

Perceptions of Social and Bureaucratic Authority

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A substantial number of writers have dealt with authority of bureaucratic organizations; inevitably, therefore, a wide range of definitions of authority has been used. Weber's theoretical contributions to the study of bureaucracy and his classification of three types of authority are so well known as to need no comprehensive discussion here.¹ Weber makes a distinction between authority based on office and authority based on personal attributes, and, therefore, differentiates his legal-rational authority from his traditional and charismatic authority.

In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office. In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the **person** of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition. But here the obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma.²

Weber's treatment of legal-rational authority distinguishes between, but does not elaborate upon, authority inherent in office and authority based on technical knowledge and expertise. With regard to the former, "the typical person in authority occupies an office,".....The members of the corporate group, in so far as they obey a person in authority, do not owe this obedience to him as an individual, but to the impersonal order."³ Furthermore, for Weber bureaucratic authority is "the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability."⁴

¹Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons (Glencoe Ill.: Free Press, 1947)

²Max Weber, *Ibid*, p. 328

As with Weber so with others following him, emphasis is placed upon the formal, and rational, and impersonal aspects of authority. Bierstedt restates the case for the formal interpretation of authority: "In the ideal case the exercise of authority is wholly objective, impersonal, impartial, and disinterested."⁵ People are relegated to square boxes in organization charts. Management manipulates the workers in "the best way" in order to achieve its predetermined goals. The supreme authority is vested in the top of the structural hierarchy and flows down the "chain of command."

Lines of authority lead up through this administrative hierarchy; authority passes down from the top, through successive levels of management, to the first-line superior, while information and reports pass up through the same channels from the first-line superior to the top.⁶

Later studies of authority have altered the legal-rational authority by emphasizing the attitudes and emotions of the workers as determinants of performance efficiency; thus their chief concern is with the finding of informal organization, communication, morale, and interaction patterns. The consequence of these studies is the shift in emphasis from authority viewed as formal, rational, and impersonal control to an awareness of the importance of informal, nonrational, and subjective factors which condition acceptance of authority in bureaucratic organizations. This last point—the subjective factor—receives particular attention in the treatment of the "subjective aspect of authority" by Chester I. Barnard:

Authority is the character of communication in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to or "member" of the organization as governing the action he contributes; that is, as governing or determining what he does or is not to do so far as the organization is concerned.⁷

Barnard's interpretation of authority as the subordinate's personal acceptance of the communication reverses the traditional emphasis upon authority as orders issued from above and transmitted down the "chain of command". Why do subordinates accept order? In Barnard's view, a person can and will accept authority when four conditions prevail: (1) when he understands the communication, (2)

⁵Weber, *Ibid*, p. 330

⁶Weber, *Ibid*, p. 337

⁷W. Brooke Graves, *Public Administration in a Democratic Society* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1950) pp. 40-41

⁸Morroe Berger, Theodore Abel, and C. H. Page, eds., *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York: Van Nostrand & Co., 1954), p. 76

believes it to be consistent with organizational purposes, (3) is in his own personal interests, and (4) is mentally and physically able to comply with the communication.⁷ Barnard's central theme is that the acceptance of authority depends upon the cooperative personal attitude of both superior and subordinates and an effective system of communication. How can cooperative attitude be developed? Barnard's answer to this question is that there is an existence of a "zone of indifference" in each individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority. Whether this zone is wide and narrow determines the extent to which both superior and subordinates are cooperative; and its width or narrowness is in turn determined by the extent to which the rewards of membership exceed the burdens and sacrifices demanded. This zone of indifference reflects the individual's loyalty to or identification with organization. This theory of the inducement contribution equilibrium which operationally functions to maintain or enlarge the "zone of indifference" leaves a central questions; that is, what will happen if sacrifices made by the members or demands made upon them exceed the rewards they receive? A further question: what if the rewards offered are not the rewards the members want to obtain or the rewards that the members want to obtain are not offered by the organization? For example, the subordinates in our bureaucratic system wish to have promotional opportunity, but the principle of favoritism in promotion deprives them of this opportunity; and, therefore, we can safely predict that subordinates will have views about the processes by which their superiors are selected which may undermine the effectiveness of a superior simply because they do not accept the legitimacy of the selection process.

Most writers of authority explain the concept of authority in relation to power and influence. Among them is R. V. Presthus who analyzes authority as a special phenomenon arising out of a relationship between interpersonal relationships in organizations. His definitions of authority, influence, and power are as follow:

Authority can be defined as the capacity to evoke compliance in others on the basis of formal position and of any psychological inducements, rewards, and sanctions that may accompany formal position. The capacity to evoke compliance without relying upon formal role or the sanctions at its disposal may be called **influence**. When formal position is not necessarily involved, but

⁷Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p.163

when extensive sanctions are available, we are concerned with **Power**. The definitions turn upon formal position or role because this point of reference best suits the conditions of large-scale organization. The sanctioned control of organized resources through formal position is probably the major source of power in modern society.⁸

Thus, Presthus defines authority in terms of formal position.

Yet he goes on to suggest a view of organizational authority in which psychological elements play just as significant a part as the institutionalized power aspect of authority. He argues that the values, training and perceptions of members play a crucial role in defining and validating the authority of a bureaucratic system. Therefore, a number of field settings exist for the exploration of authority by social scientists: the family (parental authority), the school (teacher authority), small groups (informal authority and influence), and large organizations (bureaucratic authority). The boundaries between these kinds of authority are not clear-cut; they often interact in important ways. Presthus describes the various processes by which authority is "legitimated," and he suggests that legitimation rests upon four bases: technical expertise; formal role or position in the organization's hierarchy; the capacity of leaders to meet individual needs for recognition, security, and pleasant working relations; and, finally, legitimation through a generalized deference towards authority. His notion of the importance of generalized deference to authority is essential to a full understanding of the means by which bureaucratic authority is underwritten by individual personality factors. He maintains that "from infancy on the individual is trained to defer to authority. He develops over time a generalized deference to authority of parenthood, experience, knowledge, power and status." Elsewhere he further asserts: "It seems equally clear that personality structures are not discarded like snakes' skins when one enters the bureaucratic arena; rather the patterns of bureaucratic authority and deference reflect the values of institutions through which the bureaucrat has grown, primarily the family."⁹

A. Fox emphasizes the importance of the "authority of sanctions" as the basis upon which subordinates accept authority. Powerless individuals accept authority because they know that if they came into conflict with those who wield sanctions

⁸R. V. Presthus, "Authority in Organizations" in *Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior*, ed. S. Mailick and E. H. Van Ness, p. 123

⁹"Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 111 (1958) p. 57

they could not win. He acknowledges that within a bureaucratic organization the withdrawal of and threat to withdraw future benefits may be a significant sanction that is commonly used, or at least believed to be commonly used, and thus it is far more important than punishment, which takes the form of the removal of current privileges. He has this to say: "Every sanction has its positive and negative aspects. Financial rewards, promotion prospects, praise and approval, transfers to more desired work, and any other forms of gratification are positive, but also have a negative aspect in that they embody a conditional clause threatening their withdrawal or withholding if the required behavior is not forthcoming."¹⁰ He suggests that power rather than authority is often of key importance in the explanation of organizational compliance. For him, "apathetic conformity" is a key characteristic of much bureaucratic behavior. In adopting this approach to authority he stresses ways in which mixtures of authority and power contribute to the maintenance of bureaucratic control. Many bureaucrats will not have to be coerced into compliance, rather they will passively accept the status quo while feeling considerable discontent about many aspects of the system. When conflicts arise within the bureaucratic system, those who control it will compete with the active malcontents for the allegiance of this large apathetic group.

Our review of the primary literature on authority does not attempt to make an exhaustive analysis of all approaches to or definitions of authority. Our main purpose is only trying to adopt some of the concepts we find fit for our interpretation of the bureaucratic authority in the bureaucratic system under our study. In this article, our chief concern is with the exploration of the sentiments and emotions about and attitudes toward authority which are supposed to lead to the bureaucratic phenomenon of overcentralization of all decision-making authority at the very top of the system. Then, we will further concern ourselves with the description and elaboration of the functional and dysfunctional consequences arising out of this bureaucratic phenomenon.

Decision-making in a bureaucratic organization is often viewed as a process of accumulative authority in which an executive decision is only a moment in the process. With such a view, authority may be properly defined as a shared and cooperative activity

The form of organization should be such as to allow or induce the continuous coordination of the experiences of men. Legitimate authority flows from

¹⁰ A. Fox, *A Sociology of Work in Industry*, (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), p. 37

coordination, not coordination from authority.¹¹

But the reality in the Chinese bureaucratic organization is not so. Decision-making takes place at the apex of the hierarchy with little previous coordinating activities involving people across hierarchical levels. Why is decision-making authority so overcentralized? To answer this question, we find the legal-rational model of authority insufficient for our interpretation. We believe the generalized attitude toward and the sentiments and feelings about authority contribute substantially to conditioning the bureaucratic pattern of authority, so that we regard it as necessary to explore the process of socialization through which the individual has grown. Our objective will not be to give a detailed description of how the Chinese in fact have been socialized but rather to utilize the data we collected and whatever specific knowledge is available to describe in general terms their attitudes and sentiments.

Perceptions of Social Relations

The general perceptions of social relations in a society determine the patterns of interaction and communication, as well as the extent to which individuals or groups in the society can cooperate with each other and make concerted activities for the achievement of predetermined objectives. They further determine the nature of social control. Consensual conceptions of social relations make cooperative efforts much easier than conflictual ones, and are more likely to conceive of influence as the primary means of social control. On the contrary, the conflictual conceptions make imperative the authority of sanctions as proper mechanism of social control. The definition of authority in terms of communication made by Barnard and in terms of influence made by Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson¹² is based upon the assumption that social relations are basically consensual. In studying the bureaucratic authority in Chinese bureaucratic system, the prerequisite is to explore the general perceptions of social relations.

