Chinese patients were thrown out of the hospital to perish at the hands of the mob.¹¹

Their rage having subsided, the Dutch began to think of their trade and of the possible retaliation of the Chinese empire, then under the reign of Emperor Chien Lung (1736-1795), one of the greatest of the Manchu line. To him was dispatched a letter of apology and explanation, "couched in humble and submissive terms."¹² It was admitted that innocent and guilty had perished together in the incident, but the plea of necessity was advanced. As a matter of fact, the Dutch had nothing to worry about the Chinese authorities. Not only did the young Emperor take no steps to avenge the death of his subjects but was even reported to have said that "he was little solicitous for the fate of unworthy subjects who, in the pursuit of lucre, had quitted their country and abandoned the tombs of their ancestors,"¹³

The economic consequences of the indiscriminate pogrom was much real and pressing. Chinese sugar mills were all but destroyed. Rice and other foodstuffs which the Chinese used to import from East Java came no longer. In the city, as a Dutch eye-witness says, "there is a shortage of everything, and everything here costs twice as much as in former times, indeed sometimes there is nothing at all."¹⁴ The government was compelled to ration many of the daily commodities, including rice and sugar. Moreover, the Dutch goods at the Company's warehouses could not find any buyer, even at a much reduced price. The disappearance of the Chinese traders and laborers was so keenly felt that, even before the Chinese resistance in the countryside was totally quelled, the Board of Sheriffs decided that the colony needed the services of at least 5934 Chinese, and requested the government to grant amnesty to those who wished to return to the city.

Recovery, however, was surprisingly quick. While in December, 1740, according to the census which recorded only six women and one girl living in the suburbs, "there was not a single Chinese house left intact, because everything with the exception of side walls was taken away and burnt down and there was not one Chinese to be found in the whole city of Batavia, all either having been murdered, burnt, hanged or drowned,"¹⁵ by 1743, when the Captain system was restored, Chinese were swarming back to the city to bid for monopolies and tax farms.

During the second half of the century, the position of the Chinese was further strengthened. With the expansion of Dutch rule over the whole island, and the suppression of the East Javanese traders, the Chinese also gained in their sphere of activities, until they became "necessary to both Dutch and natives as middlemen, and it was no longer possible, even if it had been desirable, to root them out."¹⁶

Towards the end of the century the Company took to farming out, in addition to tolls and taxes, large areas of land. In 1796 out of 8535 villages (*dessa's*) belonging to the Company 1134 were leased out to the Chinese.¹⁷ With the governor's consent, they also rented villages from the regents, to whom they advanced money and reimbursed themselves from the harvest. They thus acquired quasi-sovereign rights over the occupants of the soil, and became, in a sense, the overlords of the population. In this system abuses and oppressions inevitably occurred; particularly in the villages leased to the Chinese for only a short period the people were worst treated. Naturally some Dutch disapproved the system and called the Chinese "a pest of the country," a phrase borrowed by Stamford Raffles when he came in contact with them in 1811.

111

In 1799 the East India Company was liquidated, and its rights were taken over by the Dutch government. Governor-General Daendels was much set against the practice of farming out the monopolies and the sale of land to the Chinese. The situation, however, could not be remedied due to shortage of money. During the English interregnum (1811-1814), Raffles began to buy back the monopolies, though he continued to lease lands to the Chinese.

After the Dutch came back, most of their planned reforms were throttled by the native uprisings known as the wars of independence (1825-1830). When order was restored, Governor Van den Bosch, aiming at building up the production of Java, and thereby restoring the commercial prosperity of the Netherlands, inaugura-

ted what became the famous *Culture System*. Under this scheme native cultivators were compelled to devote one fifth of their land to crops designated by the administration, and to hand over the yield in lieu of taxes. Non-cultivators were subjected to corvée labor of one fifth of a year's time (66 days).

