

國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學程
International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS)
College of Social Sciences
National Chengchi University (NCCU)

博士論文

Doctoral Dissertation

中國文化軟實力在美國的展現：以十二個孔子學院為案例
China's Cultural Soft Power in the United States:
A Case Study of Twelve Confucius Institutes

指導教授：趙建民

Advisor: Chien-min Chao

研究生：孫紹正

Candidate: Shao-cheng Sun

中華民國 105 年 3 月

March 2016

Abstract

This research assumes that China's cultural soft power relies on language teaching and cultural programs of the Confucius Institutes (CIs). The study selects twelve Confucius Institutes in the United States (U.S.) for analysis; examines their language courses and outreach programs; and analyzes how they contribute to China's cultural soft power.

This dissertation asks two central questions. The first question is, what are the positive and negative views on the CIs in the U.S.? The answer is that the CIs in the U.S. are seen with a considerable degree of ambivalence. The CIs are attractive for universities seeking engagement with China, but they are also viewed as a threat. The supporters claim that knowledge and skill gained at a CI will equip students to be more employable. To critics, the CIs are situated at campuses serving the interests of the Chinese Communists. They are concerned that the CIs' presence on campuses would interfere with academic freedom. The second question is, how effective are the CI's project in shaping China's image? Here the answer is not very effective. For CI students, the vocabulary they used to describe China has changed from the negative (boredom, alien, foot-binding, and communism) to the positive terms (advanced, amazing, cool, and diligent). The proportion of those with positive views of China moves up, and those with negative views go down. However, average Americans know very little about the CI. Even when they hear about the CI, most Americans are suspicious about Beijing's intention to set up the Institute. In view of negative views from media and scholars, many Americans do not trust CI and hold a pessimistic view on China.

The main conclusion of the study is that China's cultural soft power has gathered limited momentum in the U.S. through the CIs. Although the improvement of China's image can't be achieved by CIs alone, they have made some initial contributions to smoother relations between the two countries.



Acknowledgements

Writing this dissertation is one of the most rewarding academic journeys in my life because along the road I have received educational and personal assistance from many good Samaritans. Without them, this work would not have become a reality. Here, I would like to express my heart-felt appreciation and gratitude for their invaluable help.

I am especially indebted to my dissertation committee members for their academic advices. My advisor, Professor Chien-min Chao, instructs me with a clear direction in outlining the framework and for revising the work. Because he has encouraged me to produce the best research possible, I will carry this attitude in mind when pursuing academic career. Honorary Professor Leonardo Chu, an extremely wise and well-informed scholar, enlightened my understandings of China's image building and soft power. He generously provided much insight into this dissertation various aspects. It was such an enjoyment to listen and learn from him. Professor Ping-Yin Kuan, a warm and intellectual teacher, helped me formulate research questions. He shared with me how to conduct interviews in the U.S. Professor Simon Chang gave me a clear guidance on how to improve my dissertation. His suggestions during my oral defense were extremely helpful and greatly improved the quality of this work. Professor David Holm kindly wrote me a letter of recommendation to the Ministry of Science & Technology. With his support, I can continue to conduct a research in the U.S. He also shares with me his valuable, first-hand experience in the Australian Confucius Institutes. Most importantly, he carefully reviewed my dissertation and offered many valuable suggestions.

The seven months of research in the U.S. is such a beautiful experience due greatly in part to the interaction and guidance from the teachers and interviewees. First of all, I would give my heartfelt thank to Professor Shale Horowitz at University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. I enjoy our times of mutual discussion on how to improve the quality of my research. Professor Barrett L. McCormick from Marquette

University also informed me a lot of insightful analysis and reflections about Confucius Institutes in the U.S. The relationship I respect the most is the one with Miss Joan Moeller, a respected and retired English teacher, who spent more than two months carefully proofreading my writings. At least twice a week, she would discuss with me and correct my writings. Without her kind help, this work would not have been possible. I am also very grateful for the valuable input from my interviewees at various university Confucius Institutes.

During my stay in the U.S., I also receive much spiritual nourishment from teachers at the Lutheran Memorial Chapel and Eastbrook Church. These teachers include Bessie Fick, Rev. Dr. Kenneth Wieting, Tim Albers, Pastor Adam Shidler, Dan Zimmerman, and Shane Martin. With their love and care, our family has had a wonderful time in the U.S.

In this acknowledgement I would also like to thank my family. The unconditional love of my parents has been the greatest source for pushing me further. My deceased father, Zhi-Peng Sun, had always encouraged me to work hard and to achieve excellence. My mother, Yu-Zhao Xie, had to suffer through our long absences. Her values imbued the importance of education within me. Without her, this degree would not be possible. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my sister Joy Sun for taking care of my mother and our home while we were overseas. My thanks also go to my children, Michael and James; they are the source of my joy and pride. While I spend long hours doing research, they behaved extremely well. I hope they will grow up to value the importance of education. Of course, I wish to express my appreciation to my wife Anna Liao for her self-sacrificing care and nurture of the family and for the countless hours chauffeuring me to different states for interviews. Thus I dedicate this work with deepest gratitude for her love and support.

Most important, I give thanks to our Heavenly Father for giving the strength to complete my second Ph.D. and pray that He continues to guide my next steps for His glory.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	iii
List of Tables	v
Chapter I Introduction	1
1.1 The problem statement.....	6
1.2 Methodology.....	12
1.3 Literature review.....	13
1.4 Structure of the study.....	26
1.5 Summary.....	28
Chapter II Theoretical Framework	30
2.1 The soft power resources.....	31
2.2 Conceptualizing cultural soft power.....	38
2.3 Operationizing cultural soft power.....	49
2.4 Research method.....	59
2.5 Summary.....	60
Chapter III China's Cultural Soft Power Strategy and the Confucius Institutes	62
3.1 The evolution of China's cultural policy.....	64
3.2 The Confucius Institute project.....	72

3.3 Confucius Institutes' approaches to disseminate cultural soft power.....	82
3.4 The global expansion of Confucius Institutes.....	87
3.5 Summary.....	92
Chapter IV Confucius Institutes in the United States.....	94
4.1 Confucius Institutes' project in the United States.....	95
4.2 Confucius Institutes' status in the United States.....	99
4.3 Summary.....	115
Chapter V Views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States.....	119
5.1 The Confucius Institutes' reception in the United States.....	120
5.2 The effectiveness of Confucius Institutes in promoting soft power.....	138
5.3 Summary.....	143
Chapter VI Conclusion.....	147
6.1 Findings.....	147
6.2 Answers to the research questions.....	151
6.3 Summary.....	152
Appendix I Interview Guides.....	154
Appendix II The Basic Background of the Interviewees.....	158
Appendix III Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes...160	
Appendix IV Glossary.....	169
References.....	172

Tables

1. Annual numbers of setup of CIs and CCs (Table I).....	54
2. Annual numbers of students' enrolment (Table II).....	55
3. Annual numbers of the Chinese proficiency test takers (Table III).....	55



Chapter I Introduction

In international relations, power means one state having the ability to influence the behavior of other states. The power can take both a hard and a soft form. The former would be one state changing the behavior of another state by threatening them. The latter would be a state changing the behavior of another state by enticing them.¹ Joseph Nye, an American professor at Harvard University, coined the term “soft power” in the late 1980s, defining it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion.”² He argues that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and foreign policies. When the policies of a country are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, soft power is enhanced.³ Nye’s soft power concept has provided a novel idea for strategists to use to cope with a changing international environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the demise of the Cold War, international system had undergone a transitional period. Hard power (military and economy), dominant in the past, has gradually lost its grip in leading global affairs, while soft power, focused on culture, is on the rise. Many countries have started to embark on the soft power strategy in global competition.

Soft power as a recent concept in international affairs is long rooted in Chinese culture and society. The idea of soft power dates back to ancient Chinese philosophers such as Laozi (604 BC - 531 BC), who said: “Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water

¹ Shryll Whittaker, *China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives* (South Orange: Seton Hall University Master Thesis, 2013), p. 24.

² Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 25.

³ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p.1.

will wear away rock.”⁴ After Joseph Nye proposed the soft power theory, China’s academic circles accepted this idea. Research on this relevant topic has also become a fad. Although there is no unanimous definition of soft power, most Chinese scholars would agree that culture is the core component.⁵ They claim that, after two thousand years of practice Confucianism represents the essence of China’s cultural soft power and that it is embedded in Chinese society. Developed from the teachings of Confucius, Confucianism is characterized as a system of social and ethical philosophy. It built on an ancient religious foundation to establish the social values, and institutions of traditional Chinese society. Confucianism is focusing on morality and interpersonal ethics, which is understood to contribute to the establishment of a harmonious society.⁶ Given that Confucianism has been practiced in daily life, Chinese people can embrace the concept in the power of culture as their non-coercive strength.⁷

As China’s national comprehensive power continues to strengthen, its soft power is becoming an indispensable form of global competition. Chinese strategists observe that the prior great powers, such as the Roman Empire, Imperial Britain, and the United States (U.S.), relied not simply on coercive power but also on attractive values and cultural influence. They argue that the declining U.S. power can be attributed to its waning soft power brought about by the unpopularity of unilateralism, reduced attention to cultural diplomacy, and the war waged in the Middle East.⁸ The former General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Jintao is a strong advocate of prioritizing the soft

⁴ Priscilla Roberts ed., *Going Soft? The US and China Go Global* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2014), p. 60.

⁵ Zhang Pei, “The International System Transition and the Construction of China’s Soft Power,” *International Forum* (Winter 2008), pp: 34-47.

⁶ Judith A. Berling, “Confucianism,” *Asian Religions*, Vol.2, No. 1 (Fall 1982), p. 5.

⁷ Mingjiang Li, ed., *Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham: Lexington-Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p.25.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 497-498.

power strategy into foreign policy agenda and of knitting it with “scientific development”⁹ of national strategy in attempting to garner a broader international support.¹⁰

Several Chinese scholars (such as a political theorist Wang Huning, a professor at the Party School of the CCP Men Honghua, and a former director of the Shanghai Institute Yu Xintian) have come up with innovative ideas to bolster China’s soft power. One such idea is that the harmonious world¹¹ of the foreign policy under Hu Jintao should be promoted as a globally shared value to ascend into a morally high ground in the world. Another idea is that China should transform itself from a participant to an active establisher in the international system to wield greater influence in leading international institution reform. A third proposal is that the Chinese government should improve its image and embed Chinese culture in the international system to win over “hearts and minds” of other countries. The aim of these suggestions is to showcase China’s soft power so that Chinese character of foreign policy can be a leading force in directing the future international system. Beijing has increased its influence with more approaches by using a combination of culture, diplomacy, and participation in multinational organizations.¹²

⁹ The scientific development concept is the official guiding socio-economic ideology of China incorporating sustainable development, social welfare, a humanistic society, and, ultimately, the creation of a harmonious society.

¹⁰ Jacques DeLisle, “Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Competition and U.S. Policy,” *ORBIS*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2010), p. 493.

¹¹ In September 2005, President Hu Jintao called for a harmonious world concept at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. He expounded on the concept by making a four-point proposal: 1) multilateralism should be upheld to realize common security; 2) mutually beneficial cooperation should be upheld to achieve common prosperity; 3) the spirit of inclusiveness must be upheld to build a world where all civilizations coexist harmoniously and accommodate each other; and 4) the UN needs rational and necessary reform to maintain its authority. Please see Zou Keyuan, “Building a Harmonious World: A Mission Impossible?” *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2012), p. 74.

¹² Whittaker, *China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 29.

Beijing's leaders have prioritized the cultural soft power strategy into China's foreign policy agenda to garner a broader international support.¹³ Hu Jintao noted at the CCP's Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group Meeting on January 4, 2006, that the increase of China's international influence rests on hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defense as well as on soft power such as culture.¹⁴ Hu further highlighted the importance of cultural soft power at the 17th and 18th CCP Congress in 2007 and in 2012 respectively, addressing culture as the crucial component in enhancing national comprehensive power. Hu argued that China urgently needs to upgrade its cultural soft power.¹⁵ Chinese officials and scholars have also enriched the content of cultural soft power with Chinese characteristics. They acknowledge that cultural soft power is critical to China's image building, at the forefront of which is the Confucius Institute. The reason for Beijing's use of Confucius's name to brand the language-training Institutes is that the harmony and idea found in the philosophy of Confucius, a renowned educator and thinker, are rooted in Chinese cultural traditions.¹⁶

Following the examples of western countries of promoting languages and culture overseas such as the British Council, Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, and the Japan Foundation, the CI concept represents a means of promoting Chinese soft power worldwide. CIs develop a range of various programs designed to develop interest for foreigners in studying Chinese society and language and creating stronger personal and

¹³ DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Competition and U.S. Policy," p. 493.

¹⁴ Li, *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p.1.

¹⁵ "Hu Jintao's Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *People's Daily Online*, December 25, 2007, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/6429849.html>>(accessed October 1, 2014).
"Full text of Hu Jintao's Report at 18th Party Congress," *Xinhua*, November 17, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_7.htm>(accessed October 1, 2014).

¹⁶ Hanban, *2006 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanban, 2006), p. 9.

institutional relationships.¹⁷

The target country of this study, the U.S., has been chosen for several reasons. First, Chinese leaders have frequently claimed that the improvement of China-U.S. relations is the top priority for China's foreign policy. Another reason is that the U.S. has the largest number of Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs) around the world. A third reason is that the Chinese government has poured the most resources into American CIs, whose functions are the most well-established of all programs. Finally, Chinese leaders are most concerned about responses from the U.S. During their official visits in the U.S., the Chinese leaders would pay visits to CIs (for example, on January 21, 2011, President Hu Jintao paid a visit to the CI in Chicago) to show their supports of forging a closer cultural interaction between the U.S. and China.

Since 2004, when the first CI in the U.S. was launched (at the University of Maryland), its development has taken off rapidly because the influx of CI's dollars continues to come at a time when the U.S. government funding for language studies has been slashed.¹⁸ Other factors of booming include the following: the CIs provide a platform for students to learn Chinese language and culture; Chinese guest teachers paid by the PRC government were a major benefit to their universities; *Hanban* (Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi, the colloquial abbreviation for the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language), the Confucius Institute Headquarters, provides the free textbooks and teaching materials.¹⁹

¹⁷ Sirirat Ngamsang and John Walsh, "Confucius Institutes as Instruments of Soft Power: Comparison with International Rivals," *Journal of Education and Vocational Research*, Vol. 4, No. 10 (Oct 2013), p. 302.

¹⁸ Elizabeth Redden, "Confucius Says," *Inside Higher Ed*, January 1, 2012, <http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities> (accessed March 28, 2016).

¹⁹ Muriel M. Zhou, *School-University Partnership in Teaching the Mandarin Chinese Language: The Confucius Institute Experience* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Ph.D. Dissertation, 2011), pp. 39-40.

Since China has vigorously promoted the cultural soft power through CIs in the U.S., the operation of these Institutes deserves in-depth studies; and examining the contents of language and cultural programs of selective CIs is also necessary.

In the introductory chapter, the author proposes the problem statement; explains the methodology of this research; reviews literature of China's soft power concept and CIs; states potential contributions; and lays out chapters' arrangement.

1.1 The problem statement

As China increases its influence in world politics and economy, China's international behavior has become a worldwide spotlight; and learning Mandarin Chinese is becoming more popular. Chinese strategists have thus advised Beijing's authorities to provide multiple channels for foreigners interested in Chinese culture. Utilization of CIs has given Beijing's leaders a new thinking in the crafting of cultural diplomacy.²⁰ According to the Hanban (under the Ministry of Education)—the agency financing the CI's activities—its objectives are to promote the study of Chinese language and culture, to improve relationships between China and other countries, to develop multiculturalism, and to foster global peace and harmony.²¹ To achieve these objectives, Hanban provides grants to sponsoring organizations in China and overseas for the creation of CIs abroad.²²

Since 2004, the year of the first CI establishment (in South Korea), overseas CIs have been widely and rapidly growing. Until March 2016, 500 Confucius Institutes and 980 Confucius Classrooms had been opened in 123 countries and regions worldwide,

²⁰ Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power," *Policy Brief*, Vol. 47 (June, 2006), p.3.

²¹ "About Us," *Confucius Institute Online*, September 27, 2011, http://english.chinese.cn/article/2011-09/27/content_342613.htm>(accessed June 2, 2014).

²² Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, "Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network," *The Learning Organization*, Vol. 16, No. 6 (2009), p. 473.

with over a million registered students.²³ China has sent a total of approximately 50,000 language teachers and volunteers overseas. The number of people studying Chinese on a global scale has risen to 100 million.²⁴

Beijing believes that the CIs can generate several benefits for the nation. First is the expansion of China's international influence. Courses provided by the CIs can help foreign students' understandings about China that can subsequently promote a positive image and bolster its influence in the world. Second is the enhancement of China's cultural uniqueness. The Institute showcases the positive facets of Chinese culture, contributing to foreigners' increasing interests in that culture (i.e. in medicine, art, and gastronomy). Third is the expansion of China's diplomatic arena. The setup of CIs is largely based on universities' cooperation between China and hosting countries. The government can utilize the CIs as a useful platform for justifying China's foreign policy. The Institutes are described as Hu Jintao's cultural soft power initiatives, designed to influence perceptions of China. Li Changchun, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, claimed CIs as an important part of China's overseas propaganda set-up.²⁵

The CIs have gathered momentum in China's foreign policy. For example, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Judith McHale, gave credits to the CIs in cementing U.S. and China relations during the National Chinese Language Conference 2010 held from April 22nd to 24th in Washington D.C. She stated that Chinese language teaching exerts not only an effect on the cultivation of international talents but also an extended influence on the

²³ Hanban, "About Confucius Institute," *Hanban Website*,
http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm>(accessed March 29, 2016).

²⁴ Hanban, "Confucius Institutes Worldwide Celebrate Confucius Institute Day," *Hanban Website*, October 10, 2014, http://english.hanban.org/article/2014-10/16/content_557341.htm>(accessed September 2, 2015).

²⁵ "A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power," *The Economist*, October 10, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/14678507>>(accessed April 20, 2013).

overall interests of U.S.-China relations; and she added that the U.S. government will join forces with the society and educational institutions as well as enhance cooperation with CIs.²⁶ The CIs have also received praises from Chinese and foreign media. On December 18, 2008, the People's Daily selected the Confucius Institute the "10 Major Events" that took place since the Chinese economic reform. World-renowned mass media such as *New York Times*, *Financial Times*, CNN, and the BBC have also credited the CIs as being the most successful product of PRC in helping other countries to understand China.²⁷

Although the official aim of CIs is purely education and promotion of friendly relations with other countries in nature, the language institutes are not without suspicions from international society. Media and scholars see the CIs as an attempt to exert Chinese political control. With those critics, the CI programs have been the subject of controversy during its global expansion. Their arguments include 1) infringing on academic freedom: China's contributions to host universities give Beijing too much leverage over those institutions. The sizeable grants coming with the establishment of CIs could make universities more susceptible to pressures from Beijing. 2) Advancing political purpose: A Taiwan independence activist, Ming-min Peng, accuses that a college or a university where a CI is established has to sign a contract in which it supports a "one China" policy.²⁸ 3) A Trojan horse scheme: James Paradise notes that CIs may be viewed as Chinese "Trojan horses." Paradise argues, CIs are part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes.²⁹ 4)

²⁶ Hanban, "The 3rd National Chinese Language Conference Held in Washington," *Confucius Institute Bimonthly*, Vol. 8 (Beijing: Editorial Office of Confucius Institute, 2008), p.14.

²⁷ "Telling the Story and Spreading the Voices of China – the Confucius Institute Builds a "Spiritual Express Train" Connecting China with the People of the World," *Hanban News*, December 30, 2015, http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-12/30/content_628684.htm (accessed March 26, 2016).

²⁸ Peng Ming-min, "China picks pockets of academics worldwide," *Taipei Times* (31 May 2011), p. 8.

²⁹ Steven W. Mosher, "Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics," *Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs*,

Propaganda tool: The CIs are governed by representatives from Hanban and foreign partners, but the Chinese political system tends to conceal the extent of its influence. According to one Chinese professor, he claims that the CIs are part of propaganda system that is directed at external audiences.³⁰

Some countries have banned or restricted the CI for fear of China's political penetration. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs opposed the setup of CIs in universities, arguing that they were nothing more than a Chinese design to spread its soft power — widening influence by using culture as a propaganda tool. The Japanese government has reservations as well. Of the more than 20 CIs that Hanban has been able to set up in Japan, all are at private universities. Government-funded public universities have refused to play host to the CIs.³¹ In 2006, China and Malaysia had prepared to establish CIs in Malaysian universities through “semi-official” form. Malaysia, where 61% of the population is Muslim, did not agree with using the name of “Confucius institute” for registration for they thought the CI has religious colors. After compromise on both sides, there was agreement to establish the Chinese Language Institute, which has the same education function as the CI but not the name.³² On May 17, 2012, the directive sent by the U.S. State Department to universities which sponsor CIs states that any academics at university-based institutes who were teaching at the elementary- and secondary-school levels were violating the terms of their visas and had to leave at the end

March 28, 2012, <<http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics>> (accessed December 1, 2015).

³⁰ Interviewee 1.

³¹ Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics.” <<http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics>> (accessed December 2, 2015).

³² Hao Chuan, “Legal Consideration on the Confucius Institute Development Process,” *Higher Education of Social Science*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013), p. 17.

of the current school term in June.³³ On May 24, the State Department called the original directive sloppy and arranged the appropriate visa categories for Chinese teachers, without their needing to leave the country.³⁴ In April 2014, over 100 professors at the University of Chicago signed a petition calling for the University Senate Council vote against renewing the university's CI contract, arguing that the Hanban should not control the hiring of teachers.³⁵ In September, the University of Chicago suspended negotiations to renew its CI contract.³⁶ Soon after the University of Chicago's announcement, Pennsylvania State University stated that it would discontinue hosting a CI at the end of 2014, when the contract expired.³⁷

Despite critics' charge that CIs act as a platform for espionage and political purposes, several scholars argue that the major mission of CIs is mainly for language teaching and cultural expansion. For example, Peter Mattis, an editor of *China Brief* at the Jamestown Foundation (an American think tank), argues that the CIs are not being used for espionage because the institutes offer no benefit to China's intelligence apparatus. China's intelligence services have already used diplomats, journalists, civic organizations, and businessmen in their clandestine operations.³⁸ Therefore, it would be unwise for China to use the CIs to engage in intelligence collecting that might tarnish its reputation as an

³³ Karin Fischer, "State Department Directive Could Disrupt Teaching Activities of Campus-Based Confucius Institutes," the Chronicle of Higher Education, May 21, 2012, <http://chronicle.com/article/State-Department-Directive/131934/> >(accessed December 2, 2015).

³⁴ Victoria Nuland, "State Department Daily Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/05/190847.htm#CHINA> >(accessed December 1, 2015).

³⁵ Elizabeth Redden, "Rejecting Confucius Funding," *Inside Higher Ed*, April 29, 2014, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/29/chicago-faculty-object-their-campus-confucius-institute> >(accessed December 2, 2015).

³⁶ "Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago," *Chicago News*, September 25, 2014, <http://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confucius-institute-university-chicago> >(accessed December 2, 2015).

³⁷ "Confucius Institute update," *Penn State College of Liberal Arts*, December 1, 2014, <http://www.la.psu.edu/news/confucius-institute-update> >(accessed December 2, 2015).

³⁸ Peter Mattis, "Reexamining the Confucian Institutes," *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/> > (accessed March 3, 2014).

educational organization. Other scholars (such as Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani, and Joseph A. Ilacqua) also defend CIs. Their research findings show that Hanban does not dictate the curricular design of a language or cultural program. The teaching materials provided by Hanban have been designed to meet students' learning needs and are not intended for propaganda purposes. Hanban can't control the contents of a lecture series or the design of a festival program. The CI at the University of Rhode Island sponsored a series of lectures. Among the invited speakers was a well-known sinologist from Yale, who openly criticized Chinese government. For the annual Chinese New Year festivals, sponsored by the CI at Bryant University, Consulate Generals from both China and Taiwan have attended. By diplomatic protocol, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would boycott any event which has invitations extended to delegates from Taiwan.³⁹ Though financially sponsored by Beijing's government, the CIs focus on the dissemination of culture and avoid from being labeled as the tool of propaganda.⁴⁰

There are debates whether the CIs are neutral scholarly institutions or an attempt by Beijing to control what people know about China. While supporters praise the CIs' achievements, some view their fast expansion as an aggressive and political strategy of

³⁹ Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, "Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network," p. 474.

⁴⁰ Liang Cai and Lilei Song, "Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanqiu Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua" (Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), *International Prospect*, Vol. 9 (November/December, 2010). There are problems arising in CIs. 1) Institute puts too much emphasis on quantities rather than qualities of teaching thus hindering the progress of promoting China's soft power. 2) Some institutions and universities have viewed CIs as a tool to upgrade their organizational status and to make profits that could tarnish the Institutes' reputation. 3) Textbooks of the CIs are mainly edited and provided by universities from China. Some of textbooks lack local characteristics because of having an insufficient knowledge of cultural background. Please see Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, "Confucius Institute: China's Soft Power Construction," *Theory and Reform*, Vol. 5 (2011), pp. 122-125. For the above reasons, some Chinese scholars have proposed the following suggestions. First, the promotion of China's soft power through the CIs should be based on the peaceful development policy to realize national strategy. Second, the CIs should devote its efforts to promoting Chinese culture, dodging from profit-seeking, and becoming a showcase of contemporary China's achievements. Please see Zhang Xiping, "Jianlun Kongzi Xueyuan De Ruanshili Gongneng," (Soft Power Function of Confucius Institute), *Shijie Hanyu Jiaoxue (World Chinese Language Teaching)*, Vol. 1 (June 2007), pp. 3-5.

China to gain world power status.⁴¹ Hence, the research questions for this dissertation are listed as follows:

Q1: What are the positive and negative views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States?

Q2: How effective of the Confucius Institutes in shaping China's image in the United States?

1.2 Methodology

The main goal of this study is to explore the effectiveness of China's cultural soft power strategy through CIs in the U.S. using the twelve CIs as a particular case study. Qualitative research is applied to offer an in-depth understanding and comprehensive analysis on China's cultural soft power. The case study involves an in-depth examination of a single event; it provides a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data, analyzing information, and reporting results.⁴²

The data for empirical research are mainly from archival research of primary and secondary sources and in-depth interviews. The dissertation is descriptive in nature and illustrates what is happening and why it is happening. Field interviews are one way to collect opinions. Interviewees were asked questions based on their knowledge of and experience with the CI (Please see Appendix I). These data offer an insight into the perspective of current CIs' status. This research also benefits by using existing surveys of

⁴¹ Shuai Li and Yanyin Zhang, "A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education," *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 2013), pp. 29-30.

⁴² Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Third Edition)* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 13.

the U.S. public view on China.⁴³

The writer has reviewed all the official websites and many annual reports of the CIs in the U.S. Based on the available information and focus of this study (cultural soft power), this dissertation for analysis has narrowed down and selected twelve CIs. This section also explores their language programs and cultural activities as well as responses from CIs' students and participants.

This dissertation first clarifies key variables: the effectiveness of China's cultural soft power strategy (dependent variable) and cultural diplomacy such as promotion of language teaching courses and cultural dissemination programs through CIs (independent variables). This research dissects how cultural diplomacy influences China's cultural soft power. The writer then reports results and assesses their implications. Despite the information collection limitation (particularly the insufficient budget for visiting other CIs), the generalization can be done. If we have a clear research scope, we can still make an overall analysis of a particular case.⁴⁴

1.3 Literature review

Cultural soft power has been embraced by Chinese scholars and leaders because it appears to be an alternative to power politics.⁴⁵ Research has been carried out by a plethora of well-known experts, usually in major universities (including Tsinghua and Fudan), research centers (for instance, the Central Party School), and relevant branches of

⁴³ The data analysis in this study followed the two phases. The first phase entails classifying, comparing, and combining material from the interviews to extract meaning and implication. The second phase figures out what data mean by building toward description. Please see Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (Second Edition)* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 13.

⁴⁴ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971), p. 691.

⁴⁵ Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 81.

the government (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The products of their analyses have appeared in leading academic and policy journals.⁴⁶ Unlike Nye's focus on the efficacy of soft power in achieving foreign policy goals, Chinese scholars frequently refer to a domestic context. For example, political analyst Yu Keping argues that education, the psychological and physical condition of the people, technology, culture, social cohesion, and socio-economic development are all sources of soft power.⁴⁷ Wang Huning considers soft power under the following six aspects: political system, national spirit, the international image of society, foreign strategy, the capability of the international system, science and technology development. Liu Jie, a scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, views soft power resources including: core values, political systems, culture, philosophy, and the national spirit.⁴⁸ This dissertation has taken most of the recent literature from journals, books, official documents, and the CIs' website. The following section categorizes the literature into either China's soft power concept or Confucius Institutes.

1.3.1 China's soft power concept

China's scholars attempt to craft their own soft power strategy with Chinese characteristics. Although related studies have increased, there is no shared definition of what soft power actually means.⁴⁹ On the whole, scholars' writings focus mainly on two parts: China's soft power concept and its relations with foreign policy.

The Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University conducted a study on the practice of soft power in China. The highlight of their researches states that the key to

⁴⁶ Joel Wuthnow, "The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse," *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 2.

⁴⁷ Li, ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p. 28.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁹ Shaun Breslin, "The Soft Notion of China's Soft Power," *Asia Programme Paper* (February 2011), p. 2.

understanding soft power is to know relations between soft power and hard power. The hard power lays the foundation of the soft power. For China, its economic development is not only the core of hard power but also a solid basis for cultivating soft power. Hard power sustained by economic power could be beneficial to boost soft power, but its contribution is limited.⁵⁰ In order to enhance China's soft power, Men Honghua states that the philosophy of soft power can be enriched by addressing the important resources of culture, China's development model, international institutions, and international image.⁵¹ Mingjiang Li proposes an approach positive use soft power's resources. He contends that if a country uses the resources in a prudent way in its relations with other countries, it will win reciprocity. If a country has the ability to make proposals in multilateral institutions that the international community regards as beneficial, it gains soft power.⁵²

"Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," written by two researchers from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Bonnie Glaser and Melissa Murphy, summarizes their findings. First, international observers have raised the concern of the expansion of China's soft-power influence. Second, soft power is a hot topic in China. The mainstream intellectual view is that culture is the core resource of a state's power. The view has been embraced by China's leadership. Third, despite strong interest at the highest circles, China has yet to develop a comprehensive and coherent national soft-power strategy. Finally, as China expands its national power and assumes a bigger role on the international stage, it is possible that Beijing will promote the China

⁵⁰ Beijing Daxue Zhongguo Ruan Shili Ketizu (Chinese Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University), "Ruanshili Zai Zhongguo De Shijian Zhi Yi—Ruanshili Gainian," (One of the Practice of Soft Power in China—the Concept of Soft power), *People's Daily Online*, March 5, 2008, <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/6957188.htm> (accessed March 3, 2014).

⁵¹ Men Honghua, "Zhongguo Ruanshili Pinggu Baogao(shang)," (Chinese Soft Power Assessment Report), *Guoji GuanCha (International Observation)*, Vol. 2 (2007), pp.15-26.

⁵² Li, ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p. 7.

development model.⁵³ Another U.S. scholar, Joel Wuthnow, in his paper “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse” describes that the discourse on soft power within China’s strategic studies community offers a window into Chinese thinking about non-coercive strategy. Wuthnow provides an assessment of the discourse, covering the conceptualization of soft power development as a key component of China’s grand strategy. Three mechanisms through which soft power can support China’s long-term growth have been discussed: the efforts to earn international understanding of its Confucian heritage; the involvement of China’s leadership position in the developing world; and the policies through which China can enhance its image as a responsible power.⁵⁴ Two Korean scholars, Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, investigate China’s soft power strategy and resources by focusing on three areas: the developmental model, foreign policy, and civilization. They conclude that China’s recognition of soft power and its application to national policies is an important factor in explaining China’s improving image and increasing influence in Asia.⁵⁵

Competitions in soft power have laid the cornerstone to build a new international system. Chinese strategists are exploring innovative approaches in its rise in international politics. There have been several notable elements of these approaches in China’s diplomatic practice, including softer rhetoric, promotion of culture abroad, and image building.⁵⁶ The idea of soft power figures crucially in the story of China’s re-emergence as a global power. China has embarked on its quest for an image makeover.⁵⁷ “China’s

⁵³ Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” in McGiffert, (ed.) *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States* (October 5, 2009), p. 10.

⁵⁴ Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” pp. 1-28.

⁵⁵ Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48, No. 3, (May/June 2008), pp. 453-472.

⁵⁶ Li, ed., *Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p.1.

⁵⁷ Jian Wang, (ed.) *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-14.

Harmonious World: Theory and Significance,” written by Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu, finds that peace and development have become China’s grand strategy for the fourth generation leaders. The harmonious world theory is a diplomatic strategy that is designed to pave the way for building a new world order. While intending to construct overseas CIs as the core of cultural foreign policy, China has tried to build a soft power policy that can realize its foreign policy objective to project image of peaceful rise.⁵⁸ With changes of identity and interests interacting between China and the world, Hu Jintao has advocated the notion of a harmonious world to create a collective identity of the world.⁵⁹ Shulan Ye, an instructor at the Department of Politics at East China Normal University, argues that China has the possibility to rise peacefully and become the regional leader by peaceful means if it can commit to constructing a regional identity by drawing from the strength of its culture in conjunction with western values.⁶⁰ Yu Xintian claims that soft power is a powerful instrument for representing national culture in the international community and should be regarded as an essential resource of crafting foreign policy. China should value the interests of foreign countries and accordingly put forth proposals on strengthening soft power by seeking a feasible approach of win-win cooperation.⁶¹

Hu Jintao’s administration has employed Chinese traditional culture and modern art to engage in exchanges and cooperation with other countries.⁶² One of the approaches to

⁵⁸ Chao Chien-min and Hsu Chih-chia, “Zhonggong Di Sidai Lingdao Jiti de Hexie Shijieguan Lilun yu Yihan” (China’s Harmonious World: Theory and Significance) *Yuanjing Jijinhui Jikan (Prospect Quarterly)*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 27-28.

⁵⁹ Tang Jiang-Yu, “Jiangou Zhong De Hexie Shijie—Hexie Shijie Linian de Jiangou” (Harmonious World in Construction—An Observation of the Concept of Harmonious World from the Perspective of Constructivism), *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations)*, Vol. 3 (2008), pp. 7-12.

⁶⁰ Ye Shulan, *Rising China’s Regional Policy in East Asia: A Constructivist Perspective* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University Ph.D. Dissertation, August 2010).

⁶¹ Yu Xintian, “Soft Power Construction and China’s Foreign Strategy,” *International Studies*, Vol. 2 (2008), pp. 15-20. Yu Xintian, “The Role of Soft Power in China’s External Strategy,” *Global Review* (2007), pp. 113-127.