From an historical perspective the basic emotional concerns about interpersonal conflictual relations have run deep and wide in Chinese society. This was thoroughly explored by Richard H. Solomon and others. In our research, we asked one question: "Talking about social relations, some say that there are always conflicts of interests between individuals or between groups, while others say instead that interests or groups or individuals have much in common and share fundamentally

¹¹Mary Parker Follett, *Creative Experience*, (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924), p. 327

the same interests. What do you think about this?" The response rates are given in Table 3-1:

Table 3-1

Perceptions of Social Relations *

Perceptions	HLAs (N=15)	MLAs (N=69)	E. O. s (N=12)
Consensus is by far more typical	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%
Consensus is basically more typical	13.3	17.4	0.0
Pro/Con; hard to say	0.0	5.8	16.7
Conflict is basically more typical	33.3	18.8	33.3
Conflict is by far more typical	53.3	55.1	50.0
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table 3-1 indicates that more than 80 percent of the HLAs and EOs conceptualize social relations as conflictual (86.6% for the HLAs and 83.3% for the EOs) as compared to 73.9% of the MLAs with the same conceptions. If we take the variable of age into account young administrators appear more likely to be consensually oriented toward social relations than older ones. But through cross tabulation we don't find correlation between perceptions of social relations and education, career patterns, or socio-economic status. This may lead to the assumption that this social orientation might be culturally conditioned rather than the outcome of the interplay of internal bureaucratic elements.

Our further rigorous investigation into the nature of definitions of social conflicts made by our respondents turns out to be the result shown in the following table.

*HLAs is the abbreviation of high-level administrators, MLAs is the abbreviation of middle-level administrators, and EOs is that of elected officials.

¹² Chester I. Barnard, *Ibid*; H. A. Simon, D. W. Smithburg, and V. A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1950), Chapter 8

Table 3-2
Definitions of Social Conflicts

Definitions	HLAs (N=11)	MLAs (N=51)
Everyone is out for himself; man is by nature selfish	90.9%	76.5%
Conflict between different groups of interests	9.1	17.5
Conflict between superiors and subordinates	0.0	0.0
Generational conflicts	0.0	0.0
Conflicts between traditional ideas and new ones	0.0	2.0
Conflicts between ruler and ruled	0.0	2.0
Everyone is inclined to dominate over everyone else	0.0	2.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%

The table indicates strikingly that our respondents perceive social conflicts not in a group context, but in a personal context, and that man is by nature selfish and each one is out for himself. Their perceptions of conflictual social relations are seen to be very general, broad, and diffuse, though the MLAs are relatively specific. In the following we are to quote some exact statements of our respondents about their perceptions of social conflicts:

Individuals or groups are basically in conflictual relations. (Could you elaborate a bit?) Each person is self-centered, never pays attention to the good of the public or of others. (Are these social conflicts irreconcilable or not?) They can never be reconciled unless we restore our traditional social order. In traditional social order, we stressed strongly upon social harmony between individuals and between groups, and each person strictly followed moral virtues decreed by social order. Now, our traditional order is completely broken down, with the result that social conflicts become a common phenomenon. (How is it broken down?) People no longer hold it true to regard moral virtues as guide of their social behavior. (How can traditional social order be restored?) Now we are launching a Cultural Renaissance Movement. I think this is the best way to restore our traditional social order.

Another respondent said:

I think individuals are in conflictual relations. (Could you elaborate a bit?) You know, Chinese are too "clever," and each has his own ideas and thinks his own ideas are absolutely right; the ideas of others, if found contradictory to his, are absolutely wrong. Each one shows his unwillingness to cooperate with everyone else and tries to dominate over others. Such a character makes him unable to be cooperative with others. (Are these conflicts irreconcilable or not?) They are irreconcilable. (Then how.....?) We should have a strong authority to run over all conflictual relations.

A third respondent said:

Man is born selfish, and groups formed out of selfish individuals are naturally selfish groups; therefore, when individuals or groups come into contact with each other, conflicts are bound to arise.

These responses verify the assumption that endemic in the political culture and in the mind of the individual are deep worries about interpersonal conflicts. The supreme emphasis placed upon peace, order, and harmony, which is found prevalent in traditional Confucian classics, may be viewed as testimony of these innermost worries. The preaching of the good of human nature and the emphasis upon the importance of self-cultivation of moral character may similarly reflect those worries.

Desire for Authority as a Means of Seeking Security Against Social Conflicts

Perception of social relations as conflictual brings about tensions and anxieties in the individual in his personal interaction with others, and, therefore, desire for control of social conflicts. Historically, the Chinese social tradition has emphasized the supreme importance of maintaining peace and interpersonal harmony as basic social values and regarded "disorder" and "confusion" as social taboos. Structurally these basic social values and taboos make Chinese society welcome the orderly and predictable qualities of hierarchism in the structure of all social role relationships. The famous five Cardinal Social Relations (wu-lun), which determine the relations between father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, ruler and ruled, friend and friend provide the basic matrix of hierarchical social structure in which each individual finds his own permanent place and is made to learn from early childhood the proprieties of moral virtues and ritual forms as guide of his

action. Out of these five basic social relations, three are in the family and the relation between father and son is the most basic of all social relations. Therefore, "the Confucian political order was centered on the notion that the family was the matrix of society's political relation." The maintenance and management of a harmonious familial relation depends upon the cultivation of the moral virtue of filial piety ".....with which the superior man serves his parents and which may be transferred as loyalty to the ruler; and the fraternal duty with which he serves his elder brother may be transferred as submissive deference to elders," Thus, the central themes in Chinese political and social life"..... all converge in accentuating the importance of the collectivity. The individual found his identity only as a functioning member of the social order. More particularly, the definition of the self in terms of status in the collectivity was governed by relations to the appropriate form of authority. The central concern of both individual and collective life was thus propriety with respect to authority."¹³ In the rigidity of hierarchical authority relationship, authority is supposed to be harsh and stern in the treatment of subordinates; it is something to be feared and distrusted, to be revered and relied upon; it is omnipotent and monopolistic. Take parental authority for an example, our question, "As you recall now, when you were a boy in the family, who would have more say in important family decisions?", derived the following responses:

Table 3-3
Family Authority Pattern

Decision Maker	HLAs (N=15)	MLAs (N=67)
Father monopolized all decision-making power; children were never permitted or dared to speak out their ideas	73.3%	76.1%
Father monopolized all decision-making power, but children were consulted or usually expressed their ideas	26.7	23.9
Family were discussing the matter before father made the final decision	0.0	0.0
All family members had equal opportunity to participate in family discussion and decisions	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%

As Table 3-3 indicates, parental authority is monolithic and monopolistic; and children were not permitted nor dared to express their opinions. We find no significant variation in the responses to this question when the sample of respondents is considered in terms of geographical origin, socio-economic status, or educational level. In the following we are to list a few of the responses we derived from our interviewing:

All the time it was father who made all important family decisions. (Could you express your ideas when your father made the decision?) Could I? Who says so? What he decided had to be obeyed without anyone in the family daring to interrupt him. We children dared not cast any doubt on his decisions. What we should do was just passively following his order. (What if you happened to express your ideas?) You would be surely pointed out not as a filial son; therefore, you would get yourself be punished, no matter whether the idea you expressed was for or against his decision. (Anyway, what were the relations between you and your father?) Father was a very stern and harsh man, we feared him; but he was also a kind man, and therefore we loved him. He loved us children, too. (How did you express your love of your father and how did he express his love of you?) We just loved each other deep at our hearts, we seldom expressed our love.

A second respondent:

.....Father was very strict and stern. He often gave us children a good talk that good children never interrupted when adults were talking. (If you happened to interrupt, then what?) You would be punished. (How would you be punished?) You would be punished to kneel down or stand upright and motionless for an hour straight or longer, or be beaten with a stick until it was worn out on you. So, when father was talking, I usually pretended not to listen.

A third respondent:

.....In traditional Chinese family, people usually had their marriages arranged for them by their parents rather than they themselves chose their own partners. My marriage was arranged by parents; and before I married, I had not seen my wife for even once. (Why couldn't you choose your own partner?) Children were supposed to have no right to express their own

¹³Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T., 1968), p. 86

opinions or to initiate anything including your own marriage. (What if you initiated doing something?) I would commit a serious crime of being not a filial son. (Then what?) I would be looked down upon as disturbing the family order, and I would be severely punished. This crime and this crime alone would be far enough to have yourself be brought to the ancestor temple (Tze-tang) or before the public to be severely punished. So, after I married, I went away from home and never went back again. Later, I found my own wife.

A fourth respondent:

..... I thought and still think it is right that father in the family should monopolize all decision-making authority. (Why?) Children are easily amenable to bad influences, and they are immature. If you let them have their own ideas expressed without limitation, they will sometimes oppose yours. (What if they oppose your ideas?) They will disturb the harmony of the family and they will try to stand over your head. Now I have my own five daughters; I treat them the way I was treated by my father.

A fifth respondent:

..... My elder brother once committed a very serious crime, gambling. When he came home, father was very angry and beat him nearly to death with a heavy stick. But brother didn't ask for excuse; on the contrary, he swore to leave home and would never come home again. Father swore, too, that if he came back he would break his leg. (Then what happened?) Brother really left home, and father feared he might lose him forever. (And then?) You know, a young boy of 16 had nowhere to go in the countryside at that time. Three days later, brother came back and held a very hostile attitude toward father, keeping a distance from him and not speaking to him. (What did your father do to your brother?) Father didn't break his leg, didn't beat him anyway. (Why?) I don't know why. Possibly father feared that if he beat him again he would leave home forever. But father appeared very angry and was indifferent to him. (And then what came out at last?) One day, father told me that when brother happened to be in his presence I would kneel down before father and ask him to forgive brother for his crime of gambling, and in this way the war between father and brother might terminate. (Did you do as you were told?) Yes. (Why? It was not your fault!) He was father and I had to obey him; and I did so also in the hope that family relations might

be kept in order and harmony.

Several points shown from these responses are worthy of discussion. First of all, filial piety is extremely emphasized as the basis governing parent-son relations. Filial obligation is an absolute requirement and exists without regard to the quality of parental behavior. The relationship with authority is thus not a reciprocal one in which the obligations of obedience and respect are contingent upon the modal behavior of those with authority. The statement of Franklin W. Houn that "within each relationship rights and obligations of those who have entered into it are reciprocal and mutually conditioned rather than unilateral and absolute" is not telling the truth, even though Confucius himself expounded the point time and again in the *Analects* that when a ruler no longer behaves like a father he forfeits his parental authority.¹⁴ When Duke Ching of the State of Ch'i asked Confucius about government, the latter replied: "There is government when the prince is prince and the minister is minister; when the father is father and the son is son. . . ." But in actual practice, this does not indicate the rejection of unconditional obedience to authority.

Second, acceptance of authority is strongly sanctioned by moral virtues, "He was father, and I had to obey him!", without reference to how the individual was treated by authority. Since early childhood the individual has been made to learn through self-discipline and self-cultivation of moral character the propriety of not expressing either his emotions or thoughts about authority. Thus, suppression of emotions, passive dependence upon and generalized deference to authority are perceived to be the chief ingredients of attitude toward authority.