Liberal terms were offered to induce Europeans and Chinese to act as contractors. But since "the Dutch," as van den Bosch remarked, "could not be beaten out of their home (Holland) with sticks",¹⁸ the Chinese became the obvious choice. Sometimes even "gentle pressure" had to be exerted to make the Chinese accept the onus of being middlemen. It was reported that a leading Chinese merchant had been warned that he could not expect to succeed his father as Captain unless he accepted a contract. After vainly offering 5,000 flanks for a substitute he had to comply. He became one of the wealthiest men in Java within a few years.¹⁹

The Chinese middlemen seemed to have profited materially by the *Culture*, or forced labor system, which left them practically free of native competition. They became the unchallenged distributors of European goods when the import trade began to flourish next to the export trade in this period. Increasing economic activities in the Outer Islands also demanded more Chinese labor than ever before. In the 1850's all restrictions on Chinese immigration ceased. Coolie recruitment stations were set up in various ports in South China, and large shipments were brought in to work in the plantations and mines. The Chinese population in the Indies increased to 221,000 in 1860, and to 344,000 in 1880.²⁰

The privileged position the Chinese enjoyed in the economy of the Indies, however, did not entail much change in their civil liberties. They were still confined to certain towns and to certain areas of these towns. They could not land in the Indies without buying a permit. And they could not travel in the interior without a pass. In fact, many of these regulations were revised and more rigorously applied in the 1850's and the 1860's. They were classified by the government as "Foreign Orientals" in 1848 and removed from the jurisdiction of European courts (*Raden van Justitie*). They were subjected to a special police court (*politie rol*) in which it was difficult to secure justice because of the wide and arbitrary powers of the judges.²¹ They remained a race apart from both the natives and Europeans.

IV

The Culture System was formally abolished in 1870 and replaced by what is known as the Liberal Period, characterized by the development of private Western

enterprise, mainly Dutch. The Chinese in this period, as a whole, made even greater progress than the Europeans, though they did not form big firms and large joint-stock enterprises.²²

Roughly speaking, the government continued to apply very restrictive measures against the Chinese residents in the Indies during the 1850-1900 period, even though their services were much required. But from about 1900 on the government began to reconsider their policies and many restrictive measures were either relaxed or abandoned.

In 1848 the *Grondwet*, or the fundamental law of the Netherlands, recognized, for the first time, the responsibility of the Dutch nation towards its colonial dependencies. The *Grondwet* involved certain important changes which were embodied in an Act in 1854 and were commonly known as the Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India. They reformed the judicature, introduced elementary education for the natives, and, in general, mitigated the despotic character of the administration and paved the way for the progressive reduction of servitude of all kinds, including the Culture System.

On the other hand, the Chinese, with their unsavory reputation as the exploiters of the natives, were held responsible for the latter's visible impoverishment. The new policy, which aimed at the betterment of the natives, logically started by curtailing the activities of the alien entrepreneurs. By a gubernatorial decree of 1848 Chinese were moved to the jurisdiction of the native courts. In 1854 they were forbidden to buy lands. In 1863 the pass system was revised and more vigorously applied. Such passes were to be issued at the discretion of local officials, and a visa must be affixed for each individual trip. In the nineties the Chinese were required to get new visas for every four days spent away from home. In 1866 the ghetto system (restricted residential zones) was extended to the whole island of Java and Madura, and later to all Outer Provinces.²³ In short, while increasing numbers of Chinese coolies were transported to work in European plantations, all kinds of expedients were tried to restrict them and to throttle their trading activities.

By the turn of the century, however, an obvious change in the government's thinking about the Chinese was discernible. In 1900 a Bureau of Chinese Affairs was set up to study their problems and to furnish information and advice to all branches of the government. The pass system was slightly relaxed in 1904, further slackened in 1910, and completely abolished in 1916. After 1916 the crowded Chinese zones of many cities were permitted to extend their boundaries, and in 1919 in Java and 1926 in the Outer Provinces all restrictions of residence came to an end.

In 1910 the classification of "Oriental Foreigners" was dropped and replaced by

a new classification of "Dutch citizens and Dutch subjects". In 1914 the hated police courts were abrogated. Subsequent legislation from 1917 to 1925 had the effect of completely removing the Chinese from the civil jurisdiction of the native courts, though their demand to be placed on the same legal footing as Europeans in criminal *procedure* (after 1918 the criminal law was substantially the same for all races) was never granted. ²⁴ In 1928 the *Capitan Chinese* system was abolished by an Act of the *Volksraad*.