⁶² Yang Yu-Sheng, *Zhonggong Waijiao Zhanlue Zhuanbian Yu Chuangxin 2002-2008—Ruanshili Waijiao*

promote China's soft power is through the state-run China Central Television (CCTV) International.⁶³ Since 2000, China has implemented the policy of outreach and has used media to exert its influence worldwide. According to international polls, there is an increasing trend in the developing countries which have a positive view of China.⁶⁴ *Soft Power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China's Soft Power in its Modernization Process*, written by Sheng Ding, focuses on two subjects: the theoretical discussion of soft power and its assessment and an assessment of China's soft power in its modernization process. The author concludes that China has achieved impressive gains in its overall level of soft power. Its successful development model has won global admiration while aiding in the development of a new affinity between China and the rest of Asia. Its new diplomacy has led to China's more active and responsible participation in international affairs, which is increasing China's agenda setting abilities and improving its national image. However, further expansion of China's soft power is constrained both by its domestic political institutions and by those of international crises. More importantly, the rise of China is occurring at a time when the international system is undergoing a structural transformation, which inevitably complicates China's efforts to project its soft power. However, China might have a long way to go before it possesses the level of soft power needed to make it a true global leader.⁶⁵

As for China's role in Asia, Philip Saunders, a scholar from the U.S. National Defense University, finds that educational contacts between China and Asia have

Zhanlue De Fensi (China's Diplomatic Strategic Change and Innovation 2002-2008—Soft Power's Diplomatic Strategy) (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis, 2009).

⁶³ Zhang Xiaoling, "China as an Emerging Soft Power: Winning Hearts and Minds through Communicating with Foreign Republic," *Discussion Paper*, Vol. 35 (October 2008), pp. 1-18.

⁶⁴ Zhong-Jian Deng and Yu-Nu Lu, "Zhongguo Dalu Ruanquanli De Fazhan yu Yingxiang" (The Development and Influence of China's Soft Power), *Quanqiu Zhengzhi Pinglun (Review of Global Politics)*, Vol. 21 (2008), pp.1-18.

⁶⁵ Sheng Ding, *Soft Power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China's Soft Power in its Modernization Process* (New Jersey: The State University of New Jersey Ph.D. Dissertation, 2006).

multiplied. Beijing supplements educational exchanges by supporting the establishment of CIs in Asia, and talented Chinese artists are beginning to win regional recognition.⁶⁶ China is considered to be the primary economic patron of the small but strategically important countries such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos; it also provides considerable economic aid to Indonesia and the Philippines.⁶⁷ However, problems of “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers in the area have begun to challenge Beijing.⁶⁸ Chinese strategists thus recommend that the government should institutionalize the foreign aid mechanism and increase interactions between Chinese officials and the local governments.⁶⁹

Achievements of the cultural soft power within China are reflected in the improvement of cultural system reform, cultural industries, and overseas cultural information dissemination. Despite Chinese culture having been taught by immigrant Chinese since WWII, the flourishing CIs in the recent past has helped more foreigners learn about Chinese culture. Although China’s cultural soft power may already be diffused, there is still much needed to be done. Scholar Zhang Guozuo has a few suggestions: establish a value system for socialism, promote Chinese culture, upgrade culture with scientific development, and shape national image through culture.⁷⁰

The above literature primarily explores why China employs the soft power strategy

⁶⁶ Philip Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, edited *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 137-141.

⁶⁷ Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, “China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” *CRS Report for Congress* (January 4, 2008).

⁶⁸ Sheng Ding, “To Build A Harmonious World: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2008), pp. 193-213.

⁶⁹ Wei Xuemei, “Dui Tisheng Zhongguo Ruanshili de Sikao: Yi Dui Feizhou Yuanzhu Wei Shijiao” (Thought on Promoting China’s Soft Strength: from the Perspective of Aiding to Africa), *Fujian Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Fujian Administration Institute)*, Vol. 4 (2010), pp. 66-71.

⁷⁰ Zhang Guozuo, “Tisheng Woguo Wenhua Ruanshili de Zhanlue Sikao” (The Strategic Thinking of Enhancing China’s Cultural Soft Power), *Qiushi (Seeking Truth)*, April 4, 2011, http://www.qstheory.cn/tbzt/sqjlz/zgtsshzywh/qshqwg/201104/t20110427_78521.htm (accessed September 25, 2014).

and what the benefits are of implementing this strategy. These studies commonly lack a theoretical perspective that restricts them from having much academic value. Nonetheless, they can still contribute to a better understanding of the reasons why Chinese highest circles choose soft power strategy.

1.3.2 China's cultural diplomacy: Confucius Institutes

In the 21st century, the cultural soft power has occupied a strategic high ground as reflected in the study of international relations theory and in the performance of the cultural renaissance throughout the world. Since the establishment of CIs, Chinese scholars and officials have paid close attention to Institutes' development. Several related literature has been released. Huang Lianying's article on *Chinese Scholars Literature on Confucius Institute* conducted a poll on related Chinese literature. Studies on CIs started in 2005, and since then the research has gained more momentum. This body of literature can be classified into several categories: functional significance (31.93%), development issues and recommendations (19.33%), Institute management and operation (14.29%), teaching content (14.29%), developmental status (10.92%), teacher-training (5.04%), the teaching method (2.52%), and language teaching materials (1.68%).⁷¹

The CI adopts a “university to university co-established” approach and introduces socialist economic system with Chinese characteristics to other countries to gain recognition.⁷² Chinese scholar Wang Rui analyzes cultural communication and cultural heritage through overseas CIs. Wang's findings suggest several primary reasons for the

⁷¹ Huang Lianying, “Guonei Xuezhong Kongzi Xueyuan Yanjiu de Wenxian Zongshu” (Chinese Scholars Literature on Confucius Institute), *Oriental Enterprise Culture (Dongfang Qiye Wenhua)*, Issue 8 (April 2011), pp. 173-174.

⁷² Liang Cai and Lilei Song, “Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanguo Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua” (Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), *Guoji Zhanwang (International Prospect)*, Vol. 9 (2010), pp. 38-49.

rapid development: China's economic strength has become more robust; Chinese culture possesses a deep historical root; CIs can meet the increasing demands of Chinese language learners; Chinese government has been the strong sponsor for the expansion of Institutes.⁷³

The Chinese Mandarin learning craze is rising around the world. The root cause for this phenomenon is the rapid growth of China's economy. Two Chinese scholars, Hongqin Zhao and Jianbin Huang, argue that the Chinese language has emerged as a subject for research as well as an educational market. The enhancement and flexibility of language curriculum policy has led to the swift expansion of the CIs. The findings, however, indicate that it is unlikely that Mandarin Chinese will replace English as the world's most widely used language in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that English will continue to be the dominant language in the world, the view that the Chinese language is an essential component in the future unity of the world has been voiced.⁷⁴ Fu Liping and Li Gang make a similar argument. They discovered that the CIs have integrated the resources of cooperation between local (Mainland China) and foreign universities, and that the cultural industry has enhanced cultural diplomacy to increase soft power. Leaders must acknowledge that cultural soft power in the West still holds a dominant position, and China still has a long way to catch up.⁷⁵ By the same token, the rising interest of foreigners in Chinese culture does not mean they agree with the CCP,

⁷³ Wang Rui, "Lun Kongzi Xueyuan Jianshe de Shidai Beijing yu Wenhua Yiyi" (Historical background and Cultural Significance of Confucius Institute) *Shenyang Shifan Daxue Xuebao* (Shenyang Normal University), Vol. 35, No. 2 (2011), pp. 136-138.

⁷⁴ Hongqin Zhao and Jianbin Huang, "China's Policy of Chinese as a Foreign Language and the Use of Overseas Confucius Institutes," *Educ Res Policy Prac*, Vol. 9 (2010), pp. 127-142.

⁷⁵ Fu Liping and Li Gang, "Kongzi Xueyuan Yu Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Tisheng" (Confucius Institute and the Ascending of the Cultural Soft Power of China), *Nanjing Xiaozhuang Xueyuan Xuebao* (Journal of Nanjing Xiaozhuang College), Vol. 2 (March 2011), pp. 97-102.

nor do they become less fearful of China's rapid rise.⁷⁶ Several Chinese scholars (Tseng Wen, Hong Gao, Ding Zhongyi, and Wei Xing) propose recommendations on how to improve China's cultural soft power so as to beautify its image: the government should use the cultural soft power through CIs as its national strategic development; the Institutes should become institutionalized and flexible so that they can better promote Chinese culture.⁷⁷

While Western powers are suspicious of China's rise, Beijing urgently needs to be within a long-term peaceful and stable international environment for its goal of building a well-off society by 2020. Leadership realizes that if China wants to maintain its economic edge, it cannot rely solely on the development of its hard power. Instead, China should devote its efforts to cooperating with the major powers by displaying its softer sides of cultural power. The best approach would be strengthening cultural diplomacy through CIs. Through cultural dissemination, China could build its credibility as a civilized country and reduce the political hostilities from the West in an attempt to influence agendas in the Asia Pacific affairs, and finally reach the goal of "the Beijing Consensus replacing the Washington Consensus."⁷⁸

To minimize the fear of China's threat and to realize the goal of well-off society, China is adopting a peace-oriented strategy through the use of CIs.⁷⁹ James F. Paradise's

⁷⁶ Zhang Xiping, *On Soft Power Capability of Confucius Institute* (Taipei: Chengchi University Master Thesis, 2009).

⁷⁷ Tseng Wen, "The Study on China's Wide-Spread Confucius Institutes—An Analysis of Soft Power," *Genamics Journal*, Vol. 3 (2007). Hong Gao, "An Analysis of the Phenomenon of Global Mandarin Fever," *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 7, No. 12 (December 2011), pp. 253-257. Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, "Confucius Institute: An Effective Platform for Soft Power Construction in China," *Theory and Reform*, Vol. 5 (2011), pp.122-125.

⁷⁸ Hsieh Yu-yen, *Dui Zhonggong Jiango Shijie Zhi Yanjin Yi Sheli Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research on China Building A Harmonious World – A Case Study of the Establishment of Confucius Institute)* (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis, 2008).

⁷⁹ Ho Min-chih, *Hu Jintao Shiji Zhonggong Wenhua Zhi Yanjiu Yi Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research of China's Cultural Diplomacy under Hu Jintao's Period—An Case Study of Confucius Institute)* (Taipei:

paper “China and International Harmony: the Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power” states that China is setting up Institutes to spread its language and culture and to increase collaboration with foreign academic institutions. China is projecting a more favorable image and re-assures the world that its intentions are benign. Its approaches include espousing theories of China’s peaceful rise and development and disseminating information through various government white papers and websites oriented toward foreign readers.⁸⁰

There are two researches on the CIs in Germany and Thailand as a case study. Falk Hartig uses Confucius Institutes in Germany to discuss the concepts of cultural diplomacy and culture institutes as a conceptual tool to analyze CIs. This case study provides empirical data to explore China’s image-shaping efforts in Germany.⁸¹ Hartig discovered that CIs are not only designed to teach language and promote culture but also aim to balance the dominant American cultural influence. The Institutes also contribute, at least indirectly, to China’s foreign policy agenda.⁸² Olan Sumananusorn has used the soft power perspective to analyze the relations between China and Thailand. The findings show that the traits of China’s foreign policy are that Beijing has emphasized a peace-oriented approach and cultural strategy to create a favorable international environment.⁸³

The paper “Confucius Institutes: Distributed leadership and knowledge sharing in a worldwide network,” written by Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani, and Joseph A. Ilacqua,

Ming Chuan University Master Thesis, 2009).

⁸⁰ James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 647-665.

⁸¹ Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies*, Vol. 17 (March 2012), pp. 53-76.

⁸² Ibid., p. 57.

⁸³ Olan Sumananusorn, *China’s Cultural Soft power toward Thailand in the 21st century: A Case Study of Confucius Institute* (Taipei: Chengchi University Master Thesis, 2009).

focuses on CIs and assesses the applicability of theories of leadership and knowledge sharing to multinational organizations and worldwide networks. The research applies theoretical developments to analyze leadership and knowledge sharing of the successful CIs. The findings are that many similarities exist between the operations of the CIs and multinational businesses. For both, strategic goals are achieved through the promotion of global expansion and the management practices.⁸⁴

The number of K-12 schools in the U.S. offering Mandarin Chinese has been growing. Muriel M. Zhou investigated how six U.S. secondary schools developed Mandarin Chinese programs through partnership with the CI at University X, and explored how the partnership helped those schools achieve their educational goals. The study found that the partnership was complementary and cooperative in nature and the schools worked with the CI on a need-response basis. Working in the partnership as “loosely coupled systems,” the schools enjoyed autonomy and flexibility, but they were challenged with much uncertainty and a lack of consistency and communication on a regular basis.⁸⁵ Amy Stambach, a distinguished professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, explored how CI teachers and U.S. students use language to identify qualities of Chinese people and culture. The study argues that students’ and teachers’ contextualized use of language occurs in relation to their different yet naturalized assumptions about a commonly shared social world. The article offers the concept of linguistic hegemony to aid in understanding the multiple expressions of language form

⁸⁴ Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” *The Learning Organization*, Vol. 16 No. 6 (2009), pp. 469-482.

⁸⁵ Muriel M. Zhou, *School-University Partnership in Teaching the Mandarin Chinese Language: The Confucius Institute Experience*.

and use that emerge in CI programs.⁸⁶

Confucius Institute project: China's cultural diplomacy and soft power projection, written by Su-Yan Pan, applies the theory of cultural diplomacy to explore and explain the role and function of the CI project and its implications for understanding China's soft power projection. This paper first presents the theories of soft power and cultural diplomacy as an analytic framework. It then delineates an interpretative illustration of the CI project as a platform for China's cultural diplomacy. The paper argues that the CI's project can be understood as a form of cultural diplomacy that is state-sponsored and university-piloted, a joint effort to gain China a more sympathetic global reception. As such, the project involves a complex of soft power techniques. However, it is not entirely representative of soft power capability because the problems embedded in the project and in wider society run counter to the Beijing's efforts to increase the CIs' attractiveness and popularity.⁸⁷

Presently the setup of CIs is at the developmental stage, with most studies on Institutes focusing on the exploration of the mission and functions of Chinese culture transmission in the international arena. The body of literature discussed in this chapter is valuable for the understanding of China's favoring the soft power strategy and the CIs, and for predicting their future trend. The relevant research on the relations between CIs and cultural soft power is, however, understudied, especially in terms of their operations in the U.S. Moreover, the literature presented in general lacks theoretical discussions. As such, the main purpose of this dissertation is to improve and to discuss further the

⁸⁶ Amy Stambach, "Confucius Institute Programming in the United States: Language Ideology, Hegemony, and the Making of Chinese Culture in University Classes," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, Vol. 46, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 55–70.

⁸⁷ Su-Yan Pan, *Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection* (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2013).

theoretical components.

Cultural soft power is a “hot topic” in China. The mainstream intellectual view is that culture is the core element of a state’s power. Cultural diplomacy can shape an international environment that is beneficial to China’s continuous economic growth and image building. Pursuing a cultural soft power, China could send a message to assure other countries of its peaceful intentions during its rise. The view has been supported by Beijing’s leadership, resulting in expanded funding for the development of China’s cultural soft-power resources at home and its expansion abroad.⁸⁸ Though there is some literature discussing China’s cultural soft power and CIs respectively, most of studies lack theoretical examination; this hinders them from having much academic value. This dissertation thus has the following expectation: the study expects both to improve empirical and theoretical understanding of China’s cultural soft power through overseas CIs and to shed light on China’s intentions.

1.4 Structure of the study

This dissertation includes six chapters. It examines how the Chinese government utilizes CIs to achieve its assumed goal and how effective CIs are in shaping Americans’ opinions towards China. Hence, the chapters are arranged as follows:

Chapter One (introduction) first illustrates the problem statement of CIs and creates research questions. Next, it states the methodology. The chapter then introduces the literature review (China’s soft power strategies and the Confucius Institutes), summarizes their major arguments, and highlights findings.

Chapter Two (theoretical framework) begins with summarizing the essence of

⁸⁸ Glaser and Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 10.

Joseph Nye's cultural soft power theory and discussing his major arguments. It then turns to examining China's cultural soft power resources, the Chinese approaches to cultural soft power, and the relations between CIs and cultural soft power. The writer builds key relationships between China's cultural soft power strategy, cultural diplomacy, and the CIs. This chapter also identifies dependent variables (cultural soft power) and independent variables (programs of overseas CIs).

Chapter Three (China's cultural soft power strategy and the Confucius Institutes) explores the evolution of China's cultural policy. The writer explains cultural policies from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping. The focus is to explore the essence of cultural diplomacy of each top leader. Next, the chapter analyzes the rationale of the CI project, the establishment model, and demonstration of cultural soft power. It also discusses relations between cultural soft power and language promotion and the relations between cultural soft power and cultural dissemination. Then, it explores how Beijing disseminates cultural soft power and employs soft power in its cultural diplomacy. Last, the chapter briefly introduces the current status of global expansion of CIs.

Chapter Four (Confucius Institutes in the United States) introduces their current status in the nation. First, it explores the reasons for the Chinese government's establishing CIs in the U.S. Second, it describes the current status of twelve CIs. Third, it describes the contents of language teachings and cultural activities. Fourth, the writer analyzes the relations between language promotion and the Institute and how it promotes Chinese language. The chapter also examines the cultural activities hosted by the CIs.

Chapter Five (views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States) examines how the mass media, professors, CI personnel and students, and general public view CIs in the U.S. This chapter also looks at language programs and cultural activities held by CIs to

evaluate the effectiveness of these programs and activities in promoting cultural soft power and image. The chapter then analyzes the results of data and predicts the possible future development of CIs in the U.S.

The concluding chapter summarizes the major arguments of the dissertation. It then reports the findings of this research. In addition to presenting the findings, this chapter will also answer two research questions and elaborate their underlying meanings.

1.5 Summary

Given that the Chinese government has vigorously promoted the cultural soft power through CIs to augment China's image abroad, the international mass media and scholars have kept a watchful eye on the booming proliferation of Institutes. Thus the reasons for the Chinese government's establishing CIs and the actual operations of Institutes deserve in-depth empirical and theoretical studies. The dissertation addresses the role of the CIs in China's modernized foreign propaganda. It is generally accepted that the CIs have become a means of showcasing cultural soft power directed at influencing foreign public opinion to forge positive views toward China. What is clear to the most people is the physical — the building, the books, the people. What is unclear is intangible — cultural soft power and China leaders' intention. This study aims to explore the elusiveness of cultural soft power and China's intention. It also explores the CIs' programs and activities in the U.S. and examines their functions by interviewing the various voices of participants.

This chapter introduces the problem statement, methodology, literature review, and problem statement. In the section on the problem statement, the writer has found that the CI programs have been the subject of controversy during its global expansion. Topics of controversy include infringing on academic freedom, advancing political purpose, a

Trojan horse scheme, and a propaganda tool. Several countries thus have restricted the establishment of CI. Despite the fact that some critics have charged CIs as a platform for espionage and political purpose, some scholars defend CIs and claim that they focus on the dissemination of culture and avoid being labeled as the tool of politics. The writer also proposes two research questions: What are the positive and negative views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States? How effective of the Confucius Institutes in shaping China's image in the United States? In the section on methodology, the author introduces the main goal of this study — to explore the effectiveness of China's cultural soft power strategy in the U.S. through CIs. This section also explains the reasons for selecting the U.S. as the targeted country. Qualitative research is applied to offer an in-depth understanding on China's cultural soft power. In the section on literature review, the author has following observations: Chinese discourse on cultural soft power conforms to Nye's conceptual framework but is not limited to the scope of that conceptualization; writings on China's soft power focus on two parts: China's soft power concept and its relations with foreign policy; the research on the relations between CIs and cultural soft power is understudied, especially in terms of their operations in the U.S.

Chapter II Theoretical Framework

This study uses literature reviews to formulate theoretical frameworks that could analyze the data from various sources regarding the relationship between Confucius Institute (CI) and China's cultural soft power in the U.S. To understand how CI generates China's cultural soft power, this study embarks on an examination of selective CIs in the U.S. by conceptualizing cultural soft power and operationalizing the exact procedures of this research.

The theoretical framework is going to conduct the following steps: 1) Defining cultural soft power. Section One first looks at the soft power resources (culture, political value, and foreign policies) proposed by Joseph Nye because soft power is a concept developed by Nye. It then explores China's soft-power resources in the areas of culture, political values, and diplomacy. 2) Conceptualizing cultural soft power. Culture is the core of the Chinese government's projecting its soft power strategy. Section Two specifies the meanings of the cultural soft power and cultural diplomacy (its tool) and explains the key relationships between cultural diplomacy and CIs, and lists ways Institutes could be beneficial to boost China's image. 3) Operationizing cultural soft power. The writer argues that the effectiveness of China's cultural soft power rests mainly on language teaching and cultural programs through CIs. Section Three proposes two variables: promotion of Chinese language and cultural dissemination programs in CI, and examines how these programs increase China's cultural influence in the U.S. This research adopts a qualitative research. Section Four introduces how to collect data and explains selections choices of twelve CIs.

2.1 The soft power resources

Hard power and soft power are intertwined because both are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The hard power, the ability to change what others do, relies on coercion or inducement. Soft power, however, is the ability to shape what others want depending on the attractiveness of one's culture and values. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also its soft-power resources. All three sources of power (military, economic, and soft power) remain relevant. Simply put, hard power and soft power reinforce each other.¹ Many Chinese analysts (such as Yan Xuetong, Men Honghua, Zhang Xiaoling, and Xu Jin) also believe that soft power and hard power are complementary. The domestic context is evident in the remarks of top Chinese leaders. Hu Jintao stated that cultural soft power has the purposes of enhancing national cohesion and creativity; meeting the demands of people's spiritual life; and strengthening China's competitiveness in the contest for comprehensive national power within the international arena.² In the post Cold War era, there have been an increasing number of countries beginning to craft their soft power strategy to vie for national interests.

In Joseph Nye's conceptualization, soft power of a country depends primarily on three resources: culture (its acceptance by foreign countries), political value (its understanding by foreign countries), and foreign policies (acceptance of them as

¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp.7, 9, 15, 30.

² Li Mingjiang, "China Debates Soft Power," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2 (2008), pp. 287-308.

legitimate and moral authority).³

Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. When a country's culture includes universal value and its policies promote values that others share, the probability of achieving desired outcomes is increased.⁴ Culture is an important resource for soft power. Culture constitutes the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values.⁵ Language, philosophy, art, and literature all serve as cultural elements which organize a common experience and guide the behavior of a society.⁶ Nye argues that narrow values and parochial culture are less likely to produce soft power.⁷ Soft power can be understood as using shared concept and culture to influence the positions of other countries to meet their expectations. Those who occupy the leading role of cultural development gain an upper hand in the global competition.

The political values a government champions in its behavior at home (such as exercising democracy), in international institutions (such as working with others), and in foreign policy (such as promoting peace and human rights) affect the reactions of other

³ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 30.

⁴ Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 84. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.11.

⁵ A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge: Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1952), p. 181.

⁶ Youling Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization* (New York: State University of New York Ph.D. Dissertation, 2011), pp.17-18.

⁷ Nye, "Soft Power and Higher Education,"
<http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffp0502s.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2015).

countries. Governments can attract or repel others by the influence of their examples.⁸ American political ideals favorably influenced Europe after World War II. Chinese students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square used a replica of the Statue of Liberty as a symbol for democracy. Nye argues that these are examples of U.S. soft power upon other countries. Nye emphasizes that “When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction.”⁹

Foreign policy is another potential source of soft power. Foreign policy of a country that appears to be indifferent to the opinion of others or is based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine its soft power.¹⁰ If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its values, its actions will appear legitimate in the eyes of others. However, incorporating soft power into a governmental strategy is a daunting task. Formation of foreign policy often takes a long period of time. Politicians and publics are impatient to see a prompt return on their investments.¹¹ A nation’s soft power characteristics can be conveyed through a higher education system, both within a country and abroad. The use of higher education as a vehicle for soft power projection has been part of an overall strategy in U.S. foreign policy to create understanding for U.S. ideals across the globe. Other nations are also making significant investments in this area.¹²

⁸ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.14.

⁹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, p.83.

¹⁰ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp.13-14.

¹¹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, p.83.

¹² Joseph Stetar, Colleen Coppla, Li Guo, Naila Nabiyeve, and Baktybek Ismailov, “Soft Power Strategies: Competition and Cooperation in a Globalized System of Higher Education,” in the *Higher Education, Policy, and the Global Competition Phenomenon* (Los Angeles: Palgrave Macmillan, January 2010), p. 191.

China's soft-power resources in the areas of culture, political values, and diplomacy have shown substantial growth in recent years.

We can explore further the ways in which culture is an important source of China's soft power. China has abundant resources of soft power, thanks to a culture which is one of the oldest of the world.¹³ With a long history, the Chinese culture drew a stream of traders, emissaries, and scholars in quest of riches and power. China's status as Asia's traditional central power created abundant reserves of soft power.¹⁴ Chinese history in written records can be traced back more than 3,000 years, and archaeological evidence shows Chinese culture originating around 5,000 B.C. China has influenced its neighbors by its writing system and philosophy. For instance, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese have adopted Chinese characters in their own writing systems. Confucianism has also provided a significant intellectual source for the modern societies of Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore in their cultural, ethical, and educational systems.¹⁵ In the past decade, China has paid more attention to promoting Chinese culture overseas. For instance, China has established many overseas CIs. In addition, China sponsors over 1,300 cultural exchanges a year, such as Year of Chinese culture, Chinese cultural festival, and Chinese New Year celebrations in the U.S., France, the UK, Russia, and Thailand.¹⁶

A state-political system initially emerged in China around 3,700 B.C. By the second

¹³ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.17.

¹⁴ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power," *Survival* (Summer 2006), Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 17-18.

¹⁵ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp.18-20.

¹⁶ Xin Li and Verner Worm, "Building China's Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise," *Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Discussion Papers*, Vol. 28 (July 2009), p.13.

century B.C., China was unified as a centralized state. Ancient China had established complex forms of political organization. Noble birth was not a decisive factor for people in determining their social status, and the general public could attain the higher ranks by excellence in examinations. Confucius proposed “ruling by virtue” and argued that virtue was the foundation of a stable state.¹⁷ Social stability is the key to economic growth; and robust economy is central to the legitimization of an authoritarian government.¹⁸ China claims that its economic miracle, amid political stability, is an alternative to the Western model. In the past three decades, China’s developmental model enhances the international appeal of China’s political values. The model, which has been designed and adjusted according to China’s own situation, combines China’s ideas with Western experience.¹⁹ Joshua Cooper Ramo claimed that China’s economic miracle presents the developing world a recipe for success: the “Beijing Consensus” that emphasizes development based on a country’s own characteristics.²⁰ According to some scholars, in parts of Asia, Africa,

¹⁷ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China’s Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁸ Pavlos Efthymiou, “Chinese Soft Power: Sources and Implications for the US,” <http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sources-andimplications-for-the-us/> (accessed April 4, 2014).

¹⁹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China’s Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p. 32.

²⁰ The Beijing Consensus, Ramo explains, consists of three theorems: the first states that China’s development model is based on innovation, the second states that China’s development model considers sustainability and equality as top priorities, the third states that China strives for self-determination in foreign policy. In parts of the developing world, the “Beijing Consensus” on authoritarian government and a successful market economy has become more popular than the “Washington Consensus.” Leaders of developing countries are admiring and emulating what might be called “the China Model.” It has two components. The first is to copy successful elements of liberal economic policy by opening up China’s economy to foreign and domestic investment, allowing labor flexibility, keeping the tax low, and creating a first-class infrastructure. The second part is to permit the ruling party to retain a firm grip on government, the courts, the army, the internal security apparatus, and the free flow of information. The China model’s advantage over the authoritarian approach is obvious: it produces economic growth, which keeps people happy. Please see Li, ed., *Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham: Lexington-Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p. 26. Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (May/June

and Latin America, the “Beijing consensus” on authoritarian government plus a market economy has become more popular than the previously dominant “Washington consensus” of market economics with democratic government. China’s sustained success in modernization could establish an alternative model of successful development, which may appeal to other countries with similar socio-economic and political conditions.²¹ Admittedly, there are problems in China: corruption and lack of transparency; however, Beijing has been reforming its political system. According to a research by scholars Xin Li and Verner Worm, proposals have been adopted by the Chinese government, such as court hearing system in 1996, developing “political civilization” in 2001, protecting human rights and private property amended in the Constitution in 2004, and building a harmonious society in 2004.²²

Foreign policies can contribute to soft power when they are seen as legitimate. China’s foreign policy has adopted a less confrontational and more sophisticated approach. This approach seeks a stable external environment so that Beijing can focus on domestic socioeconomic development, reassuring its neighbors about its peaceful development and promoting constructive relations with the major powers.²³ Beijing advances a peaceful development and harmonious world for its foreign policy that may allow China’s soft power to expand. The adjustment of China’s foreign policy is demonstrated in its more sophisticated dealings with foreign relations. China has been involved in global affairs such as providing foreign aids, dealing with various global

2008), pp. 461-462. Gill and Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” pp. 20-21.

²¹ Baohui Zhang, “Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Trends and Implications,” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2010), p. 59.

²² Li and Worm, “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise,” p. 78.

²³ Gill and Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” pp. 21-22.

issues, and serving in international institutions. These efforts help China not only create an international environment favorable for its economic development but also disseminate its soft power to the global community. China values itself as a rising power that pursues a peaceful development. By extending the concept of a harmonious society into the arena of foreign relations, China's proposal of building a harmonious world serves as an alternative to developing its own economy and also deals with complicated global issues. Such a stance would help China's soft power become more attractive to other countries.²⁴

The process of wielding soft power involves resources, conversions, and outcomes. A country with greater power resources has more possibilities to possess soft power. The outcomes of generating soft power, however, are not ensured merely by abundant resources. Efficient vehicles are necessary for converting soft power resources into desired goal. External communication provides an effective means of wielding soft power, by which a nation's image is presented to the world through governmental efforts.²⁵ Successful wielding of soft power depends not only on the combination of resources, but also on the nation's capabilities for communication.

Many Chinese scholars hold optimistic views on China's soft power. Despite some argue that soft power constitutes the main gap between China and the developed countries. This is attributable to China's shortcomings as regards inadequate research and poor national image. Majority of scholars argue that China has all the elements of soft power, including cultural power, language power, and civilization power.²⁶ Indeed, China has

²⁴ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp. 33-34.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁶ Li, "China Debates Soft Power," p. 298.

done much to promote its soft power in recent years. Efforts include sponsoring various large-scale cultural activities in other countries, allotting financial resources towards cultivating a better image of China, promoting the capacity of its mass media, and sponsoring CIs worldwide.²⁷

China's soft power strategy is in accordance with Confucian culture and political value and fits well with the nation's grand strategy of peaceful development. China has launched a full-blown public diplomacy effort consisting of increased international broadcasting, higher visibility for its national news agency, and significant investment in CIs worldwide.²⁸

2.2 Conceptualizing cultural soft power

The soft power focused on culture is becoming more globally accepted. Joseph Nye describes soft power as co-opting people rather than coercing them; its ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive culture.²⁹ The cultural soft power thus can be seen as an ability to shape what others want, depending on the attractiveness of one's culture.³⁰ Now, culture has become an important tool for countries in shaping a positive image in the world politics.³¹

²⁷ Ibid., p. 308.

²⁸ Lars Willnat, Emily T. Metzgar, and Ernie Pyle Hall, "American Perceptions of China and the Chinese: Do the Media Matter?" *The 65th Annual Meeting of the World Association for Public Opinion Research, Hong Kong* (June 2012), pp. 3-4.

²⁹ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp. xi-6.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

³¹ According to Nye that soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: culture (its places where it is attractive to others), political value (where it lives up to them at home and abroad), and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Please see Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp.7, 9, 15, 30.

2.2.1 What is cultural soft power?

Culture, the pattern of social behaviors by which groups transmit knowledge and values, is an important power resource. Culture is also defined as “a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of a society that includes ways of living together, values systems, traditions, and beliefs.”³² In a globalized world where cultures constantly intersect, cultural identity and competition are becoming more important. Culture has been seen as an effective tool in seeking interests among nations and can be used to appeal to foreign citizens. The country whose culture is most highly accepted is the winner in the global power competition.

Nye further distinguishes culture into high culture and popular culture. The former, such as education, literature, and art, appeals to the elite; and the latter centers on mass entertainment, such as “pop” music and movies.³³ Nye values the role of high education in promoting American culture and value, quoting the former Secretary of State Colin Powell: “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.”³⁴ Cultural attraction and education have won over the hearts and minds of the many of foreign young talents studying in the U.S. Many, after obtaining their degrees, return to their home countries with a greater appreciation of American values, which are the most important assets of cultural soft power. Cultural soft power thus can be said to use shared culture to influence the positions of other countries. Those who occupy the leading role in cultural fields gain an

³² Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 11. Culture is also considered as a set of values and practices that create meaning for a society.

³³ Nye, *The Future of Power*, p.84. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.11.

³⁴ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.43.

upper hand in the international competition. For the above reasons, this study focuses on high culture, particularly on China's language education and cultural attraction.

Since the late 1990s, China has concentrated on the development of cultural soft power.³⁵ There are several factors prompting this shift. First, China's economic development has boosted both the leaders' and the public's greater confidence in its place in the world.³⁶ Second, Chinese academics saw that the American cultural power has declined and that China could compete on this front. Third, China realized it needed to improve its cultural ties with neighbors to meet its national interests. The first Chinese article on cultural soft power was penned in 1993 by the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Wang Huning. He argued that "if a country has admirable cultures, other countries will tend to emulate them. Countries therefore do not have to use hard power which is expensive and less efficient."³⁷ Since the release of Wang's paper, there has been a plethora of literature exploring cultural soft power. For example, Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, both professors from Tsinghua University, explain that a state's ability to transmit its culture internationally will lead to the understanding, sympathy, and acceptance of its

³⁵ From the 1950s to the late 1970s, China's foreign policy was focused on supporting revolution in the third world countries. At the time, China was an outsider of international community. Since 1980s, China's interests have altered in its foreign strategy. Beijing has sought interests by closely linking with world and become an active participant of international system. Please see Tang Jiang-Yu, "Jiangou Zhong De Hexie Shijie—Hexie Shijie Linian de Jiangou," (Harmonious World in Construction—An Observation of the Concept of Harmonious World from the Perspective of Constructivism), *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations)*, Vol. 3 (2008), pp. 7-12.

³⁶ Some Chinese analysts suggest that China's economic development is a model of nation's soft power. China's approach to reform and opening-up policy has provided a new option for under-developed countries. The Chinese experience of development has been brought up at many forums, indicating that it is part of the consideration for China's soft power among elite. Please see Li, (ed.) *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p. 26. Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects," pp. 461-462.

³⁷ Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," in McGiffert, (ed.) *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States* (October 5, 2009), p. 10.

cultural values by outsiders.³⁸ Some writings claim that traditional Chinese cultures possess universal values, for instance — winning respect through virtue, peace and harmony, and harmony without suppressing differences. These traditional values with harmony are the basis of appeal in an era of cultural diversification and globalization.³⁹

In a nutshell, to vie for national interests, to build a well-off society, and to realize the rejuvenation of Chinese traditional culture, the country's officials and scholars have crafted cultural soft power strategy and enriched its content. Hu Jintao also recognized culture having three fundamental roles: raising the civilized nation, being a pillar industry, and increasing China's cultural profile internationally.⁴⁰ Culture is now regarded as a critical component of China's national strength and new tool in its diplomacy.

2.2.2 Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy can be seen as a government's attempt to manage the international environment by spreading cultural resources and facilitating cultural transmission overseas.⁴¹ It refers to cultural exchanges conducted with willingness to share ideas, values systems, and other aspects of culture.⁴² Cultural diplomacy as a tool for international relations was first used by the U.S. Information Agency in countering

³⁸ Joel Wuthnow, "The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse," *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 10.