Third, submissiveness of the individual to the interests of collectivity sanctioned by authority is a prominent trait in Chinese personality. The fact that the respondent knelt down before father and asked him to forgive brother for his crime of gambling for the purpose of restoring family harmony and order is a case in point for the illustration of this personality trait. The striking contrast between the self-centered Americans and the situation-centered Chinese elaborated by Francis L. K. Hsu provides a plenty of data verifying this trait.¹⁵ The individual's identity with the self is meaningless unless he functions as a member of a hierarchic collectivity. His attempt at self-realization is thought of as "selfish"; he doesn't have his own interests in isolation from the interests

¹⁴Franklin W. Houn, *Chinese Political Traditions* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 9

of the collectivity; his marriage, for example, is not a self-choice of a life-long partner but a choice made by parents functioning to fulfill the obligations of family continuity. The following story told about a girl of 19 can serve to illustrate how an individual sacrificed herself for the peace and harmony of the family:

Father was working in a corporation as a high-level manager, earning enough to support a family of seven: parents and five children. Mother was dutiful and loyal to father, and made the home a comfortable place. Children were all attending school and were filial to parents. The family was a very happy one.

But through careful concealment, father established another family with a woman and gave birth to a child. When this was revealed, the family was disturbed into great disorder and confusion. Father and mother quarreled harshly day in and day out and both turned their anger to children. The children could do nothing but patience with parents. The girl, the eldest child in the family, had done all she could to show her deeper filiality to both father and mother in the hope that by doing thus she could win back the family peace and harmony. In addition, she had repeatedly knelt down at the feet of mother and asked her to be patient with and tolerant of father and even to show more love for father, but what she got in return was mother's more anger at her. She further went to see her father's uncle and asked him to mediate the family quarrel but all was of no avail. Finally, she thought she could do nothing more than commit suicide as the last resort of winning back family harmony and of revitalizing love between father and mother¹⁶

All the moral virtues preached by the traditional Confucians were crystallized in the personality of the girl: filiality to parents, patience with and tolerance of parent's anger, and, finally, self-sacrifice, all for the family order and harmony.

Fourth, the authority of sanctions has its limit. Beyond that limit, the emotional aggression of those in subordinate positions against authority is perceived to be possible, which may threaten to break up the authority relations. The son's running away from home is a case in point. Authority's understanding of the limit may function to check the extent of severity and harshness to which authority

¹⁶Francis L. K. Hsu, *Americans and Chinese: Two Ways of Life* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953)

is exercised. For example, after the son came back, the father might be well aware that if he punished him again, the parent-son relations might be permanently broken up.

Finally, intermediary plays an important role in the mediation of authority relationships. When an authority relationship develops into such a high tension as to be drawn near the edge of being broken up, some intermediate agent is elicited as a means of restoring the relationship. When the girl found that her direct appeal to filiality could not win back her family order, she thought that the intervention of a higher authority might have some result. Then she went to ask her father's uncle to mediate the family quarrel.

Avoidance of Direct Contact

As we noted above, given the perceptions of conflictual social relations, the individual finds it safe to huddle himself up under the umbrella of authority as a means of seeking security against social conflicts. Another means of dealing with social conflicts is avoidance of direct contact with those with whom there is potential of running into conflicts. Since early childhood, the individual has been cautioned and severely disciplined against involvement in fight with neighboring children. A child frequently going out among other children is termed a "wild child" or a "bad child". A Chinese saying, "Sweep the snow in front of your own door," or "Mind your own business," is taken as a daily creed governing personal dealings with others. One of our respondents recalled:

As I remember, I once fought with a neighboring child. After the fight, father beat me harshly and took me by the ear to the child's family and ordered me to kneel down before his parents asking their excuse for my crudeness. (For what did you fight with the boy?) He broke my kite, and I beat him; then the fight started. (Did you kneel down as you were ordered?) Yes, how could I disobey father's order? (How did the child's parents react?) They were educated people, so asked my father's excuse, and promised to buy a new kite for me. (Then what happened?) When I came home with father, mother scolded me and swore never to permit me to run out of the house again.

One senses this parental punishment of the child for his involvement in fight

¹⁶*Home Education Journal*, a Chinese periodical monthly issued at Taipei, Issue No. 19, 1966, p. 27

with a neighboring child to the deep worries of the parents about conflicts with neighbors. The best way to deal with these conflicts is avoidance of contact with them, to shut up child in the house and never permit him to run out again.

Historically, though Chinese have prided themselves on their traditional emphasis upon the ties of friendship, it is generally recognized that true friendship is hard to obtain. A Chinese woman educator once stated, "If you make friends with bad men, then you will become bad; if you make friends with good men, then you will become good. Therefore, it is advisable that you have to be very careful if you have a mind making friends with somebody. You should carefully study what he has done in the past, how he has behaved himself, and consider whether you can benefit by making friends with him. Confucius is right in saying, "Don't make friends with those who are inferior to you!" For, if you make friends with those who are inferior to you, you can not benefit from them."¹⁷ Thus, realistic expectations of benefits from friends underwrite Chinese friendship.

Even when brothers can not get along well, the best way is to get them separate from each other in order to avoid conflicts. "Brothers in the family sometimes can not get along very well. The elder brother no longer is kind to younger ones and the latter will not be respectful to the former. Under such a situation, it is advised that they had better be separated from each other and divide the family. After they are set apart, they will not be in conflict again, and they will maintain brotherly affection, just like the sun and the moon which have never met and will never meet together but maintain an eternal and harmonious relation. The case is the same with friends. When old friends can not get along well, they had better keep some distance from each other. Separation often makes friendship more intimate, and dreaming of friends far away is a feeling of sorrowful happiness, a feeling highly valued in Chinese poetry."¹⁸

Chinese parents are very unhappy about and even furious at their children's going around with neighboring children and therefore keep them indoors most of the time for fear that they may be led astray by "bad" children. How happily a person gets along with people as an adult in his job, in his family and social life depends to a great extent on how he gets along with other children when he was young. Deprivation of chances of getting along with other children will bring about in the child a feeling of distrust of others, and therefore discourage him from making friends and make him grow up unable to mix with people or adapt to social life.

If contact can not be avoided, interaction patterns are usually wrapped up in ritual forms, such as politeness, restraint from expressing opinions, or adopting a role of listening rather than a role of talking.

Personalization of Social Relations

Perceptions of conflictual social relations, a generalized mutual distrust of each other, avoidance of contact, and reliance upon ritual forms or control of emotions are characteristics of Chinese interpersonal relationships as we have so far described. Under such a situation, it is understandable that traditional Chinese society places great emphasis upon personalism as an ultimate value. Thus, kinship groups such as families and clans, circles of friends, fraternal bodies, and localistic associations are noted as the basis of social structure within which highly affective, nonrational, and emotional dimensions of the man are the central elements governing his action and interaction with others. These personal relationships are not merely ethically valued but also the medium the common people have for getting things done. They are recognized to provide for the social and moral order upon which the peace and stability of the society rest. Within these personal groups the worth of the individual is the complete devotion of his filiality and loyalty to the authority of these primary groups and to the achievement and aggrandizement of primary-group goals. In a bureaucratic situation, it is found that personal associations overshadow impersonal bureaucratic rules. One of our respondents has the following to say in responding to our question, "What are the most satisfying aspects of your job?":

The most satisfying aspect of my job is that nearly in every office I have a close friend. (What kind of friend?) One of my classmates or schoolmates, of province-mates, of classmates in party school, or of my colleagues with whom I worked together somewhere else. (Why is it so satisfying to you to have a close friend in each office?) You know, we Chinese highly value personal feelings (Jen-ch'ing). If you have a personal matter which you want to deal with through a bureaucratic office you can not put it through if you don't have a friend in that office.

Thus, the informal personal relationship as a prevailing and ethically approved

¹⁷*Taiwan Women Periodical*, No. 151, Jan. 1969, p. 22

¹⁸*Education and Culture Monthly*, No. 349 Jan. 30, 1967, p. 21

operational norm in traditional Chinese society intrudes into the impersonal bureaucratic system of behavior. We will discuss this later. Chinese are found to feel uneasy in their association with people outside their primary groupings. Our informal and supplementary interviewing of some college students revealed that the informal grouping in the classroom centered upon the factors of former schooling in a same high school and of a same locality. Students from different high schools or from different localities seldom gathered together for extracurricular activities through their college years. When we asked them the question, "How do you get along with your classmates?", one of them responded thus:

I get along with my classmates very well. We seldom quarrel or argue with each other. (Why don't you argue with each other?) They are your classmates and will be your life-long associates in your future career. You can not endure to harm mutual warm feelings toward each other. (What if you find their opinions are different from yours?) Just try to listen to them and not express your own opinions. (As you can recall now, have you never quarreled or argued with any classmate during the past three college years?) Oh, yes, I have quarreled with those classmates who were my high schoolmates. You know, it doesn't matter if you quarrel with those with whom you have already closely associated.

In concluding what we have discussed so far, we are made to learn that the traditional Confucian ideology is oriented toward the achievement of social peace and harmony through structuring all social role relationships into a rigid form of hierarchism and through a system of ritual forms and moral virtues. The individual from early childhood is made to learn the supreme importance of authority, the absolute denial of the legitimacy of all forms of aggression, and the passive dependence upon, filiality or loyalty to authority as the sole means guaranteeing him the comforts of security and controlling social conflicts. Through constant self-discipline and selfcultivation of moral character, he has learned to conform to specific and rigid patterns of conduct in all of his relationships, and is made to realize that all these relationships constitute a well defined hierarchy within which he has a definite and permanent place. He is made to further realize that the existence and worth of the self is for the realization and aggrandizement of collective interests and that attempts at self-realization is morally wrong. Thus, submissiveness of the self to collective interests is one of the characteristics of his personality. The severe sanctions of authority against the individual's association

with peers in his childhood cultivate in him a generalized feeling of distrust of others and therefore make him think it morally right to avoid contact with others with whom he has no clear-cut social role relationships. This provides a social value placed on personalism as a basis governing interpersonal relations. Further, severe punishments or threats of severe punishments make the individual fear those in authority and keep him from contact with them. A modal Chinese personality is lacking in initiative and autonomy, but comes to expect initiative and guidance from those in authority. These are the social and personality characteristics. What are their implications for bureaucratic pattern of authority? Our central assumption is that social, cultural, and personality characteristics are critical in molding individual behavior and attitude in a bureaucratic system of organization. In the following section, we are to explore the authority relationships in the bureaucratic system under our study.