Probably the most important innovation in the long run was the establishment of the "I. C. S.", or Dutch-Chinese schools, beginning in 1908. Unlike most of the schools provided for the indigenous population, the language of instruction in these schools was Dutch, and the curriculum was the same as in the European elementary schools. By 1914 there were 27 Dutch-Chinese schools, and their numbers continued to expand throughout the period of the Dutch rule. Moreover, the graduates of these schools were permitted to continue their education in European secondary schools. An increasing number of them even went to Holland for a university training.

Other petty discriminatory practices against the Chinese were ameliorated or completely stopped. In its letters sent to the Chinese the government began to use the title "to Mr. so and so" instead of "to the Chinese so and so", as was the former practice. In 1911 the Chinese in the Indies for the first time were permitted to wear western dress and to cut off their queues.

Several reasons induced the Dutch to reconsider their policy towards the Chinese. The most important were the pressures from the Chinese community itself, and the fears of the growing influence of the Manchu government. The two factors were closely interrelated. In 1860 China, in treaties with England and France, recognized for the first time the right of her subject "to go to [countries beyond the seas to establish himself or to seek his fortune]."²⁵ In 1886 two mandarins were sent out by the Viceroy of Kwantung to the South Seas to investigate the conditions of the emigrants. In 1898 the Chinese Envoy to the Netherlands travelled through the Indies, and in his memorial to the Imperial government listed six major grievances of the Chinese living there, with the conclusion that "the establishment of consulates is a thing which must not be delayed."²⁶ Before consulates were formally allowed in 1911, Chinese officials were already stationed in the Indies to advise and supervise the local Chinese school system. In 1907 a school was set up in Nanking especially for these overseas students who wanted to continue their education in the home country.

At the same time, under the stimulus of the reawakening spirit of China, the overseas Chinese also began to assert themselves to improve their position. Organized cultural activities flourished with the founding of such associations as the Confucian

Society, Java General Council of Educational Affairs and so on. From 1906 to 1910 Chinese Chambers of Commerce were set up in most of the major cities. The Dutch probably quickly sensed that their own interests lay in winning the allegiance of the Chinese community rather than in continuing the older policy of antagonism and suppression.

In reshaping their policies, the Dutch could be also influenced by the more felicitous example of the British next door in Malaya. Malaya had a much larger Chinese population proportionately, yet the British had them admirably managed by working with them in harmony. Considering that the Chinese was bound to come, that he was determined to live in his own way, that he was indispensable to the material success of the colonies, the British tactfully pursued a liberal policy towards him and made him a useful instrument in developing their coastal colonies into great centers of international commerce. It was very probable, though documentary evidence is hard to find, that the Dutch Secretary of Chinese Affairs was set up with an eye on the successful British experiment with the office of the Protector of Chinese.

Moreover, by the beginning of this century a growing nationalistic feeling became discernible among the Indonesians. In order to forestall a possible united front between the two subject people, it was imperative for the Dutch to win the goodwill of the Chinese by ameliorating his position. Against the growing Indonesian nationalism the Chinese might even be used as a buffer. A separate school system for the Chinese was instituted, in Donald Willmott's opinion, just with this objective in view:²⁷

When residential segregation was finally abolished, educational segregation took its place The system was in effect a very successful example of the colonial practice of divide and rule.

Let us further examine the racial composition of the so-called People's Councils (Volksraad), which the Dutch, in order to give their colonial rule an appearance of democracy, began to inaugurate in the 1910's and '20's. In both municipal and national levels, the Indonesians were invariably given a slight majority in representation. For example, in the national Volksraad of 1929, there were 30 Indonesians, 25 Dutch, and 5 Orientals (1 Arab and 4 Chinese). On the surface the favor was with the Indonesians. In reality, however, since the Oriental members were always Dutch-dominated, the Indonesian majority became a pyrrhic victory. In fact, a massacre of Chinese occurred in Koedoes, East Java, in 1918 because the Chinese representatives in the People's Council always followed the Dutch in voting down every Indonesian move.²⁸ The Chinese ameliorated position, therefore, seemed to have been obtained at the high price of having to antagonize the Indonesians. And to the Dutch consolation, their policy had succeeded so well that to the eve of the Indonesian war of independence few Chinese were interested in the revolutionary cause. They felt more secure to do business under a tolerable colonial rule than to be involved in the nationalistic

ferment. Unfortunately for them, this foreboding of theirs, as later events proved, turned out to be very true.