³⁹ Li, ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p. 25.

⁴⁰ David Bandurski, "Culture and the 18th Party Congress," *China Media Project*, November 16, 2012, <<http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/11/16/28955/>> (accessed September 1, 2015).

⁴¹ Falk Hartig, "Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 17 (November 30, 2011), pp.54-55.

⁴² Jocelyn Chey, "Cultural Diplomacy and Australia-China Cultural Relations," *AIIA NSW Branch Charteris Lecture*, July 20, 2010, <www.aiia.asn.au/resources/papers-a-transcripts <http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/11/16/28955/>> (accessed September 1, 2015).

Soviet propaganda in the 1960s;⁴³ it also aims at supporting foreign policy goals.⁴⁴ Now other countries have undertaken cultural diplomacy to achieve their idealistic and functional purposes. The purpose of the idealistic is to develop mutual understanding and prevent conflicts; and the purpose of functional is to advance political and economic interests.⁴⁵ Cultural diplomacy is defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.”⁴⁶ It is a domain of diplomacy concerned with establishing, developing, and sustaining relations with states by way of cultural and language education to achieve a greater degree of soft power.⁴⁷

While public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are compatible on many levels, they are not synonymous.⁴⁸ Public diplomacy is the planned use of cultural, educational, and informational programming to achieve a government’s foreign policy objectives⁴⁹ which aim to convey a message to the general public and to mould public opinion of other countries.⁵⁰ It is employed by a country as an official instrument, with the aims of

⁴³ Joanna Blazkowska, “Country Profiles: China,” http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_03-01.pdf >(accessed September 1, 2015).

⁴⁴ Simon Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy* (Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009), p.8.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.9.

⁴⁶ Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, *Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, September 2005), p.4.

⁴⁷ Blazkowska, “Country Profiles: China,” http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_03-01.pdf > (accessed September 1, 2015).

⁴⁸ Gifford D. Malone. *Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1988), p.1.

⁴⁹ For example, the Voice of America (VOA) grew rapidly during WWII. During the Cold War, the VOA continued to expand. Please see Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp. 100-102.

⁵⁰ Valerie Hudson and Martin Sampson, “Culture Is More than a Static Residual: Introduction to the Special Section on Culture and Foreign Policy,” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1999), p. 668.

creating a positive image of the country, influencing foreign public opinion, and attempting to reach the desired goals.⁵¹ Public diplomacy with other countries involves building a long-term relationship that creates a friendly environment for government policies.⁵² Public diplomacy can be described as a “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas, its culture, as well as its national goals.”⁵³ The practice of public diplomacy can be divided into five elements: 1) Listening: collecting information on international opinions; 2) Advocacy: promoting policies, ideas to foreign publics; 3) Cultural diplomacy: promoting a nation’s cultural resources overseas and facilitating cultural transmission abroad; 4) Exchange diplomacy: promoting reciprocal exchanges of people of other nations; and 5) International broadcasting: the use of news, radio and television broadcasting, and Internet communication to engage with foreign publics.⁵⁴ The Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy released by the U.S. State Department places cultural diplomacy under the domain of public diplomacy.⁵⁵ Cultural

⁵¹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China’s Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p. 48.

⁵² There are three dimensions of public diplomacy that require direct government information and cultural relationships. The first dimension is daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions. The second dimension is strategic communication, which occurs in a political or advertising campaign. The campaign plans symbolic events and communications over the course of a year to reinforce the central themes, or to advance a particular government policy. The third stage of public diplomacy is the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarship, exchanges, and training. Each of these three dimensions of public diplomacy plays a significant part in creating an attractive image of a country that can improve its prospects for obtaining its desired outcomes. Please see Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp. 107-110.

⁵³ The need to project a friendly image to the world has inspired China’s new public diplomacy. It is used as the major tool to promote the peaceful development of China and to eliminate fears of a new power rising. Please See Wilfried Bolewski and Candy M. Rietig, “The Cultural Impact on China’s New Diplomacy,” *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*.

⁵⁴ Flew, and Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Network Communication Approach to Public Diplomacy,” p. 4.

⁵⁵ Hyungseok Kang, “Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: International Cultural Politics of Soft Power and the

diplomacy, revealing the soul of a nation, has the potential to contribute more effectively to foreign policy goals and to governments' domestic objectives.⁵⁶ In brief, cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy, for it is in cultural activities that a nation's idea is best represented.⁵⁷

Culture through diplomacy can provide a powerful range of benefits for a country.⁵⁸ First, there is a greater emphasis on using culture to present a national image.⁵⁹ Another advantage is that culture, to reach its full potential, would benefit from a better understanding of its place within nation branding. A third benefit is that cultural diplomacy can work towards achieving national domestic goals. A final benefit is that culture can contribute to improving the esteem of minority groups and can enhance national confidence and social cohesion.⁶⁰ To serve national interests, a state displays its favorable culture through diplomacy that the outside world believes is agreeable.⁶¹

Cultural diplomacy not only incorporates activities undertaken by a wide range of participants such as artists and singers but also promotes aspects of the culture of a state.

Creative Economy,” p. 3.

<http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2011-08-loam/Reframing-Cultural-Diplomacy-International-Cultural-Politics-of-Soft-Power-and-the-Creative-Economy-Hyungseok-Kang.pdf>.> (accessed September 1, 2015).

⁵⁶ Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy*, p.2.

⁵⁷ *Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy*, p.1.

⁵⁸ Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy*, pp.32-34.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.22-23.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.33-37.

⁶¹ The discipline of International Relations, however, has ignored cultural diplomacy. Three reasons may explain the lack of scholarly attention on cultural diplomacy. First, politicians have regarded cultural diplomacy as a lesser tool of diplomacy. Second, the low priority to cultural diplomacy is exacerbated by the difficulty in determining cultural diplomacy's long term impact on the audiences. Finally, it is caused by a lack of scholarly attention to cultural diplomacy. Please see Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy*, pp.2-5.

Examples of this broader scope of cultural diplomacy include scholarships, seminars and conferences, etc.⁶² Through these cultural activities, mutual recognition and understanding may be fostered among nations and their peoples.⁶³ In a modern world where the messages of states disseminated are often seen with suspicion, cultural diplomacy can narrow the gap.⁶⁴

Cultural diplomacy has been one major tool used by China to project cultural soft power.⁶⁵ The PRC Ministry of Culture administering overseas cultural offices and promoting cultural exchanges has stepped up its activities since the 1980s.⁶⁶ In general, China's cultural diplomacy has been more successful in the developing world, particularly in countries that are recipients of Chinese aid, or where trade with China is growing. Despite difficulties, Beijing has given priority to cultural diplomacy in Western countries that rank high on its diplomatic agenda (particularly the U.S.) in an attempt to alter an unfavorable image toward China.⁶⁷

2.2.3 The key relationships between cultural diplomacy and Confucius Institutes

⁶² Ibid., p.10.

⁶³ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp. 49-50.

⁶⁴ Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy*, p.37.

⁶⁵ Hongyi Lai, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power," in (ed.) Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu *China's Soft Power and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 83.

⁶⁶ Of approximately 120 agreements on cultural exchange China signed with foreign countries between 1949 and 1991, 91 were signed in fourteen years from the beginning of economic reforms in 1978. In the 1980s nearly all such agreements were with third world countries, but the emphasis has changed in recent years to focus on promoting Chinese culture in Europe and America. Please See Chey, "Cultural Diplomacy and Australia-China Cultural Relations," Please see *AIIA NSW Branch Charteris*, July 20, 2010, <www.aiia.asn.au/resources/papers-a-transcripts> (accessed September 1, 2015).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

China has perceived that image-building is crucial for its future development. China's emergence as an economic and military power has been viewed by some countries as a threat to their national interests. Moreover, corruption, human rights, and media freedom have been criticized by many countries.⁶⁸ Certain Chinese strategists were aware of this harmful image and attempted to alter this trend by proposing a more benign foreign policy. In 2003, the "Peaceful Rise" was advocated by Vice-President of CCP Central Party School Zheng Bijian. This slogan holds that the ascendance of China can be achieved without destabilizing the international order or threatening its neighbors. Promoting culture abroad as a means of overcoming hostility towards China has become an urgent task its government.⁶⁹ The growing interest in soft power in China with the rise of concepts such as "Peaceful Rise," "Peaceful Development," and "Harmonious World" among the China leadership in the 2000s show that the key objectives of this discourse have been to change the outside perception of China for the better and to build a positive image of China's contribution to the world.⁷⁰ The concept of the peaceful sends a message to the international community because there is the need to counter negative perceptions. Thus China has used the cultural promotion with foreign audiences as a charm offensive,⁷¹ and its cultural diplomacy has evolved into an intelligent approach. A

⁶⁸ Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, pp. 464-465. Suisheng Zhao, "The Prospect of China's Soft Power: How sustainable?" in Li, (ed.), *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p.257. Wuthnow, "The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse," p. 15.

⁶⁹ Zheng Bijian, "China's Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005), <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status>> (accessed September 1, 2015).

⁷⁰ Flew, and Hartig, "Confucius Institutes and the Network Communication Approach to Public Diplomacy," p. 4.

⁷¹ These include assisting Chinese businesses abroad, improved foreign broadcasting, assistance for student exchanges, and the promotion of the culture and language abroad.

series of measures has been devised to reinforce China's growing influence. One of these is the CI program. The CI is appealing to leaders because it agrees with China's approaches to cultural diplomacy. The underlying message that China conveys is that its rise will not deviate from the international order. To clarify these correlations, this writer explains the key relationships between cultural diplomacy and CIs and the ways CIs could be beneficial to enhance China's cultural soft power.

The terms "cultural diplomacy" and "soft power" are frequently found in official speeches, illustrating a growing interest among Chinese policymakers. Academic circles have also conducted research on cultural diplomacy and soft power, and they claim that culture has become a powerful tool to realize China's soft power.⁷² Cultural diplomacy, whose main purpose is to introduce China to the world, has been perceived by its top leadership as having critical functions for China's emerging cultural power in the world. A super-power influences the world through its cultural products, as seen by U.S. cultural domination.⁷³ Accordingly, China's strategists employ culture to lay out the roadmap of soft power strategy. For them, the CI is an ideal platform to let other countries better understand China, enhance cooperation, and expand international space.⁷⁴ As China's global influence grows, interests in Chinese language and culture have risen, with the

⁷² Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System," in Jian Wang (ed.), *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 19-20.

⁷³ Xiaogang Deng and Lening Zhang, "China's Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World," pp.143-144. Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, p.89.

⁷⁴ Hsieh Yu-yen, *Dui Zhonggong Jiango Shijie Zhi Yanjin Yi Sheli Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research on China Building A Harmonious World – A Case Study of the Establishment of Confucius Institute)* (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis, 2008).

most notable success being the swift proliferation of the CIs.⁷⁵

The CIs are the central project of China's cultural diplomacy. China attempts to increase communication with foreign citizens facilitated through CIs. Strengthening domestic and international communication is related to the general situation of China's reform. It is related to China's international influence and status and the upgrading of the nation's cultural soft power.⁷⁶ Li Changchun describes CIs as a huge component of China's scheme of international publicity. State Councilor Liu Yandong praised CIs as a powerful brand of international language education. Beijing in 2002 announced plans to set up CIs overseas to promote culture and language. Chen Zhili, a member of the State Council in charge of CIs, proposed to use the name of Confucius to name the Institute because Confucius is the symbolic icon of Chinese culture. Choosing a titular saint for teaching language abroad is an indication of the revival of traditional Chinese culture.⁷⁷ The Institute aims at promoting Chinese culture to foreigners and reassures the world that China's rise will be peaceful. The CIs are representative of the fundamental changes in actions of leaders towards foreign relations; they have become a channel of communication to promote the "peaceful characteristics of Chinese culture."⁷⁸

The effects of the increase in China's wealth and the promotion of its cultural soft power have been seen in the U.S. There are more and more universities having Chinese

⁷⁵ Yongjin Zhang, "The Discourse of China's Soft Power and Its Discontents," in Li, (ed.) *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p. 51.

⁷⁶ Flew and Hartig, "Confucius Institutes and the Network Communication Approach to Public Diplomacy," p. 7.

⁷⁷ Hartig, "Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China," pp.54-55.

⁷⁸ Chao Chien-Min and Hsu Chih-chia, Zhonggong Di Sidai Lingdao Jiti de Hexie Shijieguan Lilun yu Yihan" (China's Harmonious World: Theory and Significance) *Yuanjing Jijinhui Jikan (Prospect Quarterly)*, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 27.

language courses. The number of CIs has also been growing. In spite of China's efforts to build a favorable image, its reputation in the U.S. still suffers. Public opinion polls reveal that more than 50% of Americans have negative views toward China.⁷⁹ However, this does not mean that the increasing presence of Chinese soft power institutions is unimportant. As China continues to pour its efforts on its soft-power resources, we might expect China's cultural image in the U.S. to gradually improve.⁸⁰

The CI is a tool of cultural diplomacy designed to improve China's soft power.⁸¹ Cultural exports can promote Chinese culture abroad and bolster its national strength. This language institute has been viewed by many scholars and mass media as China's most successful story to craft its cultural soft power strategy. Consequently, Hanban has continuously enriched and diversified its programs.

2.3 Operationizing cultural soft power

Since the language education and cultural activities are the two key functions of CI, the demonstration of China's cultural soft power rests on language teaching and on cultural programs of overseas CIs.⁸² To operationalize the above variables, the subsequent section examines Chinese language and cultural dissemination programs in CI and analyzes how these programs contribute to China's cultural soft power.

2.3.1 Promotion of language

⁷⁹ Efthymiou, "Chinese Soft Power: Sources and Implications for the US," <http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sources-andimplications-for-the-us/> (accessed April 4, 2014).

⁸⁰ Gill and Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power," pp. 30-31.

⁸¹ Stephen J. Hoare-Vance, *The Confucius Institutes and China's Evolving Foreign Policy* (University of Canterbury Master Thesis, 2009), p.2.

⁸² Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 11.

Language, an essential part of culture, is the most effective tool for spreading culture and can determine the way individuals perceive the world around them.⁸³ Although English remains the most dominant language in the world, Mandarin Chinese language has the largest number of speakers, and it is growing in popularity as China ascends in economic power.⁸⁴ Now that the importance of Mandarin Chinese has been recognized, those who have this language skill can equip with better access to huge Chinese markets.

Teaching Chinese, which is mainly the responsibility of Hanban, is of strategic significance.⁸⁵ Hanban aims to make teaching resources and services available to the world.⁸⁶ In October 2004, the PRC State Council approved Hanban's proposed "Chinese Bridge Project," which includes standardizing requirements for Chinese teachers and the setup of the overseas Confucius Institutes.⁸⁷ Hanban assesses applications for setting up new Institutes, provides aid and teachers, formulates rules, and approves annual programs

⁸³ Ding and Saunders, "Talking up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language," *East Asia*, No.2 (Summer 2006), p. 6.

⁸⁴ Sheng Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 117.

⁸⁵ Jeffrey Gil, "The Promotion of Chinese Language Learning and China's Soft Power," Vol. 4, No. 10 (October 2008), *Asian Social Science*, pp.116-120. The CI division is one part of Hanban, which includes an Examination Division, focusing on Chinese proficiency tests; a Teaching Quality and Evaluation Division, which is responsible for teaching materials; and a Communications Division, which handles international cooperation and exchange activities. Please see James F. Paradise, "The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, Issue 4 (2009), pp. 647-669.

⁸⁶ Members from 12 state ministries and commissions make up the NOCFL: the General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the State Press and Publications Administration, the Information Office and the State Language Committee. Please see Gil, "The Promotion of Chinese Language Learning and China's Soft Power," pp.116-120.

⁸⁷ Hanban, "Liu Yandong Attends the Awarding Ceremony of the Fifth "Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for International Students in China," *Confucius Institute Bimonthly*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (Beijing: Editorial Office of Confucius Institute, 2012), pp. 5-6.

and budgets.⁸⁸ It has restructured CI's education system and gathered resources that include the following: 1) Transitioning from simply teaching Mandarin Chinese to an international promotion of language. 2) Shifting from being guided by government while strengthening market operation. 3) Extending teaching from textbooks to other means including multimedia and the internet.⁸⁹ Hanban also provides scholarships for teachers and foreign students to enroll in the "Master of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages" (MTC SOL) program in China.⁹⁰ China counts the language promotion through Hanban as one of its essential cultural soft power tools.

With the aid and resources provided by Hanban, the CIs have expanded quickly. Each Institute is essentially a cooperative partnership between a Chinese educational institution and its counterpart in the host country.⁹¹ By 2014, there were more than 440 Confucius Institutes and 646 Confucius Classrooms in 120 countries and regions — with more than 850,000 registered students — across the globe (For annual numbers of CIs and CCs see Table I and for numbers of students' enrollment see Table II).⁹² There are

⁸⁸ CIs have offered the following services: 1) develop Chinese language courses for various social sectors; 2) train Chinese language instructors for local institutions and providing them with Chinese language teaching resources; 3) establish local facilities for the holding of the HSK Examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and for the administration of procedures for the certification of the Chinese language teachers; and 4) provide information and consultative services concerning Chinese education, culture, economy, and society. Please see "Introduction to the Confucius Institutes," August 29, 2009, <http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22308.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014). According to Hanban, China aims to open one thousand CIs by 2020. Every three days a CI was born, said a Chinese source. Just in the U.S. alone, about 75 CIs and 285 CCs were established between 2004 and 2011. Each year the Chinese government spent about \$145 million to support CIs (including Confucius Classrooms) worldwide.

⁸⁹ Hanban, *2006 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanaban, 2006), p. 5.

⁹⁰ Hanban, *2009 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanaban, 2010), pp. 4-5.

⁹¹ Hanban would offer a seed grant of US \$100,000, and provide teaching staff, textbooks, and other educational materials to facilitate Chinese teaching. Please see Young Deng, "The New Hard Realities: Soft Power and China in Transition," in Li, ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, p. 70.

⁹² Qu Yingpu, Zhao Huanxin and Cheng Yingqi, "Confucius Institutes Go beyond Borders," *China Daily*,

still more than 400 universities in 76 countries on the waiting list for CIs.⁹³ Confucius Institute Online has been completed; and the brand new website, available in 45 foreign languages, has been built up.⁹⁴

Among China's rapid expansion of CIs around the world, the U.S. has the largest number of institutes, with 456 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms.⁹⁵ This study's focusing on the U.S. is apparent—the Chinese government considers its relations with the U.S. as the top priority in its foreign policy; Beijing has expended more resources for American CIs than for any other country.⁹⁶

Director General of Hanban Xu Lin stated in 2010 that Hanban will carry out “Three 800 Projects” in the U.S.—namely, inviting 800 U.S. high school and college students to participate in the “Chinese Bridge” summer camp; offering 800 U.S. teachers and students scholarships; and inviting 800 elementary and middle school district leaders to visit China.⁹⁷ The scale of student enrollment into U.S. CIs has quickly expanded. For example, there were only 49 registered students at the CI of University of Pittsburgh in

December 2, 2012, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/02/content_15978436.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014).

Joshua Eferighe, “GW Opens Doors to China with Confucius Institute,” *The Washington Times*, April 10, 2013, <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/10/gw-opens-doors-to-china-with-confucius-institute/>>(accessed September 25, 2014).

⁹³ Qu, Zhao, and Cheng, “Confucius Institutes Go beyond Borders,” <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/02/content_15978436.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014).

⁹⁴ Hanban, *2011 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanaban, 2011), p.7.

⁹⁵ “China Says U.S. Directive on Confucius Institutes May Harm Friendship,” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/24/c_123187293.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014).

⁹⁶ Peter Mattis, “Reexamining the Confucian Institutes,” August 2, 2012, *The Diplomat*, <<http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

⁹⁷ Hanban, “The 3rd National Chinese Language Conference Held in Washington,” p.15.

2007, but by 2011 the number increased to 2,993.⁹⁸ There are increasing number of first-tier universities such as the University of Michigan and Stanford University setting up CIs.⁹⁹

The courses of CIs have become more diversified with more than 40,000 courses offering a multitude of teaching styles. There are currently 837 Chinese test centers in 104 countries and regions, 215 of which are located at CIs. The Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK) takers increased remarkably, reaching 5,020,000 in 2013 (annual numbers of the Chinese Proficiency Test takers see Table III).¹⁰⁰ Regarding the courses' designs, each Institute adopts flexible teaching patterns and adapts to suit local conditions.¹⁰¹ CIs hold different language programs. For example, the CI at the University of Maryland offers language courses ranging from beginner to advance. Beginner I courses are geared to students with no prior study of the language; Beginner II courses are designed for students with the equivalent of one semester of college Chinese. Intermediate classes focus on reading and writing skills; Intermediate Business Chinese courses prepare the students for business interactions. Advanced courses focus on newspaper reading skills,

⁹⁸ Hanban, *2011 Annual Report*, p. 6.

⁹⁹ Hanban, "The 3rd National Chinese Language Conference Held in Washington," p.15.

¹⁰⁰ Hanban, *2010 Annual Report*, p. 7.

¹⁰¹ Taking the CI of the University of Kansas for example, their "2011 Chinese Language and Culture Classes" are divided into four levels. The elementary level includes an introduction to Chinese characters as well as instruction in the standard, "pinyin," spelling system. Intermediary level includes practical, conversational structures and new characters. The high intermediary level is a continuation of Chinese II, with more complex sentence structures in Chinese. The advanced level is a continuation of Chinese III, with more complex sentence structures and situations in Chinese. Please see Confucius Institute, "Spring 2011 Chinese Language and Culture Classes," http://www.confucius.ku.edu/language_classes_spring_2011.shtml (accessed March 3, 2014). The Confucius Institute of University of Pittsburgh, *2011 ANNUAL Report 2011* (Pittsburgh: The Confucius Institute of University of Pittsburgh, 2011), p. 9.

business contexts, and translation skills.¹⁰² The CI at the University of Minnesota conducted a summer training program for Mandarin elementary immersion teachers to improve their instructional skills.¹⁰³

The increasing number of CIs and students' enrollment and the diversity of language courses are signs of the growing popularity of the Chinese language. This study looks first at the annual number of CIs and students' enrollment (data from Chinese government in a macro perspective). It then ascertains and evaluates relevant data from participants through interview.

Annual numbers of setup of CIs and CCs (Table I)				
Year	CIs (No.)	Increase (+)	CCs (No.)	Increase (+)
2006	122		4	
2007	226	104	19	15
2008	249	23	56	37
2009	282	33	272	216
2010	313	31	369	97
2011	353	40	473	4
2012	400	47	535	63
2013	435	35	644	144
2014	440	5	646	2

Sources: Hanban, (2006) *2006 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanaban); *2007 Annual Report*; *2008 Annual Report*; *2009 Annual Report*; *2011 Annual Report*; *2012 Annual Report*; *2013 Annual Report*; and *2014 Annual Report*.

¹⁰² "Chinese Language Courses," *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website*, <<http://www.international.umd.edu/cim/246>> (accessed March 3, 2014).

¹⁰³ Confucius Institute of Minnesota, *2008–2009 Annual Report* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 2011), p.13.

Annual numbers of students' enrolment (Table II)		
Year	Numbers of students' enrolment	Increase (+)
2006	13,000	
2007	46,000	33,000
2008	130,000	84,000
2009	260,000	130,000
2010	360,000	100,000
2011	500,000	140,000
2012	655,000	155,000
2013	850,000	195,000

Sources: Hanban, (2006) *2006 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanaban); *2007 Annual Report*; *2008 Annual Report*; *2009 Annual Report*; *2011 Annual Report*; *2012 Annual Report*; and *2013 Annual Report*.

Annual numbers of the Chinese proficiency test takers (Table III)		
Year	Numbers of test taker	Increase (+)
2006	72,942	
2007	138,000	65,058
2008	310,000	172,000
2009	548,000	238,000
2010	689,000	141,000
2011	2,010,000	1321,000
2012	3,520,000	1510,000
2013	5,020,000	4668,000

Sources: Hanban, (2006) *2006 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanaban); *2007 Annual Report*; *2008 Annual Report*; *2009 Annual Report*; *2011 Annual Report*; *2012 Annual Report*; and *2013 Annual Report*.

2.3.2 Cultural dissemination programs

China has embarked upon cultural diplomacy to defuse mounting external concerns over a rising China; using CIs to enhance its global reputation, Chinese government has taken initiatives to promote Chinese culture overseas. Sun Jiazheng, the PRC Minister of Culture, declared that culture has become the third pillar, after economy and politics, of China's diplomacy. Li Changchun stated that China should aim to establish brand names in cultural exchange.¹⁰⁴ In conducting cultural diplomacy, China takes advantage of the perception that it is a culturally rich nation. For example, the Chinese government has sponsored "Years of Chinese Culture," Chinese cultural festivals, and Chinese New Year celebrations worldwide. It also promotes cultural exports, especially movies, arts, music, and sports. Famed actresses, actors, concert musicians, and classical dancers also act as cultural ambassadors for China. Chinese movies have won prestigious international awards or nominations. Some of Chinese actresses (Zhang Ziyi, and Gong Li) and directors (Chen Kaige, and Zhang Yimou) have become international superstars.¹⁰⁵ Culture has indeed become the essence in China's diplomacy.

Given the importance of overseas CIs in shaping China's image, Hanban has held many workshops to improve its functions; and top leaders have visited the Institutes to forge close relationship between China and other countries. For example, the Second Executive Workshop for CI Directors 2010 was held at Xiamen University, where there were 70 directors from 25 countries in attendance. During the one-week workshop, the

¹⁰⁴ Lai Hongyi, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power," *EAI Background Brief*, No. 308 (October 26, 2006), p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.i, 2.

participants took part in discussions on China-foreign cultural exchanges, foreign policies, and economic policies.¹⁰⁶ Chinese leaders' visits to CIs augment the importance of the Institutes. For example, Hu Jintao visited Confucius Institute in Chicago in January 2011. On December 24, 2011, Xi Jinping visited the Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. Xi stated that CIs have drawn wide attention from young students and all sectors of Thai society and played an important part in deepening the friendship between the two peoples.¹⁰⁷

The major cultural activities initiated by CIs are varied such as arts performances, cultural exhibitions, film festivals, and community outreach aiming at cultural exchange. Hanban selects teams from domestic universities to cooperate with overseas CIs to launch cultural activities. According to Hanban 2013 Annual Report, to that date CIs have launched 20,000 cultural activities, with 9.2 million participants. More than 30,000 educational officials, headmasters, teachers, and students worldwide were invited to China for exchange.¹⁰⁸ Some heads of state, like the President of Greece, the Chairman of Laos, and the Prime Minister of Belgium, attended cultural activities of local CIs.¹⁰⁹ These cultural activities have become an important showcase for China to introduce the modern China to the outside world.

Chinese government has enriched cultural programs in the U.S. Taking the CI of

¹⁰⁶ XMU Newsletter, "The Second Executive Workshop for Confucius Institute Directors 2010- Learning from Each Other and Making Progress Together," April 26, 2011, http://ice.xmu.edu.cn/english/showletter.aspx?news_id=2830>(accessed March 3, 2014).

¹⁰⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, "Xi Jinping Visits Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand," December 24, 2011, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t891076.htm>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

¹⁰⁸ Hanban, *2013 Annual Report* (Beijing, Hanaban, 2013), p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ Hanban, *2009 Annual Report*, p. 17.

Minnesota University as an example, Joan Brzezinski, the director of the CI, stated that this Institute with the help of Hanban held Chinese culture summer camps annually for children. Campers studied tai chi and kung fu, learned about the art of shadow puppetry, and created their own puppets. Other activities include Chinese cultural dances, film watching, and celebration of the Chinese New Year and the Dragon Boat Festival.¹¹⁰ George Mason University CI organizes and sponsors a variety of events on campus and in the community highlighting Chinese culture, artists, and performers. Activities have included performances by artists from the National Academy of Chinese Theater Arts, musicians from Nanjing, and lectures by Chinese scholars.¹¹¹ The CI at the University of Kansas has held the Chinese celebrations in Kansas City, with more than 1,300 participants. “The CI at the University of Michigan has sponsored a credit-giving performance class on playing Chinese music instruments. The Institute has presented Chinese gourmet cooking class series to University of Michigan undergraduates,” said by assistant director Jiyoung Lee.¹¹² The CI at the University of Utah helps local citizens understand China’s culture through programs like arts performances, music concerts, film watching, and speech competitions.¹¹³

This study concentrates the CI’s development and use in the U.S. (CIs originated in the U.S. in 2004) It will include presentation of activities sponsored by the CIs,

¹¹⁰ Interviewee 2.

¹¹¹ “About Us,” *Confucius Institute at Mason*,
<<http://confucius.gmu.edu/aboutus.cfm#culturalActivities>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

¹¹² Interviewee 3.

¹¹³ The Confucius Institute at the University of Utah, *Confucius Institute at the University of Utah 2010 Annual Report*,
<<http://confucius-institute.utah.edu/documents/docs/organization-1721-1311089133.pdf>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

examinations of program purposes, and evaluation of the program's result.

2.4 Research method

Perception is an important aspect of soft power. If opinions about a country deteriorate, that country's ability to successfully project its soft power will greatly suffer. However, cultural diplomacy can overcome the gap.¹¹⁴ It is difficult to use a cultural approach to measure soft power's impact.¹¹⁵ Despite the difficulties, this study can still be done. Embarking on an in-depth examination of selective CIs by providing a systematic way of analyzing information and reporting results can help understand the responses of American perspectives on CIs. Besides studying the American perception towards CI, this study will also examine what public criticism it faces.¹¹⁶

Qualitative research is applied to this study in providing an in-depth understanding and comprehensive analysis. Field interviews were conducted to collect the opinions of participants to obtain reliable information. In the phase of data collection, taking place from August 2015 to February 2016, in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted with directors, teachers, staffs, and students from CIs and professors and administrators from universities in the U.S. to acquire their responses.

¹¹⁴ Simon Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy*, p.37.

¹¹⁵ An audience's decision to accept and internalize or to reject the "product" depends on education, family, religion, etc. Some may even feel the benign cultural diplomacy as "cultural imperialism." Thus Rawnsley thinks that there might not have a direct correlation between consuming a cultural product and an increase in preference with the source. Please see Gary Rawnsley, "Limits of China's Cultural Diplomacy," *China Policy Institute*, October 23, 2013, <http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/10/23/limits-of-chinas-cultural-diplomacy/> (accessed May 1, 2014).

¹¹⁶ Blazkowska, "Country Profiles: China," http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_03-01.pdf (accessed September 1, 2015).

This writer reviewed official websites of all the American CIs and chose several CIs. Based on the available information, this research has narrowed down and selected twelve CIs (based on location and budget concern) and further categorizes them into four distinctive features focuses (local-oriented, cultural-oriented, research-oriented, and teacher training-oriented) for analysis. In addition to introducing the background and mission of these CIs, this study also explores their language programs and cultural activities. The writer also uses surveys released by research institutes (such as PEW, BBC) to study the U.S. public view on China and to analyze the reasons. This study also examines annual reports from Hanban websites and selective American CIs, books and journals. A list of interview guides was formulated (from Appendix I). Interviewees, including CIs' personnel and students, and universities' faculties and administrators (the Basic Background of the Interviewees, Appendix II), were asked questions based on their knowledge of and experience with the CI. These data offer an insight into the perspective of the current status of CIs and American responses toward them. The questions were designed to gain aspects of information for twelve CIs: current foci and decision-making process and future plans. The interviews were mostly conducted via face-to-face meetings of about 45-60 minutes. The interviews were conducted in either English or Chinese, based on the choice of the interviewees.

2.5 Summary

This chapter conceptualizes cultural soft power and cultural diplomacy and explains their relationships. To clarify these correlations, the writer argues that CI represents a tool of cultural diplomacy aimed at improving China's soft power image. The writer argues that the increasing number of Institutes and of enrolled students can be seen as growing

popularity of Chinese language. This study first looks at annual number of CIs and students' enrolment; it then analyzes data of some selective CIs. The writer also looks at cultural activities sponsored by Hanban in general and examines specific activities held by CIs for analysis. Interests in Mandarin Chinese have been growing in the U.S. because of China's increased wealth and rising global influence. The increase in number of CIs is a response to the Chinese language popularity in the U.S.



Chapter III China's Cultural Soft Power Strategy and the Confucius Institutes

With one of the world's earliest civilizations, China is a cultural treasure-house; its treasures, which include language and values, make it the most important resource of soft power.¹ By the time of the Shang Dynasty (1523-1027 B.C.), the foundations of culture, including music, art, and a written language, had been laid. During the Spring & Autumn and Warring States Periods (770-221 B.C.), various schools of thought sprang up and are still partially reflected in the current articulation of soft power. Strategists at the time preferred to use diplomatic maneuvering to secure national interests.² Among these strategists, the most notable figure is Confucius. Confucianism, Confucius' teaching, emphasized the importance of education that was integrated into Chinese governance. By the late 19th century, intellectuals had begun searching for new methods to build a strong China. One of the most significant movements was the New Culture Movement, which called for a revolution against Confucianism because of its failure to transform China into a modern society.³ The anti-Confucianism movement reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which crippled the cultural appeal in the Western countries.⁴ It was not until Deng Xiaoping initiated the "reform and opening up" policy in the late 1970s that China's cultural power was on the rise.⁵ China acknowledged that culture is essential in the competition of national strength.

¹ Youling Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization* (Buffalo: University at Buffalo Ph.D. Dissertation, 2011), p.159.

² Bai Liu, *Cultural Policy in the People's Republic of China: Letting a hundred flowers blossom* (Paris: Imprimerie des Presses Universitaires, 1983), pp. 10-13.

³ Shryll Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives* (South Orange: Seton Hall University Master Thesis, 2013), pp. 53, 56.

⁴ Su-Yan Pan, "The Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection," *Asian Education and Development Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), p. 26.

⁵ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp.25-26.

The employment of culture as a Chinese foreign policy tool is a combination of both the leadership's idea and the academic effort to open channels of communication with the world. Beijing crafted out cultural soft power as a national strategy in Hu Jintao's address to the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2007. Following Hu's speech, relevant government apparatus poured significant resources into the implementation of cultural diplomacy; and academic studies on cultural soft power also spiked.⁶ Beijing stimulated cultural attractiveness with official campaigns, with the 18th Congress in 2012 endorsing its relevance and the 3rd Plenary in 2013 reaffirming its importance. Cultural diplomacy and soft power are important strategies in shaping benign impressions about China and securing strategic interests.⁷ In Xi Jinping's speech to the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art Work in October 2014, Xi said that serving socialism is the fundamental orientation of the arts, which should combine socialist ideology with Chinese tradition to implement the Party's literature and art principles and policies well. The linkage between culture and diplomacy is evident that cultural export should convey a positive view of China.⁸

Confucius Institutes (CIs) have been recognized as a significant symbol for the transmission of Chinese language and cultural elements abroad. Exporting Chinese culture is a momentous component of the soft power strategy.⁹ China's approaches to disseminate cultural soft power can be broadly categorized into cultural expansion and high education's promotion, in particular through overseas CIs. Hence, the following sections explore five aspects: the evolution of China's cultural policy, looking at leaders'

⁶ David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 207-208.

⁷ Parama Sinha Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes," *China Research Center*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013), <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

⁸ Christopher R. Hughes, "Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (2014), pp. 53-54.

⁹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp.159-160.

cultural policies from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping; the CI project examines the rationale for the CI's project, establishment model, and its function of showcasing China's cultural soft power; China's approaches to disseminate cultural soft power analyze how CI expands Chinese culture and cultivates high education; the global expansion of CIs looks at their current development in Asia, Europe, and the Americas; the summary ends with the findings and the impact of cultural soft power.