Different Categories of Personnel

Before we are to discuss the authority system, we think it necessary to describe the different categories of personnel and the operational principles of their recruitment, transfer, and promotion. These principles are seen both to reflect the impact of the general social system of which the bureaucratic system is a part and to produce impact upon the system of authority.

Elsewhere we already made a detailed description of the social and career backgrounds of the administrators in the bureaucratic system of organization. Here we are to make a further description of their recruitment, transfer, and promotional patterns at the operational level. In positional terms, there are three distinct categories of personnel: the first-line supervisors (subsection chiefs), middle-level administrators (section chiefs), and the high-level administrators (department and bureau directors and deputy directors). Because our purpose is to study those administrators who are supposed to be called upon to participate in decision-makings or to formulate policy proposals, our chief concern is only with the latter two categories of personnel: the MLAs and the HLAs.

Within the bureaucracy, no civil bureaucratic interest groups exist to bring systematic pressure upon the political center of the governmental system. The deliberate organization of such power groups to exert pressure upward whether for increased salaries or for other demands such as merit systems of appointment and promotion is inconceivable. It would be a stark violation of the basic value

of the supreme importance of hierarchical authority. **Operational Principles of Recruitment and Promotion of the MLAs**

1. Nearly all personnel recruitment of those from the MLAs downward to the rank-and-file takes place at the bottom of the formal hierarchical structure, the fifth class and the second or third class. All the personnel of the bureaucratic system are classified into 14 classes: from the lowest class one to the highest class fourteen. A college graduate, after he has passed a senior civil service examination, is appointed to class five; and a high-school graduate is qualified only for taking a junior civil service examination, and after he has passed such an examination he starts his career as a class two or class three personnel. Each class consists of three grades; and a civil servant automatically has an annual salary increase from one grade to the next on the condition that his performance during the year is graded as "satisfactory" by his superior. A middle-level administrator must be a class nine or class ten administrator. Thus, he will not be promoted to a position as section chief unless he has worked from 12 to 15 years during which he may be expected to be promoted from class five to class nine or ten.

2. Formally the civil service examinations are open and highly competitive, but the content of those examinations functions to screen out those candidates with technical and professional competence mostly required by the bureaucracy, especially during the period of its rapid modernization. A college graduate majoring in medical science, for example, finds himself unable to pass such an examination emphasizing excessively the "generalist" aspects of the candidate. This type of civil service examination may serve to explain why the generalists and specialists in the bureaucratic system constitute such a disproportionate ratio. Thus, we may hypothesize that college graduates with majors in technology are not motivated to take civil service examinations or seek employment in public bureaucracies, especially when their expert competence is found more marketable outside government sector. This hypothesis can be partially tested by the response of a highly technical bureau director to our question: "What do you think is the most important problem in your Bureau?" He had this to say:

The most important problem in my Bureau is that I have had difficulty to find qualified persons to fill up the four positions of section chiefs directly under me. (Why?) You know, I have been director in this Bureau for years, and at the same time I have taught in a medical school of a university. I have tried to recruit some of my smart students with master degrees to fill up

those positions, but I failed. (How come?) A person will not be appointed to any bureaucratic position according to laws if he has not passed a civil service examination. But all my students do not want to take such examinations.

3. When eligibility for appointment to a bureaucratic position is established by passing a civil service examination centrally sponsored by the National Government, operational procedure of appointment, which is also centrally administered by the Bureau of Personnel of the Executive Yuan, is based not on the merit system of the order of the examination scores, but rather reflects strongly the supreme value of personalism characteristic of the general social system. In our most important problem discussions during our interviewing, 24 out of 73 respondents mentioned personalism as the determining factor in personnel appointment. One of them said:

The most important problem is that personal relations are the determining factor in all aspects of personnel administration. If you look deeper into the personnel administration, you can clearly see that those appointed to the desired positions must have had strong backers behind them..... This is the fundamental characteristic of our society, emphasizing personal relations, and this characteristic pervades not only the governmental organizations but every corner of the society. (Who are the strong backers?) The national legislators, the controllers, the party leaders, and the ministers.

The pressure from social groups—stable circles of friends, powerful political bodies such as national legislature and national assembly and party, localistic associations and alumni associations, and above all, kinship organizations—is usually a matter of claiming privileges from the bureaucrats. An official, if he refuses requests, will risk to alienate himself from the whole system of social relations based upon the informal personal bond. "The average official could hardly afford to take this step because of the transitory nature of his official position. His office of the moment carried no guarantee of a life-time career; and there was, of course, no provision for pensions. In fact, his personal primary groups were his permanent base of social life, the society from which he sprang, which he brought with him when he entered officialdom, and to which he must return when his official career came to an end" ¹⁹

4. The operational principles of promotion and transfer tend to discourage a productivity and achievement orientation, because these principles are based upon three formally established criteria: moral conduct including loyalty to superior,

punctuality to jobs, and performance records. The diffuse, abstract, and subjective nature of these criteria leaves a great leeway for personal sentiments of likes and dislikes and for the social groups to intrude into the operational procedures of promotion and transfer.

5. Lateral movement of the MLAs across departmental or bureau boundaries is limited. This can be tested against the average long tenure of an MLA in one agency and the small number of agencies in which he has served. An individual normally advances in class and grade within his own department or bureau, generally the department or bureau in which he was initially appointed.

6. The security of the individual bureaucrat is to a great extent protected by the civil service regulation that reads that a civil servant shall not be removed unless he violates penal laws. Bad job performance has never led a civil servant to removal or dismissal.

7. Because the HLAs are exclusively appointed from National Government based upon favoritism, the MLAs find themselves in a position from where they can not advance any further. Our question, "What do you think you will do five years or so from now?", the responses we obtained are indicated in Table 3-4 in the following:

Table 3-4
Frequency and percentage of Perceptions of Own Future
of the Middle-Level Administrators

Perception	Frequency	Percentage
Expects to remain where he is	13	18.3%
Just waits for retirement; no hope for advancement	23	32.4
Already starts seeking employment elsewhere; anxious to leave public administration	10	14.1
Expects to advance in bureaucracy	11	15.5
Future uncertain; doesn't know	9	12.7
Expects to be transferred to another position at the same level	3	4.2

¹⁹ C. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior," in *Confucianism in Action*, edited by David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 158

Not concerned with promotion or transfer; only concerned with opportunity to apply specialized knowledge	2	2.8
Total	71	100.0%

Table 3-4 shows that more than 60 percent of our respondents express hopelessness in their career advancement, among whom some expect to remain where they are, others just wait for retirement, and still others have already sought employment outside public bureaucracy. Only more than 15 percent see the possibility for further advancement. Those who think they can be promoted in bureaucracy told us that they had strong political backers behind them. In the following are a few of the responses:

.....You know, in the past years my performance records have been all above 84 to 89.5, a record of a solid "A". If promotion is made upon the basis of performance achievement, I am the first one to be promoted, But the situation is not so. Whether you can be promoted or not depends completely upon the social relations you have cultivated with your superior or with some more important political leader who can back you up.

A second respondent said:

I have never considered the problem of transfer or promotion, because I don't think I have such an opportunity. (Why don't think you have such an opportunity?) To be promoted or transferred to some desired position, you have to have some good personal relations with some powerful political leaders. I don't have such personal relations.

A third respondent:

Retired. I think of nothing but retirement.

A fourth respondent:

It's hard to say. I think that I have ample opportunity to be promoted to higher position, because I have good ties with the party authorities and with some politically important persons at the National Government.....

A fifth respondent:

I have never thought of promotion. As an administrator, you should not be concerned with your own promotion or transfer. If you are thinking of that, you are no longer a good administrator. What a good administrator should do is just faithfully performing his duties. If your superior happens to promote you, that's all right and you should take your new position; if he doesn't

promote you, you still should remain happy. Only by doing thus can you maintain good relations with your superior and can the organization be kept in peace and order.

A sixth respondent:

.....Only God knows, but I know, too, that I will never have a chance to be promoted.....

A seventh respondent:

.....I hate that I don't have a good father. If I had one, I would have a chance to be promoted. (What do you mean by a "good" father?) He were a national legislator, a minister, or a party leader for example.....

Operational Principles of the Appointment of the HLAs

The operational principles governing the appointment of the HLAs are found different from those governing the recruitment, appointment, and promotion of the MLAs.

1. Persons who are to be appointed to the high-level administrative positions don't have to pass a civil service examination. It is found that out of the 49 high-level administrators only six have passed a civil service examination. Their appointment is made by a protege arrangement. Their long careers are seen to be consistently linked to the political careers of their patrons with whom they have established an identification by being helpful, informative, and deferential to them. They were appointed down from National Government rather than promoted up from within the bureaucracy.

2. The tenure of the HLAs is not protected by civil service laws but subject entirely to the whims and fancies of their patrons who can move them from one position to another as they see fit. Thus, the HLAs are found to have been transferred frequently from one agency to another and consequently have had a relatively short tenure in each agency. This protege arrangement is assumed to have created a great impact upon their value orientation. The temporary nature of their positions may create in them a feeling of insecurity and therefore orient them toward the maintenance of status quo rather than toward performance achievement.

3. Different powerful national political leaders are perceived to patronize different HLAs, and the Protégés of each are in control of certain departments or bureaus. The functional consequences of this are the formation of factions, the limited capacity for the establishment of lateral relationships across departmental

boundaries, and internecine conflicts and struggle for allocation of resources.

4. This protégé arrangement is further seen to completely deprive the chief executive of his appointive power of the HLAs, and consequently decreases his authority over them. But his own appointment by the highest authorities secures his formal position of authority over them. Powerless may he be in appointment, he has potential power or threat of power to remove them. This helps maintain formally the hierarchic nature of authority of the bureaucratic system. In this dilemma situation encountered by the HLAs, they see it appropriate to show formal conformity and deference to the chief executive and at the same time maintain informal personal relations with their patrons.

Taking into account the political nature in the appointment of the HLAs, we can assume that a perception of a highly uncertain future must be prevalent among them. Their responses to our question, "What do you think you will do five years or so from now?", are shown in Table 3-5 in the following:

Table 3-5
Frequency and Percentage of the HLAs' Perception of Own Future

Perception	Frequency	Percentage
Expects to remain where he is	2	11.1%
Just waits for retirement; no hope for advancement	3	16.7
Already starts seeking employment elsewhere; anxious to leave public administration	0	0.0
Expects to advance in bureaucracy	3	16.7
Future uncertain; doesn't know	7	38.9
Expects to be transferred to another position	3	16.7
Total	18	100.0

In addition to the two categories of personnel described above, the third group worthy of brief description is the elected body, the council. Collectively, the council has no legislative authority according to laws promulgated by the National Government. The authority of initiating and formulating policies is entirely vested in the administrative bureaucracy. But it has some limited authority over the budgets submitted to it by the bureaucracy by increasing or decreasing

a number of dollars for each program, though it can not veto a program. The councilmen, nominally elected by ward to represent the population, actually function as representatives of primary social groupings. Their particularistic demands upon the bureaucracy can hardly be resisted by the chief administrators.