V

It is widely assumed that the extension of European domination over the lands and islands of Southeast Asia was mainly stimulated by economic reasons: to trade, to exploit the native resources, and to make as much money as possible for the home country. At the beginning the colonists were chiefly interested in the tropical products, which they exported to Europe, often at tremendous profit. At this stage, the natives were mostly allowed to retain their traditional order, unless the colonists were possessed with a great proselyting zeal. To maintain the luxuries of urbanite living in the tropics, the new rulers often found services of native labor inadequate. So they allowed the immigration of a limited number of alien laborers and craftsmen. A small number of traders might also be welcome as they brought in luxury articles of the Oriental kingdoms and provided commodities of daily living. But there was always fear or jealousy of this third element, and a conscious effort to limit its number.

With the Industrial Revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century, there came a great change in the economic structure of all colonial regimes. A colony was no longer looked upon merely a source of exotic products and spices. It became a ready market for the manufacturers of the home country. For this purpose a money economy had to be built. The retailing of large quantities of imported goods became especially important. Since the ruling community had not enough manpower, and the natives were not adequately trained for the job, the services of alien merchants became indispensable in this respect. Concomitantly, there was a great impetus to exploit the native resources for the world market. Large-scale plantations and mining absorbed more labor than could be found on the spot. Chinese coolies and Indian indentured laborers thus became the price imports. It was in the later part of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries that the Chinese began to "flood" Southeast Asia.

An economic theory pertaining to colonialism, especially in Southeast Asia, is that colonialism not only imposed a political superstructure over the tropical dependencies, but also a Western economic superstructure over the native scene. In other words, colonialism has created a dual economy, one money economy relating to the world market, and one native subsistence economy. It is said that the native people, so far as they were left alone, led their own life in their own

way according to a traditional scale of values in which economic values ranked so low as to be negligible.²⁹

In our view, even though the initial contact of the two economies could come in the nature of a shock for the native, who was unfamiliar with Western economic values, it is rather unrealistic to assume that he long remained unaware of the exploitations he was forced to undergo and the new economic system operating around him. He might not be given means to better himself, but surely could not fail to make a simple contrast between his own increasing misery and the exuberant prosperity of the foreigners in his own country. But until very late colonial policy was seldom blamed for this situation. Instead, the Chinese middlemen were invariably represented as great sinners. They were supposed to overreach the natives in every way, cheat in trade, advance money at usurious interest, and exploit their victims sometimes mercilessly. The Chinese were accused of shrewdness, extortion, and secretiveness in business method, which would be looked upon as the highest commercial virtues in London, New York, and Amsterdam. Even so much as this might be true, one has to remember that the Chinese were forced to be rich so that the colonial rulers could make full profit. And they were hated just when they helped to develop the economy and were giving some elementary lessons of modern economics to the natives.

An even more conspicuous phenomenon than the dual economy in tropical Asia was what by J. S. Furnivall called the plural society.³⁰ Each dependency was made up of a medley of peoples Europeans, Chinese, Indians, Arabs and natives. It was in the strictest sense a medley, for they mixed but did not combine. Each group held by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they met, but only in the market place, in selling and buying. There was not a common will, as there was not a common community. There was nothing like a common sacred tradition of customs to restrain the actions of the rulers. The whole dependency was kept alive, as it were, by artificial respiration, exercised mechanically from outside and above.

As the colonial rulers imposed their power over the native people by superior force, other aliens were brought in to help exploit the natural resources by virtue of their superior skill and industry. Coming from widely separated homelands, they could not possibly have any high degree of sympathy with, or understanding of, one another. Their common interests were exclusively material. They might have a mutual respect based on an appreciation of the other administrative or commercial qualities as the case might be, but nothing more. The alien entrepreneurs were let in as they continued to be useful to the interests of the colonial rulers. But they could be expelled, massacred, or stopped with advent of reserve economic forces or for any other political reasons.