3.1 The evolution of China's cultural policy

Since the CCP's establishment, three debates on cultural policy have occurred in China, each happening with different historical backgrounds. The first cultural debate took place during the anti-Japanese war period (from 1937 to 1945). The debate was targeted at the Japanese invasion. Mao Zedong claimed China should have its own cultural army in the anti-Japanese war, the army being the broad mass of the people.¹⁰ The series of lectures on culture given by Mao in 1942 instructed artists, musicians, and writers to understand that there is no such thing as art for art's sake. The cultural policy was to form a "cultural army" aimed at defeating the enemy.¹¹ The second debate was a battle between the proletariat culture and the bourgeois culture (from 1956 to 1976). Mao emphasized that the CCP would not hesitate to harness literature and art for achieving national interests.¹² The third cultural debate occurred during the 1980s, after China launched the "opening up and reform" policy. During Deng's era, the debate on Chinese culture was more open. Some scholars contended the traditional culture heavily reflects Chinese philosophy, which was a treasure not only for China itself but also for mankind

¹⁰ Junhao Hong, "Mao Zedong's Cultural Theory and China's Three Mass-Culture Debates: A Tentative Study of Culture, Society and Politics," *Intercultural Communication Studies*, Vol. 15: 2 (1994), pp. 89-90.

¹¹ Hughes, "Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural," p. 53.

¹² According to the Marxist theory, class struggle is endless until a society becomes classless. The CCP issued a special culture policy, entitled "Letting a Hundred Flowers Blossom and Letting a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend." Please see Hong, "Mao Zedong's Cultural Theory and China's Three Mass-Culture Debates: A Tentative Study of Culture, Society and Politics," p. 97.

as well.¹³

Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Chinese scholars have adopted the realist way of thinking about cultural soft power. These thoughts can be divided into three schools.¹⁴ Realist empiricists contribute to cultural policy by trying to measure China's soft power disadvantages. They argued that the best way to increase cultural power was to express China's policy choices to international society in the clearest ways. China's policy should first serve its own interest and only secondarily consider what effects it might have on the world. Defensive realists believed that U.S. cultural hegemony will lock China into an insecure position that posed a threat to Chinese culture; thus, Chinese culture should be protected. Offensive realists think that China is powerful enough to adopt an offensive approach so that China can expand its cultural influence abroad. To trace the evolution of China's cultural soft power, the following section explains cultural policies from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping.

3.1.1 Deng Xiaoping

Deng Xiaoping leaned toward a conservative brand of Confucianism that filled an ideological vacuum after the Cultural Revolution.¹⁵ The cultural policy at the time had given greater latitude to writers and artists. Highlighted in this trend was the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1978, in which intellectuals were encouraged to liberate their thought. Top leaders recognized the drawbacks of over-emphasized politics and negligence of culture. In January 1980, Deng said, "The reason why we stop talking about literature and art under the subordination of politics is

¹³ Hong, "Mao Zedong's Cultural Theory and China's Three Mass-Culture Debates: A Tentative Study of Culture, Society and Politics," p. 98.

¹⁴ Daniel C. Lynch, "Securitizing Culture in Chinese Foreign Policy Debates: Implications for Interpreting China's Rise," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July/August, 2013), pp. 634-638.

¹⁵ Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, pp. 61-62.

that the political intervention will hinder the development of literature and art.”¹⁶ The 4th Congress of the Writers Association in 1984 stressed freedom of creative writing.¹⁷ The phrase “break into forbidden zones” became popular among readers and was cited with approval by officials. However, when intellectuals were told to liberate their thought and to make “the hundred flowers bloom,” they did not know what that meant or how far they could go.¹⁸

Confucius was resurrected to be the popular symbol during Deng’s era. In 1984, Deng supported the setup of the Confucius Foundation of China, an organization that promotes Confucianism and Chinese traditional research to increase global cultural exchanges.¹⁹ In October 1989, an elaborate celebration of the anniversary of Confucius’s birthday was held in Beijing. Gu Mu, a close adviser of Deng, gave a speech endorsing Confucian values as a means to societal harmony. Since then, Beijing has sponsored annual commemorations of Confucius’ birthday. The annual festivals feature conferences highlighting the resurgence of study of Confucianism.²⁰

The cultural policies under Deng were relatively lenient. Most Chinese scholars could study a culture of their choice, national or foreign, as long as it did not espouse anti-socialism.²¹

3.1.2 Jiang Zemin

After the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, discourse in the West labeling China as a “destabilizing country” led China to contemplate the building of a positive image

¹⁶ Xiaoping Deng, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Dier Quan (Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 2)* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1994), p. 213.

¹⁷ Perry Link, “The Limits of Cultural Reform in Deng Xiaoping’s China,” *Modern China*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1987), pp. 115, 125.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁹ Whittaker, *China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 62.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²¹ Hong, “Mao Zedong’s Cultural Theory and China’s Three Mass-Culture Debates: A Tentative Study of Culture, Society and Politics,” pp. 100-101.

overseas. An interest in soft power began taking shape in the 1990s with academics deliberating the virtues of cultural interaction. Wang Huning, the major brainpower of Jiang Zemin, argued in a 1993 article that there had been an international shift from power based on wealth and violence to a knowledge-based power structure. Since culture is the main source of soft power, Chinese culture based on Confucianism could be used to seek peaceful solutions to global problems and attract other countries.²² Thus, during Jiang's era, cultural development together with economic and political developments became the 'three-in-one' model for strengthening socialism with Chinese characteristics. Zheng Bijian, who coined the concept of China's peaceful rise, advocated the promotion of Chinese culture abroad as a means of overcoming hostility towards China.²³

Jiang's administration has sought to resurrect Confucianism as a means of promoting domestic order, securing sustainable national development, and alleviating the China threat.²⁴ Jiang acknowledged the cultural advancement was urgent because it played a crucial role in rejuvenating China. Cultural officials then started both to boost art and literature domestically and to assimilate the advanced foreign culture.²⁵ Culture played an important role in vying for China's national power. Jiang stated at the 15th CCP Congress in 1997 that through carrying out various forms of foreign cultural exchanges, China could learn the strength of different countries and show the achievements of Chinese culture to the world.²⁶ In 1999, Jiang made "explaining China to the world" a

²² Parama Sinha Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes," *China Research Center*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013), <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

²³ Joe Tin-yau Lo and Suyan Pan, "Confucius Institutes and China's Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes," *A Journal of Comparative and International Education* (2014), p.3.

²⁴ Ibid., p.4.

²⁵ "Jiang Zemin's Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Xinhua News Agency*, November 7, 2002, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/48352.htm> (accessed December 1, 2015).

²⁶ Zhang, Dian-Jun, "Dangdai Zhongguo Wenhua Waijiao Zhanlue De Lishi Shanbian," (Historical Evolution of Contemporary China's Cultural Diplomatic Strategy), *Journal of Tianjin Administration Institute*, Vol. 15. No. 1 (January 2013), pp.57-65.

new creed of China's communication overseas, which included the development of China's politics, economy, culture, and diplomacy.²⁷ Delivering a political report at the 16th CCP Congress in 2002, Jiang emphasized China should treasure the fine tradition of Chinese culture and absorb the achievements of foreign cultures in building a socialist spiritual civilization. To build a well-off society, he continued, China should understand the significance of cultural development and the strength of traditional culture to enhance the attraction of a socialist culture with Chinese characteristics.²⁸ He seems to suggest that China's growing might had aroused vigilant concerns in some countries and should therefore take a benign approach to dispel such anxieties.²⁹

Developing the cultural industry was an important approach to enriching culture in the market economy during Jiang's era. In 2002, China's cultural system reform was launched. Propaganda chief Liu Yunshan noted that the cultural power was becoming an important component in integrating national power and global competitiveness.³⁰ Within the following years, a series of official documents were released, calling for the development of philosophy and social sciences, which are viewed as important elements of cultural soft power. Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, Chinese foreign relations discourse expressed an increasing appreciation of China's cultural traditions as a basis of Beijing's interactions with the world.³¹

3.1.3 Hu Jintao

Under the presidency of Hu Jintao, China was inclined to use the Confucian idea of

²⁷ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.174.

²⁸ "Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress," *Beijing Time*, December 10, 2002, <http://www.bjreview.com/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/10/content_79209_5.htm>(accessed December 1, 2015).

²⁹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p. 23.

³⁰ Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," in McGiffert, ed. *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States* (October 5, 2009), p. 15.

³¹ Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 64.

harmony in two ways to counteract the China threat theory externally and to maintain a harmonious society internally.³²

During Hu's era, the term cultural soft power could be frequently found when browsing through Chinese official publications and websites. This was a sign that culture is a noticeable aspect of China's foreign policy.³³ Beijing had launched efforts to disseminate its cultural presence worldwide. The concept of cultural soft power entered academic discourse around 2003 because the Chinese translation of Joseph Nye's book *Soft Power* had been released. The cultural soft power later was endorsed by China's top leaders. Hu stated at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on January 4, 2006, that the increase in China's global status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power as well as in soft power such as culture.³⁴ Hu also advised the 8th National Congress of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles to give attention to the country's cultural development and to upgrade its soft power.³⁵ In the same year, *The 11th Five Year Plan (2006-10) for Cultural Development* devoted an entire chapter to the "go global" strategy for Chinese culture, encouraging the media and cultural enterprises to expand cultural coverage and international impact.³⁶ It urged a bigger presence for China in the international cultural markets and pushed deep into the global culture market in particular for China to communicate with western audiences.³⁷

The release of a cultural plan indicated that cultural soft power strategy has been established. In 2007, cultural soft power became a highlight in the annual conferences of both the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political

³² Lo and Pan, "Confucius Institutes and China's Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes," p.4.

³³ Li Mingjiang, "China Debates Soft Power," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, Issue 2 (2008), pp. 288-289.

³⁴ Glaser and Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," pp. 14-15.

³⁵ Li, "China Debates Soft Power," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, Issue 2 (2008), p. 290.

³⁶ Glaser and Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," p. 17.

³⁷ Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes," <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

Consultative Conference (CPPCC), demonstrated a signal that expanding Chinese culture was a pivotal part in the national strategy.³⁸ Hu urged that China needs to improve the policies for supporting nonprofit cultural programs, developing the cultural industry, and encouraging cultural innovation.³⁹ The CPPCC held a special session in July 2007 on “cultural construction as the main approach for national soft power building.”⁴⁰ Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the role of culture as a source of national strength and international competitiveness. Propaganda Department Director Liu Yunshan noted, “Whose culture and values are widely spread is able to effectively influence the world.”⁴¹ Minister of Culture Cai Wu proclaimed that “We aim to establish a batch of world-famous cultural brands.” With the intensified global competition in the area of cultural soft power, the role of external communication has increased in importance.⁴²

The revival of Confucius’s image made him a prime candidate to represent national pride on the global stage. The opening ceremonies of the 2008 Olympics featured a choir dressed as disciples of Confucius, chanting quotations from the *Analects*. In 2009, a state-owned film company produced a film promoting Confucius. In 2011, a gigantic statue of Confucius was erected in Tiananmen Square.⁴³ However, the Chinese Communist Party has appeared worried that appealing to an ancient sage might erode its own claims to singular authority. Then four months later quietly took the statue down.⁴⁴

Beijing attempts to expand the cultural soft power worldwide. In the 6th plenary

³⁸ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China’s Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp. 23-24.

³⁹ Hu Jintao, “Hu Jintao’s report at 17th Party Congress,” *Xinhua News Agency*, December 25, 2007, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>>(accessed October 1, 2014).

⁴⁰ Li, “China Debates Soft Power,” p. 289.

⁴¹ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, p. 207.

⁴² Ibid, pp. 207-208.

⁴³ Whittaker, *China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 66.

⁴⁴ Chris Buckley, “Xi Pays Homage to Confucius, a Figure Back in Favor,” *The New York Times*, November 26, 2013, <<http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/xi-pays-homage-to-confucius-a-figure-back-in-favor/#more-3056>>(accessed March 30, 2016).

session of the 17th CCP Central Committee, a resolution on the reform of the cultural system and promotion of the cultural industry had been approved. The Resolution contained the guidelines to improve the cultural soft power and promote Chinese culture domestically and internationally. Chinese leaders not only enrich Chinese citizens' cultural life but also enhance cultural influence in the world.⁴⁵ The Resolution adopted at the 18th CCP Congress in 2012 was emphatic about upholding cultural heritage: "China's cultural soft power should be improved significantly." The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in 2013 stressed cultural openness while strengthening cultural soft power. Aspiring to play a major power role in global politics, China realized that its cultural rise would augment its strategic rise.⁴⁶

3.1.4 Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping's administration has taken several initiatives to promote Chinese culture, including programs to fund translations of Chinese literature into foreign languages, the expansion of the Chinese film industry, and the theme of "sending Chinese culture to the world." Xi attempts to regulate cultural policies within China, with notions of soft power. These are manifestations of a long-term goal—the PRC's quest to become a global cultural power.⁴⁷

Xi Jinping has voiced the importance of Confucianism, and Chinese literature and art on several occasions. On November 26, 2013, Xi visited the Temple of Confucius in Qufu and asked scholars to study Confucius' teachings on ethics, government and virtuous living. Xi also said in public he would like to read *the Analects* and *Collecting*

⁴⁵ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp.242-243.

⁴⁶ Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes," <<http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/>> (accessed December 1, 2015).

⁴⁷ Stanley Rosen, Michael Berry, Jindong Cai, and Sheila Melvin, "Xi Jinping's Culture Wars," *China File Conversation*, November 12, 2014, <<https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/xi-jinpings-culture-wars>> (accessed March 30, 2016).

Stories and Thoughts of Confucius carefully.⁴⁸ On September 24, 2014, Xi Jinping, at a seminar to mark the anniversary of the birth of Confucius, addressed that Confucianism has profoundly influenced the Chinese civilization and has been an important part of traditional Chinese culture.⁴⁹ Xi Jinping argues that the role of literature and art is irreplaceable; and Chinese classical literature should be ingrained in students' minds.⁵⁰ Xi emphasizes the literature and art is an important battlefield for the Chinese Communist Party and the people. Literature and art workers should strive to produce excellent works that disseminate the value views and reflect the spirit of Chinese culture. The Chinese government needs to elevate literature and art work into the important agenda.⁵¹

Xi Jinping also acknowledges that language is the best way to understand a country and that CIs serve as important platforms to help the world know China. Xi said “as bridges for linguistic and cultural exchanges, the CIs have played an active role in facilitating people worldwide to learn the Chinese language and understand its culture.”⁵² Xi understands that the CIs have become an important conduit of people exchanges between China and the West, making contributions to China's cultural soft power.

3.2 The Confucius Institute project

The CI has become an important channel to promote Chinese language and culture

⁴⁸ Buckley, “Xi Pays Homage to Confucius, a Figure Back in Favor,” <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/xi-pays-homage-to-confucius-a-figure-back-in-favor/#more-3056>>(accessed March 30, 2016).

⁴⁹ Zhang Pengfei, “China Commemorates Confucius with High-profile Ceremony,” *Xinhua*, September 25, 2014, <<http://english.cntv.cn/2014/09/25/ARTI1411604274108319.shtml>>(accessed March 30, 2016).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ “Xi Jinping's Talks at the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art,” *China Copyright and Media*, October 16, 2014, <<https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/xi-jinpings-talks-at-the-beijing-forum-on-literature-and-art/>>(accessed March 30, 2016).

⁵² Hanban, “Xi Jinping: Confucius Institutes serve as important platforms to help the world know China,” *Hanban website*, October 28, 2015, <http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-10/28/content_620866.htm>(accessed March 30, 2016).

overseas which may enhance the cultural soft power as well.⁵³ Chinese medicine, opera, and business CIs have been set up so that overseas audience can learn Chinese culture, art, and trade.⁵⁴ To diversify funding for the CIs, a decision passed by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP encouraged social organizations and Chinese-funded institutions to get involved in the CIs' development. Xu Lin noted that an alumni association would be a platform through which people could give donations. Some Chinese companies such as Kweichow Moutai Group, Hainan Airlines, and CITIC Group have expressed their interests in supporting CIs. Hanban has also started to select certain CIs as model Institutes to act as example for others.⁵⁵ The following analyzes the rationale of the CI project, the establishment model, and demonstration of cultural soft power.

3.2.1 The rationale of the CI project

The CI project can be understood as a form of cultural diplomacy intended to facilitate cross-cultural dialogues.⁵⁶ The Chinese leaders have accepted that the core of soft power is culture, and they have recognized the importance of the connection between language education and soft power. If foreigners understand China better, they will be more accommodating to China's interests. In April 2007, Li Changchun visited Hanban and gave a keynote speech on the significance of CIs in forming part of China's foreign propaganda strategy.⁵⁷ The State Councilor Chen Zhili explained that Confucius

⁵³ Ling-Jun Sun, "Zhongguo Chuantong Wenhua Zouchuqu Yu Guojia Ruanshili De Tisheng—Jianlun Kongzi Xueyuan De Zhongyao Zuoyong" (Chinese Traditional Culture Going out to Improve the National Soft Power—On the Important Role of the Confucius Institute), *Journal of Shandong Academy of Governance*, No. 5 (October 2012), pp. 131–133.

⁵⁴ Li Defang, "Zhongguo Wenhua Waijiao Moshi Jiangou—Yi Kongzi Xueyuan Weili," (The Construction of China's Cultural Diplomatic Model—A Case Study of Confucius Institute), *Contemporary World* (Nov. 2012).

⁵⁵ Falk Hartig, "Confucius Institutes – Quo Vadis?" *The Diplomat*, October 21, 2014, <<http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/confucius-institutes-quo-vadis/>>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).

⁵⁶ Pan, "The Confucius Institute project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection," p. 30.

⁵⁷ Wang Danping and Bob Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," *The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2014), p. 229.

Institutes could portray China as a domestic harmonious society to gain global acceptance.⁵⁸ The CI project reflects China's recognition of language teaching and cultural dissemination as an important means of promoting China's soft power. There are three rationales of the CI project:

1) Consolidate China's cohesion. Within China, the worldwide craving for Chinese language learning and the spread of CIs are projected in the mass media as a successful national cause and an achievement in winning hearts and minds in the global community. Beijing portraying the CIs' expansion strengthens China's self-esteem.⁵⁹ The CI as a platform for language education and cultural exchange can reflect the benevolence and harmony of Confucianism. Chinese people in the process of spreading their language and culture can create the environment of learning traditional Chinese culture, thereby consolidating nation's cohesion.

2) Expand Chinese influence worldwide. An official language of one country that is widely used by other countries can reduce exchange costs. More than half of CI students are from business enterprises, some of whom have a rich experience of doing business in China.⁶⁰ The CIs' expansion can facilitate the sustainable growth of Chinese economy. With the responsibility of telling China's successful story,⁶¹ the CIs have become an official mouthpiece in showcasing Chinese prestige. Foreign audiences are receiving a Chinese cultural product that has been carefully crafted, packaged, and delivered. The CIs help Chinese higher education gain recognition for its delivery of educational services in the global market, thereby expanding its influence.

⁵⁸ Pan, "The Confucius Institute project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection," p. 27.

⁵⁹ Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," p. 229.

⁶⁰ Li Jinhua, "The Implication of Cultural Soft Power by the Confucius Institute," *Journal of Fujian Institute of Socialism*, Vol. 3, No. 96 (2013).

⁶¹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.172.

3) Diminish the China threat theory. China's political system and ideology are at odds with Western countries, resulting in tension of Western powers towards a rising China. To resolve this tension, CIs form part of China's strategy to soften its global image from threatening to benign, from an aggressive dragon to a benevolent panda. The CI has highlighted the theme of "peace, development, exchange" in an attempt to lessen the rising voice of China's threat.⁶²

3.2.2 The role of Hanban

When Hanban was founded in 1987, its responsibilities included initiating policies, sponsoring activities, teaching Chinese, and engaging cultural exchanges.⁶³ In the beginning, Hanban was governed by the Ministry of Education alone. The State Council later expanded its functions to include cultural exchanges and placed it under the joint governance of 11 ministry-level organs. For example, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) are responsible for communicating with foreign governments, liaising with educational institutions, and coordinating with diplomatic missions abroad. Under the MOFA's instruction, Hanban provides language training for foreign embassies and international organizations, and launches initiatives to facilitate language teachings.⁶⁴ Recognizing Hanban's role in shaping CI's curriculum, it is logical to regard CIs as a contemporary expression of China's foreign policy.⁶⁵ The core projects are as follows:

1) Train and recruit teachers

⁶² Qiumei Guo, and Yong Lu, "Kongzi Xueyuan De Guojia Wenhua Ruanshili Yanjiu" (Soft Power of National Culture of Confucius Institute), *Journal of Harbin University*, Vol.32, No. 3 (March 2011).

⁶³ Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 68.

⁶⁴ Pan, "The Confucius Institute project: China's cultural diplomacy and soft power projection," p. 25.

⁶⁵ Amy Stambach, "Confucius Institute Programming in the United States: Language Ideology, Hegemony, and the Making of Chinese Culture in University Classes," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, Vol. 46, Issue 1 (2015), p. 63.

The demand for CIs' teachers is greater than the supply. In 2015, the number of prospective learners reached 120 million, meaning a search for 5 million teachers. However, there were only 50,000 overseas Chinese teachers available and not many local teachers who were certified to teach Chinese. To be qualified as a visiting teacher, one must have at least three years teaching experience and go through a rigorous training process. Since many countries are in earnest need of teachers, Hanban set up bases to cultivate teachers by relying on Chinese universities to develop bases for international Chinese education and by collaborating with foreign universities to set up majors in teaching Chinese.⁶⁶ The sources of recruiting teachers use four approaches. The first approach is "bringing in." Hanban has invited overseas language teachers to China to attend the short-term training. For example, in 2014, there were 2,500 teachers in 77 countries received training in China.⁶⁷ The second approach is "going out." Hanban sends Chinese experts abroad for language training as well as giving culture lectures. In 2014, there were 25,000 Chinese teachers went abroad for on-job training. The third approach is localization of teachers. There is a trend of localization of talent which the CI can utilize to narrow down the shortage of teachers. Hanban has trained 4,765 indigenous Chinese teachers, and CI trained 35,000 teachers.⁶⁸ The final approach is the recruitment of volunteers. The volunteers have been increasing; since 2004, over 10,000 volunteers have been sent to CIs.⁶⁹ Despite these efforts, demand is still much larger than supply.

2) Develop CI online

Hanban has built a digital platform for Chinese language and culture promotion to

⁶⁶ Hanban, *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014* (Beijing: Hanban, 2014), p.3.

⁶⁷ Zhou Tong, "Kongzi Xueyuan De Fazhan Dui Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Yingxiang"(The Impact of China's Cultural Soft Power by the Development of Confucius Institute), *Popular Science*, Vol. 15, No. 163 (March 2013), pp. 168-170.

⁶⁸ Hanban, *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014*, p.63.

⁶⁹ Li, "Zhongguo Wenhua Waijiao Moshi Jiangou—Yi Kongzi Xueyuan Weili" (The Construction of China's Cultural Diplomatic Model – A Case Study of Confucius Institute).

conduct distance teaching. The Guidelines for Chinese Learning Teaching Materials Development has gone online. With over 12,000 registered users, it has amassed 9,400 volumes of various materials. A database has been built up, consisting of 664 sets of indigenous teaching materials in 884 volumes from 225 CI and CCs in 75 countries.⁷⁰ A homepage for CI Online and an online live class platform for Chinese language learners have been unveiled. The faculty members are mostly professional language teachers. The number of registered users rose to 3,250,000.⁷¹

3) Organize CI brand projects

Hanban has organized several prominent projects to highlight the CI brand. First, lecture tours of experts, performance tours of students, and teaching materials exhibitions in the CIs have been held. They also hold Chinese language competitions and invite foreign school principals to visit China and foreign students to participate in summer and winter camps in China.⁷² Second, the model CI project was issued. There are now 26 model CIs aiming to expand the number of students and to improve the academic quality. Third, Chinese studies programs have been launched. For example, Confucius China Studies Program recruited overseas doctoral students to study in China. Understanding China Fellowship Program is sponsored by foreign famous universities, which enable prestigious scholars to carry out research in China. The Young Leaders Fellowship Program invited foreign outstanding youth to travel to China for study.⁷³

4) Promote Chinese tests and organize workshop

Hanban has strengthened the publicity of Chinese tests and market-oriented operation. By 2014, there were 886 testing centers worldwide, with the number of test

⁷⁰ Hanban, *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014*, p.28.

⁷¹ Ibid., p.7.

⁷² Diefeng Cao, "Introduction to the Development Plan of Confucius Institute," September 9, 2013, <<http://www.wku.edu/ci/developmentplanforci.pptx>> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

⁷³ Hanban, *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014*, p.33.

takers hitting 5,420,000. Hanban upgrades the techniques of exam systems and builds up the service platform of online tests.⁷⁴ Hanban organizes “Advanced Workshop on Culture and the Sustainable Development of International Chinese Language Education” and invites scholars and linguists to give lectures.⁷⁵ The 8th Chinese Program for Foreign Diplomats was launched, attracting 77 diplomats from 32 countries. Volunteers for the US College Board project were selected. U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama visited the Confucius Classroom at Washington Yu Ying Public Charter School.⁷⁶

3.2.3 The establishment model

The CI network operates with two models: the Confucius Institute (CI) and the Confucius Classroom (CC). A CI is typically a collaborative entity among Hanban, a partner university in China, and a host university in the target country. A CC, a collaborative entity between Hanban and a host school, caters to K-12 schools.⁷⁷ To strengthen the CI’s role in developing Chinese teaching and learning in local elementary and secondary schools, CI and these schools after consultation and approved by the Headquarters, agree on establishing CC. The CI is responsible for the management of the CC, including developing annual activity plans, budgets, and final accountings for the CC and submitting all to the Headquarters for approval. The CI also reports to the Hanban concerning the operation of CC on a regular basis.⁷⁸ Foreign applicants submit to Hanban a Letter of Intent of setting up a CI that proves: a need for Chinese learning, ability to provide a facility, and pre-selection of China’s counterpart. After submitting the letter, the applicant requires the Hanban’s approval. Thereafter, the applicant signs an agreement

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.42.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.47.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.55.

⁷⁷ Shuai Li and Yanyin Zhang, “A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education,” *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 2013).

⁷⁸ “China Corner,” <<http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/China-Corner>> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

with Hanban and the Chinese partner, respectively.⁷⁹

Hanban provides three years of seed funding. The start-up funds provided for each institute average \$150,000. The annual operation cost for an average CI around \$500,000.⁸⁰ Some CIs have difficulty in maintaining such an expense. It thus has to fight to maintain its allocation from the Ministry of Finance against those who question, “Why give foreigners money when there are so many poor Chinese?”⁸¹

The CI has an interesting organizational setup and management procedures. The setup is basically a partnership: a Chinese university and its foreign counterpart, a Chinese middle school and its foreign counterpart, a Chinese university and overseas community organizations, China’s local government and its foreign counterpart, and a Chinese university and foreign enterprises.⁸² Management practices are covered by Hanban, industry, and fund raising. The first project relies on funding and resource from Hanban that has the right to give guidance and to appoint personnel for the CI. Most CIs belong to this category.⁸³ The industrial operation model has a market interest. Their teaching programs and cultural activities are market-oriented. Participants pay for language courses and cultural activities. The third model is fund-raising. These CIs not only rely on Hanban’s funding and CI’s income but also on donors. The majority of these institutes are from the U.S. Overall, Hanban project is the most common, particularly in countries that have insufficient Chinese language teaching. Industrial operation type is based on business interest, an interest that is most common in Asia. The fund-raising

⁷⁹ Lin, Da-cheung, “Meiguo Kongzi Xueyuan Dui Zhongguo Chukou Maoyi de Yingxiang: Jiyu Meiguo Gezhou de Fenxi”(The Confucius Institute Influence American Export Trade—An Analysis of States of the America), *Shanghai Jinrong Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Shanghai Finance University)*, (April 2013), No. 115, pp. 98-107.

⁸⁰ Whittaker, *China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, pp. 76-77.

⁸¹ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, p. 246.

⁸² Ibid., p. 246.

⁸³ Guangbing Liu, “Kongzi Xueyuan Banxue Jizhi Ji Fazhan Celue Chutan,” (A Study on Establishing Mechanism and Developmental Strategy of Confucius Institutes), *Hubei Normal University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, Vol. 31, No. 5 (2011), pp.123-125.

model is distributed in the U.S. because of its economic strength and generous donors.

The CI is a nonprofit education organization with diverse stakeholders, who carry out varied official responsibilities. The first is the CI council and stakeholders—the relations between organizational leadership and members. The senior leaders (members of council) of CI are composed of major stakeholders, who are responsible for formulating CI's development strategies and determining the stakeholders' responsibilities. The second is the CI council and director—the relations between leader and executor. The council is responsible for crafting the CI's strategic objectives and development plan, which are executed by the CI's director. The third is CI's stakeholders and director—the relations between resources providers and users. The stakeholders provide CI with personnel and equipment; and the director uses them to complete the mission.⁸⁴ Each CI is under the leadership of directors. In the U.S., for example, the CI's operation is a bilateral cooperation between Chinese and U.S. directors. The director, an enforcer, communicator, and organizer, is responsible for the operations and management of CI. Directors, who execute China's foreign cultural policy, require a good communication skill with Hanban, the PRC embassies, and local governments.⁸⁵

3.2.4 The CI development plan

To expand the CI project, China has offered resources, which are basically utilitarian, to local partners in various countries. This mode might expand CIs and enhance its global branding.⁸⁶ “The Chinese government and people will consistently support the growth of CIs,” said President Xi Jinping in his congratulatory letter to the CI on its tenth

⁸⁴ Wang Yanwei, “Kongzi Xueyuan De Liyi Xiangguanfang Ji Qi Hudong Guanxi: Yige Fenxi Kuangjia” (The Interactions between the Confucius Institute's Stakeholders: An Analytical Framework), *Yunnan Normal University (Foreign Language Teaching and Research Edition)*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (July 2013), pp. 74–81.

⁸⁵ Liu, “Kongzi Xueyuan Banxue Jizhi Ji Fazhan Celue Chutan” (A Study on Establishing Mechanism and Developmental Strategy of Confucius Institutes).

⁸⁶ Lo and Pan, “Confucius Institutes and China's Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes,” p. 5.

anniversary. By the end of 2014, there were 475 CIs and 851 CCs worldwide with 33,745 teachers. Globally, CIs and CCs held around 67,000 various classes for 1,110,000 registered students.⁸⁷ Hanban has sent a total of 15,500 directors, language teachers, and volunteers to 139 countries. Around 200,000 indigenous Chinese language teachers have been trained in the past ten years.⁸⁸ Teaching conditions at CIs have further improved. In 2014, the total expenditure by local partners in cash payments, personnel expenses, and facilities and utilities charges totaled \$ 443 million. Through 2014, CIs held a total of 30,000 various cultural events, including 5,531 academic lectures and seminars.⁸⁹

Hanban has implemented the CI Development Plan (2012-2020) to further develop the CI and to promote exchange by improving the academic quality and enhancing culture exchanges.⁹⁰ There are five areas of focused development in the plan: teacher education, textbook, Chinese proficiency test, brand projects, and China studies.⁹¹ To reach the goal of this plan, Hanban's measures are as follows: 1) Providing more funding support. Hanban identifies multiple sources of fund raising by attracting support from enterprises. 2) Enhancing coordination. Provide better service for the administration of CIs and set up study on the sustainable development. 3) Mobilize relevant stakeholders. All local governments concerned take an active part in the development of CIs by utilizing such mechanisms as Sino-foreign business cooperation, sister cities, and sister schools.⁹²

Despite the growth that CIs have made, researchers have identified challenges that the CI faces: 1) Difficulty in recruiting qualified local teachers. There were only about 40,000 qualified Chinese instructors for over 30 million overseas learners. According one

⁸⁷ Hanban, *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014*, p.16.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.23.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.6.

⁹⁰ Diefeng Cao, "Introduction to the Development Plan of Confucius Institute," <http://www.wku.edu/ci/developmentplanforci.pptx> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

⁹¹ Shuai Li and Yanyin Zhang, "A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education."

⁹² Cao, "Introduction to the Development Plan of Confucius Institute," <http://www.wku.edu/ci/developmentplanforci.pptx> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

assistant professor from China, it is not easy to recruit qualified local teachers to teach CI courses. China has to dispatch teachers abroad. However, such teachers are in short supply, as experienced teachers in his university might not be willing to leave their families to work abroad because of a low pay.⁹³ 2) Materials' inability to meet local needs. Hanban had originally planned to use the textbooks published in China. However, this strategy was met with resistance because many textbooks were developed with a "one-size-fits-all" mentality and did not take into account cultural differences. The materials do not attract many readers, and textual resources also lack local sensitivity. For example, teaching materials in Russia were found to be unhelpful because they had been translated inaccurately. In the UK, teaching materials were described as awkward.⁹⁴ In response to these challenges, Hanban has implemented measures such as developing guidelines for the global promotion of language and culture; enhancing teacher training both at home and abroad; and localizing the supply of language instructors.

3.3 Confucius Institutes' approaches to disseminate cultural soft power

Chinese strategists believe that cultural soft power is an important indicator of a state's global status. A world power should also be a major cultural hub whose ideas, social life, and beliefs are appealing to people of other countries.⁹⁵ Chinese official apparatus has campaigned cultural attractiveness with tremendous efforts. They are administrative organs responsible for the implementation of the cultural policies.⁹⁶ The CI project can be seen as an intricate soft power using varied techniques, such as language and cultural events as a peaceful means to exert China's influence abroad. The

⁹³ Interviewee 4.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.5.

⁹⁵ Li, "China Debates Soft Power," p. 299.

⁹⁶ Liu, *Cultural Policy in the People's Republic of China: Letting a hundred flowers blossom*, pp. 27-28. The Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Radio and Television, and the Xinhua News Agency are all government organizations in charge of cultural undertakings under the State Council. Please see Bai Liu, *Cultural Policy in the People's Republic of China: Letting a hundred flowers blossom*, pp. 30-31.

CI serves as a Chinese ambassador to build the cultural values of a “harmonious world” as well as to enhance international affinity.⁹⁷

3.3.1 Expansion of Chinese culture

Beijing has outlined approaches to boost foreign cultural exchanges and the influence of Chinese culture through CIs. In 2006, the State Council adopted the *Outline of the National Plan for Cultural Development during the 11th Five Year Plan*. The plan laid out a “go-out” strategy to ratchet up the competitiveness and influence of cultural products abroad. The major policies the document proposed were to promote global understanding of Chinese culture, to participate in international decision-making to endorse China’s discourse rights, and to cultivate global sales networks for Chinese cultural products.⁹⁸ The *Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development Plan during the National 12th Five Year Plan Period*, released in 2012, further stated that culture is becoming an increasingly important source for national cohesion and creativity. The section of “Strengthening foreign cultural exchange and cooperation” emphasized accelerating the construction of overseas Chinese cultural centers and CIs. Beijing would support cultural enterprises to launch international service sourcing and to produce cultural products for foreign demand.⁹⁹ Beijing has allocated significant funds for and engaged cultural exchanges abroad.¹⁰⁰ In recent years, the total monetary output of

⁹⁷ Pan, “The Confucius Institute Project: China’s Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection,” p. 29.