The distinctions between the different categories of personnel in the patterns of their recruitment, appointment, transfer, and promotion are assumed to have great impact upon the patterns of intergroup relationships and upon their attitudes toward authority. In the following Section we will explore the relationships between different groups and their attitudes toward authority.

Intergroup Relationships and Attitude toward Authority

If the informal moral order of the general social system, with its emphasis on the primary groups and intimate personal relations, is found to be influential on the recruitment, appointment, and promotion of personnel, it is assumed that the intergroup relationships and attitude toward authority within the bureaucratic system of organization may similarly reflect the characteristics of the general social system. The dominant feature of the framework of the bureaucratic system is an elaborate, largely explicit structure of hierarchical statuses. This hierarchical structure has an encompassing framework of hierarchical levels which controls all components of the bureaucracy; authority is defined in terms of hierarchical status; the ability to claim resources and to make decisions is a function of the authority which goes with high status; operating units at low hierarchical levels are normally unable to exercise much influence over the process of decision-making; and important decisions can only be made at the very top levels of the government, by political officials possessing higher status than bureaucrats. The importance of an activity is usually determined by the hierarchical level at which it is performed. The importance of the work of a section, for example, is more or less equal to the work of any other section, although in one case the duties may be clerical, and in another they may be regulatory, or creative, or highly specialized. People at the same hierarchical level are paid equally regardless of the nature of the work they perform. Administrative staff units to aid higher-level chief administrators are not fully acceptable; to create such units would be to authorize lower-ranking staff officials to pass on the work of proposals of line officials who outrank the staff; and the line official is expected to be in full charge of his organization. Thus, nominally the bureaucratic system is characterized by centralization, stand-

ardization, formalism, a monocratically organized hierarchy of authority, and the norm of impersonality.

But, in reality, personalism, one of the chief characteristics of the general social system, plays a fundamental part in all operational activities of the bureaucratic system; the formal hierarchical structure is supplemented and short-circuited by complex, subtle personal relationships. The system is permeated with personal associations that exist on the basis of extraorganizational relationships, including family connection, school associations, provincial associations, and all other kinship connections. Thus, the hierarchical structure forms a background for a host of personal relationships, but hierarchical status, and the quest for it, is an important factor in determining these nonhierarchical patterns; and within the bureaucracy, the above-mentioned protégé arrangement is one significant supplement to the formal hierarchical pattern. High-ranking officials, such as department or bureau directors, generally take pains to create personal communications networks within their departments or bureaus, relying upon informants for information about activities within the organization.

The vertical relationships are governed by the norms of deference and loyalty obligations, as seen transferred from filiality obligations from the family relationships. Deference and loyalty obligations of a subordinate toward a superior are broad and diffuse, and by no means limited to what might be called official business. Hierarchical authority helps energize the system, but the action it produces is not sharply focused upon productivity or performance achievement. The forms of sanctions of authority are determined by the hierarchical level at which the person exerts authority; direct superiors are found very reluctant to exercise severe sanctions or any disciplinary forms upon their immediate subordinates; but after a superior exercises a personal discretion in applying discipline, there is little or no effective right of appeal against punitive sanction.

Achievement norms are not widespread features of the system. Performance standards, for example, are usually lacking. Punitive sanctions are seldom imposed for performance failures, unless these represent some particular disaster for which an individual can be found responsible such as failure which embarrasses one's superiors. Status is always thoroughly visible, but responsibility for performance failures is often blurred by the use of committees which get everybody in the nominal decisions of policies. But when performance is successful, reward usually goes to those in authority. Therefore, those in authority are reluctant to exercise

discretionary power in decisions of important policies, especially when the future success of those policies are highly uncertain.

Superiors and subordinates tend to develop personal reciprocal relationships which are diffuse but not deep. A superior will depend upon personal informants, and at times upon unstinting efforts of his staff in coping with some crisis or in carrying out some urgent activity. The response to such claims by subordinates will be based at least upon attitudes toward the superior shaped by his ability and willingness to look after his loyal subjects. Such superior subordinate relationships are thoroughly particularistic. Equal treatment of subordinates is not a common norm. The ones in close personal relations with their superiors may be overloaded with work while those who have no such personal relations may be kept on the sideline and given little to do. Formal rules governing such matters as leave, step increase in pay, and discipline may also be applied in personal fashion—usually to reward the loyal, but not necessarily to punish the incompetent. A good superior is paternal and his subordinates are loyal. Much of this is a matter of style and manners rather than a manifestation of deep feelings.

Job Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction

Under such a bureaucratic system of operation, our research reveals that there is a general climate of apathy and social isolation among the MLAs. They do not manifest any pride in belonging to the bureaucratic system or to the Department or Bureau in which they work. They are not interested in participating or getting involved in any way in the social life of the organization. Furthermore, they do not seem to interact much among themselves both in and outside the office, nor to be able to form stable supportive cliques relationships. Their satisfaction with their jobs appears to be very low, as compared to that of the HLAs with theirs. Through our interviewing of our respondents regarding their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their jobs, we obtained the following responses:

Table 3-6

Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction of the HLAs and MLAs with Their Jobs

Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction	HLAs (N=18)	MLAs (N=72)
Likes it very much	16.6%	4.2%
Likes it with reservations	27.8	16.6
Pro/Con	27.8	22.2
Dislikes it on balance	27.8	27.8
Dislikes it very much	0.0	29.2

Table 3-6 shows that 57 percent of the MLAs are dissatisfied with their jobs, but that only 27.8 percent of the HLAs are dissatisfied with theirs. A careful analysis of our interview data reveals that the MLAs are mostly dissatisfied with the interference of their superiors and other political leaders with their job, that there is no chance for initiative and for expressing their own opinions, and that what they can do is only passively following the orders from above. They feel disgusted to be involved in numerous meetings where they are all the same unlikely to express their opinions and which they think function only to rationalize the decisions of their superiors. Thus, they regard their jobs as routine, boredom, and drudgery. The following Table clearly shows the dissatisfying aspects of their jobs:

Table 3-7
Respondents' Perceptions of the Dissatisfying Aspects of their Jobs

Dissatisfying Aspects	MALs (N=73) Percentage	
Interference of superiors and other powerful political leaders with their jobs	25	34.2%
Too many meetings	24	32.8
Routine; boredom; drudgery	21	28.8
Meaningless contacts with people; social activities disgusting	19	26.0
Lack of chance for initiative and autonomy; no chance of expressing own opinions	13	17.8
Procedural complexities constraining job performance	10	13.7
Lack of personal independence	8	11.0
Favoritism; personalism	6	8.2
Commandism of authority	3	4.1
Total*	129	176.6%

*The fact that the total number of responses is greater than that of the respondents is that most of them mentioned more than one dissatisfying aspects of their jobs.

When we compare Table 3-7 with Table 3-8 in the following, it is found that the MLAs and the HLAs are quite different from each other in the aspects

of their jobs with which they are dissatisfied. The HLAs seem to perceive no hierarchical problems in their relations with their subordinates.

Table 3-8
HLAs' Perceptions of the Dissatisfying Aspects of Their Jobs

Dissatisfying Aspect	HLAs (N=18)	
	Frequency	Percentage
Meaningless contacts with people	7	38.8%
Too many meetings	6	33.3
Routine; boredom; drudgery	5	27.8
Lack of personal independence	4	22.2
Procedural complexities constraining job performance	3	16.6
Work too heavy; time constraints in general	3	16.6
Favoritism; personalism	2	11.1
Total*	30	166.6%

*The fact that the total number of responses is greater than that of the respondents is that most of them mentioned more than one dissatisfying aspects of their jobs.

Looking into their perceptions of the satisfying aspects of their jobs, we obtained the responses from the HLAs and the MLAs which are separately tabulated in the following two tables (see Tables 3-9 and 3-10). Now that they are different in the dissatisfying aspects of their jobs, it is possible that they might be different in the satisfying aspects. It is assumed that because the dissatisfying aspects of the MLAs' jobs are mostly connected to the hierarchical tensions and distrust between themselves and their superiors the satisfying aspects must be disconnected to the hierarchical relations.

Table 3-9
MLAs' Perceptions of the Satisfying Aspects of Their Jobs

Satisfying Aspect	MLAs (N=73)	
	Frequency	Percentage
Chance to use special talents	16	21.9%

Happy doing routine work	14	19.2
Stability of job	12	16.4
Security	11	15.1
Enjoying particular area or field	9	12.3
Serving community; helping constituents	8	11.0
Chance for initiative and autonomy	8	11.0
Contacts with variety of people	7	9.6
Introducing new techniques-innovation	5	6.9
Working with variety of people	3	4.1
Serving state	2	2.7
Pay and fringe benefits	2	2.7
Total*	117	132.5

*The fact that the total number of responses is greater than that of the respondents is that most of them mentioned more than one satisfying aspects of their jobs.

Table 3-10
HLAs' Perceptions of the Satisfying Aspects of Their Jobs

Satisfying Aspect	HLAs (N=18)	
	Frequency	Percentage
Chance to use special talents	8	44.5%
Enjoying particular area and field	5	27.8
Chance for initiative and autonomy	4	22.2
Practical Problem Solving	3	16.6
Access to important people	3	16.6
Chance of participating in decision-making	2	11.1
Happy doing routine work	2	11.1
Total*	27	149.9%

In sum, close supervision or severe sanctions of authority are seen to deprive the MLAs of their administrative discretion, their initiative and autonomy, and discourage them to accept responsibility. Elaborate bureaucratic rules that are formally established to govern activities of each office are found to constrain the job performance of the MLAs. Further, the intrusion of the social forces from the general social system puts them into a continuous conflict between two incompatible organizational systems, to both of which they owe their loyalty: the formal and impersonal system that requires them of the rational and formalistic quality of behavior; and the informal and personal system which presses them to behave in an affective and personal way. All these bureaucratic features or the aspects of their jobs make them dissatisfied and feel to be happy in doing a fair day's work, in enjoying routine operations, and in the stability and security of their jobs. Under such a situation, innovation or creativity is not regarded as a motivating force, but, conversely, as a style of behavior to be avoided. The chances to apply specialized talents or competence that are perceived as the most satisfying aspect of jobs can be explained as an escape from severe sanctions of authority and from the pressures of informal and personal social forces.