NOTES

- (註 1) Ma Huan 馬歡, *Ying-yai Sheng-lan* 瀛涯勝覽, 1416
- (註 2) J. J. van Klaveren, *The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies*. Rotterdam: Drukkerij Benedictus, 1953. P. 44.
- (註 3) "Calendar of State Papers," East Indies, 1622-24, pp. 97-101, as quoted by Harley F. Mac Nair, *The Chinese Abroad: Their Position and Protection*. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1924. P. 52.
- (註 4) J. J. van Klaveren, *op. cit.*, P. 44.
- (註 5) Herman Theodor Colenbrander, *Coloniale Geschiedenis*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1871, ii, 181. As quoted by W. J. Cater, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies*. Oxford: Blackwell, for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936. P. 7.
- (註 6) Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. P. 457.
- (註 7) Ong Tae-hae 王大海 (Wang Ta-hai), *Hai-tao Yi-chi* 海島逸志, 1791. Translated into English as *The Chinaman Abroad: An Account of the Malayan Archipelago*. Shanghai: Mission Press, 1844.
- (註 8) D. G. E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*. London: MacMillan, 1960 edition. P. 272.
- (註 9) Tai Hung-chi 戴鴻琪, *In-Nie Hua-chiao Chin-chi* 印尼華僑經濟. Taipei, Overseas Chinese Publication Co., 1956. P. 16.
- (註10) D. G. E. Hall, *op. cit.*……… P. 273.
- (註11) A detailed discussion of the incident is by Joannes Theodous Vermeulen, "The Chinese in Batavia and the Troubles of 1740", translated by Tan Yeok-Seong, *Journal of South Seas Society* (Singapore), Vol. IX, Part I (June 1953).

Appearing in the same issue is a Chinese account by an anonymous writer, who left the city in the beginning of the trouble, and completed by Tan Nai-Giok half a century later. The translated title is: "The Early Accounts of Chinese in Kalapa (Batavia)".

- (註12) Victor Purcell, *op. cit.*…… P. 470.
- (註13) Frederick Wells Williams, "The Problems of Chinese Immigration in Further Asia", *American Historical Association*. Vol. I (1899). PP. 75-76.
- (註14) As quoted by J. T. Vermeulen, *op. cit.*..
- (註15) J. T. Vermeulen, *op. cit.*..
- (註16) J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands Indies. A Study of Plural Economy*. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1944. P. 46.
- (註17) *Ibidem.*
- (註18) Victor Purcell, *op. cit.*.. P. 501.
- (註19) J. S. Furnivall, *op. cit.*.. p. 143.
- (註20) Yau Nee Yung, "Chinese Population in the Dutch Indies" (in Chinese), *Journal of the South Seas Society* (Singapore). Vol. II, Part 3 (September 1941). PP. 139-145.
- (註21) Donald E. Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University, Department of Far Eastern Studies, memo, 1956. P. 2.
- (註22) Lea E. Williams, "Chinese Entrepreneurs in Indonesia", *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*. Vol. V, No. 1 (October 1952), 34-60.
- (註23) Lea E. Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism. The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960. Chapter one.
- (註24) Victor Purcell, *op. cit.*.. P. 509.
- (註25) Art. IX of Sino-French Treaty. *Herslet's China's Treaties*. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1908. Vol. I, P. 290.
- (註26) The text of the report can be found in Chao Erh-sun 趙爾巽 (ed.), *Ch'ing Shih Kao* 清史稿. Shanghai: 1942. Vol. 1, P. 620.
- (註27) Donald E. Willmott, *op. cit.*.. PP. 9-10.
- (註28) Harley F. MacNair, *op. cit.*.. P. 277.
- (註29) See, for example, Julius O. M. Boeke, *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy*. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942. And J. S. Furnivall, *op. cit.*..
- (註30) J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*. New York: New York University Press, 1956 edition. P. 304.