⁹⁸ Li, “China Debates Soft Power,” p. 303.

⁹⁹ “Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development Plan during the National “12th Five Year Plan” Period, *China Copyright and Media*, February 16, 2012, <http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/02/16/outline-of-the-cultural-reform-and-development-plan-during-the-national-12th-five-year-plan-period/>.(accessed Feb 2, 2015).

¹⁰⁰ Efforts include participation in the United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in 1998, the 1999 Paris China Culture Week, the 2000 U.S. Tour of Chinese Culture, the China Festival at the Asia-Pacific Week in 2001 in Berlin, the Chinese year in France from October 2003 to July 2004, the 6th Asian arts festival, the Chinese cultural tour in Africa, the year of Russia in China in 2006, and the year of China in Russia in 2007. It has been stressed that the Chinese diasporas throughout the world is a good platform for promoting Chinese culture. Please see Li, “China Debates Soft Power,” pp. 303-304.

cultural industries account for 2.75 percent of GDP.¹⁰¹ With the financial support from the government, the cultural communities held many meetings on the cultural issues.¹⁰² Research institutes have also contributed to the growing popularity of cultural soft power by holding conferences.¹⁰³ Chinese traditional heritage is marketed abroad as part of a series of “Year of China” festivals staged in several countries.¹⁰⁴ For cultural officials, the competition of cultural power is the core of soft power contention.

As Minister of Culture Cai Wu indicated, China needs to be more comprehensive in presenting the positive side of China. Many temples have been restored in China and Confucius venerated. In 2010 the film *Confucius* packed movie theaters. A statue of Confucius was erected on Tiananmen Square in 2011. The State Council Information Office has been involved in staging exhibitions abroad. The largest scale in the history of World Expos (2010) showcased Shanghai along with the best aspects of urban planning, architecture, and the arts. Beijing spent \$45 billion in preparation for the half-year event that attracted 73 million people worldwide.¹⁰⁵ A more impressive example of China showcasing itself to the world was the 2008 Olympic Games, at which China’s athletes won the most gold medals.¹⁰⁶ The Chinese government has attempted to actively market its cultural footprint around the world.

The CI involves engaging with foreign local communities to promote Chinese

¹⁰¹ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, pp. 207-208.

¹⁰² Li, “China Debates Soft Power,” p. 290.

¹⁰³ For example, China Foreign Languages Bureau hosted a forum on “trans-cultural communications and soft power building” in August 2006, and the International Public Relations Research Center at Fudan University sponsored a forum in early 2007 on “national soft power construction and the development of China’s public relations.” Please see Li, “China Debates Soft Power,” p. 290.

¹⁰⁴ For example, over 200,000 people attended the 2006 Chinese New Year celebrations in London. The October 2009 to February 2010 “Europalia-China Arts Festival,” which traveled through Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Luxembourg, included presentations by artists and performers; and organized exhibitions. Please see Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China’s Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.28.

¹⁰⁵ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, pp. 239-240.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 241.

culture as represented by Chinese medicine, Kongfu, calligraphy, cuisine, etc. These events aim to tap into the cultural function of CIs, to enhance cultural influence in local communities, and to understand China.¹⁰⁷ Through the co-establishment with foreign countries, the CI can expand the boundaries of Chinese culture and increase interaction with the people of its host country. Such cooperation is conducive to China's cultural diplomacy.¹⁰⁸ The CIs are perceived as a way to soften China's global image, although some concerns have been raised about the cost and transparency of the initiative.¹⁰⁹

3.3.2 Cultivation of Chinese higher education

Higher education is a conveyor of cultural soft power and has been a key component of China to capitalize on their universities' prestige to attract foreign elites. The numbers of foreign students coming to study in Chinese universities continue to rise. In the 2010-11 academic year, 265,090 foreign students studied in China. During President Obama's visit to China in November 2009, he announced that the U.S. had set a goal of sending 100,000 students to China over the next five years. Beijing has also increased the number of 17,500 scholarships for 2009-10. In May 2010 China announced it would provide 100,000 scholarships for U.S. students. Such programs provide great value for foreign students to become familiar with Chinese customs and values.¹¹⁰ China is making a major investment in higher education with the aim of improving both innovation at home and competitiveness abroad. The Ministry of Education attempts to create world-class universities in China. In October 2009, nine leading universities combined to form so-called the "C9" (China Nine). In his 2010 work report to the National People

¹⁰⁷ Pan, "The Confucius Institute project: China's cultural diplomacy and soft power projection," p. 28.

¹⁰⁸ Tong Zhou, "Kongzi Xueyuan De Fazhan Dui Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Yingxiang" (The Impact of China's Cultural Soft Power by the Development of Confucius Institute), *Popular Science*, Vol. 15, No. 163 (March 2013).

¹⁰⁹ Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," pp. 225-234.

¹¹⁰ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, pp. 241-242.

Council, Premier Wen said that this target educational investment is meant to make China a global leader in technological high grounds.¹¹¹ Some elite universities aim at moving up the global rankings. For example, the World University Rankings for 2012-13 ranked the University of Hong Kong 35th, Peking University 46th, and Tsinghua University 52nd globally.¹¹²

China has spent huge amounts of money to attract foreign students to Chinese language and culture, funding language programs at university level in more than 100 countries. It also invites 110,000 to 140,000 foreign students annually to study at Chinese universities. Among them are opinion leaders, diplomats, and entrepreneurs. These students experience Chinese culture and build friendships with Chinese officials and leaders.¹¹³ Chinese language has also become increasingly popular abroad, with an annual increase in examinees of the Chinese language test of HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi, a.k.a. the Chinese Proficiency Test) about 40-50%.¹¹⁴ The HSK has generated huge revenue. Beijing expects to promote the test to be as popular as the American ETS language proficiency test, which is considered a large education business worldwide.¹¹⁵

The CIs project can generate benefits to China's universities. By means of cooperation with foreign universities in setting up CIs, Chinese universities have gained a greater opportunity for external contacts. Such communications foster a significant scientific capability in domestic universities.¹¹⁶ Chinese universities act as unofficial cultural diplomats, making a three-fold contribution to the CI project: seeking foreign

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 243.

¹¹² "World University Rankings 2012-2013," <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking> (accessed February 2, 2015).

¹¹³ Wilfried Bolewski and Candy M. Rietig, "The Cultural Impact on China's New Diplomacy," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (Summer/Fall 2008), p. 92.

¹¹⁴ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.28.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp.164-165.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp.165-166.

partners and cooperative venues; enhancing CIs' academic status; and paving the way for China to increase its human capital. The partnership between China and foreign universities gives CIs a role on the global academic stage.¹¹⁷ The PRC expects the China-foreign university partnership to facilitate the inflow of foreign scholars and students into China. Liu Yandong said China will increase funding to finance international students to study at China; to support world-renowned foreign universities' cooperative programs; and to sponsor foreign scholars to work in China. These can be seen as China's "brain gain" efforts to improve its higher education capacity by using foreign-trained human resources.¹¹⁸

China's charm offensive aims at both the Chinese civil society and abroad. The goal is to present cultural diplomacy by winning the hearts and minds of foreigners. Chinese leaders believe that the goal can be achieved through cultural diplomacy and the projection of soft power. Thus Beijing's motivation to strengthen its culture by communicating with foreign publics is the attempt to bring about understanding for the nation's ideas, institutions, and culture.¹¹⁹ Beijing's use of CIs as a platform for foreign policy can be seen as a cultural approach, using benign activities to counter external pressures of the China threat theory.

3.4 The global expansion of CIs

Language is the basis of communication that can lessen cultural differences. The language of one country that can be embraced by others can contribute its soft power. English, as a lingua franca, augments the soft power of the U.S. As China's economy has undergone rapid growth, there has been a sharp increase in global demands for learning

¹¹⁷ Pan, "The Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection," p. 27.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 27-28.

¹¹⁹ Bolewski and Rietig, "The Cultural Impact on China's New Diplomacy," p. 93.

Chinese. This process has been actively promoted by Beijing with the setup of CIs.¹²⁰ The CI expansion can usher China into the global community and allow the world to better understand China.¹²¹ The CIs have not been distributed evenly; rather, a disproportionate number of institutes are located in advanced Western nations, especially the U.S. The goal of Hanban is to create 1,000 CIs by 2020. The strategic objective behind the CIs' proliferation can be traced to the China's vision nurtured as a globally benign image of China. The pilot institute was established on June 15, 2004, in Uzbekistan, however, the first official CI opened on November 21, 2004, in South Korea. Over 60% of CIs were concentrated in East Asia, the EU, and the U.S.— geopolitical importance to China. With the implementation of the CI Development Plan (2012-2020), the CI has been improved its quality of teaching.¹²²

With the advantages of similar culture, peripheral location, and intense trade exchanges, the CI development in Asia has taken off. In particular, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea have the largest student enrollment. The Thai Cabinet passed a petition in 1992, proposed by the Ministry of Education, to lift the restriction of the Chinese education policy. The first CI was set up at Khon Kaen University in August 2006. Thai Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn is a strong advocate in promoting the importance of Chinese, after learning that Chinese had become a craze in Thailand. With Japan's trade with China surpassing the U.S., there are more than 30,000 Japanese companies investing in China. Japanese learning Chinese hit 2 million, ranking it the second-largest foreign language after English. There are 18 CIs in Japan having cooperation with Beijing

¹²⁰ Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," pp. 225-234.

¹²¹ Pan, "The Confucius Institute project: China's cultural diplomacy and soft power projection," pp. 28-29.

¹²² By the end of 2014, there had been 475 CIs and 851 CCs in 126 countries and regions, with 103 CIs in 32 Asian countries and regions, 42 in 29 African countries, 159 in 39 European countries, 154 in 17 American countries and 17 in 3 Oceania countries; with 79 CCs in 17 Asian countries, 18 in 13 African countries, 211 in 25 European countries, 478 in 7 American countries, and 65 in 3 Oceania countries. Please see Hanban, *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014*, p.72.

University. Their courses are diversified—Chinese history, culture, philosophy, trade, etc. The propagation of CIs began in South Korea, which was an ideal ground for launching “Brand Confucius,” given the Korean peninsula’s long history of following the Confucian system of thought and society. South Korea as an economic partner for China was responsible for launching cultural diplomacy through a CI. With the increasing personnel exchanges and international trade, Chinese language has become an important tool for young Koreans. Now there are 23 CIs and more than 150 universities offering Chinese language and culture courses.¹²³ The CIs in South Asia are fewer compared with other parts of Asia. India’s deep-rooted cultural influence has motivated a low-key cultural engagement with China. The CIs have been rather active in Central Asia – a key region for China given its vast natural resources. The CI at the Tajik National University (in Tajikistan), for example, has become an important platform for cultural exchanges since its inception in 2009.¹²⁴ China’s charm offensive is aimed at improving its standing in Asia. One of its goals is to maintain peace on its periphery, allowing opportunities for Chinese companies to look for outlets.¹²⁵

On the European continent, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have the largest CIs and CCs in terms of size and number. In 2006, there were more than 50 Chinese language centers in Russia, including more than 30 universities with Chinese courses. After the first CI was established at St. Petersburg University, there were 18 CIs and 4 CCs and the demand for learning Business Chinese spiked. Young Russians regard possessing a Chinese language skill as an important means for employment. CIs at Russia’s Far Eastern National University, Moscow State University, and National

¹²³ Xiao-nan Hong and Dan Lin, “Kongzi Xueyuan De Fazhan Licheng Yu Wenhua Yiyun” (The Evolution of the Confucius Institute and Its Cultural Implication), *Culture Journal*, No. 5. pp. 30-41.

¹²⁴ Palit, “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods & Strategic Outcomes,” <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹²⁵ Whittaker, *China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 30.

University for the Humanities have become a platform for local trade cooperation with China. The former French President Jacques Chirac once noted that learning Chinese is an excellent choice for the future. There are 110 France universities offering Chinese language courses and more than 15 universities having Chinese language departments. Students selecting Chinese for electives reached 1.6 million. The number of primary and secondary students learning Chinese has grown at an annual growth rate of 30%. The UK has set up 25 CIs and 92 CCs. Confucius Institute for Business London is the world's first CI targeted at business professionals. In February 2008, London South Bank University and Heilongjiang University of Chinese Medicine co-founded the world's first Chinese medicine CI.¹²⁶

In the Americas, CIs are mainly established in the U.S. Until 2014, the U.S. had more than 100 CIs and 356 CCs. The world's first CI network was established in Michigan State University on May 15, 2006. China's first "Yellow River TV CI" was launched on December 18, 2008, with 24-hour broadcasts that cover the U.S., Canada, and Latin America. The program serves into 400 U.S. universities', 7,000 secondary schools', and 50 cities' cable networks. The number of beneficiaries is about 15 million. Located in downtown Vancouver, Canada, BCIT Confucius Institute aims at close to the market and in response to mainstream demand for teachers training, Chinese language courses, and China trade practices.¹²⁷ Compared with the U.S., CI's development in Latin America is modest, with 26 institutes and 10 classrooms in 11 Latin American countries. Brazil has 7 CIs and 2 CCs, the most in South America. "Cultural communication between the two languages has a very long history. China is becoming one of the most important countries in the world, especially for Brazil. I see a bright future for a CI in

¹²⁶ Hong and Lin, "Kongzi Xueyuan De Fazhan Licheng Yu Wenhua Yiyun," (The Evolution of the Confucius Institute and Its Cultural Implication).

¹²⁷ Ibid.

Brazil,” said Father Francisco Ivern Simo, Vice President of the Pontical Catholic University.¹²⁸

The CIs are closely tied to China’s strategic interests. The institutes teach simplified Chinese characters rather than the traditional characters that are used in Taiwan. This strategy is helpful in advancing Beijing’s goal of marginalizing Taiwan. In addition, China’s expectation of future growing dependence on energy imports has brought the CIs to places such as Kazakhstan, Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. The CIs, which are incorporated into leading universities around the world, link the host university with key Chinese universities through supportive arrangements. For example, the London School of Economics and Political Science operates a CI in collaboration with Tsinghua University, while Shanghai Jiaotong University has partnered with Purdue University. These collaborations provide the benefit of integrating the CIs into universities, which have a vested interest in supplying them with support. In supporting the CIs, the PRC spends about US\$37 million annually; and the institutes have received significant global publicity.¹²⁹

CIs function as agents of Beijing by relaying knowledge regarding language and culture to foster global recognition of China as a civilized and harmonious society and to improve its cultural connections in the global community.¹³⁰ The CI project is still very much a work in progress; however, its development has been rapid. The CI also plays an important role in terms of economic, political, and academic significance.¹³¹ The CIs

¹²⁸ Cindy Liu, May Zhou, Zhang Fan, Cai Chunying, and Liu Chang, “A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,” *China Daily USA*, May 30, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm <(accessed December 1, 2015)>.

¹²⁹ Joseph Stetar, Colleen Coppla, Li Guo, Naila Nabiyevea, and Baktybek Ismailov, “Soft Power Strategies: Competition and Cooperation in a Globalized System of Higher Education,” in the V. Rust, (ed.) *Policy and Practices on Quality Assurance and Global Competitiveness in Higher Education: An International and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 191-205.

¹³⁰ Pan, *The Confucius Institute Project: China’s Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection*, p. 29.

¹³¹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China’s Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.164.

serve as a branch office for selling China's cultural contents, an advantage in promoting China's soft power.

3.5 Summary

With its rapid economic take-off and increased global influence, China has invested huge cultural soft power resources in competing for dominance of international affairs, resulting in discourses of "cultural diplomacy" and "soft power" often appearing in China's official speeches. The academic research on related issues is also on the rise.¹³² Cultural diplomacy has become an important tool to demonstrate China's soft power; and the CI serves as the most important platform. In China, there exists correlation of cultural soft power and national image. China expects to reclaim its positive image through exercising cultural power.¹³³ Top leaders acknowledge that China should develop cultural soft power compatible with international standing.¹³⁴ This chapter explores China's cultural soft power strategy, the construction of CIs, and various approaches to disseminate culture.

China's cultural policies have become more flexible over time. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, writers and artists were encouraged to liberate their thought. They, however, did not know how far they could go. After the Tiananmen incident, China had a poor international image. In order to win over foreign audiences, Jiang Zemin understood the strategic significance of cultural development; and cultural reform was launched. During Hu's presidency, cultural circles released development plans with an emphasis on going global with Chinese culture. Xi Jinping's administration has taken initiatives to

¹³² The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 set up a "Public Diplomacy Division" dedicated in cultural exchanges with foreign countries. In early of 2010, the "Public Diplomacy Division" was promoted to "Public Diplomacy Office." In August, the "Public Diplomacy Advisory Committee" was established to further elevate its status and function. The cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangdong province set up a "Public Diplomacy Association."

¹³³ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, p.29.

¹³⁴ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, p. 207.

promote Chinese culture; and the CIs have played an indispensable part in promoting China.

China's global cultural footprint is wide-spread, with the focuses on expansion of Chinese culture and cultivation of higher education. Chinese policy-makers have outlined approaches to enhance cultural power. Because Beijing increased the total value output of cultural industries, China's cultural policy has been able to flex its cultural power throughout the world. Beijing has poured huge resources into some top Chinese universities, aiming to squeeze them into the list of world-class universities.

China's soft power has centered on cultural diplomacy aimed at transforming cultural resources into soft power and fostering more appreciation of Chinese culture in the world.¹³⁵ However, China's efforts at shaping itself into a peaceful country could be derailed by its authoritarian political system and aggressive actions in trouble spots such as the South China Sea. Domestic criticism has focused on the CIs' funding coming at the expense of domestic educational expenditure. The growth of CIs also generates heated debates regarding their purpose, their function, and the hidden agenda behind the public statement. Hanban has been careful not to advocate Beijing's political agenda.¹³⁶ It is far too simplistic to declare that the CI expansion represents the rise of China's soft power. Nevertheless, the CI project demonstrates a new form of cultural diplomacy that is a strategy to gain China a more sympathetic global reception.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp. 27-28.

¹³⁶ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, pp. 246-247.

¹³⁷ Pan, "The Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection," p. 30.

Chapter IV Confucius Institutes in the United States

Since U.S.-China relations are the most important of China's foreign policy in the 21st century, the Chinese government has invested heavily in the Confucius Institutes (CIs) in the U.S. According to one Chinese professor who has taught courses in Chinese language in the U.S. for many years, she observed that "while Chinese economy is the second largest in the world, many American students see future job markets that are in China. As one goes where the money goes, there are many students interested in learning Chinese. The enrolled students in the CIs have increased, with a peak in 2008, when China hosted the Olympics."¹ There are now 200,000 American students studying Mandarin Chinese.² The growth of the Chinese learning in the U.S., however, is not simply by the efforts of the Chinese government. In the aftermath of the 911 attack, Chinese was listed as one of the critical languages in the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) program.³ On September 25, 2015, President Obama announced a new initiative, aimed at having one million school children learn Chinese over the next five years. PRC President Xi Jinping responded that 50,000 students will participate in an exchange program between the two countries within the next three years.⁴

Since China has vigorously promoted the cultural soft power in the U.S. through the CIs, the operation of these Institutes requires in-depth studies. This chapter attempts to

¹ Interviewee 5.

² Kyle Feldscher, "President Obama Wants 1 million Americans Learning Chinese by 2020," *Washington Examiner*, September 25, 2015, <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-wants-1-million-americans-learning-chinese-by-2020/article/2572865>><http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed February 1, 2015).

³ Wang Danping and Bob Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," *The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2014), p. 230. In terms of continent, North America had the largest number of CIs (51%), followed by Europe (26%), Asia (14.3%), Oceania (5.2%) and Africa (3.5%).

⁴ Feldscher, "President Obama Wants 1 million Americans Learning Chinese by 2020," <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-wants-1-million-americans-learning-chinese-by-2020/article/2572865>>(accessed February 1, 2015).

answer what the language courses and cultural activities provided by these CIs are and how successful they are in shaping China's image. To answer the questions, the writer has chosen twelve CIs and further categorizes them into four types (local, research, culture and teachers training) of their major missions for research. This chapter introduces the CIs' project in the U.S. and then examines CIs' programs and their features. Finally, the writer identifies findings.

4.1 Confucius Institutes' project in the United States

Daniel Bell, a professor at Harvard University, proposed that the university values could be understood as a tension between "classical" and "pragmatic" models. The former was rooted in the university entrusted by society to pursue the truth. The latter sees the university's role as being primarily to serve society through training people. While the university should be engaged in the practical affairs of society, it should also maintain a public mission of cultivating citizenship. Hanban describes its mission as appealing to both models of the university; being committed to providing both language and cultural teaching, it meets the demands of foreign learners and contributes to the building of a harmonious world.⁵

Soft power can be conveyed through a nation's higher education system. The use of U.S. higher education as a vehicle for soft power projection has been part of U.S. foreign policy. Many observers agree that higher education in the U.S. projects significant soft power. A 2007 poll of 2,536 global leaders reported that 88.5% earned at least one degree in Western universities, and nearly half of these institutions were located in the U.S. While soft power projection continues to be important for the U.S., other nations are also making significant investments. China's rise as a global economic power could extend its

⁵ Christopher R. Hughes, "Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (2015), p. 53.

influence through the strategic use of soft power resources. Since the 1990s, China's foreign policy can be found toward areas it sees as strategically important, promoting a higher level of internationalization and competing for influence with the U.S.⁶

The lack of funding for foreign language programs is the major reason for the American universities establishing CIs. One interviewee observed that Chinese language and culture courses are not seen as core functions in many universities. With the sustainable finance from Hanban, the universities could obtain funding to support Chinese programs for students and community outreach. Faculties that want to have regular Chinese classes are seeking resources. Faculty cooperation in the creation and management of a CI can be advantageous for both university and individual faculty members. Universities that see the CIs as an opportunity for obtaining funding and fostering understandings between two countries, think the Chinese program is well-worth investment.⁷

The process of setting up a CI in a university varies, but in general there is a typical following pattern. The American university is approached by its Chinese counterpart with a proposal to develop a CI. The U.S. top administrators will assign faculty or administrators (likely the future CI director) to help communications and contact with the Chinese university for working on an application. The responsible personnel will outreach and garner support from stakeholders (such as the mayor's office, Education Instruction Department from the state, business companies, local schools, etc). After preparing the potential site for hosting a CI (including software and hardware), the local PRC consulate pays a visit to evaluate the CI's facilities, the staffing, and funding. If things go well, the university packages all necessary materials and sends the application to Hanban. Then the

⁶ Joseph Stetar, Colleen Coppla, Li Guo, Naila Nabiyeve, and Baktybek Ismailov, "Soft Power Strategies: Competition and Cooperation in a Globalized System of Higher Education," in the *Higher Education, Policy, And The Global Competition Phenomenon* (Los Angeles: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁷ Interviewee 6.

university president might lead a delegation to China to visit their partner university and Hanban. If things run smoothly, they could sign a contract.⁸

Hanban is seeking the most prestigious universities in the U.S. to enhance China's soft power. The prominent universities get what they want; the less-esteemed ones get less.⁹ According to one interviewee, the main reasons for one university's setting up CI were that there was a big push in campus for establishing CIs in conjunction with a university in China. The Chinese university was willing but not extremely happy about it. Moreover, a more important judge (Hanban) did not want to move forward because it wanted to have a chance with a more prominent university. Even though the university proposed a lower funding, the project was stalled and then school finally lost interests.¹⁰

The Chinese government uses CIs to alter negative images of the American public towards China. In 2004, the U.S. established the first CI at the University of Maryland. Until 2015, the U.S. had the largest number of CIs (100) and CCs (356) in the world—with more than 220,000 students, a reflection of the booming demand for learning Chinese.¹¹ This rapid CI development shows the growing interest of young Americans in having an understanding of China.¹² In 2013, Diefeng Cao, the Director of CI Affairs Division II (American and Oceania), introduced a *Development Plan of Confucius Institute by 2015*. Key projects focus on the followings: 1) Setting up bases to cultivate teachers and a talent pool of volunteers. Universities will recruit more students majoring in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language. 2) Implementing the international Chinese

⁸ Interviewee 5.

⁹ Interviewee 7.

¹⁰ Interviewee 8.

¹¹ David Feith, "China's Beachhead in American Schools," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 26, 2014, <<http://online.wsj.com/articles/david-feith-chinas-beachhead-in-u-s-schools-1401124980>>(accessed February 1, 2015).

¹² Wen Xian, "Learning While Teaching - the Confucius Institute Win-Win," *People's Daily Online*, May 20, 2014, <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0520/c98649-8729640.html>>(accessed February 1, 2015).

language teaching material project. Hanban approaches universities to develop regionally based Chinese teaching materials in multiple languages. 3) Conducting Confucius China Study Plan. Hanban sponsors outstanding young scholars to visit China, to conduct research, or to pursue academic degrees. 4) Building model CIs. Hanban setups model CIs to play a model role in terms of expanding the number of students and improving the academic quality. 5) Providing more funding support. Hanban identifies multiple sources of fund raising, sets up a mechanism for funding CIs, and diversifies the sources of fundraising.¹³

The CI in the U.S. typically provides services of Chinese language teaching, understanding of Chinese culture, promoting business linkages, and providing scholarship relating to China study. The Institute is guided by an advisory board consisting of faculty and administrators from the U.S. university and its counterpart in China. The co-director and an administrator are provided by the Chinese university and serve as program coordinators as well as instructors. CI's operation relies on both China's funds and facilities provided by the host university. The university receives approximately \$150,000 (varies on case-by-case basis) for the initial five-year funding period. After that, Hanban will negotiate annual funding commitments on a year-to-year basis.¹⁴ The CI annually writes proposals for projects, and a board of faculty and administrators vets the proposals. One CI director said that the Institute sends an annual budget request to Hanban outlining the proposed projects; not once have Hanban officials raised any questions regarding the content of the programming proposed.¹⁵

¹³ Diefeng Cao, "Introduction to the Development Plan of Confucius Institute," September 9, 2013, [http://www.bing.com/search?q=Introduction+to+the+%E2%80%9C+Development+Plan+of+Confucius+Institute%E2%80%9D&src=IE-TopResult&FORM=IE11TR&conversationid=>\(accessed February 2, 2015\).](http://www.bing.com/search?q=Introduction+to+the+%E2%80%9C+Development+Plan+of+Confucius+Institute%E2%80%9D&src=IE-TopResult&FORM=IE11TR&conversationid=>(accessed February 2, 2015).)

¹⁴ "Proposal to establish a UWM Confucius Institute," [https://www.google.com.tw/#q=UWM+Confucius+Institute>\(accessed February 2, 2015\).](https://www.google.com.tw/#q=UWM+Confucius+Institute>(accessed February 2, 2015).)

¹⁵ Elizabeth Redden, "Confucius Says ...," *Inside Higher Ed*, July 24, 2014, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-uni>

4.2 Confucius Institutes' status in the United States

"A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education," written by Shuai Li, Richard Tucker, and Yanyin Zhang, conducted a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews from 2009 to 2010. Their findings show that the American CIs focus generally concentration on one of four areas: Chinese course offerings (95.83%), cultural events (83.33%), academic activities (70.83%), and teacher education (62.50%). Among the CIs that concentrated on Chinese language and cultural courses, 73.9% targeted K-12 students, 69.6% targeted university students, and 56.5% targeted the general public. Organizing cultural activities is another typical service area of the CIs. 70.8% organized various cultural events (e.g., festival celebration, and Chinese proficiency contest). 54.2% organized summer camps for learning and experiencing Chinese language and culture.¹⁶ Since China has vigorously promoted the cultural soft power in the U.S. through the CIs, examining programs of selective language Institutes is necessary.¹⁷

4.2.1 Local-oriented Confucius Institutes

Most CIs in the U.S. are local-oriented, aiming to meet the needs of local citizens and students. According to the geographic locations and well-established programs, the writer has chosen four CIs at State University of New York at Buffalo, University of Maryland, Michigan State University, and University of Kentucky. Their common goal is to provide an educational platform for locals to learn Chinese language and culture.

[versities>\(accessed March 28, 2016\).](#)

¹⁶ Shuai Li and Yanyin Zhang, "A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education," *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 2013), p. 36.

¹⁷ Peter Mattis, "Reexamining the Confucian Institutes," *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2012, [http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/\(accessed March 3, 2014\).](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/(accessed March 3, 2014).)

Confucius Institute at State University of New York at Buffalo (CISUNYB), launched in 2010, with its partner Capital Normal University, promotes the teaching of Chinese language and culture in western New York. The programs have expanded incrementally since its inception. Student enrollment has risen to 1,120, an increase of 755% since 2011. The classes are the Chinese for Elementary Ages, the Community Class for Adults Class, the two-week-long China Summer Camp, and a business Chinese class. The cultural activities are varied to provide locals with a better understanding of Chinese culture.¹⁸ Celebrations of the Chinese New Year and Moon Festival, featured music and dance performances by Chinese artists, have all become very popular events with thousands of attendants and were widely reported by the local news media.¹⁹ The CI has conducted a week-long Performance Tour of traditional music and dance in local schools since 2010.²⁰ In 2011, there were more than 3,000 students and educators attending the cultural event; audiences doubled to 6,000 in 2012.²¹ Since 2010, when the CI organized a nine-day Chinese Bridge for American Schools, local educators have conversations with Chinese educational leaders in Hanban and schools.²² Quite surprisingly the CISUNYB has established in just three short years. There are more groups from the business, government, and education sectors interested in doing business in China attending CI's courses.²³

Confucius Institute at University of Maryland (CIUM), established in 2004, was the first CI in the U.S. providing Chinese learning opportunities for a variety of organizations

¹⁸ Interviewee 9.

¹⁹ The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2012*, pp.8, 12.

²⁰ The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2010*, p.8.

²¹ The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2011*, p.12. The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2012*, pp.12-13.

²² The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2010*, p.16.

²³ The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2012*, pp.21-22.

in Washington, D.C. With its partner Nankai University, the CIUM is the most frequently covered CI.²⁴ Being the first to open an Institute has meant many challenges that the university had to face—process of obtaining visas for guest teachers, of establishing funding, and of maintaining exchange programs.²⁵ With Hanban's funds, the Institute was able to build the Center for Chinese Teacher Certification and Development, which offers master's degrees for students. The Institute also houses the largest HSK testing center in the U.S. Wallace Loh, president of the university, said, "Hanban and CI have done more to improve the visibility and positive image of China than almost anything else."²⁶ The CI has four teachers from China who are paid by Hanban and provide classes for students. Two interns teach a weekend class. Since its establishment, the number of students has risen from about 20 to 200.²⁷ The CIUM offers various language courses ranging from beginner to advance.²⁸ Cultural courses cover dance, calligraphy, martial art, and craft-making.²⁹ In 2013, the Institute had a 40% jump in the number of K-12 students, hosted more than 40 different lectures and activities with increased attendance, and created new centers across Maryland, and recruited teachers. The Institute

²⁴ Gregory Lee, Michael Hill, Zha Daojiong, Stephen Hanson, Mary Gallanger, Marshall Sahlins, "The Debate Over Confucius Institutes PART II," *China File Conversation*, July 1, 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes-part-ii>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

²⁵ "First Confucius Institute in the U.S.," *Inside Confucius*, April 23, 2013, <http://wkujournalism.com/insideconfucius/?p=534>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

²⁶ Cindy Liu, May Zhou, Zhang Fan, Cai Chunying, and Liu Chang, "A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas," http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed December 1, 2015).

²⁷ Peter Schmidt, "At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries About Academic Freedom," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 17, 2010, http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/Events-News/Article-Detail.php?art_uid=2433>(accessed March 3, 2014).

²⁸ For examples, Beginner I courses are geared to students with no prior study of the language. Beginner II courses are designed for students with the equivalent of one semester college Chinese. Intermediate classes focus on reading and writing skills. Intermediate Business Chinese course prepares the student for international business interactions. Advanced courses focus on newspaper reading skills, business contexts, and translation skills. See "Chinese Language Courses," *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website*, <http://www.international.umd.edu/cim/246>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

²⁹ "University of Maryland – The Confucius Institute at Maryland (CIM)," *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website*, <http://college-park.cylex-usa.com/company/university-of-maryland---the-confucius-institute-at-maryland-cim-18231912.html>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

has been recognized as a test development model for North America.³⁰ It has also closely cooperated with the World Bank and the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. to co-host conferences, symposiums, performances, lectures, and activities on Chinese culture.³¹ Due to its advantage of geographic location to the U.S. capital, the Institute has held lectures regarding U.S.-China relations by inviting U.S. officials from the State Department and the PRC's senior diplomats.³² These academic and cultural activities provide participants with a better understanding of the soft side of China's foreign policy so that CIs could promote China's peaceful development agenda.

The CI at Michigan State University (CIMSU) (established in 2006), with cooperation from the Open University of China (OUC) has made significant progress on its language courses and cultural programs. The Institute relies on the advanced educational concepts adopted by the Michigan University.³³ The purpose is to promote language and culture learning by drawing on advanced information technology.³⁴ Chinese teaching courses are wide-ranging such as Online Chinese Courses (the world's first online CI).³⁵ The "shop-factory" style operation makes it unique among CIs. In this

³⁰ "Loh Attends Confucius Institute Meetings in China," December 11, 2013, *University of Maryland Website*, <http://www.umdrihtnow.umd.edu/news/loh-attends-confucius-institute-meetings-china>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

³¹ "Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland," *Hanban Website*, http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_8399.htm>(accessed March 3, 2014). To name just as few: Conference for Teachers of Chinese Language; Washington D.C. Area International Chinese Language Education Symposium; China Disabled People's Performing Art Troupe; and Chinese Spring Festival Gala. On April 12, 2014, the CIUM hosted the 13th annual regional Chinese Bridge Language Competition, "My Chinese Dream," where 10 students competed for the chance to visit China for the next stages of global competition. Please see "13th Chinese Bridge Chinese Language Competition, Confucius Institute at Maryland," <http://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institute-maryland/13th-chinese-bridge-chinese-language-competition>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

³² Such as Under Secretary Judith McHale, Assistant Deputy Secretary Jennifer Park Stout, and the PRC Ambassador Wu Jianmin. Please see "New," *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website*, <http://www.international.umd.edu/cim/5092>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

³³ Helen Hu, "Controversial Confucius Institute Promotes Understanding of Chinese Culture," *Diverse*, December 25, 2012, <http://diverseeducation.com/article/50223/>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

³⁴ "Confucius Institute at Michigan State University," *Confucius Institute at Michigan State University Website*, <http://en.crtvu.edu.cn/confucius-institute>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

³⁵ The multimedia and web-based learning resources developed by the Institute are as follows: 1) Chinese

partnership, the American side is the “shop,” responsible for operations and market promotion. Its Chinese counterpart, the OUC, is the “factory,” which uses its strengths in domestic teaching and human resources.³⁶ The CIMSU sponsors many cultural activities; one of the examples is Language and Culture Summer Camps. Through the camps, students increase their multi-cultural competence by engaging in interactive and educational activities. Students also have the opportunity to engage in diverse activities and use specialized learning materials which are tailored for each group level.³⁷ The CIMSU is taking a multi-level approach to teaching Chinese such as developing special materials especially multi-media materials providing teachers for various levels. The CI has been able to develop a teacher certification and Masters’ program so that it can have Chinese teachers come to the U.S. with their credentials recognized.³⁸ Due to its achievement with language courses, and the invention of multimedia and web-based learning, the CIMSU has been awarded as the CI of the Year in 2007, 2008, and 2009.³⁹

Established in 2010, the CI at the University of Kentucky (CIUK) is a major center for Chinese language, culture, art, and business in the state of Kentucky. The Institute serves as the conduit for the University of Kentucky’s China initiatives, facilitating a wide range of China exchange programs.⁴⁰ The Institute works to strengthen China studies

Your Way: The teaching material has been divided into 6 levels (1A/1B for first grade high school students; 2A/2B for the second grade; and 3A/3B for the third grade). The online course adopts Chinese Your Way as the textbook that won the title of Excellent Teaching Material in 2008. 2) Chinese Cultural Appreciation Materials: The materials are designed to be used independently for Chinese culture appreciation. 3) Chinese Mini Stories: The stories are featured with traditional Chinese cultural values, such as filial piety and harmony. There are around 39 pieces of courseware that have been developed. Please see “The Confucius Institute at Michigan State University,” <http://en.crtvu.edu.cn/confucius-institute/> (accessed April 3, 2015).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ “Language and Culture Summer Camp,” *Confucius Institute at Michigan State University Website*, <http://www.experiencechinese.com/index.php/programs/summer-camp/> (accessed April 3, 2015).