The HLAs are found to be in a similar situation as the MLAs. They seem likewise to be forced to divide their loyalty to two contradictory social systems: the formal and impersonal, and the informal and personal. They are constrained, too, by the elaborate bureaucratic rules which deprive them of their administrative discretion and initiative. But they seem to be less sanctioned by authority and, therefore, seem to have more opportunity for autonomy and innovation.

One question we want to ask: Who are satisfied or dissatisfied with which aspects of their jobs? Our cross tabulation of the interview data reveals no significant correlation between age, geographical origin, length of tenure, and educational level on the one hand and satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the other. There is, however, some significant correlation between the nature of jobs and satisfaction. The specialists or those who perform technical jobs are found to be satisfied with the chances of applying their specialized competence, while the generalists seem to be satisfied with performing routine work, the stability and security of jobs, and with performing routine work, the stability and security of jobs, and with contacts with people. Among the 20 specialists of the MLAs, 12 said that they are highly satisfied with the chances by which they can apply their specialized

competence, but only four of the 53 generalists said so. 31 out of 53 generalists said that they are satisfied with doing routine work and with the stability and security of jobs, but only 6 out of 20 specialists said so. This finding further tests the validity of the assumption that the more the specialist is deprived of the formal reward of promotion the more committed he is to his professional skills.²⁰ In the following, we are to quote statements by our respondents concerning their jobs. One of them said:

When I was promoted to be a section chief, I began to have a feeling of insecurity. I might be kicked out of my position any time because the director has been changed so repeatedly. I had to be very careful in dealing with my boss and with my colleagues and with all persons concerned. So, I feel less satisfied than I did when I was working as a technician. (Who are the other persons concerned?) The personnel director, the security people, the councilmen. If you are not dealing with them smoothly, they will find fault with you and try to replace you.

Another one said:

Working in the government as a middle level administrator, you are somewhat caught up in the complicated network of the social relations in the society. You are constantly perplexed by the socially important persons in doing your work. (Who are the socially important persons?) The kinship group leaders, the leaders of the provincial associations, the councilmen, the national legislators. (What they are coming to see you for?) Finding jobs for their kinsmen, friends and relatives, as well as other things.

A third one has this to say:

.....You completely lose your freedom and autonomy, you just passively obey the orders from above, and you dare not express any opinions which run counter to orders. (What if you happen to express your opinion as opposed to the orders from your superior?) You will get into trouble. (What kind of trouble?) First, your superior thinks you are against him, disobey him, and then he will seek opportunity to do something disadvantageous to you. (What disadvantageous thing?) He might seek chance to transfer you to an unimportant position and freeze you there, or he might find fault with you and get you severely punished..... I just passively follow orders regardless of my own

²⁰W. G. Bennis, "Reference Groups and Loyalities in the Out-Parent Department," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2, 1958, PP. 497-498.

opinion.

A police chief said:

Even a police officer sometimes feels that there are pressures upon him when he is performing his duties, and these pressures can prevent him performing his duties faithfully. For instance, when he finds some criminal and he arrests him, some person, powerful person, comes to him and asks him to set the criminal free. . . .

Here are the examples indicating how the administrators must operate in two contradictory systems which pull them toward opposite directions, and thus make them highly dissatisfied. What are the implications of the feelings of dissatisfaction for the intergroup relations within the bureaucratic system of organization? In the following section, we are to explore these relationships.

Intergroup Relationships

Hierarchical Relationships

It is very striking that the complaints voiced by the MLAs are mostly about the nervous tensions they are experiencing in their relations with the higher-ups. A generalized feeling of animosity against the higher-ups is explicit and forms the core of the MLAs' grievances. Significantly, those complaints are mostly directed at the vague "they", the "national political leaders", the "party leaders", or the "superiors", and seldom at specific individuals. They seem to feel abandoned and do not know to whom they can explain. As one of them said:

Several factors combine to make up the peculiar mentality of the leadership group: narrow-mindedness, suspicion, and jealousy. (Suspicion of what?) suspicion of the subordinates' intention to struggle to take their place. (Jealousy of what?) Jealousy of the subordinates' superior competence. Because of this mentality, the political leaders adopt manipulative methods to keep the young competent men away from high positions. (What manipulative methods?) Each young person, no matter how well he has been trained and educated or even if he has got a Ph. D., must pass a civil service examination before he can find a way out to enter the political system; and once admitted into the system, he usually starts from the very bottom of the hierarchy. Consequently, young and competent and well-trained persons usually go away from the political system and find their careers elsewhere. We young competent persons

already in the system adopt a defensive attitude, and just passively perform our duties in a very low morale.

This kind of complaints implies that the MLAs are contemptuous of the HLAs. With better training in technology and modern social sciences, the MLAs' contempt may well be to the point, but the importance placed upon traditional authority makes those in positions of authority feel losing "face" if they yield to expertise. As another respondent said:

The superior is expected not to accept suggestions or ideas expressed by the subordinates. (How this happens?) In Chinese society, acceptance of ideas expressed by subordinates and accepted by superior means the loss of face of the superior. Status means everything, it means knowledge, competence, far-sightedness, and experience. To be influenced by the low-status means a fatal blow to the dignity of the high-status persons.

A high-level administrator has this say:

The young and junior technicians are too ambitious. Today, they are junior technicians, tomorrow they want to be senior engineers, and the day after tomorrow they want to be general managers. (What makes them so ambitious?) It is hard to tell. Essentially, the young technicians no longer pay respect to the older technicians as we did two decades ago. I, as a case, had worked more than ten years before I became an assistant engineer. I thought it right not to be promoted to the same rank with my former superiors. Now the tide has turned upside down and all the young people want to step us older people down as quickly as possible. (If they are not promoted so fast as they expect, then what will happen?) They will become pouting and grudging and talk about everything possible to disqualify us older people. (If they do this, what will you do to them?) I just try to keep them in their proper place and let them know what they really are. (What do you think they really are?) They are young people, they are less experienced, and they can not do independent thinking and judging; and, therefore, they should depend upon us older people and obey us older people.

From these responses, it is found that the relations between superior and subordinates develop into a situation of high tension which threatens to break out into open conflict if not properly manipulated. The subordinates' challenge of the superior's position of authority forces the latter to rely all the more upon severe sanctions of authority to discipline the former into "their proper place" of depen-

dence upon and obedience to authority. Even a daily newspaper has this to comment in its editorial:

He (the superior) trusts no one; he permits nothing to happen without his personal knowledge. His intimate acquaintance with the details of so many public matters is in part the result of his mistrust of coworkers and subordinates, a mistrust which appears to have been compounded of the conviction that no one can be trusted to do any given job so well as he and that no one can be trusted not to attempt to do him personal injury. He is suspicious and hostile. He does not like to rely upon people. Since delegation is inevitable in the complicated hierarchy of governmental and party affairs, he does a prodigious amount of checking and overseeing. He is known to have employed espionage agents. In addition, he saturates himself with information on any subject with which he is concerned. Thus, he is much less at the mercy of the words and judgments of others.²¹

The indication of all these responses is that there is not only a generalized distrust of and disgust with the higher-ups and superiors, but their complaints are phrased more or less as a sort of grudge "They don't care for us!", "They are power lovers!", "They just enjoy pushing us around!" Our rigorous analysis indicates that more than 46.5% (34) of the 73 MLAs mentioned explicitly the hierarchical conflicts and distrusters between themselves and the HLAs, 9.6% (7) mentioned conflicts and distrusters only implicitly or in passing, and 43.8% (32) didn't mention any conflicts and distrusters. Cross tabulation does not show any significant correlation between the perception of hierarchical conflicts and geographical origin, educational level, or family socio-economic status. But there is some significant correlation between perception of hierarchical conflicts and the nature of jobs. Specialists are found to be more conflictually oriented and generalists are more consensually oriented (see Table 3-11 in the following).

Table 3-11

Hierarchical Conflicts and Distrusters Mentioned By the MLAs

	Specialists (N=20)	Generalists (N=53)
Yes, explicitly	60%	41.5%
Yes, but only in passing	15	7.5
No, didn't mention	25	51.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%

²¹*United Daily*, April 20, 1971, p. 1

This difference of orientation toward hierarchical relations between the specialists and generalists may serve to illustrate that specialists are more committed to their specialized skills, less inclined to identify with the bureaucratic organization by which they are employed, and less conform to bureaucratic authority and procedures, while the generalists are more oriented to hierarchical authority and bureaucratic procedures. This professional orientation of the specialists comes directly into conflict with the importance of the sanctity of hierarchical authority which requires that performance be strictly controlled by directives received from one's superior rather than by self-imposed standards. Our findings seem to support Gouldner's that "there seems to be some tension between an organization's bureaucratic needs for expertise and its social system needs for loyalty."²² These findings can point out an implicit contradiction in Weber's conception of bureaucracy; in Gouldner's words, "On the one side, it was administration based on expertise, while on the other, it was administration based on discipline."²³ By emphasizing both expert judgment resting on technical knowledge and disciplined conformity with directives of superiors as the basis for bureaucratic decisions, Weber implies that there is no conflict between these two principles. This is not a realistic assumption; in reality, bureaucratic prerogatives tend to conflict with technical considerations. This conflictual perception of hierarchical relations of the specialists is made to be correlated with their satisfaction and dissatisfaction with different specific aspects of their jobs we discussed above.

Lateral Interpersonal Relations

The general conception of conflictual hierarchical relations is found to be consistent with the conception of hierarchical authority in all social relations of the general social system; with this conception, our MLAs are made to be not interested in the purposes of the bureaucratic organization, and they feel completely neglected. This moral isolation is not compensated by a warm atmosphere of friendship ties derived from belonging to a lateral cohesive group relationship. Our interviewing of a few MLAs for their social friendship associations reveals that none of them mentioned of having any close friend within the bureaucracy with whom he could open his heart. As one of our respondents said:

²²Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2 (1957-1958), pp. 281-306

²³Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954, p. 22

We are lacking in *esprit de corps*. (What is the cause of this?) The causes are many. First of all, all persons are selfish, seeking to increase the individual gains only. Individualism is the word that serves everyone as his guide for all activities. The second cause is that possibly it is the character of us Chinese that each one strives to dominate over others. If he can not do so, he is ready to subject himself to the domination by others. (How do you think that friendship ties can be cultivated?) Each one should have the idea that he is dependent upon others and that he can not stand alone, let alone stand over others.

From this statement we can clearly see that the lack of lateral friendship ties is more culturally conditioned than is the logical consequence of the bureaucratic factors. Each person either tries to dominate over others or is ready to be dominated by others. Equal dealings with friends will be detrimental to friendship. As a civic training textbook for college students has this well said:

To deal with friends, the first thing that should be kept in mind is to be respectful to friends; to be respectful to friends, one should be polite in attitude toward them, should be gentle and humble when speaking with them, and should accept the opinions expressed by them. Second, even if one is much better educated and possessed of much higher standard of moral virtues than friends, one should both in behavior and attitude display humility that one is inferior to one's friends. An old Chinese proverb says, "Humility brings one great advantage, and pride produces great harm on him." Another proverb again says, "Trees are afraid of growing tall and pigs are afraid of becoming fat." Tallness of a tree draws near to being cut down, and fatness of a pig draws near to being killed. Both tallness and fatness are tantamount to the expression of feelings of superiority to friends, and thus lead to the detrimental consequence of being "killed" by friends. Third, in dealings with friends, one should be able to exercise self-control of emotional expression and should be patient. Lack of patience will disturb things into disorder; and lack of self-control will make one unable to accomplish great achievements. In Tang dynasty, a monk by the name of Han-shan asked one of his friends, "Now, I am very much worried. Many of my friends contempt me, deceive me, laugh at me, and take me mean. How can I do with them?" "Be patient with them, be tolerant of them, respect them, don't pay attention to them, ignore them, and keep a distance from them. Then, look and see what will happen a few years later." Fourth, Keep a distance from friends. As another

old proverb goes, "Relatives kept at a great distance will be more intimate to deal with; neighbors set apart by high walls will be more easily kept in harmony and peace." Closeness of friends is easy to lead to conflictual relations.²⁴

From this it is clearly perceived that people in the general social system as those within the bureaucracy are deeply concerned about interpersonal conflicts. How can these social conflicts be controlled in order to maintain order and harmony of a system? Several mechanisms are seen to be adopted: First is the subordination of lateral social relations to a hierarchical arrangement, that is, "Each one should have the idea that he is dependent upon others;" second, moral virtues of politeness, patience, humility, and respectfulness have been internalized since early childhood as guidance of conduct in relations with friends; third, self-control of emotional expression is exercised as a means of prevention of breakout of "bad" feelings among friends; and finally, avoidance of direct contact with friends is seen as most rewarding in keeping "good" relationships with friends. This general lack of friendship among status equals will make it impossible for lateral social transactions to be carried out efficiently and for group problem-solving situation to be prevalent as a primary means of achieving group ends. Thus, lack of lateral friendship relations functions to reinforce the desire for strong authority as a personal necessity.

Attitude toward Authority

If we accept the logical validity of Weber's rational construct of bureaucracy as the most efficient bureaucratic apparatus, then any significant development of the rational qualities of a given bureaucratic system approaching his "ideal type" would require a commensurate development of rational behavior, rational attitudes, and rational motivations on the part of the bureaucrat. But this mechanistic construct of bureaucracy makes it impossible to take into account the incompatible values and functional requirements from the general social system which are perceived to constantly exert disconcerting influence upon the bureaucratic behavior and modify the rational features of the bureaucratic structure. As we have repeatedly pointed out above, the Confucian tradition is deeply concerned about social conflicts, and therefore Confucian ideology is oriented toward the achievement of social peace and harmony as the ultimate value. This value is made to welcome an orderly structuring of a harmonious system of human relations and

²⁴*Self-Cultivation of College Students*, VOL. 2, p. 59

moral norms. Thus, the rigidity of hierarchism in social role relationships, the supreme importance placed upon the sanctions of hierarchical authority, the moral norms of filiality and loyalty as bases governing all superior-subordinate relations, and personalism as the core of all interpersonal relationships are seen to be the essential functional and structural elements of the traditional society. All these elements are found to be reflected in the bureaucratic system of action under our study. The deep worries about interpersonal conflicts, for example, make the system function to maintain and achieve peace and harmony as its ultimate bureaucratic goal. This goal is not only influential in structuring all bureaucratic roles in a strict and rigid form of hierarchism but in all other operational activities. The reliance upon the severe sanctions of formal hierarchical authority as the primary means of the maintenance of bureaucratic control; personalism used as the chief criterion in personnel recruitment, appointment, transfer, and promotion; the emphasis upon moral virtues and ritual forms; the establishment of an elaborate set of impersonal bureaucratic rules, all work toward the maintenance and achievement of the supreme bureaucratic goal of peace and harmony. Here we only concern ourselves with an elaboration of the pattern of authority relations and its impact upon the attitudes of the subordinates toward those in authority. All the other characteristics will be discussed in details in later paper(s).

From our analysis in the previous sections, we discovered that there is a great deal of tensions and conflicts between the HLAs and the MLAs. Under such a situation, what are the attitudes of the MLAs to the HLAs? The central assumption underlying our exploration of the attitudes toward authority is that the social attitudes toward authority as cultivated as early as during childhood will be consistent with those within the bureaucratic system. Therefore, the MLAs will be perceived to have ambivalent attitudes toward the HLAs. On the one hand, they will think it morally right and appropriate to display deferential obedience to authority without considering its quality. The MLAs with this type of attitude we identify as **loyal conformists**. On the other hand, there are those who are afraid of the severe sanctions of authority, and therefore they accept authority because they know that if they come into conflict with those who wield sanctions they can not win. Sanctions of authority may be classified into two categories: positive sanctions and negative ones. The former refer to financial rewards, promotion prospects, praise and approval, transfers to more desired work, and any other form of gratification; and the latter refer to threatening withdrawal or

withholding of any of these gratifying objects. Those who perceive authority as potential for exercising positive sanctions will seek actively to conform to authority, and we select to call them **positive conformists**. There are still those who are afraid of the negative sanctions, and therefore who will be coerced into conformity to authority and passively accept authority while feeling considerable discontent about it; and we identify them as **apathetic conformists**. A final group of the MLAs along with the three discussed above are those who display neither loyal and positive nor apathetic conformity but try to escape the authority situation altogether in the bureaucratic system; and they are identified as **escapists**. Here in the following we are going to illustrate each type of attitude toward authority.

The loyal conformists are said to be those who accept authority whenever he permits his behavior to be guided by the decisions of a superior, without independently examining the merits of that decision. One of our respondents has this to say:

...As an administrator, you should not be concerned with your own promotion or transfer to some important position. If you are thinking of that, you are no longer a good administrator. A good administrator is and should be just faithfully performing his duties without thinking about personal gains. He should be loyal and faithful to his superior and do what his superior tells him to do. If his superior happens to promote him, fine, and he should take his new position; if not, he should also remain happy.

Another respondent says:

The moral virtues of all employees in the Government are gradually degenerated. (How does this happen?) People at present are exclusively concerned with material gains and they become too selfish. They no longer consider moral virtues essential in interpersonal relations. (What are the moral virtues?) Filiality to parents, loyalty to superior, patriotism to state. Now, sons are no longer filial to their parents, younger brothers are no longer respectful to elder brothers, subordinates are no longer loyal and deferential to superiors. (How can one be loyal to his superior?) He should do as he is told to do without reference to personal gains and without considering the merits or demerits of the order.....

From these two responses, it is clearly seen that the ingredients of loyal conformity are unselfishness, self-sacrifice, unconditional obedience and loyalty to authority without questioning the quality of authority behavior.

Positive conformists are those who are actively seeking to do things which

they believe and predict will please their superiors. In the following are a few examples which indicate this kind of conformity to authority:

Subordinates must be loyal and deferential to their superior. What their superior says they should obey and will be happier men in the organization. (Why must subordinates be loyal and deferential to their superior?) Liking it or not, if you want to advance or remain happy where you are you must get along well with your superior.

Another example:

I like my job very much. I just do what is told to do, and sometimes I actively seek something to do which I think my superior will be very pleased to see me doing. (Then what after your superior is very pleased with your performance?) Then you give him a good impression and some day he may promote you or transfer you to a better job.

The positive conformists are seen to be motivated to conform to authority by self-interests. Four conditions are made to be essential in determining this type of conformity: (1) a knowledge of what can please the superior; (2) the ability to perform the duties; (3) a knowledge of the superior's ability to reward him; and (4) the visibility of his performance to his superior, or the possibility of transmitting his achievement to superior. Absence of any one of the four conditions will not bring about such a type of conformity.

The apathetic conformists are primarily characterized by a feeling of insecurity or uncertainty, and therefore they are in all cases conservatives, oriented to the maintenance of status quo. Their behavioral patterns are chiefly passive. "The more you do, the more mistakes you will commit; the less you do, the fewer mistakes you will commit; and if you do nothing, then you will commit no mistakes and you may stay on your position longer." one of our respondents says.

As another one says:

As a subordinate you are pushed around and told to do things. You must try not to express your ideas if you want to get along well with your superior. (How can you get along well with your superior?) Try to be obedient to him and not speak against him. (What if you speak against him?) He first might distrust you and think that you are not obedient and loyal to him, then he might hate you and give you a low performance rating whereupon he might find excuse to transfer you to some undesired position and even to fire you.

Still another one says:

.....I just try to obey him and follow his orders passively. When we subordinates go to his office, we must stand erect and dare not take a seat without his permission; we play the role of a yesman. We can not talk to him in a loud voice, and we can not stick to our own opinions. This is the best way by which we can stay where we are.

Finally, the escapists are those who relinquish the institutional goals and norms, and perceive the bureaucratic system as working against their self-interests. They are resentful of authority and try to disentangle themselves from all relations with authority. Thus, their behavioral pattern is characterized by escapism not only from authority situation but even from the bureaucratic system. The following responses from our interviewees may be representative of this type of attitudes toward authority:

To be an administrator in the Government is much worse than to be a prisoner in the prison. Of course, you have nothing to do if you are a prisoner, but at least you can lie down if you like. To be an administrator in a bureaucratic system where you are played down but bureaucratic politics, you likewise have nothing to do, but you can not lie down or do what you like; you just sit behind your desk and look out of the window at the clouds sweeping across the sky.

You just keep away from your superior and try to meet him as little as possible. If you have nothing to do you are fortunate and then you are free from being manipulated by authority.