³⁸ Zhao Pingping, “Interview with Nancy Romig, the senior project director at CI of MSU,” *CRIENGLISH.com*, August 3, 2009, <http://english.cri.cn/7106/2009/08/03/102s506143.htm> (accessed April 3, 2015).

³⁹ “Confucius Institute at Michigan State University,” *Confucius Institute at Michigan State University Website*, http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_8391.htm (accessed April 3, 2015).

⁴⁰ “About the Confucius Institute at UK,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky Website*, <http://www.uky.edu/international/About%20the%20Confucius%20Institute%20at%20UK> (accessed April 3, 2015).

within the university, while providing leadership for language programs in Kentucky's K-12 classrooms, and forging community relationships through Chinese cultural outreach to people. The courses aim at improving students' language capabilities so that they may gain a deeper understanding of China.⁴¹ The Institute sent out instructors to public schools and helped to jumpstart a Chinese program, granting more than 2,000 students the opportunity to study the language.⁴² The CIUK offers various Chinese, business, and culture courses.⁴³ Business Chinese is designed for improving basic language skill as well as the professional ability. The cultural classes provide teachings on Tai Chi and Chinese calligraphy. Cultural events include New Year celebration, Culture Night, and photo competition.⁴⁴ The CIUK was named the 2012 CI of the Year. Huajing Maske, director of the CI, said "The award is not only an acknowledgment of our excellence in the past years, but most important, it will bring in more program funding and resources."⁴⁵ In 2013, the CIUK supported 29 UK faculty members' travel to China to teach at Shanghai University. Ernest Yanarella, chair of the Department of Political Science, said that teaching in China proved to be an opportunity for an American teacher to engage in a real dialogue with China's future leaders. History professor Phil Harling

[April 13, 2015\).](#)

⁴¹ Sarah Geegan, "UK's Confucius Institute Sends 29 Professors to China; Program Promotes China Literacy," *KyForward*, August 14, 2013,

<http://www.kyforward.com/our-universities/2013/08/14/uks-confucius-institute-sends-29-professors-to-china-program-promotes-china-literacy/>>(accessed April 13, 2015).

⁴² Geegan, "UKCI Named 2012 Confucius Institute of the Year,"

http://www.uky.edu/international/CI_of_the_Year>(accessed April 13, 2015).

⁴³ 1A course focuses on the basic use of the language. 1B focuses on the practical use of the language. 2A course introduces more Chinese culture and art in order to help students to prepare for real-life experiences in China. 2B is a second-semester course in intermediate Chinese language. 3A is a first-semester course in advanced Chinese language that is designed for students who have been learning Chinese for about 2 years. 3B is a second-semester course in advanced Chinese language. Please see "Chinese language courses," *Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky Website*,

http://www.uky.edu/international/language_courses>(accessed April 13, 2015).

⁴⁴ "Annual Events & Activities," *Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky Website*,

http://www.uky.edu/international/annual_events>(accessed April 13, 2015).

⁴⁵ Olivia Jones, "UK Confucius Institute recognized internationally," *Kentucky kernel Campus News*, January 16, 2013,

<http://kykernel.com/2013/01/16/uk-confucius-institute-recognized-internationally/>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

said the experience left him much more optimistic about the future of the U.S.-China relationship.⁴⁶

The local-oriented CIs have offered an educational platform for locals with various language and cultural courses. These Institutes also provide various cultural activities, lectures on Chinese-related topics, and seminars for the business community. Since some CIs are the only institute in the state, they have become the major center for learning Chinese language and business. The CIs also provide opportunities for American teachers to teach at Chinese universities, giving them positive feelings of the future U.S.-China relationship.

4.2.3 Cultural oriented Confucius Institutes

Unlike most CIs in the U.S., which put their emphasis on Chinese language teaching, there are three unique CIs at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville, the University of Michigan, and Wayne State University, whose programs stress mainly appreciation of Chinese arts.

The CI at University of Wisconsin-Platteville (CIUWP) is a collaborative project among UWP, Hanban, and South-Central University in China. Their focuses of language courses and cultural programs include providing language courses for community members and students; offering lectures on Chinese culture and business; hosting Chinese cultural events; and advising individuals who wish to study, travel, or do business in China.⁴⁷ The CIUWP has a strong cultural program. The celebration of festivals is organized annually. Lectures and presentations on culture have introduced Chinese customs and folk culture. The CI was invited by communities to present China's

⁴⁶ Geegan, "UK's Confucius Institute Sends 29 Professors to China; Program Promotes China Literacy," *KyForward*,
<http://www.kyforward.com/our-universities/2013/08/14/uks-confucius-institute-sends-29-professors-to-china-program-promotes-china-literacy/> (accessed April 13, 2015).

⁴⁷ Interviewee 10.

multicultural heritage, including calligraphy, folk dance, and knot-tying.⁴⁸ In April 2013, the CI hosted its five-year anniversary celebration event; and South-Central University sent groups in its honor to the event. The two universities finalized a plan on sustainability of the exchange programs and the further cooperation in various areas, including the exchange of students and professors and the training of the administrators. As a tribute to the anniversary celebration, Chinese language had been approved as a credit course.⁴⁹

The CI at University of Michigan (CIUM) is unique because its central mission is to promote understanding of Chinese arts.⁵⁰ The Institute has one of the most lucrative deals among public universities for its CI specializing in performing arts. Hanban agreed to give \$250,000 annually from 2009 to 2014, Chinese musical instruments and artifacts, and funding for two staff members to organize arts programs.⁵¹ Since a China Culture Learning Center was established in 2010, the Institute has been able to promote its resources for Chinese culture and language learning among communities in southeast Michigan, with over 3,000 people visiting the Center. The CIUM presents a diversity of Chinese artistic activities, which include performances of music and exhibitions of paintings, calligraphy and other visual art forms by artists.⁵² The Institute has presented a series of gourmet cooking classes to undergraduates that attracted many students. The Institute has sponsored a credit-giving performance class on playing Chinese music instruments. Enrollment for the class has been steadily increasing. At the end of the academic terms, the students play in a semi-public concert. Because of its diverse art programs, the Institute has become the Chinese culture center in the state of Michigan.

⁴⁸ "The CI at UW-Platteville Newsletter 2010," *UW-Platteville CI Newsletter*, January-June 2013.

⁴⁹ "University of Wisconsin-Platteville Confucius Institute Newsletter," January-June 2013.

⁵⁰ Interviewee 3.

⁵¹ "China and the University of Michigan," *Confucius Institute at University of Michigan Website*, <<http://www.confucius.umich.edu/about/china>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

⁵² Interviewee 3.

Confucius Institute at Wayne State University (CIWSU) promotes Chinese language and culture to K-12 schools and the university community in the southeastern Michigan. In April 2006, President Irvin Reid led a delegation of Wayne State University to Shanghai and Beijing to meet with Chinese university and governmental officials from the Ministry of Education and Hanban. Dean Thomas explored the possibility of establishing a CI at Wayne State University. A proposal to establish one was submitted by him to the Consul for Education at the Consulate General of the PRC in Chicago in July 2006. In September, Hanban accepted the proposal.⁵³ Established in January 2008, the CIWSU, with the support of Hanban and Huazhong University of Science and Technology, provides a multitude of programs and resources. The Institute's mission is to enhance inter-cultural understanding of students and faculty at Wayne State University and residents of the Detroit community.⁵⁴ The K-12 outreach program provides volunteers from Wayne State University to make visits to southeastern Michigan schools. Volunteers help teach basic aspects of Chinese language and culture. Teachers may fill out a request form to indicate performance types and times.⁵⁵

The culture oriented CIs emphasize introducing Chinese art and customs. Groups are often invited by local communities and schools to present Chinese multicultural performance and to sponsor a wide array of cultural programs, including outreach events, class demonstrations, and workshops. The CIs' students are also actively performing art skills at the campus and in communities providing locals with opportunities to appreciate Chinese culture.

4.2.4 Research-oriented CIs

⁵³ "Background & History," *Confucius Institute at Wayne State University Website*, <http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/BackgroundHistory> (accessed May 1, 2015).

⁵⁴ Interviewee 11.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Given their distinguished faculty and rich academic resources, there are two CIs at prestigious universities (Stanford University and University of Chicago) that stand out as research-oriented language institutes in the U.S.

CI at Stanford University (CISU) was established in 2009 with a handsome \$4 million from Hanban.⁵⁶ Beijing was willing to treat Stanford generously because it was keen to use the world top-tier university for its own larger purposes,⁵⁷ such as improving Chinese universities' academic and research capability. Richard Saller, dean of Humanities and Sciences, said he was approached by Hanban about establishing a CI after Sun Chaofeng, professor of East Asian Languages and Cultures, made the initial introduction. Although there was no major stumbling block during the process, it took three years to establish a partnership between Stanford and Peking University and Hanban. Saller said, "We help our students to understand Chinese literature, history and culture." Professors Wang Ban, chair of the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures housing the CI, was involved at the initial stage of setting up the CI. Wang said the Institute raises the profile of Stanford as a significant player in academic communication with China. However, Stanford's CI does come under some criticism. Critics presume that the Institute is funded and is thus controlled by Beijing. Wang defended CI by saying, "The CI is funded by an endowment, half of which comes from the Hewlett Foundation, with no strings attached. Stanford faculty and administrators make decisions for CI programs."⁵⁸ The CISU supports teaching and research relating to Chinese language,

⁵⁶ \$1 million for conferences and other programs, \$1 million for two graduate fellowships, and \$2 million for a CI professorship in sinology, please see Elizabeth Redden, "Chinese-funded institutes raise concerns on U.S. campuses," *Inside Higher Education*, January 4, 2012, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/story/2012-01-04/chinese-funded-institutes-us-colleges/52378280/1>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

⁵⁷ Marshall Sahlins, "China U.," *The Nation*, October 29, 2013, <http://www.thenation.com/print/article/176888/china-u-2013/11/3>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

⁵⁸ Qidong Zhang, "Stanford dean: Builds bridges with CI," *China Daily*, April 4, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm>(accessed June 23, 2015).

literature, and culture by holding lectures and workshops⁵⁹ such as linguistics, literature, drama, etc.⁶⁰ Faculties have a distinguished publication record in the intellectual history, cultural studies, and literary traditions in Chinese history (such records are required in teaching and advising in literary theory, classical poetry, and classical Chinese). The Institute also assists the language program in the summer, in particular the five weeks the students spent at Peking University.⁶¹ The Institute aims to broaden the study of Chinese language and culture and to train more students based on its rich academic resources, research capability, and well-qualified faculty.⁶²

Founded as a research-oriented CI, the University of Chicago (CIUC) promotes language teaching and supports a broad program of research on China's topics. The CIUC was inaugurated in 2010; Renmin University was designated as the collaborating academic institution in China. The Institute complements the substantial resources supporting the work of the Chicago faculty and students interested in China. In addition it helps reinforce the University's role as a leading research center in the world on issues related to China.⁶³ The origin of the CIUC is identified with Professor Dali Yang, who ushered the proposal through negotiations with Chinese officials, Chicago administrators, and faculty colleagues. The university was awarded by Hanban not only research proposals concerned with Chinese economic development but also an annual University

⁵⁹ "Confucius Institute Founded," http://ceas.stanford.edu/docs/horizons/HORIZONS_2010.pdf (accessed June 23, 2015). Pui Shiau, *The Confucius Institute at Stanford University Web site*, January 10, 2013, <http://oia.stanford.edu/node/14779> (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁶⁰ "Events Archive," *The Confucius Institute at Stanford University Web site*, http://www.stanford.edu/dept/asianlang/cgi-bin/confucius_institute/events_archive.php?ay=2010-2011 (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁶¹ "Center for East Asian Studies 2010 HORIZONS," *The Confucius Institute at Stanford University Web site*, http://ceas.stanford.edu/docs/horizons/HORIZONS_2010.pdf (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁶² Pui Shiau, "The Confucius Institute at Stanford University," <http://oia.stanford.edu/node/14779> (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁶³ "About Us," *Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago Website*, <http://confuciusinstitute.uchicago.edu/about-us> (accessed June 23, 2015).

of Chicago–Renmin Symposium.⁶⁴ In 2010, 174 Chicago faculty members, however, signed a petition protesting the administration’s ill-advised acceptance of a CI without the consent of a governing body that properly represented them. Dali Yang responded that the executive committee of the Center for East Asian Studies had discussed the CI in the year leading up to its founding. The university controls the hiring of teachers from China and is engaged in the hiring process, not just a right of refusal. However, the director of the Chinese-language program at the university, who engages the Hanban teachers, had a different view of the process. The director responded, “We don’t choose. They recommend, and we accept.”⁶⁵ The CIUC has held many cultural and diplomatic activities. For example, the Institute celebrated the Chinese New Year by hosting a concert that featured traditional Chinese music to be performed by award-winning professional musicians from China. The CIUC celebrates Lantern Festival that features singers, dancers, a martial artist, and musicians trained in classical Chinese instruments. Diplomatic activities are also held a forum titled “Chinese Foreign Policy after the 18th CPC Congress and US-China Relations.” Three former Chinese ambassadors shared their thoughts on the changes and challenges of Chinese foreign policy and told their personal stories of being in the forefront of Chinese foreign policy decision-making.⁶⁶

Research-oriented CIs are mainly hosted at prestigious universities, reinforcing the university’s role as a leading research center on Chinese studies. These universities are under criticism because funds provided by Chinese government might violate academic autonomy. However, responses emphasized that these funds had no strings attached.

⁶⁴ Marshall Sahlins, “China U.,” *The Nation*, October 29, 2013, <http://www.thenation.com/print/article/176888/china-u-2013/11/3>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ “CIUC Holds Forum Discussing Chinese Foreign Policy and US-China Relations,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago Website*, <http://confuciusinstitute.uchicago.edu/ciuc-holds-forum-discussing-chinese-foreign-policy-and-us-china-relations>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

4.2.5 Teacher training Confucius Institutes

There are three CIs in the University of Minnesota, San Diego State University, and Chicago focusing on teacher training and assisting local schools with the development of Chinese language programs.

Confucius Institute at the University of Minnesota (CIUM) was established on September 19, 2008, with Chinese partner institution Capital Normal University. The Institute has a strong teacher-training program. The institute supports teachers by offering professional development and networking.⁶⁷ For the fifth consecutive year, the CI was awarded the STARTALK grant to offer teacher-training programming. Further, the CI created the “Cultural Access Mini-Grant” fund, offering teachers up to \$1,000 to enhance Chinese language and culture learning. The quality of instruction is high. Most of instructors are doctoral or master’s of education candidates at the University of Minnesota.⁶⁸ The CIUM, with 11 Minnesota Confucius Classrooms, has offered courses for adults and children in Chinese language and culture.⁶⁹ Student enrollment at language classes grew from 55 students in 2010-2011 to 82 students in 2011-2012. The CIUM is the only official test center in Minnesota for the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) and Youth Chinese Test (YCT) Chinese proficiency tests. The CIUM has offered several learning opportunities for children such as day camps and evening classes to read books, play games, and make crafts.⁷⁰ Hanban honored the CIUM with a 2011 “Confucius Institute of the Year” award.

By offering both on-site and online classes, while also utilizing the advanced

⁶⁷ Interviewee 2.

⁶⁸ “Annual Minnesota Chinese Language Teachers Conference,”
http://confucius.umn.edu/teachers/pd/annual_teacher_mtg/index.html (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁶⁹ Interviewee 2.

⁷⁰ “Confucius Institute University of Minnesota, 2011-2012 Annual Report: Promoting the study of Chinese language and culture throughout Minnesota,”
http://confucius.umn.edu/about/annual_reports/2011-12_CIUMN_report.pdf (accessed July 7, 2015).

language teaching pedagogy and technology, the Confucius Institute at San Diego State University (CISDSU) aims to establish a central environment for Chinese language teachers training in the region. The goals include to offer teacher-training and to provide a pool of qualified Chinese language teachers; to assist local schools with the development of Chinese language programs; to provide a series of seminars and courses in language and culture with San Diego Chinese Historical Museum and local arts and cultural communities; to provide a series of seminars and workshops in economic and market updates for business executives; and to provide information and consultation services for people who are interested in conducting cultural and business activities with China.⁷¹ Given that the CISDSU aims to establish a platform for teachers training in the region, the Institute has conducted several teachers' workshops.⁷² For examples, on April 17, 2013, managing director of CISDSU, Lilly Cheng, held a Chinese teachers' workshop for the faculty and staff at Riverview Elementary and International Academy, one of the Confucius Classroom schools affiliated with the CISDSU. The entire Chinese language faculty from the school attended the workshop. On January 20, 2013, the CI held a Chinese teacher training workshop for teachers from 16 Confucius Classroom schools from San Diego and neighboring counties. Professor Benjamin Tsou from Hong Kong Education College Corpus Linguistics Center lectured on "Large-scale monitoring Chinese corpus creation-Method and application." On February 23, 2013, Daming Li, a *World Journal* reporter to San Diego, gave a speech on the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, elaborating the origin of the dispute, and listing the reasons for Chinese ownership of the islands.⁷³

⁷¹ "Confucius Institute at San Diego State University," *Confucius Institute at San Diego State University Website*, <http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_8349.htm>(accessed July 7, 2015).

⁷² "New," *Confucius Institute at San Diego State University Website*, <<http://confucius.sdsu.edu/news.html>>(accessed July 7, 2015).

⁷³ Ibid.

The CI in Chicago (CIC), opened in 2006, is a partnership between Chicago Public Schools, Hanban, and Shanghai's East China Normal University. It is the only CI in the U.S. housed in a K-12 school—a school within a school. The CIC has been awarded the CI of the Year for four consecutive years from 2007 to 2010 and Director of the Year in 2011. PRC's President Hu Jintao visited CIC in 2011 during his state visit to the U.S. The CIC is an educational resource for educators and students in Chicago on the teaching of the Chinese language and culture. In addition to being a professional development center, the CIC is a resource library with more than 10,000 print and multimedia materials. The Institute is open to the general public with following services and courses: Coordination of the Chicago Public Schools Chinese World Language Program (housed at 43 schools in Chicago with 13,000 students); professional development programs and workshops for K-12 Chinese World Language teachers; various Chinese language courses for adults; Chinese culture and history courses and workshops for adults; resource center for the teaching of Chinese language and culture; coordination of study programs for teachers and students in China; and pre-travel cultural orientation seminars for the business, diplomatic and educational communities.⁷⁴

Established on May 16, 2007, the CI at Portland State University (CIPSU) aims to promote U.S.-China educational cooperation and to develop academic exchanges with its partner school Soochow University. The Institute supports community outreach of language programs; offers short-term courses in cultural awareness and language training programs for primary and secondary teachers in Oregon; hosts language proficiency tests; and organizes summer camps and school principals to visit China.⁷⁵ The CIPSU has played a pivotal role in the two Oregon legislative bills that were passed in 2010 for

⁷⁴ Interviewee 12.

⁷⁵ "Confucius Institute at Portland State University," *Confucius Institute at Portland State University Website*, [http://www.google.com.tw/?gws_rd=cr&ei=xKsqUuWYBIXSkwWKwoHwBg#q=The+Confucius+Institute+at+Portland+State+University+\(CI-PSU\)>](http://www.google.com.tw/?gws_rd=cr&ei=xKsqUuWYBIXSkwWKwoHwBg#q=The+Confucius+Institute+at+Portland+State+University+(CI-PSU)>) (accessed July 7, 2015).

promoting Chinese language and cultural education in all Oregon schools that makes Oregon the first state that guarantees Chinese language education in the K-12 public schools. The CIPSU, which offers Chinese to adults and K-12 students, includes Chinese listening, speaking, reading, writing, news, travel & business, etc. The Institute has sponsored more than 100 Chinese culture-related lecture series and cultural activities. The CIPSU is the first CI in the U.S. developing Chinese teaching materials. The first language textbook series *Easy Express Chinese/ECC* was released in 2009 by Peking University Press. It is the first textbook for all CIs' students in English-speaking countries.⁷⁶ The CIPSU has held several conferences, seminars, forums, and cultural events, including the Chinese Teaching Conference for all CIs in the U.S. and Canada in 2009; photo exhibition of the 30th Anniversary of the U.S.-China Diplomatic Relations in 2009; Oregon-China Investment and Trade Conference in 2010; and forums on Heritage Chinese Education and China's Economic Shift in 2011.⁷⁷ Due to its efforts, the CIPSU has made much improvement in upgrading its educational program; it won 2013 CIs of the Year; and its achievements have been frequently covered by the media.

The mission of these CIs emphasizes teaching, training, and assisting local schools with the development of language programs in order to provide a pool of qualified teachers. They have conducted several teachers' workshops and have made significant improvement in enhancing their educational program.

The majority of CIs focus on language teaching and public outreach. The CIs are new cultural terrains that incorporate Chinese language and culture into U.S. higher education settings. CIs shift away from an older language of identity politics to a seemingly apoliticized approach to language that emphasizes culture.⁷⁸ Chinese

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Stambach, "Confucius Institute Programming in the United States: Language Ideology, Hegemony, and

educational policy in the U.S. represents the soft diplomatic arm. However, to see CIs solely as China's contemporary soft power is to overlook the fact that CIs operate in a manner that involves both host institutions and the Hanban, including political and economic interests of U.S. university leaders who attract and secure CI funding.⁷⁹ Analysis of CIs in the U.S. shows how language and education are intertwined in a manner that blends activities with diverse ideas about people, places, and history.⁸⁰

4.3 Summary

Ever since the first CI in the U.S. was launched at the University of Maryland, the CI's development has "taken off" because of the influx of Hanban's resources.⁸¹ Other factors for booming CIs include both the universities and the CIs share a goal—to provide a platform for students to learn more about China; Chinese guest teachers are a major benefit to U.S. CIs and universities because these teachers have the ample knowledge about China; and Hanban provides the free textbooks and teaching materials.⁸² In addition to briefly introducing the background and mission of these CIs, the previous chapter also explored their language programs and cultural activities. The writer concludes with the following findings.

1) Meeting the needs of local citizens and students. In reviewing the language courses and cultural activities provided by the aforementioned CIs, the reason for the creation of these courses and activities is clear: to meet the demands of locals for better Chinese language and cultural understanding. More than half of the CI students in the U.S. are children brought by their highly motivated parents. They believe that if their children

the Making of Chinese Culture in University Classes," p. 67.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 66–67.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 68.

⁸¹ Redden, "Confucius Says,"

<http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities> (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁸² Zhou, *School-University Partnership in Teaching the Mandarin Chinese Language: The Confucius Institute Experience*.

could learn Chinese language and culture at early age, it might better equip them to become more competitive in future careers related to China.

2) Promoting university's prestige through its specific academic strength. Some U.S. universities set up CIs primarily based on their distinctive academic expertise. For example, the CIs at top-tier universities such as Stanford University and University of Chicago place their focus on their program of research because of their rich research resources and capable faculties. At San Diego State University and Binghamton University, these institutes have a strong teachers-training program and sound cultural program, respectively; hence, they established their CIs according to their own strength. With their academic expertise and qualified teachers from China, these universities can better promote their prestige.

3) Forging a better U.S.-China relationship. The CIs in the U.S. share a common goal—that is to promote China's cultural soft power. The relationships between the development of language education and the partnership with the CI are complementary and cooperative in nature because the universities would not be able to establish Chinese programs without the resources (finance, teachers, Chinese artists, teaching materials, etc.) from Hanban. As stated, most students in the CI are college students and children. Through language learning and cultural sharing, these students will nurture a better understanding of China because introducing positive culture could influence the positions of other countries to meet its expectation. As these American students grow into their adulthood, they might have a more favorable image toward China that would forge a better U.S.-China relation in the future.

4) Diversifying language and cultural programs. Each CI has its own unique feature. The programs are varied, particularly those of CIs which have been established for a longer period of time (experience) and located in affluent areas (sufficient income from

stable students' enrollment). One can expect that with the passage of time, the language courses and cultural programs of the CIs in the U.S. will become more creative in order to meet needs of students and participants from all walks of life.

The opportunities and challenges that the American CIs face in promoting Chinese language and culture education are as follows:⁸³ 1) K-12 Chinese education holds great potential for future development. The CIs were found to have adopted localized strategies to promote Chinese teaching at the K-12 level. While Chinese language teaching at the K-12 level constitutes an opportunity for development, it may also put more pressure on the localization of qualified Chinese teachers. 2) The enrollment growth seems to outpace the development of the CI's capacity to provide teachers with supporting staff. The shortage of qualified teachers also motivates some CIs to find creative ways to address this challenge. Given the considerable regional differences (e.g., actual need in Chinese language and cultural education, availability of local resources) and the possible limitation in Hanban's capacity (e.g., financial, human resources) in supporting the fast-growing CI network, localization would be an advisable strategy to sustain the CI network and its development. 3) The CIs in the U.S. offers a range of programs that contributed to Chinese language and cultural education, particularly in the areas of language teaching, teacher education, and cultural events. Among these areas, K-12 Chinese teaching and teacher education hold great promise for future development. On the other hand, teaching material development, language assessment, and program development and evaluation are areas that need to be further developed. The CIs in the U.S. generally take a "localization" strategy to involve local communities in decision-making, program implementation, and performance evaluation.

⁸³ Li and Zhang, "A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education."

Interest in Chinese language has been growing in the U.S. because of China's increased wealth and rising global influence. The quick rise of CIs is in response to the Chinese language craze of American students. Most of the CIs focus on language and cultural teaching and public outreach, serving as a vehicle of showcasing China's cultural soft power and contributing a benign image of China.



Chapter V Views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States

China is a recognized major power, creating both goodwill and anxiety for the world. According to a 2013 Pew survey, China was viewed favorably in 19 of 38 nations.¹ Recognizing China's superior economic performance, Americans hold a blend of positive and negative views towards China's rise. Much of Americans, however, thinking that China is dodging international responsibility, holds pessimistic views on the prospects of Chinese democracy.² The American media coverage on China has focused on negative issues such as censorship and human rights abuses. Positive trends such as China's growing economy have been framed in a pessimistic manner by indicating how China's growth might harm the U.S. economy.³

The Confucius Institutes (CIs) serve as China's cultural soft power charm to those Americans who are coming to appreciate Chinese culture and language. The CIs, however, have been to other Americans a source of controversy that stems from the institutes' receiving financial, administrative, and political support from Beijing. The critics' concern is that the CIs' presence on campuses would interfere with academic freedom.⁴ The admirers claim the CIs contribute to the general good by facilitating the teaching of

¹ China garners its highest ratings in Africa, South America, and Muslim Asian nations (Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia). However, China is seen less positively in much of Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Please see "Global Image of the United States and China," *Pew Research Center*, July 18, 2013, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/global-image-of-the-united-states-and-china/> (accessed January 2, 2016).

² John Aldrich, Kang Liu, Jie Lu, "How Do Americans View the Rising China?" *Journal of Contemporary China* (17 Sep 2014), pp. 8-9.

³ Lars Willnat, Emily T. Metzgar, and Ernie Pyle Hall, "American Perceptions of China and the Chinese: Do the Media Matter?" *The 65th Annual Meeting of the World Association for Public Opinion Research*, Hong Kong (June 2012), p.18.

⁴ Shryll Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives* (South Orange: Seton Hall University Master Thesis, 2013), p.1.

the Chinese language;⁵ knowledge and skill gained at a CI will equip students to be more employable.⁶ Many U.S. universities agree to host CIs because of the financial incentives. Without Hanban's assistance, some institutions might not have the funding to start their Chinese language programs.⁷ American academics and journalists have debated various aspects of the CI. Since domestic public opinion is the driving force in crafting U.S. foreign policy, how CI projects are perceived in the U.S. will determine how successful Chinese soft power will be. If mass media and scholars frame the CIs favorably, these language institutes will be an important asset to Chinese foreign policy.⁸ The section below examines how the mass media, CI personnel, scholars, and general public view CIs in the U.S.

5.1 The Confucius Institutes' reception in the United States

The CIs serve as China's major soft power drive to increase the number of foreigners coming to admire Chinese culture. Chinese top leaders praised the CI program for its important role in enhancing understanding and friendship across the world.⁹ The self-praise atmosphere, however, is clouded by increasing criticism.¹⁰ The CIs in the U.S. are considered with an uncertain degree of ambivalence. They are attractive to universities seeking engagement with China but also viewed as a potential threat to

⁵ Christopher R. Hughes, "Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (2015), p. 45.

⁶ Chen, Jia, "US Confucius Institutes gather," *China Daily*, September 30, 2013, p.1.

⁷ When then-Senator Richard Lugar asked then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton why the U.S. did not open more centers in China to emulate the work of the CIs, Clinton responded, "We don't have that kind of money in the budget." See Mike Gonzalez, "China's Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC," *The Heritage Foundation*, Background #2986 on Asia and the Pacific, February 5, 2015, <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/chinas-public-opinion-warfare-how-our-culture-industry-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-prc>> (accessed January 2, 2016).

⁸ Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p.1.

⁹ Shannon Tiezzi, "The Future of China's Confucius Institutes," *The Diplomat*, September 30, 2014, <<http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-future-of-chinas-confucius-institutes/>> (accessed January 2, 2016).

¹⁰ Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, "A Spoiled Anniversary: China Reacts to Confucius Institute Controversy," *China Brief*, Vol.14, Issue 19 (October 10, 2014), p.1.

academic freedom.¹¹ Tensions surfaced with a series of incidents starting in 2012. In March at that year, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee held a hearing on Chinese propaganda efforts (including CIs) in the U.S.¹² An amendment of the working visa policy issued by the State Department on May 24 stated that any faculty working in a university through a J-1 visa who teaches students of elementary or secondary school is violating visa rules. If enacted, 51 CIs teachers would have to leave the U.S. by June 30. Chinese media characterized the U.S. directive as a sudden attack on CIs. The State Department backtracked, claiming the move was an administrative error, and promised that no Chinese teacher would be forced to leave the U.S.¹³ The House Committee held another hearing in December 2014 on whether academic freedom is threatened by China's influence, with the CI receiving particular attention.¹⁴ The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) called for universities to cease their involvement in the CIs. Several universities have stepped away from their affiliation with the CIs. For example, the University of Chicago suspended negotiations for the renewal of the CI, and Pennsylvania State University announced it would end cooperation with the CI.¹⁵ The CI has seemingly become another source of friction in U.S.-China relations.¹⁶

The American CIs have triggered a round of debates and have been under scrutiny as many academics argue that Beijing-funded institutes wind up restricting academic freedom at their host universities.¹⁷ There have also been allegations of CIs monitoring

¹¹ Wang Danping and Bob Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," *The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2014), p. 225.

¹² Falk Hartig, "Confucius Institutes – Quo Vadis?" *The Diplomat*, December 21, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/confucius-institutes-quo-vadis/> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

¹³ Wang Danping and Bob Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," p. 226.

¹⁴ Falk Hartig, "Confucius Institutes – Quo Vadis?" <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/confucius-institutes-quo-vadis/> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

¹⁵ Beauchamp-Mustafaga, "A Spoiled Anniversary: China Reacts to Confucius Institute Controversy," p. 2.

¹⁶ Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," p. 226.

¹⁷ Shannon, "The Future of China's Confucius Institutes," <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-future-of-chinas-confucius-institutes/> (accessed January 2, 2016).

Chinese students abroad and attempting to advance China's political agenda.¹⁸ Some supporters, however, say that CIs could help increase cultural exchange and better understanding of two major powers. The following further illustrates positive and responses towards the CIs in the U.S.

5.1.1 Positive views

The reason for the CI's growth is the rising demand for Chinese language learning, reflecting the glowing promise of the Chinese economy. In the U.S., Chinese has emerged as a must-have language. Hanban provides lucrative incentives to the host institution such as start-up costs, annual payments over a five-year period, and teachers' salaries. Other incentives include students' tours to China; funding research on China; dining with university presidents on visits to China; air travel and hotels, etc.¹⁹ In 2006, the U.S. College Board signed an agreement with the Hanban to engage the two countries in a variety of activities to promote Chinese programs. The College Board president, Gaston Caperton, commented that Chinese language and culture is an excellent way to promote international exchange. Michael Hill, the director of the Program in Chinese at the University of South Carolina, claimed, "without the CI, I don't see how we could offer our current array of courses. Students have benefited from working with experienced instructors from our partner school."²⁰ These statements show positivity in terms of attitude and demonstrate American expectation to have engagement with China. The effect of such collaborations has expanded, and the influence of CIs is felt in diverse

¹⁸ Interviewee 13. Steven W. Mosher, "Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics," Mar 28, 2012, *Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, p.2.

¹⁹ Garcia, "Scholarly Subversion or Innocuous Instruction? The Confucius Institute Debate," <http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/01/19/scholarly-subversion-or-innocuous-instruction>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

²⁰ Stephen Levine, Matteo Mecacci, Michael Hill, Zha Daojiong, Stephen Hanson, Mary Gallagher, "The Debate Over Confucius Institutes in the United States," *Foreign Policy*, July 11, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/the_debate_over_confucius_institutes>(accessed January 2, 2016).

dimensions in American society.²¹

According to one survey taken by CIs' students at Bryant University and the University of Massachusetts, the vocabulary used to describe China had moved away from terms such as boring, alien, foot-binding, and communism to beautiful, advanced, amazing, cool, and hard work. The proportion of those with "very positive" views of China has moved from 33% up to 52%, and those with "negative" or "slightly negative" views of the PRC has moved down from 28% to 3%.²²

Defending academic freedom

While the institute exists (thanks to a grant from Hanban), its governance remains solely within a university's influence. Quite a few scholars describe the fears regarding CIs as unfounded. According to Richard Saller, Stanford University's dean of Humanities and Sciences, Hanban has no input on staffing or curriculum. Their gift is like any other endowment gift. Saller emphasized, "We don't let them constrain any of our academic freedom."²³ Professor John Mark Hansen, chair of the Board of Directors of University of Chicago, said in a statement, "Academic freedom has always been a paramount value at the University of Chicago, and faculty members here are deeply committed to free inquiry...That's as true of faculty members who participate in the work of the CI." Dali Yang, director of the CI at the University of Chicago, said, "Chinese instructors apply to work with Hanban. The nominees are then interviewed and selected by University faculty and teach the same curriculum as other instructors. The faculty has the right to reject nominated CI instructors."²⁴ The director of Columbia's CI, Liu Lening, stated, "CI is

²¹ Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," p. 230.

²² Hughes, "Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural," p. 72.