What are the percentages of the four types of attitudes toward authority held by the MLAs? Through our vigorous analysis we obtain the following result (see Table 3-12):

Table 3-12
Patterns of affitudes to Authority Among the MLAs

Pattern of Attitude	Frequency	Percentage
Loyal conformist	5	6.8%
Positive conformist	14	19.1
Apathetic conformist	27	37.0
Escapist	6	8.2
Uncertain	21	28.9
Total	73	100.0%

This Table indicates that in the bureaucratic system, both positive and apathetic conformists constitute the dominant percentage (56%), and that the percentage of the other two types is insignificant. Our cross tabulation doesn't provide any significant correlation between types of conformity and educational level, socio-economic status, or the nature of jobs. There is, however, some correlation between type of conformity and age. The older MLAs are seen to be more apathetic conformists and the younger ones are seen to be more positive conformists. nineteen out of the 27 apathetic conformists are over 50 years of age, while only 3 out of 14 positive conformists are over that age. This is made to mean that the older MLAs are more concerned with the maintenance of status quo and more conservative, but the younger ones are more concerned with their advancement or other kinds of gratifications.

Why is the bureaucratic system so overwhelmed by conformists? The answers to this question may be many. One of them may suggest that the impact upon the individual of his socialization in early life affects his success in the bureaucratic context, with the conformist individual finding the bureaucratic environment more congenial than the nonconformist individual. If social structure is critical in molding individual behavior and personality, the big organization can usefully be conceived as a small society whose characteristics of hierarchy and authority have similar influence upon its members. The mechanism that society employs to inculcate its values may also be seen at work within the bureaucratic organization. The organization, in a word, socializes its members in a way similar to that of society. It co-opts the learned deference to authority inculcated by institutions such as family and formal schooling. Early in this article, we discussed briefly the socialization process through which the individual has cultivated an ambivalent attitude to authority: deference to, passive dependence upon, fear of, and avoidance of contact with authority. Our analysis of the attitude to bureaucratic authority finds the similar ingredients.

But, if we move from the psychological level to the sociological one, we will find that the selection and promotion processes contribute greatly to the consequence of predominance of conformists. In a bureaucratic system with its supreme emphasis placed upon the maintenance of order and harmony as its goal, conformist behavior will be much more valued than innovative behavior. People with submissive or conforming tendency are found to be in a better position of being selected or promoted. So, the predominance of conformists is both the product of the fact

that certain types of people are selected to join the public service, or indeed the fact that selection procedures may pick out certain types of people, and the product of the bureaucratic environment. The operational procedures of personnel selection, appointment, and promotion, which we discussed early work to pick out those of submissive and conforming tendency. People who fit most readily into subordinate roles are the ones who are most likely to be selected and promoted as they will please their superiors. Personalism and favoritism used as the basis of appointment of the HLAs and thus depriving the MLAs of their promotional opportunity tend to reinforce the pressure for apathetic conformity within the bureaucratic system.

Though the hierarchical relationships between the HLAs and the MLAs are perceived to be conflictual, their interactions are found to be "intimate." The HLAs, as we discussed previously, are all appointed from higher government or the Kuomintang as based upon a patronage system, and their tenure is not guaranteed by civil service laws, subject completely to the whims and fancies of their patrons. Whether they can stay in their positions of authority depends upon whether they can manage their departments or bureaus smoothly and upon whether they can get along well with their patrons. A single unexpected tumultuous accident or disturbance, or their inability to meet any personal demand from their patrons will lead to their removal. Once they are patronized into the high-level administrative positions, they find it highly appropriate to personalize their relations with their subordinates, the MLAs, or, alternately, to seek excuse to replace the MLAs with those selected from their own social primary groups. The MLAs, on the other hand, either positively conform to the HLAs to gain their favor of being appointed to a desired position or apathetically conform to them to maintain their positions. Thus, behavior within the bureaucracy is saturated with norms reflecting a high value placed upon personalism. Superiors and subordinates tend to develop personal relationships which are temporary, diffuse, but not deep. A superior depends upon subordinates as personal informants for providing him with information, at times upon their unstinting efforts in coping with some crisis or in carrying out some urgent activity, or upon their assistance in going around formal rules to meet the personal demands made by people to whom he owes his appointment. The response to such claims by subordinates will be based upon the attitudes toward the superior shaped by his ability and willingness to reward his "loyal" subordinates, such as transfers to a desired work or maintaining the

present positions. As a consequence, cliques across hierarchical levels are formed and become a common phenomenon. These cliques have a very real significance for the power structure of the bureaucratic system. The superior uses friendship with a subordinate as an informal source of information and hence as a means of controlling subordinates; a subordinate exploits friendship with a superior as a means of gaining personal advantages. Where superiors gain the loyal support of certain subordinates in return for their readiness to consult those people and perhaps to sponsor them when opportunities arise for their further advancement.

These hierarchical cliques, however, can not be seen as mechanisms of making possible informal consultations in order to avoid the premature formal decision makings. On the contrary, the functions of these cliques can be traced to the peculiar features of the Chinese cultural system. The HLAs, owing their attainment of the high-level administrative positions to their personal webs of the primary-group relations, work to elevate the statuses and aggrandize the interests of the primary groups whereby to elevate their personal statuses in these groups rather than commit themselves to the achievement of the formal bureaucratic goals. Therefore, their collaboration with their subordinates, the MLAs, into informal cliques is seen to be disruptive of the formal and rational bureaucratic operations. On the part of the MLAs, their being co-opted into the informal cliques will satisfy their needs for social dependency upon authority in a world full of conflicts.

This mutually exploitative hierarchical collaboration makes the conflictual lateral relations more conflictual. Crozier describes a kind of lateral grouping which develops in terms of a concept taken from Pitts as a "delinquent community" which protects itself from interference from those in authority, and in this sense possesses a negative kind of lateral solidarity.²⁵ Its peculiar features are ascribed by Crozier to the particular nature of French culture which emphasizes the importance of the independence of the individual as an ultimate personality trait; but it may also be that it is in general more feasible for a grouping of subordinates who acquire power as a consequence of their solidarity to operate in a negative rather than a positive way. Solidarity is more easily achieved on defensive issues; positive innovation tends to be more difficult, and the occupancy of a subordinate role is in itself detrimental to initiative taking. But the case in the Chinese cultural background is quite different. The "social dependency orientation" as Richard H. Solomon elaborated leads to a competitive situation among status equals, competitive not in the sense for job achievement but in the sense for ingratiation

themselves into the favor of their superior. Though encountered with the severe sanctions of formal authority, the MLAs do not seek the solidarity of lateral social grouping as a means of preventing interference of authority. Conversely, they show all the more loyalty and conformity to authority in order to obtain its acceptance and protection.

The informal and personal hierarchical interdependent relationships and personal hierarchical concerns are the primary bases for behavior within the system. Under such a situation, the rule of law is no central value of the system; particularism is highly valued, or at least thoroughly accepted as a normative characteristic of the system, rather than substantial reliance upon institutionalized universalistic norms. Innovation is not highly valued. Generally, innovation is linked with a purposive orientation, a problem-solving posture, and a concern with administrative rationality. In a bureaucratic system which is seen to reflect the basic values of personalism and primary groupings of the general social system rather than as a productive, responsive instrumentality, innovation is irrelevant, and may even be regarded as undesirably disruptive. A conscious concern about survival in rapidly changing environment implies adaptation and thus innovation. But the sensitivity to this prime value is not so much bureaucratic as it is political. The bureaucratic system, in a word, works as the antithesis of the Weberian legal-rational model.

Centralization of Formal Decision-Making Authority

The bureaucratic system is made to adopt several mechanisms as a means of eliminating the influences of the general social system: the centralization of formal decision-making authority, a system of elaborate formal rules, and some formal control hierarchical structures responsible for seeing to it that rules are followed to the letter. Here we are concerning ourselves with only the centralization of decision-making authority, leaving the discussion of the others in the subsequent papers.

The authority of formal decision making within the bureaucratic system is located at the chief executive where pressures from the general social system for particularistic treatments can be most effectively resisted and the bureaucratic goal

²⁵M. Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: The U. of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 219; J. R. Pitts, *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963)

of order and harmony most effectively achieved. Not only is the authority to make policy decisions and to interpret and change bureaucratic rules centralized in the chief executive, even the administrative procedures by which policies are implemented must be approved by him before they can be followed. Centralization of authority at the very top can also be explained as the consequence of the strategic maneuvering of the HLAs. The HLAs, with their feelings of insecurity and the temporary nature of their positions, think it highly hazardous to be involved in decision-makings, and at the same time centralization of authority can help them out of a dilemma situation where they are pulled by two different forces to two different directions: by forces from their social webs of in-group members against out-group members, and impersonal bureaucratic rules. Thus centralization of authority eliminates their discretionary power and therefore pushes them aside from direct confrontation with social pressures.

On the part of the MLAs, with the absence of promotional opportunity, with the threat of being transferred at any time to an undesired position, and with a perception of conflictual relations between themselves and their superiors, they regard participation in decision makings as highly dangerous and feel happy to see authority be centralized at the very top to alleviate the tensions which would occur if authority of decision makings were located at the hands of their immediate superior. Centralization of decision makings is thus seen as working to the advantages of all. From a cultural level of abstraction, the individual has been cultivated into a personality characteristic of passive dependence upon and a desire for authority without inclination to express his own opinions. He is used to "taking in," rather than "giving out," in terms used by Richard H. Solomon. This makes centralization of decision makings a natural phenomenon in all systems of authority.

There is a great impact of this pattern of formal decision-making authority upon the structural pattern of the bureaucratic system. The bureaucratic organization is made to be overwhelmingly a "line" organization, marked by little lateral interdependence among units and no systematic use of "staff" units; there is little reliance upon the practice of delegation of authority, and hence no chance for administrative discretion; the thrust must come from the very top, and "upward authority"—the making of authoritative proposal for accomplishing results by those engaged in the work on the basis of their competence, dedication, and technical training—does not exist in any systematic, legitimate way. "Upward authority" operates only as a facet of a personalized reciprocity arrangement, involving an

association of leader and immediate subordinates functioning as a clique. Concomitant with this is perceived the reinforcement of a dependence and loyalty component indicative of the subordinates' behavior, with the functional consequence of importance placed upon more centralization of decisionmaking authority and upon a harsh and manipulative leadership style. Then, a vicious circle is formed.

How do the administrative leaders, both the HLAs and the MLAs, learn to adjust to this authority situation? What are the functional and dysfunctional consequences of these adjustments? What does the bureaucratic system do to cope with the dysfunctional consequences, if any? How do all these influence the communication patterns? These questions will be handled elsewhere.