²³ Michael Gioia, "Forbes accuses Stanford of collaborating with Chinese spies via Confucius Institute," <http://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/10/24/forbes-accuses-stanford-of-collaborating-with-chinese-spies-via-confucius-institute/> (accessed January 23, 2016).

²⁴ Ibid.

committed to academic integrity and that it would reject any attempt by Hanban to censor its research.”²⁵

In countering the AAUP calling on all universities hosting CIs to cease contracts with Hanban, Stephen Hanson, the CI director at the College of William and Mary, responded that he has not experienced any self-censorship from Hanban. Lectures and conferences on subjects like the Tiananmen protests, the status of Tibet and Taiwan, and Falun Gong take place on campuses.²⁶ Edward McCord, the director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, also disagrees with the AAUP.²⁷ “We’ve not ever had the experience of anybody telling us, don’t talk about that, or, this is a sensitive topic, avoid that,” said Ken Hammond, a co-director of the CI at New Mexico State University. The CI boards tend to have 50-50 representation from the American university and its Chinese partner university. There is no way that CI is getting orders from Hanban.²⁸ Deborah Pierce, director for Webster University’s CI, said, “I was a professor for 30 years and would never, ever agree to anything that I felt meddled with academic freedom and would not be involved in anything where that was the case.” Pierce said Webster has never experienced any censorship from the institute when it came to human rights or political issues concerning China.²⁹

Stanford University received \$ 4 million from Hanban to fund an endowed professorship in Sinology, graduate student fellowships, and collaborative programming

²⁵ Wang and Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” p. 231.

²⁶ Stephen I. Levine, Matteo Mecacci, Michael Hill, Zha Daojiong, Stephen E. Hanson, Mary Gallagher, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/the_debate_over_confucius_institutes>(accessed January 2, 2016).

²⁷ Thorpe, “The Future of Confucius Institutes in the U.S.,” <<http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/united-states-china-confucius-institutes-academic-freedom-culture-sharp-seminar>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

²⁸ Elizabeth Redden, “Confucius Controversies,” *Inside Higher ED*, July 24, 2014, <<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/24/debate-renews-over-confucius-institutes>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

²⁹ Cindy Liu, ed., “A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,” *China Daily*, May 30, 2014, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed to January 2, 2016)..

with Peijing University. Richard Saller said that during discussions of the gift Hanban expressed concern that the endowed professor might discuss “politically sensitive things, such as Tibet...We don’t restrict the freedom of speech of our faculty... I’ve had domestic donors walk away because of that, and in this case Hanban did not walk away.”³⁰ He added that when he was provost at the University of Chicago, the French government established the France Chicago Center with a million dollar gift. “The consulate in Chicago was far more involved in trying to influence the nature of the programming for the purposes the French wanted to see, than Hanban has been for our program.”³¹

According to the Cconstitution and by Laws of CIs (Appendix III), the annual plans of local CIs must be submitted to Beijing for approval. “However, none of this has ever happened, Hanban has never told us what to do or not to do. No plans of CI events and research proposals have been rejected by Beijing,” say a chorus of CI directors.³² As the founder of the CI at the University of Texas A&M, Alan Kluver said, “I do not know a CI director who would agree to any programming that makes concessions to Beijing.”³³ Wang Ban, chair of the department of East Asian languages at Stanford, said, “Critics presume that our CI is funded and is thus controlled by the Chinese government...The CI is funded by an endowment, half of which comes from the Hewlett Foundation, with no strings attached. Stanford faculty and administrators manage and make decisions for CI

³⁰ Redden, “Confucius Says ...”,
<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Garcia, “Scholarly Subversion or Innocuous Instruction? The Confucius Institute Debate,”
<http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/01/19/scholarly-subversion-or-innocuous-instruction>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

³³ Gregory Lee, (ed.) “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes PART II,” *China File Conversation*, July 1, 2014,
<http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes-part-ii>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

events and programs.”³⁴ Hanban has probably concluded that it reaps so much benefit from the CIs that if they do anything that might jeopardize their image, it is not worth doing.³⁵

The CI personnel’s responses to criticisms from various American faculties and media are one-sided and biased. One of interviewees said U.S. media covering CIs are mostly negative because of their lack of understanding about CI’s actual functions and prejudice about the rise of China. He said few professors in his university were strong critics of China in the past. After they have an opportunity to teach in China, their image on China has dramatically changed. For example, one professor strongly opposed the CI instructors teaching credit courses. After visiting China as an exchange scholar, he finally changed his mind. He continued to elaborate, “Some elite universities claimed that having a CI in their campus interrupting their academic autonomy is not justifiable...Some professors did not receive grants from the Chinese government in conducting research. They might have hostilities against the Chinese government funded institute in their campuses... Unfamiliarity raised hostility. That is why CI instructors serve as a bridge for narrowing down the differences between the two countries.”³⁶

The CI teachers keep away from sensitive issues. One CI teacher said, “Our textbooks are purely for teaching Chinese language and introducing Chinese culture. We do not touch upon political issues. Only when students ask sensitive questions, we will base on our own understanding the answers. The answers do not necessarily represent government’s views.”³⁷ One CI director said, “Our CI did not have the problem of

³⁴ Qidong Zhang, “Stanford dean: Builds Bridges with CI,” *China Daily USA*, April 4, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm>(accessed June 23, 2015).

³⁵ Jennifer Hubbert, “Ambiguous States: Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power in the U.S. Classroom,” *Academia.Edu*, http://www.academia.edu/8957882/Ambiguous_States_Confucius_Institutes_and_Chinese_Soft_Power_in_the_U.S._Classroom>(accessed March 28, 2016).

³⁶ Interviewee 14.

³⁷ Interviewee 15.

academic freedom. When we signed a contract with Chinese counterpart, it said the teachings adhered to the regulation of our university. The spending will abide by the State's regulation...If the CI instructors teach credit courses, they have to be viewed and finalized by department Chair.”³⁸ One interviewee said, “If the CI is located off-campus, the Chinese government can totally control the institute. However, the CI on campus can be under the monitoring of the faculty and administrators. They will keep a watchful eye on CI. There is thus no way for CI violating academic autonomy...Moreover, now the Chinese government seldom talks about CI enhancing soft power instead of focusing on education.”³⁹

Obtaining appreciation about China

The CIs could help generate appreciation by connecting Chinese dreams with those of the rest of the world. Knowledge gained at a CI could help students to be more employable. Susan Pertel Jain, CI director at UCLA, emphasized that her institute is not only a platform for learning language but a platform for professionals in art to polish their professions in communicating with China. For Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU), CI's impact went beyond language and culture. MTSU President Sydney McPhee said, “MTSU has carved out a space for CI to develop a Chinese music program. The CI also helped MTSU's research collaboration with Chinese counterparts. MTSU connected with Guangxi Botanical Garden in Nanning, to study the medicinal effect of Chinese herbs.”⁴⁰ Richard Saller said, “CI is a bridge that promotes mutual understanding among Chinese and American people and academics, and benefits both Chinese and American cultures...The U.S.-China relationship is dependent on such understanding in today's world simply because we cannot afford making any mistakes of

³⁸ Interviewee 10.

³⁹ Interviewee 14.

⁴⁰ Cindy Liu, ed., “A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,”
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed December 1, 2015).

any kind.”⁴¹

Hanban describes itself as a public institution that goes all out in meeting the demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the building of a harmonious world.⁴² “I do not know of any other government programs of any other countries that’s been so successful in 10 years...Hanban and CI have done more to improve the visibility and positive image of China than almost anything else,” said Wallace Loh, president of University of Maryland.⁴³ Nine days a semester, the CI sends instructors to the Warren Regional Juvenile Detention Center to give the students a look into Chinese culture. Rebecca Painter, the Center’s science teacher, said, “They supplement us with the fact that we can’t go out on field trips, so they bring it to us.”⁴⁴ Wang Ban, chair of the department of East Asian languages at Stanford, said, “The CI at Stanford allows researchers in the U.S. to have an excellent platform of scholarly research and exchange with our Chinese colleagues in Beijing University and other Chinese universities.”⁴⁵ The CIs can serve as a bridge to help Chinese people and foreigners know more about each other.

The immense growth in China’s economy and its global investment means there has been growing global interest in learning Chinese. After English, Chinese is now the second most widely used language on the internet. Those students who have gone through the courses would know more about China. The CI can provide the story in terms of

⁴¹ Qidong Zhang, “Stanford dean: Builds bridges with CI,” April 4, 2014, *China Daily USA*, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm> (accessed June 23, 2015).

⁴² Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.4.

⁴³ Cindy Liu, Cai Chunying, Chang Liu, “A Tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,” *China Daily*, May 30, 2014, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm> (accessed December 1, 2015).

⁴⁴ Mackenzie Mathews, “Confucius Instructors Teach Students in Detention Center,” *Wkuherald*, April 16, 2014, <http://wkuherald.com/news/article_612fb5c0-c5b7-11e3-a9af-001a4bcf6878.html>(accessed March 28, 2016).

⁴⁵ Qidong Zhang, “Stanford dean: Builds Bridges with CI,” <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm>(accessed June 23, 2015).

cultural, societal, and political aspects of China. When the students walk out of class, they know a version of China that is good for them because they could apply a critical thinking toward China.⁴⁶ One interviewee said, “I don’t think CI is propaganda. To some extent, the media in the U.S. is biased. Some faculties thought that CI provides Chinese value that students should not learn about.”⁴⁷

Many CIs focus on public outreach. With the financial support from Hanban, the CI has been able to do things academically in terms of programming and involvement with the public schools. At North Carolina State University, the CI offers non-credit language and cooking classes for local residents as well as a credit Chinese conversation course. “We’re known as a mini-China center here in the region, so if corporations want somebody to talk to about doing business in China, they contact us...If the public school wants to have an Asia day or a Chinese culture day, they contact us, so we send a teacher or a student to do show and tell.” said Bailian Li, director of the CI.⁴⁸

Since there is increasing number of Americans doing business with China, many students welcome the CI. The workshops, cultural activities, and language courses held by CI help students have a better communication with Chinese people. In general, young attendees are more receptive; and they have a strong motivation for learning Chinese. After attending CI, most students will have a better image of China.⁴⁹

5.1.2 Negative views

To critics, the complaints about CIs far outweigh benefits because the Institutes

⁴⁶ Interviewee 16.

⁴⁷ Interviewee 17.

⁴⁸ Redden, “Confucius Says ...”,
<<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

⁴⁹ Interviewee 12.

situated at campuses serve Chinese interests.⁵⁰ The CI program, an ambitious soft-power effort by China, has encountered a setback by two of its prestigious American partners (University of Chicago and Penn State University). There is a growing sense that these institutes need to be investigated carefully. It is thus important to look at the risks of the CCP involved in hosting CIs.

Discriminatory hiring practices

The hiring practice of CIs' imposed discriminations is contrary to the Western democracy.⁵¹ Clauses in the Hanban contract require that applicants shall abide by Chinese laws that forbid belonging to several religions, whereas U.S. citizens enjoy freedom of worship. A hiring notice for CIs educators in China stipulated that candidates will be assessed to ensure they meet political requirements. Such discrimination violates against U.S. anti-discrimination laws.⁵²

The Hanban's policy is in breach of employment rights. Its website shows that teachers would be considered only if they are between the age of 22 and 60, physically and mentally healthy, have no record of participation in Falun Gong and other "illegal" organizations.⁵³ The often-used charge of discrimination in the hiring practice against Canada's McMaster University was brought (in 2012) by a former CI teacher, Sonia Zhao, who was forced to leave when she revealed her adherence to Falun Gong.⁵⁴ Ms. Zhao charged that her university was discriminatory.⁵⁵ She told a human rights tribunal that

⁵⁰ Becca Thorpe, "The Future of Confucius Institutes in the U.S.," *Pulitzer Center*, March 5, 2015, <<http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/united-states-china-confucius-institutes-academic-freedom-culture-sharp-seminar>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

⁵¹ Interviewee 18.

⁵² Gonzalez, "China's Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC," p.9.

⁵³ Ibid., p.5.

⁵⁴ Evan Garcia, "Scholarly Subversion or Innocuous Instruction? The Confucius Institute Debate," *Chicago Tonight*, January 19, 2015, <<http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/01/19/scholarly-subversion-or-innocuous-instruction>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

⁵⁵ David Feith, China's Beachhead in American Schools, *Wall Street Journal*, May 31, 2014, p.13.

her employment contract dictated she was not allowed to join illegal organizations such as Falun Gong. The practice could extend to CIs at American universities, where China controls many hiring and curriculum choices.⁵⁶

The CI risks creating divisions—an instructor’s refusal to cooperate marginalizes the development of Chinese studies in the university, while his colleague who does cooperate enjoys accessibility to funds and resources.⁵⁷ One interviewee said, “it is a good thing for universities to bring in faculties from other countries; however, the university needs to maintain the autonomy of hiring...The CI definitely violate if the Chinese government controls the selection of the language instructors without oversight by the university... And the university should make sure who are the teachers being appointed and all the courses in the CI should be politically neutral. The university would not want CI’s teachers to work only for Beijing. If some students complain the teaching has political biases, the university will really look bad.”⁵⁸

Propaganda tool

Propaganda usually serves political purposes; the CI is an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.⁵⁹ Hanban (CI headquarter) is governed by a council chaired by Vice Premier Liu Yandong. The CCP’s highest ranked female official, she is a former head of the United Front Works Department, which is the government organ conducting action by influencing other countries in support of Chinese foreign policy.⁶⁰ There is a fear that the spread of the CIs in the U.S. would inevitably bring in China’s political

⁵⁶ Editorial Board, “The Price of Confucius Institutes,” *The Washington Post*, June 21, 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-confucius-institutes/2014/06/21/4d7598f2-f7b6-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html>(accessed January 2, 2016).

⁵⁷ Hughes, “Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural,” p. 66.

⁵⁸ Interviewee 19.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.7.

propaganda. As an ideological extension of the PRC, the CIs have encountered doubts and resistance. The opposition reveals a tension between the American hegemonic status in world politics and the ideological incompatibility of China with the Western value system.⁶¹

The CI is a propaganda tool that is very sophisticated. The teachers from China are conducting cultural contacts with Americans—people-to-people engagements and person-to-person relations. Indeed, propaganda is not all bad at all, and sometimes it is good for Americans to know more about China.⁶² Public controversy, however, has arisen over issues such as the Hanban website describing the Korean War as “the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea,” demonizing the U.S. forces and portraying the Chinese soldiers as heroes.⁶³ It blamed the U.S. for drawing China into the Korean War by bombing Chinese villages.

American universities should have the responsibility to make sure that there is not political control of CIs on the campus.⁶⁴ The College Board in 2014 announced plans to teach Chinese language and culture in 20 school districts across the U.S. in partnership with CIs. Indeed, learning Chinese language, culture, and history through CIs are all good. Unfortunately, College Board President David Coleman said at a conference in Los Angeles on May 8, 2014, “The Hanban is the Sun and the College Board is the Moon. I am so honored to reflect the light that we’ve gotten from Hanban.”⁶⁵ It is no surprise that administrators appreciate Beijing’s offer of money, plus instructors and teaching materials. However, it is politically inappropriate at a public occasion to praise the institutes founded by the Chinese government implying their superiority over American

⁶¹ Wang and Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” p. 231.

⁶² Interviewee 19.

⁶³ Hughes, “Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural,” p. 70.

⁶⁴ Interviewee 19.

⁶⁵ Feith, “China’s Beachhead in American Schools,” p.13.

academia.

Violating academic freedom

The establishment of CIs on university campuses has caused some anxiety for American academics. Because economic benefits are mitigated by potential limits on academic freedom, most elite universities in the U.S. have decided against establishing a CI. Some faculty members raised objections to CIs. An American professor said, “I would be very concerned my university faculties are controlled by Beijing...Even though the people I respect that got involved in the CI who assured me in her campus that violation of academic autonomy is not going to happen...I think she is over optimistic...Some universities had compromised certain degree of academic autonomy.”⁶⁶ Most of the contracts that U.S. universities sign with Hanban include a nondisclosure clause that is contrary to the principles of academic freedom. The clause reads as follows: “The two parties to the agreement will regard this agreement as a secret document, and without written approval from the other party, no party shall ever publicize, reveal, or make public.” Because China suppresses many freedoms guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, such as freedom of speech, many academics wonder whether the contracts can be legal in the U.S.⁶⁷ Although most CI directors have affirmed the independence of their institutes, it does not mean that they do not pay special attention in arranging programming that is uncontroversial in the eyes of their benefactor.⁶⁸

Hanban teachers are trained to ignore questions on issues that are political taboo in China, such as the status of Taiwan, Tiananmen, etc. According to Robert Marquand, Xu

⁶⁶ Interviewee 20.

⁶⁷ Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.8.

⁶⁸ Redden, “Confucius Says ...”, July 24, 2014, *Inside Higher Ed*, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities> (accessed March 28, 2016).

Lin, Hanban director-general, attending an international conference, saw references in a program to a Taiwan think tank and demanded the pages be removed. Roger Greatrex, president of the European Association for Chinese Studies, criticized that such interference in the international conference of an organized non-profitable academic organization is totally unacceptable.⁶⁹

Several faculty members worry that the CIs would suffocate free debate on China in the U.S. campuses. The AAUP called on the universities to end their involvement with the CIs unless the university has unilateral control over all academic matters, including recruitment of teachers, determination of curriculum, and choice of texts.⁷⁰ It would be unwise for Beijing to spend money on something that does not serve its interests.⁷¹ Universities with the institutes can become dependent on Chinese funds and susceptible to China's pressure.⁷² Many universities are coming around to the view that collaboration with CIs is not worth the risk to their academic freedom.⁷³

The PRC diplomats have shown their annoyance when universities invited speakers that China opposes. The University of Oregon came under pressure from the PRC consul general in San Francisco to cancel a lecture by Peng Ming-Min, an advocate of Taiwanese independence. Although the University of Washington played host to the Dalai Lama over Chinese objections in 2008, it came under fire for taking steps to ensure

⁶⁹ Robert Marquand, "Academic Flap Turns up Heat on China's Confucius Institutes," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 22, 2014, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0822/Academic-flap-turns-up-heat-on-China-s-Confucius-Institutes>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

⁷⁰ Gonzalez, "China's Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC," pp.5-6.

⁷¹ Peter Schmidt, "At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries about Academic Freedom," *Faculty* (October 17, 2010), pp.1-2.

⁷² Jennifer Hubbert, "Ambiguous States: Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power in the U.S. Classroom," *Academia.Edu*, http://www.academia.edu/8957882/Ambiguous_States_Confucius_Institutes_and_Chinese_Soft_Power_in_the_U.S._Classroom>(accessed March 28, 2016).

⁷³ Gonzalez, "China's Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC," p.15.

that he would not be asked questions concerning the autonomy of Tibet or China's crackdown on unrest there.⁷⁴

Hanban can have different types of influence on campus. The universities will probably not be able to criticize China; they could be worried about the funding; the impact might become more subtle. If the university with a CI held a conference or had a study tour to China, those professors who are critical toward China may not be invited or be denied to access to China. It is possible for CIs to have enough financial influence on university leaders in regard to decision-making. For example, a president of a university might not go to Taiwan during a very sensitive period because he does not want to give a wrong impression for Hanban.⁷⁵ Xu Lin, in the BBC interview, confirmed that CIs export the CCP values to foreign academic institutions. The teachers must file reports about whether they discussed sensitive subjects in the classroom.⁷⁶

A congressional subcommittee is scrutinizing the CI programs in the U.S. Critics of the program are uncomfortable that faculty are sent from China and classes avoid controversial subjects such as the Tiananmen Square massacre and Falun Gong. Several congressional representatives have called for the U.S. government to study academic agreements that American universities have made with China. Their concern is with the outsourcing of academic control, faculty and student oversight, and curriculum to a foreign government.⁷⁷

Most of the U.S. educators misunderstand “training” of teachers in China. They

⁷⁴ Schmidt, “At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries about Academic Freedom,” p.2.

⁷⁵ Interviewee 7.

⁷⁶ “Madam Xu’s Party Line; Beijing confirms that Confucius Institutes subvert Western academic freedom,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 25, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/madam-xus-party-line-1419375797>>(accessed March 3, 2016).

⁷⁷ Ron Grossman, ed., “China-run Confucius Institutes under Fire in U.S. Schools, like CPS,” *Tribune Business News*, December 5, 2014, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-confucius-institute-hearing-met-20141204-story.html>>(accessed March 3, 2016).

think that CI teachers have been instructed to avoid talking about sensitive issues. Hanban may make pressing mention that, but knowledgeable teachers might not want to bring up sensitive topics.⁷⁸ One interviewee said, “I would not want to associate with the CI because it is a Chinese government entity. The university may eventually lose the control because China’s government is not able to be trusted. The CIs are not very transparent. People supporting the CI are taken by their own interests, such as getting promotion or having a better connection with China.”⁷⁹

The rise of the CIs has caused frustrations about the U.S.’s own lack of investment in language study. The chief frustration is the lack of ability of the U.S. government to fund its own academic projects. David Prager Branner, an associate professor at Columbia University, said it is a fallacy to believe that “taking money from China will have no long-term consequences...I think this is like taking out a sub-prime mortgage or buying everything on credit without paying off the full debt. It may seem like a good deal at first but it will have consequences we may not be able to foresee at the outset.”⁸⁰

Conducting secrecy

Some intelligent organizations and media have claimed that the CIs serve as bases for industrial espionage and monitoring Chinese people who stray from the party line.⁸¹ Richard Fadden, the head of Canada’s intelligence agency, charged CIs are managed by people operating out of China’s embassy or consulates.⁸² These suspicions are shared by U.S. intelligence. The institutes are Chinese studies, but informally they become a vehicle that the PRC uses as a vehicle for infiltration into the campuses to find out whether

⁷⁸ Interviewee 7.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Redden, “Confucius Says ...”,
<<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

⁸¹ Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.5.

⁸² Feith, “China’s Beachhead in American Schools,” p. 13.

anything hostile to their interest is occurring.⁸³

An article in *Forbes Magazine* claimed that Stanford University may be collaborating with Chinese espionage efforts through its CI. Eamonn Fingleton, author of the *Forbes* piece, quotes sinologist Arthur Waldron as saying, “CIs may play a key role in affecting China’s espionage agenda.”⁸⁴ The fact that Huawei Technologies vice-president Zheng Baoyong was chosen to sit on the board of the institute at the University of Texas at Dallas, one of the centers of the U.S. telecommunications corridor, increased suspicions that the Institutes act as forward bases for stealing intellectual property. One former PRC intelligence official who defected to the West has affirmed that the CIs are established as spy centers.⁸⁵ Moreover, the Chinese Scholar Association, organized through the PRC embassy in many American universities, does track certain people. It records what happens in its university and sends the information to the local embassy.⁸⁶

As American imaginations are mired in a vision of China as authoritarian, the CI project is to try to show them that China is not. The representations of China circulated globally through CIs are driven by national interests. As they have expanded, the CIs have been encountered with a degree of concern. There is an understanding that at best CIs are the PRC’s propaganda tool and at worst are institutes for conducting espionage. There is a concern that such partnerships give Beijing influence on Western institutions. Hanban offers money to foreign universities starved for funding. The discomfort with the

⁸³ Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.8.

⁸⁴ Michael Gioia, “Forbes Accuses Stanford of Collaborating with Chinese Spies via Confucius Institute,” *University Wire*, October 24, 2014, <http://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/10/24/forbes-accuses-stanford-of-collaborating-with-chinese-spies-via-confucius-institute/> (accessed January 23, 2016).

⁸⁵ Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.9.

⁸⁶ Interviewee 7.

growing financial power of China and the loss of Western centrality is what is fearful.⁸⁷

5.2 The effectiveness of Confucius Institutes in promoting soft power

The CIs have begun expanding on U.S. campuses because the economic slowdown has bitten into university budgets. China has capitalized on quite a few opportunities because many universities have invited CIs to their campuses. Hanban partner with the prestigious American universities in order to have a positive effect on the faculties and students of both sides and also to present its version of China. Because there are many universities lack funding to have language programs, Hanban can provide money and teachers to solve budget problem. The Institutes can highlight the positive side of China such as the success of joining the world community and its economic development. Chinese professors can also go to American universities for research to equip them with a better training. One interviewee said, “As a tool of cultural outreach, the CI is tremendously effective.”⁸⁸ Another CI teacher explained, “The main value is not just to know the traditional art. It’s about the ideas that are carried by this art...When we are doing paper-cutting, all the patterns are about happiness, about peace, about harmony. And when people enjoy this art they form a view of harmony, and of peace.” The spreading of Chinese culture spreads the philosophies behind that culture.⁸⁹

According to a study of one CI regarding a month-long intensive immersion program in China, this program aimed to increase student language skills and cultural understanding. Prior to the trip, students were asked, “What are you most excited about your upcoming trip to China?” They were excited to learn about Chinese culture (79%), practicing a different language (46%), traveling abroad (25%), meeting new people (17%),

⁸⁷ Heather Schmidt, “China’s Confucius institutes and the necessary White Body,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2013), p. 651.

⁸⁸ Interviewee 20.

⁸⁹ Schmidt, “China’s Confucius Institutes and the Necessary White Body,” p. 658.

comparing U.S. and Chinese culture (8%), learning about green energy (8%), and sightseeing (4%).⁹⁰ After the trip, some of the students responded saying, “I learned more Chinese... My speaking and writing abilities have made a lot of improvement.”⁹¹ “Never did I expect to be exposed to the rich history and cultural ethics that China has to offer.”⁹² “Their respect for others gave me a new perception of the way of life in China.”⁹³ “The knowledge I have gained on this trip is just the beginning of my work to help the relationship between the U.S. and China.”⁹⁴ Many students expressed their visit in China to be one of the best experiences in life.

A trip to China is a popular program among local educators and students that could enhance their appreciation of the Chinese culture. The CIs advertise the trip, select participants, and arrange for the students’ air travel. Students participate in Chinese language classes and enjoy cultural activities and sightseeing. Participants have responded, “I fell in love with everything Chinese.” “This trip to China was a remarkable experience.”⁹⁵ “We were warmly welcomed everywhere we traveled and left China with a better understanding of the Chinese people and their culture,” said one school principal.⁹⁶ One parent commented, “It gave our children the opportunity to connect with one of the most important countries of the world.”⁹⁷ The trip not only provides participants with a better understanding of contemporary China but also enhances their appreciation of Chinese culture.

⁹⁰ Interviewee 12.

⁹¹ Interviewee 21.

⁹² Interviewee 22.

⁹³ Interviewee 23.

⁹⁴ Interviewee 24.

⁹⁵ “Excerpts from Feedbacks of Arkansas High School Students,” *Confucius Institute at University of Central Arkansas Website*, <<http://uca.edu/confucius/excerpts-from-feedbacks/>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

⁹⁶ The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo, *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2011*, p.13.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.5.

American opinion polls suggest that the CIs have had limited success in changing Americans' view of China. For example, Americans' view of China was favorable in 2007, climbing to 51% in 2011, then plummeting to 37% in 2013. Despite the proliferation of CIs in the U.S., the percentage of Americans who have favorable views of China has declined. Nonetheless, the public has no difficulty distinguishing between Chinese language and culture, which they may admire, and the nature of the Chinese Communist regime, which they oppose. Opponents argue that the CI is not simply engaged in spreading Chinese language and culture but also in the promotion to increase the political influence of the PRC. Some supporters argue that U.S.-China relations might be worse without these "people-to-people" exchanges through CIs.⁹⁸

The CIs can be vulnerable to attack. If the CIs were viewed as a government tool, they might be less effective and Americans might not trust them.⁹⁹ CIs' influence can be limited because it is not an acceptable model for foreign government fund organizations in the U.S. campus. The existence of the CIs in the campus runs into a gray area. An American professor said, "The PRC gives a better press than they [CIs] deserve."¹⁰⁰ If students attend the CI and learn Chinese history from the PRC perspective, it could be very hard to understand the Chinese viewpoint because most of them know very little about the country. For example, they learn a "cross-Strait" history by CI teachers. What they teach is, "It is only because of American imperialism that the mainland had not been able to reunify its lost province (Taiwan)." Students then go home wandering about

⁹⁸ Edward A. McCord, "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom; Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend," February 15, 2014, <http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/response-to-sahlins-6.pdf> (accessed March 28, 2016).

⁹⁹ Interviewee 25.

¹⁰⁰ Interview 26.

American imperialism; they are able to hear only one-side of the story. That may impact them deeply.¹⁰¹

The CI is not a very effective platform to promote China's cultural soft power. According to one interviewee, "If the scale is one to ten, I would say 0.5 because there is very little visibility for CIs in the U.S. For students who attend CIs' programs, they might have a positive outcome because of their language skill and cultural affinity. But if there was a news report about China limiting the freedom of expression, all the CI's hard work is gone."¹⁰² Another interviewee said, "I don't think that language and culture are necessarily going to influence the students' image on China, particularly on Chinese government. The media on U.S. and China relations will have more influence than CIs."¹⁰³ The goal at a university is not to improve anyone's image but to educate students and help them engage with other countries. Through learning other countries' languages, people can get a better appreciation of other countries and cultures. They can also become more knowledgeable.¹⁰⁴ One interviewee said, "the main reasons for the existence of the CI in the U.S. are not acceptable: The CIs do not reach enough people. Even if those who attend the CI might have a better understanding of China, they might not appreciate China's image. The CI is not an academic pursuit. Most Americans have a strong negative feeling towards China's media control and its abuse of human rights. As for the people who do not attend, even they have heard the positive side of CIs, it is highly doubtful that the CI will change their opinions on China significantly."¹⁰⁵

China's strategy for its culture aims at transforming traditional cultural resources into effective soft power and fostering more appreciation of Chinese culture; however, the

¹⁰¹ Interviewee 26.

¹⁰² Interview 7.

¹⁰³ Interviewee 26.

¹⁰⁴ Interviewee 8.

¹⁰⁵ Interviewee 26.

strategy so far has had a limited success. Even though the CIs can help China depict itself internationally as a benign country, these efforts could be derailed by its authoritarian political system and aggressive actions in trouble spots.¹⁰⁶ Thus the overall impact of China's global cultural presence should not be overstated.¹⁰⁷ To analyze global public opinions of China is a way to gauge China's cultural soft power. A survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute of South Korea shows that, in the eyes of most Americans and many Asians, China still has a long way to go to claim the world's recognition as a great soft power. Even culture, the remarkable component of China's soft power, has struggled to spread worldwide.¹⁰⁸ According to a 2008 survey, majorities in South Korea (74%), Japan (74%), and the U.S. (70%) are worried that China could become a threat in the future.¹⁰⁹ A BBC survey conducted in May 2013 across 21 countries revealed perceptions about China at their lowest since 2005. The Pew Research Center survey indicates that while people across the world may accept China's superpower status, they "don't like it." CIs' capacity for attraction is also in question, given that they have encountered objections, including protests by foreign professors opposed to the setup of CI at their universities.¹¹⁰ China's soft power is far from being successfully disseminated to the world. Since the successful wielding of cultural soft power is based on others' perception, utilizing diverse information channels to carry on efficient expression is vital for enhancing national image.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Parama Sinha Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes," *China Research Center*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013), <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹⁰⁷ David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 266-267.

¹⁰⁸ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp.246-247.

¹⁰⁹ Baohui Zhang, "Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Trends and Implications," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2010), p. 60.

¹¹⁰ Pan, "The Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection," p. 30.

¹¹¹ Liu, *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization*, pp.247-248.

5.3 Summary

American views of CI have focused on opportunities to engage with China and on a growing fear of China's cultural hegemony and of a threat to academic freedom.¹¹² The CI is an integral part of China's strategy to improve American public opinion on China, which in turn attempts to shape American foreign policy towards China. If met with less resistance, the CIs will be able to promote China effectively. The reaction to the CIs, however, has been mixed in the U.S. While many universities are appreciative of the CIs' contributions, there has arisen skepticism among journalists and professors.¹¹³ For smaller colleges with no budget for the Chinese program, a CI seems a good trade-off. Elite universities, on the other hand, can make a better deal in which Beijing will not interfere because China wants to share their prestigious reputation¹¹⁴

The CIs could project its peaceful development strategy and improve its national image abroad. Views of the CIs in the U.S. show, on the one hand, fear of cultural and political hegemony and, on the other, an appreciation of the economic advantages they might offer. The CIs have spread in the U.S. despite some resistance because the learning of the Chinese language is riding a wave of popularity. This popularity is due to its commercial potential rather than enthusiasm for Chinese culture. If China were to lose its economic strength, there would be a decrease in the desire to learn Chinese.¹¹⁵

Measuring the success and failure of the CI project is not easy because different parties have different perspectives. If results are measured solely by the number of CIs,

¹¹² Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," p. 230.

¹¹³ Randy Kluver, Introduction: The Confucius Institute as a communicative phenomenon, *China Media Research*, Vol. 10, No.1 (2014), pp.1-3.

¹¹⁴ Interviewee 30. William Adams, Zha Daojiong, "A Lot of Active Cooperation Going on," *A China File Conversation*, July 10, 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹¹⁵ Interviewee 30. Wang and Adamson, "War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA," p. 232.

the achievements of the CI project are remarkable.¹¹⁶ If one of the major purposes of the CI project is to brand China's global image, public opinion polls can be a valid means of gauging whether the outcomes could help this purpose. BBC polls between 2005 and 2007 found that the percentage of respondents holding positive views of China's influence had dropped from 48% to 42%. This trend was confirmed by the results of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which reported the deterioration in China's global image between 2005 and 2007. China's soft power, as embodied in the CI project, has not contributed much to improving China's global image, despite the remarkable rate of CIs' global expansion.¹¹⁷ The Pew survey shows that 51% of Americans felt favorably towards China in 2011. By 2014, only 35% felt favorably.¹¹⁸ Most Americans view China as a competitor and express their low levels of trust.¹¹⁹ The American assessment of Chinese culture is much less positive than what Beijing had hoped for. Over 70% do not think China's popular culture is appealing.¹²⁰ China has faced constraints in translating its soft power into desired outcomes in the U.S. The difficulty of using culture to create soft power that is inconsistent with domestic realities may be one of the reasons China is seeing limited returns on its efforts.¹²¹ It is not easy to say how effective CI has been in shaping the image of China. Students taking CI classes will increase their knowledge of China; however, it is difficult to predict how the CI is going to affect students' image of China. It depends mainly on different factors, such as the students'

¹¹⁶ Joe Tin-yau Lo and Suyan Pan, "Confucius Institutes and China's Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes," p. 11.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

¹¹⁸ Thorpe, "The Future of Confucius Institutes in the U.S.,"

<http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/united-states-china-confucius-institutes-academic-freedom-culture-s-harp-seminar> (accessed January 2, 2016).

¹¹⁹ Levels of trust were higher among youth because they tend to be more trusting and open. Please see Michael D. Swaine, Rachel Esplin Odell, Luo Yuan, Liu Xiangdong, *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and China Strategic Culture, 2013), p. 9.

¹²⁰ John Aldrich, Kang Liu, Jie Lu, "How Do Americans View the Rising China?" *Journal of Contemporary China* (Sep 17, 2014), p. 14.

¹²¹ Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, p. 131.

political viewpoints.¹²²

The opportunities and challenges that the U.S. CIs face in promoting Chinese language and culture education are as follows: 1) K-12 Chinese education holds great potential for future development. The CIs are found to have adopted localized strategies to promote Chinese teaching at this level. 2) While Chinese language teaching at the K-12 level constitutes an opportunity for development, it may also put more pressure on the localization of qualified Chinese teachers. 3) The enrollment growth seems to outpace the development of the CIs' capacity to provide teachers with supporting staff. 4) The shortage of qualified teachers also motivated some CIs to find creative ways to address this challenge. Given the considerable regional differences and the possible limitation in Hanban's capacity in supporting the fast-growing CI network, localization would be an advisable strategy to sustain the CI network and its development.¹²³

The future CIs will increase credit courses in the universities. The faculty of each department will review CI potential teachers' abilities, which are relied purely on their expertise. Most CI teachers have a good command of English (Some of them taught English in China.) The CI is a non-profit organization and needs a sustainable funding from Hanban. Now many American universities are applying for the development of the CI. Consequently, the Hanban reviewing process has become stricter. Since the budget is limited, the local CI has to mobilize all the necessary resources to support the programs. Some CIs' goal is to have a Chinese research center. Some faculties of many departments are delighted with this idea and committed to having a further cooperation with CI.¹²⁴

¹²² Interviewee 26.

¹²³ Shuai Li and Yanyin Zhang, "A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education," *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February, 2013). These differences include actual need in Chinese language, cultural education, and availability of local resources. Hanban's capacity also involves financial, human resources.

¹²⁴ Interviewee 10.

The CI project is like searching for stepping stones to cross the river—China has no experience in managing such a venture in the world. When China uses cultural diplomacy to boost national interests, it tends to use utilitarian soft power resources in pushing its agenda through propaganda mechanisms. However, China’s rampant corruption and political oppression along with its lack of democracy, has undermined its soft power resources. That is why the CI project can do little to relieve the fear of the China threat. Fear of China is inevitable because, as a rising power, it is bound to challenge the interests of the U.S. As China’s soft power basis is fragile, the CI project can hardly bring about broader intended outcomes. The results of the soft power attempted through the CI project reveal that China’s cultural diplomacy still has a long journey ahead.¹²⁵ China’s early acts of soft power seem to be clumsy. University faculties will serve as advisors as the CIs develop steadily over the next several years. Increased cooperation between the two countries will bring change and understanding on all sides.

¹²⁵ Lo and Pan, “Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes,” p. 16.

Chapter VI Conclusion

The forerunner of Chinese cultural expansion is the Confucius Institute (CI). Chinese strategists and leaders assess that the CIs, a tool of cultural diplomacy, can enhance China's image and national cultural competitiveness. This dissertation chooses American CIs as a case study by dissecting their language programs, cultural activities, and responses from CIs' personnel. Since the language education and cultural activities are the two most important missions that the CI implements, this study analyzes how these courses and programs contribute to China's cultural soft power. The research conceptualizes cultural soft power and cultural diplomacy; and it then explains their relationships. Field interviews were conducted to collect the participants' opinions. This dissertation explores China's cultural policies, CI's projects, and Beijing's approaches to disseminate culture; and it also raised two questions. The findings and answers to the questions list below:

6.1 Findings

The China's cultural policies have become more flexible since Deng Xiaoping. Deng encouraged Chinese intellectuals to have a creative way of thinking to promote Chinese culture to the world. Jiang Zemin acknowledged the importance of cultural development. After Jiang consolidated his power, cultural reform was launched in order to win over the hearts and minds of foreign audiences after the Tiananmen crackdown. During Hu's presidency, Chinese cultural circles released cultural development plans with an emphasis on going global. Xi Jinping has emphasized on traditional culture as China's cultural soft power. He acknowledges that language is the best way to understand a country; and CIs serve as important platforms to help the world know China. Examining the cultural policies of these top leaders, they have committed a great amount of efforts to present

China as a cultural power to the world.

The CIs, a Chinese cultural ambassador, have become the most important platform to promote Chinese language and culture overseas, and to enhance international affinity. Their rationales are to consolidate China's cohesion, to expand Chinese influence worldwide, and to diminish the fear of Chinese power. The focused developments of CIs' project thus consist of improving teacher education, enhancing the quality of textbooks, highlighting brand projects, and expanding the China studies. Its approaches to disseminate culture include expansion of the boundaries of Chinese culture and interaction with the people of the host country. The CI acts as unofficial cultural diplomats, making contribution by seeking foreign partners, enhancing academic status, and increasing human capital.

Since the U.S.-China relations are the most important in China's foreign policy, Beijing has invested the largest resource in American CIs, focusing on four areas of development: language courses, cultural events, academic activities, and teacher education. Among the CIs that offered language and cultural courses, 70% targeted university students, and 57% targeted the general public. Organizing and sponsoring cultural activities is another service area. 71 % CIs organized cultural events.

This study has selected twelve American CIs and categorizes them into four distinctive features of their major missions. 1) Local-oriented CIs. Most CIs in the U.S. are local-oriented aiming to meet the needs of local citizens and students craving for knowledge about China. These CIs have close cooperation with local schools, governments, and companies to garner more supports and resources. Their objectives are to provide an educational platform for locals and to become a major center for learning Chinese language and business. 2) Cultural oriented CIs. The cultural CIs emphasize introducing Chinese art and customs to the American public. They are often invited by

local communities and schools to present Chinese multicultural performances and to sponsor a wide array of cultural programs. The CIs' students are also performing art skills at the campus and communities providing locals to have a better understanding of Chinese culture. 3) Research-oriented CIs. This type of CIs is mostly hosted at prestigious universities as a research center on Chinese studies. These universities have received the huge financial and resource support from the Chinese government for further developing their Chinese-related research programs. However, these universities can come under strong criticism by its faculty because funds provided by Beijing might infringe upon their academic autonomy. 4) Teacher training CIs. Their mission emphasizes assisting local schools with the development of language programs in order to provide qualified teachers. The teacher-training CIs have held many workshops, inviting famous and experienced educators to enhance Institutes teachers' teaching skills. With sufficient support from Hanban, the teacher training CIs have made improvement in their educational program.

The writer has come up with the following discoveries of selected CIs. 1) Students at CIs equipped with Chinese language and culture capability will become more competitive in their future careers; thus, the creation of courses and activities attempts to meet the demands of students. 2) The universities in the U.S. set up CIs based on their distinctive academic expertise. With qualified teachers from China, these universities could better promote their prestige. 3) Most CIs' attendants are college students and young children. As these students reach their adulthood, they might have a favorable image toward China that could forge a better U.S.-China relationship. 4) The CI's programs are varied, particularly for those earlier established institutes and those located in affluent areas because of their experience and sufficient income from stable students' enrollment. In time, the courses and programs of the CIs can become more creative and prolific. The

CI's program should become more robust if there are continued support of Hanban's resources, Chinese guest teachers, and free textbooks.

The reaction to the CIs has been mixed in the U.S. While many universities are appreciative of the CIs' contributions, some skepticism has arisen about them. China has capitalized on the number of prestigious American universities that have CIs on their campuses. The Institutes can present their version of China and highlight the positive side of modern China. The data have shown that most students in the CIs have a positive view toward China. However, some interviewees, mainly professors, consider the CIs not a very effective platform to promote China's cultural soft power because there is a limited visibility (There is little coverage by either national or local media) in the U.S. Moreover, if there was a negative news report about China, CIs' image could be harshly damaged and its efforts wasted.

The CIs' capacity for attraction is in question, given that they have encountered objections. The CIs have spread quickly in the U.S. because the learning of Chinese is riding a wave of popularity. This popularity is due mainly to its commercial interests rather than to passion for Chinese culture. If China were to lose its economic edge in the future, there would be a dramatically decline in CIs' attendance.

The CI has done little to change China's opinion poll ratings. Regardless of the proliferation of CIs in the U.S., the percentage of Americans who have favorable views of China has gone down. Polls can be a valid means of gauging the result. BBC polls between 2005 and 2007 found that the percentage of respondents holding positive views of China's influence had dropped from 48% to 42%. This trend was confirmed by the results of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which reported the deterioration in China's global image during the same period. The Pew survey shows that 51% of Americans felt favorably towards China in 2011. By 2014, only 35% felt favorably. Most Americans

view China as a competitor and express their low levels of trust toward the Chinese government. The American assessment of Chinese culture is much less positive than what Beijing has hoped for. Over 70% do not think Chinese popular culture is appealing. China's soft power, as embodied in the CI project, has not contributed much to improving China's image. China has encountered difficulty in translating its soft power into desired outcomes in the U.S.

6.2 Answers to the research questions

This dissertation asks two central questions. The followings are the answers to the questions:

The first question is, what are the positive and negative views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States? The answer is that the CIs in the U.S. are seen with a considerable degree of ambivalence. The supporters claim that knowledge and skill gained at a CI will equip students to be more employable. The CI is not only a platform for learning language but also a platform for professionals in arts to polish their skills in communicating with China. Some of the U.S. scholars describe the fears regarding CIs as unfounded. To critics, the CIs are situated at campuses serving the interests of the Chinese Communists. They are concerned that the CIs' presence on campuses would interfere with academic freedom. Their concerns are listed as: the CI-imposed discriminations in hiring practices are contrary to the Western democracy; the CIs are about propaganda; their programming arrangements are influenced by the Chinese government.

The second question is, how effective are the CI's project in shaping China's image? Here the answer is not very effective. For CI students, the vocabulary they used to describe China has changed from the negative (boredom, alien, foot-binding, and communism) to the positive terms (advanced, amazing, cool, and diligent). The

proportion of those with “very positive” views of China moves up, and those with “negative” or “slightly negative” views go down. The CI has received positive comments mostly from the CIs’ students because they learn the skills of the Chinese language and culture from the Institute. However, average Americans know very little about CI. Even when they hear about CI, most Americans are suspicious about Beijing’s intention to set up the Institute. In view of negative views from media and scholars, many Americans do not trust CI and hold a pessimistic view on China. The CI is not a very useful platform to persuade Americans to a more positive view toward China.

6.3 Summary

The CI project has become an important means for China to demonstrate its cultural power and to introduce the modern China to the outside world. To the students and participants of the CI, its language courses and cultural activities seem to be very effective. Most of them have a better opinion of China after participating in the programs. However, most Americans are suspicious or do not trust CI. They think that CI is only a Chinese government tool for propaganda and self-interests. Thus the CI’s contributing to China’s image in the U.S. is very limited.

The CI project is like “feeling for stones to cross the river” (Deng Xiao-ping) as China has no experience in managing language Institute worldwide. China has utilized cultural diplomacy to obtain national interests. However, China’s lack of democracy, rampant corruption, and political oppression has undermined its soft power credibility. That is why the CI project can do very little to relieve the fear of the China threat. Fear of the China is inevitable because as a rising power, it is likely to challenge the U.S. status in the world. The CI project can hardly bring about broader intended outcomes. The results of the soft power attempted through the CI reveal that China’s cultural diplomacy still has a long way ahead. The future of CI development in the U.S. will remain slow but steady.

The main theme of the study is that China's cultural soft power has gathered limited momentum in the United States through the Confucius Institutes. Although the improvement of China's image in the United States can't be achieved by Confucius Institutes alone, they have made some initial contributions to lay a basic foundation for smoother relations between the both countries.



Appendix I

Interview Guides

For directors:

1. What are the main reasons for this university setting up CI? And what are the missions of this Institute intended to achieve?
2. What are your roles and responsibilities in this Institute?
3. What kinds of role does this CI play in this university?
4. Could you elaborate the relations between Hanban and CI?
5. Do you receive any instruction from Hanban? If yes, could you elaborate these instructions?
6. Could you introduce the language programs and cultural activities of this institute? And which of them are well-received by attendants?
7. Do you think students attending the CI's language courses and cultural activities help improve their image on China?
8. Some scholars claimed that CIs have been used by the Chinese government as a platform for propaganda? What are your takes on these claims?
9. What major challenges has this institute been facing?
10. What are the future goals of this CI?

For teachers

1. Could you elaborate the main reasons of your students to come to the CI?
2. Do you think China has utilized the cultural soft power through the CIs?
3. What kind of language courses and cultural activities are being held by CI? And which of them are popular among attendants?
4. Do you think language education and cultural programs provided by this CI will be beneficial for students to change China's image?
5. Are your students become more interested in Chinese culture after taking language courses and participating cultural programs?
6. Is your teaching being guided by the Institute? If yes, what are they?
7. Do you attend any teaching training programs? If you participate in any, what are the contents of these programs and are they beneficial for your teachings?
8. What challenges or problems have you come across at work and teaching?
9. What feedbacks have you heard from students about the Chinese language program in your Institute?

For administrative staff

1. What kinds of programs does this CI arrange?
2. Can you explain services that the CI offers to the university and community?
3. How is the annual tendency of enrolment in CI since its establishment?
4. What are the motives for students come to CIs?
5. What kinds of language courses and cultural activities are most welcomed by participants?
6. Do you think people image about China is improved through the CI language courses and cultural activities?
7. Are there any teacher development programs in CI? How useful are these programs in improving teachers' teaching capabilities?
8. Are there any education cooperation and academic exchange program?
9. What kinds of cultural activities are provided by the CIs to introduce Chinese culture?
Are they well-received by students in CIs?

For students

1. Why are you interested in studying in CI?
2. Where do you get the information about CI?
3. What do you think of the service CIs offer? And are you satisfied with the language programs and teachers?
4. Besides Chinese language classes, what kind of cultural activities have you attended? If you attended any, how do you feel about these activities?
5. After you finish the current program in CI, would you like to proceed into the next level?
6. Have you participated in any education exchanges or academic research program hold by CI? Are you interested in those programs?
7. How do you think the language program design fits your learning need?
8. What other programs are you anticipating that the CI will offer?
9. What else would you like to share not covered in this interview?

Appendix II

The Basic Background of the Interviewees

Number	Gender	Nationality	Position
1	Male	The PRC	Professor
2	Female	The U.S.	CI director
3	Female	South Korea	Assistant Director
4	Male	The PRC	Assistant Professor
5	Female	The PRC	Director of Language Resource Center
6	Male	The U.S.	Professor
7	Male	The U.S.	Assistant Director for International Education
8	Female	The U.S.	Executive Director, Center for International Education
9	Female	The U.S.	The former CI director
10	Female	The U.S.	CI director
11	Female	The PRC	CI vice director
12	Female	The U.S.	CI director
13	Male	The U.S.	Professor
14	Male	The PRC	CI teacher
15	Female	The PRC	CI teacher
16	Female	The PRC	CI teacher

17	Female	The PRC	Professor
18	Male	The U.S.	Pastor
19	Male	The U.S.	Professor
20	Female	The PRC	CI teacher
21	Male	The U.S.	CI student
22	Male	The U.S.	CI student
23	Female	The U.S.	CI student
24	Female	The U.S.	CI student
25	Male	The U.S.	Professor
26	Male	The U.S.	Professor

Appendix III

Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes

Source: Hanban, “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes,” Hanban Website, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm (accessed March 2, 2016).

Chapter 1: General Principles

1. Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.

2. This Constitution and By-Laws is applicable to all Confucius Institutes worldwide.

3. In any other language, the name chosen to represent the Confucius Institutes must be equivalent in connotation and meaning to that of the head institute in Chinese.

4. The Confucius Institutes are non-profit educational institutions.

5. Adhering to the principles of mutual respect, friendly negotiations, and mutual benefit, the Confucius Institutes shall develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international communities.

6. The Confucius Institutes shall abide by the laws and regulations of the countries in which they are located, respect local cultural and educational traditions and social customs, and they shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China.

7. The Confucius Institutes shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of Confucius Institutes.

8. A Confucius Institute can be established in various ways, with the flexibility to respond to the specific circumstances and requirements found in different countries.

9. Any corporate entity outside of China capable of facilitating language instruction, conducting educational and cultural exchange activities, and meeting the requirements for application as stated in this Constitution and By-Laws may apply to the Confucius Institute Headquarters for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute.

10. The Confucius Institutes conduct Chinese language instructions in Mandarin, using Standard Chinese Characters.

Chapter 2: Business Service

11. The Confucius Institutes shall provide the following services: a. Chinese language teaching; b. Training Chinese language instructors and providing Chinese language teaching resources; c. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers; d. Providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so forth; e. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries.

Chapter 3: The Headquarters

12. The Confucius Institute Headquarters is a non-profit organization that has the independent status of a corporate body. It owns the proprietorship of the name, logo and brand of the Confucius Institutes. The Headquarters is the regulatory body that provides guidelines to the Confucius Institutes worldwide. The Headquarters is located in Beijing in the People's Republic of China.

13. The Confucius Institute Headquarters shall be governed by the Council. The Council shall consist of the Chair, the Vice Chairs, the Executive Council Members, and the Council Members. Candidates for the Chair, several Vice Chairs and the Executive Council Members shall be recommended by the education administrative agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council. Among the fifteen Council Members, ten shall be the Heads of the Board of Directors of Confucius Institutes overseas. These ten members of the First Council are appointed by the Headquarters, while members of following Councils shall be elected or rotate service on the basis of the founding dates of Confucius Institutes. The other five Council Members shall be representatives of Chinese partner institutions, appointed directly by the Headquarters. The term of service of Council Members is two years. They can pursue reappointment for one term. During their tenure of office, Council Members shall not receive any payment from the Confucius Institute Headquarters. The Council shall establish positions of the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executives. The Chief Executive, who shall also be an Executive Council Member, is the legal representative of the Headquarters.

14. The duties of the Council include: Formulating and amending the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, examining and approving the development

strategies and plans of global Confucius Institutes, examining and approving annual reports and working plans of the Headquarters, and discussing issues of significance concerning the development of Confucius Institutes.

15. The Council shall assemble once a year, called by the Chair. When needed, the Chair may decide to call for provisional Council Meetings or Executive Council Member Meetings.

16. Under the leadership of the Council, the Confucius Institute Headquarters carries out its own daily operations. The duties include: a. Formulating development plans, criteria for the establishment of Confucius Institutes, and assessment standards for the Confucius Institutes; b. Examining and approving applications for the establishment of new Confucius Institutes; c. Examining and approving the implementation plans of annual projects, annual budgetary items, and final financial accounts of individual Confucius Institutes; d. Providing guidelines and making assessments to activities carried out by Confucius Institutes, supervising their operations and doing quality assurance management; e. Providing support and teaching resources to individual Confucius Institutes; f. Selecting and appointing directors and faculties from the Chinese side for individual Confucius Institutes, and training administrative personnel and instructors for these Confucius Institutes; g. Organizing Confucius Institutes Conferences annually; h. Constituting regulations and institutions for the management of the Chinese funds.

17. The Headquarters shall establish Special Working Committees that can provide consultative suggestions to the Headquarters. Members of the Committees shall be appointed by the Headquarters.

18. The Headquarters shall invite well-known leaders and visionaries of both China and abroad to be Senior Consultants.

Chapter 4: Establishment

19. An application for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute must satisfactorily demonstrate the following: a. That the applicant is a legally registered organization or corporation at the place where it is located with resources to conduct teaching, educational and cultural exchanges, and public service; b. That there is a demand for learning the Chinese language and culture at the applicant's location; c. That the personnel, space, facilities, and equipments required for language and culture instruction are available; d. That the capital for the establishment is in place, and that the source of funds for operation is stable.

20. An applicant for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute shall submit an application package to the Confucius Institute Headquarters. This package shall include: a. An application letter signed by the principal or president; b. An introduction of the applicant site, its registration certificate, and the principal or president; c. A floor plan for the required instructional space, and lists of the relevant equipment and facilities available for the proposed Confucius Institute; d. A projection of market demand, managerial structure, and operational plans for the proposed Confucius Institute; e. A statement detailing the source, regulation, and management of the funds for the proposed Confucius Institute; f. Other materials required by the Confucius Institute Headquarters.

21. The Confucius Institute Headquarters will assess the application package submitted by the applicant. The assessment may include verification of the document

materials, debriefings and interviews, on-site verification, and consultation with experts.

22. Upon the approval of an application, the Confucius Institute Headquarters will sign an agreement with the applicant, thus conferring the permission for establishment and the official Confucius Institute Plaque upon that applicant.

Chapter 5: Funds

23. A newly established Confucius Institute will receive aid to its initial operation in the form of a set amount of funds provided by the Chinese Parties. The funds for its annual projects shall be raised by individual Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Parties together in a ratio of approximately 1:1 commitment in general.

24. The aforementioned funds provided by the Chinese Parties will be managed through project management measures. Detailed measures are stipulated in Regulations for Administering the Chinese Funds for the Confucius Institutes.

Chapter 6: Administration

25. An individual Confucius Institute shall establish a Board of Directors. A Confucius Institute established under joint venture between Chinese and overseas partners shall form a Board of Directors consisting of members from both sides. The total number of members and the component ratio of the Board shall be determined through consultation.

26. The Board of Directors shall be responsible for assessing and approving the Confucius Institute's development plans, annual plans, annual reports, project implementation schemes, budget proposals, and final financial accounts. The Board shall

also be responsible for appointing and dismissing Directors and Deputy Directors of the Confucius Institute. Appointments and dismissals of Directors and Deputy Directors shall be put on records at the Headquarters. The appointments of Directors and Deputy Directors for joint venture Confucius Institutes shall be decided upon negotiations between the Chinese and overseas partners.

27. An individual Confucius Institute shall adopt a system in which the Director, under the leadership of the Board of Directors, shall assume the main responsibility for the Institute's daily operation and administration.

28. The Director of a Confucius Institute shall have in-depth comprehension of Chinese current national issues, a skillful command of the language of the country in which the Institute is located, suitable administrative experiences in this position, and a strong ability to promote public affiliation and market potential.

29. Instructors appointed by Confucius Institutes shall have professional knowledge and teaching competence required by such positions as teachers.

30. An individual Confucius Institute, in the allotted time, shall draw up executable plans for annual projects and budget proposals, summarizing the implemental efficacy reports of annual projects and final financial accounts, and submit them to the Headquarters for examination and approval. Changes and dispositions made to the assets on the Chinese side shall be reported to the Headquarters for examination and approval. Individual Confucius Institutes shall also submit the working schedules and summaries of their annual projects to the Headquarters for archiving purposes.

31. Confucius Institutes are not profit-making organizations, hence, income drawn from operation of the Institutes shall be used for teaching activities and improving teaching and service conditions. The accumulated income shall be utilized for sustainable development of the Institutes and may not be used for purposes otherwise.

32. The Confucius Institute Headquarters shall be responsible for conducting assessments of individual Confucius Institutes. The Headquarters reserves the right to terminate the Agreements with those Institutes that violate the principles or objectives, or fail to reach the teaching quality standards set forth by the head establishment.

33. The Confucius Institute Headquarters shall convene a Confucius Institute Conference annually to provide the opportunity for individual Institutes to exchange ideas and experiences, and to further study issues concerning the construction and development of the Institutes.

Chapter 7: Rights and Obligations

34. All Confucius Institutes shall enjoy the following rights: a. The rights set forth in the Agreement and this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes; b. The right to use the Name and Logo of the Confucius Institutes; c. The right of priority for obtaining teaching and cultural materials or resources provided by the Headquarters.

35. All Confucius Institutes shall observe the following obligations: a. The obligation to observe the measures and regulations set forth in the Agreement and this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes; b. The obligation to uphold and defend the reputation and image of the Confucius Institutes; c. The obligation to accept

both supervision from and assessments made by the Headquarters.

36. The Confucius Institute Headquarters reserves the right to pursue legal action to affix responsibility and invoke punitive consequences on any person/party for any of the following conduct: a. The establishment of a Confucius Institute without permission or authorization from the Confucius Institute Headquarters; b. Any activity conducted under the name of the Confucius Institutes without permission or authorization from the Confucius Institute Headquarters; c. Any violation of the Agreement or this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes that causes losses of capital or assets or damages or tarnishes the reputation of the Confucius Institutes.

Chapter 8: Supplement

37. Individual Confucius Institutes may constitute their own regulations and measures in accordance with this Constitution and By-Laws and submit to the Headquarters for archiving purpose.

38. This Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes shall be followed as guide for setting up and regulating Confucius Institute Classrooms.

39. The Confucius Institute Headquarters reserves the right to interpret this Constitution and By-Laws.

40. This Constitution and By-Laws shall go into effect from the date of approval set forth by the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters.

Appendix IV

Glossary

Beijing consensus: The phrase was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo to pose China's economic development model as an alternative — especially for developing countries — to the Washington Consensus.

CCP's Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group Meeting: The meeting was held in Beijing. In general, the General Secretary of the CCP will deliver an important address to outline China's foreign policy in the future.

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (abbreviated CPPCC) is a political advisory body in the PRC. The organization consists of delegates from a range of political parties and organizations, as well as independent members.

Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK): HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi, in Chinese), translated as the Chinese Proficiency Test, is China's national standardized test designed by the HSK Center of Beijing Language and Culture University to assess the Chinese language proficiency of non-native speakers.

Confucianism: The system of ethics, education, and statesmanship taught by Confucius and his disciples, stressing love for humanity, ancestor worship, reverence for parents, and harmony in thought and conduct.

Cultural diplomacy: A government attempts to manage the international environment by

spreading cultural resources and facilitating cultural transmission overseas.

Five-Year Plan of China: Five-Year Plan is a series of social and economic development initiatives. The CCP plays a leading role in establishing the foundations and principles of Chinese socialism, mapping strategies for national development, setting growth targets, and launching reforms.

Hanban: The Confucius Institute Headquarters, the colloquial abbreviation for the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi).

Hard power: A state uses the military and economic means to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies.

Harmonious world: The concept of a harmonious world is an extension of Hu's domestic policy into the arena of foreign relations.

National People's Congress: National People's Congress (abbreviated NPC) is the national legislature of the People's Republic of China. The NPC is structured as a unicameral legislature, with the power to legislate, the power to oversee the operations of the government, and the power to elect the major officials of state.

National Security Language Initiative: National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) is a program introduced by U.S. President George W. Bush in 2006 to develop the foreign language skills of American students, especially in foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Hindi, and Persian.

Peaceful Rise: This phase was advocated by Vice-President of Central Party School

Zheng Bijian. It holds that China can rise peacefully and the ascendance of China can be achieved without destabilizing the international order or threatening its neighbors.

Public diplomacy: The planned use of cultural, educational, and informational programming is used to achieve a government's foreign policy objectives.

Scientific development: The scientific development concept is the official guiding socio-economic ideology of China incorporating sustainable development, social welfare, a humanistic society, and, ultimately, the creation of a harmonious society.

Soft power: A state changes the behavior of another state by enticing them.

Three 800 Projects: Director General of Hanban Xu Lin stated in 2010 that Hanban will carry out “Three 800 Projects” in the U.S.—namely, inviting 800 U.S. high school and college students to participate in the “Chinese Bridge” summer camp; offering 800 U.S. teachers and students scholarships; and inviting 800 elementary and middle school district leaders to visit China.

References

Books

- Babbie, Earl. (2007) *The Practice of Social Research* (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth).
- Deng, Xiaoping. (1994) *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Dier Quan (Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume 2)* (Beijing: People's Publishing House).
- Ding, Sheng. (2008) *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power* (Lanham: Lexington Books).
- Ho, Min-chih. (2009) *Hu Jintao Shiji Zhonggong Wenhua Zhi Yanjiu Yi Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research of China's Cultural Diplomacy under Hu Jintao's Period—An Case Study of Confucius Institute)* (Taipei: Ming Chuan University Master Thesis).
- Hoare-Vance, Stephen J. (2009) *The Confucius Institutes and China's Evolving Foreign Policy* (University of Canterbury Master thesis).
- Hsieh, Yu-yen. (2008) *Dui Zhonggong Jiango Shijie Zhi Yanjin Yi Sheli Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research on China Building A Harmonious World – A Case Study of the Establishment of Confucius Institute)* (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis).
- Kumar, Ranjit. (2001) *Research Methodology: a step-by-step guide for beginners, 3rd Edition* (London: Sage Publications).
- Lai, Hongyi and Lu, Yiyi. (2012) *China's Soft Power and International Relations* (New York: Routledge).
- Li, Mingjiang, (ed.) (2012) *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham: Lexington-Rowman & Littlefield).
- Liu, Bai. (1983) *Cultural Policy in the People's Republic of China: Letting a hundred flowers blossom* (Paris: Imprimerie des Presses Universitaires).
- Liu, Youling. (2011) *External Communication as a Vehicle for Disseminating Soft Power: A Study of China's Efforts to Strengthen its Cultural Soft Power in the Era of Globalization* (Buffalo: The State University of New York at Buffalo PhD Dissertation).
- Malone, Gifford D. (1998) *Organizing the Nation's Public Diplomacy* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia).

Mark, Simon. (2009) *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy* (Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’).

Nye, Joseph S. (1990) *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books).

_____. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs).

_____. (2011) *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs).

Pan, Su-Yan. (2013) *Confucius Institute project: China's cultural diplomacy and soft power projection* (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Institute of Education).

Roberts, Priscilla, (ed.) (2014) *Going Soft? The US and China Go Global* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press).

Rust V. (2010) *Policy and Practices on Quality Assurance and Global Competitiveness in Higher Education: An International and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Rubin, Herbert J. and Rubin, Irene S. (2005) *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data, Second Edition* (London: Sage Publications).

Shambaugh, David. (2013) *China Goes Global* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Shambaugh, David and Yahuda, Michael. (2008) *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield).

Sheng, Ding. (2006) *Soft Power and the Rise of China: An Assessment of China's Soft Power in its Modernization Process* (New Jersey: The State University of New Jersey PhD Dissertation).

Stetar, Joseph. (2010) *The Higher Education, Policy, And The Global Competition Phenomenon* (Los Angeles: Palgrave Macmillan).

Sumananusorn, Olan. (2009) *China's Cultural Soft Power toward Thailand in the 21st Century: A Case Study of Confucius Institute* (Taipei: Chengchi University Master Thesis).

Yang, Yu-Sheng. (2009) *Zhonggong Waijiao Zhanlue Zhuanbian Yu Chuangxin*

2002-2008—*Ruanshili Waijiao Zhanlue De Fensi (China's Diplomatic Strategic Change and Innovation 2002-2008—Soft Power's Diplomatic Strategy)* (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis).

Ye, Shulan. (2010) *Rising China's Regional Policy in East Asia: A Constructivist Perspective* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University PhD Dissertation).

Yin, Robert K. (2002) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd Edition* (California: Sage Publications).

Wang, Jian. (2011) *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Whittaker, Shryll. (2013) *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives* (South Orange: Seton Hall University Master Thesis, 2013).

Zhou, Muriel M. (2011) *School-University Partnership in Teaching the Mandarin Chinese Language: The Confucius Institute Experience* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh PhD Dissertation).

Reports

Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. (2005) *Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State).

Confucius Institute of Minnesota. (2011) *2008–2009 Annual Report* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota).

_____. (2012) *2011–2012 Annual Report* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota).

_____. (2006) *2006 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanban).

_____. (2010) *2009 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanban).

_____. (2011) *2011 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanban).

_____. (2013) *2013 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanban).

_____. (2014) *2014 Annual Report* (Beijing: Hanban).

The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo. (2010) *The Confucius Institute at the*

University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2010 (Buffalo: The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo).

_____. (2011) *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2011* (Buffalo: The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo).

_____. (2012) *The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo: Annual Report 2012* (Buffalo: The Confucius Institute at the University at Buffalo).

The Confucius Institute at the University of Utah. (2010) *Confucius Institute at the university of Utah 2010 Annual Report* (Salt Lake City: The Confucius Institute at the University of Utah).

Periodicals

Aldrich, John. (2014) "How Do Americans View the Rising China?" *Journal of Contemporary China*, pp. 203-221

Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan. (2014) "A Spoiled Anniversary: China Reacts to Confucius Institute Controversy," *China Brief*, Vol.14, Issue 19, pp.1-3.

Breslin, Shaun. (2011) "The Soft Notion of China's Soft Power," *Asia Programme Paper*, pp.1-18.

Cai, Liang and Song, Lilei. (2010) "Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanqiu Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua" (Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), *Guoji Zhanwang (International Prospect)*, Vol. 9, pp. 38-49.

Chao, Chien-Min and Hsu, Chih-chia. (2009) "Zhonggong Di Sidai Lingdao Jiti de Hexie Shijieguan Lilun yu Yihan" (China's Harmonious World: Theory and Significance) *Yuanjing Jijinhui Jikan (Prospect Quarterly)*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.1-44.

Cho, Young Nam and Jeong, Jong Ho. (2008) "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 453-472.

DeLisle, Jacques. (2010) "Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Competition and U.S. Policy," *ORBIS*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 493-524.

Deng, Zhong-Jian and Lu, Yu-Nu (2008). "Zhongguo Dalu Ruanquanli De Fazhan yu

Yingxiang” (The Development and Influence of China’s Soft Power), *Quanqiu Zhengzhi Pinglun (Review of Global Politics)*, Vol. 21, pp.1-18.

Ding, Sheng. (2008) “To Build A Harmonious World: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 193-213.

Ding, Sheng and Saunders, Robert A. (2006) “Talking up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language,” *East Asia*, No.2, pp. 3-33.

Ding, Zhongyi and Wei, Xing. (2011) “Kongzi Xueyuan: Zhongguo Guojia Ruanshili Jianshe de Youxiao Pingtai” (Confucius Institute: China’s Soft Power Construction), *Lilun yu Gaige (Theory and Reform)*, Vol. 5, pp.122-125.

Flew, Terry and Hartig, Falk. (2014) “Confucius Institutes and the Network Communication Approach to Public Diplomacy,” *The IAFOR Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 27-44.

Flyvbjerg, Bent. (2006) “Five Misunderstandings about Case Study Research,” *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 1-35.

Fu, Liping and Li, Gang. (March 2011) “Kongzi Xueyuan Yu Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Tisheng” (Confucius Institute and the Ascending of the Cultural Soft Power of China), *Nanjing Xiaozhuang Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Nanjing Xiaozhuang College)*, Vol. 2, pp. 97-102.

Gao, Hong. (2011) “An Analysis of the Phenomenon of Global Mandarin Fever,” *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. 253-257.

Gill, Bates. and Huang, Yanzhong. (2006) “Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 17-36.

Gill, Jeffrey. (2008) “The Promotion of Chinese Language Learning and China’s Soft Power,” *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 116-122.

Gonzalez, Mike. (2015) “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” *The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #2986 on Asia and the Pacific*, pp. 1-14.

Guo, Qiumei and Lu, Yong. (2011) “Kongzi Xueyuan de Guojia Wenhua Ruanshili Yanjiu” (Soft Power of National Culture of Confucius Institute), *Journal of Harbin University*, Vol.32, No. 3, pp. 23-27.

Hanban. (2012) “Liu Yandong Attends the Awarding Ceremony of the Fifth “Chinese Bridge” Chinese Proficiency Competition for International Students in China,” *Confucius Institute Bimonthly*, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 6-8.

_____. (2008) “The 3rd National Chinese Language Conference Held in Washington,” *Confucius Institute Bimonthly*, Vol. 8, pp. 14-15.

Hao, Chuan. (2013) “Legal Consideration on the Confucius Institute Development Process,” *Higher Education of Social Science*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 16-19.

Hartig, Falk. (2012) “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies*, Vol. 17, pp. 53-76.

Hong, Junhao. (1994) “Mao Zedong’s Cultural Theory and China’s Three Mass-Culture Debates: A Tentative Study of Culture, Society and Politics,” *Intercultural Communication Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 87-104.

Hong, Xiao-nan and Lin, Dan. (2011) “Kongzi Xueyuan De Fazhan Licheng Yu Wenhua Yiyun,” (The Evolution of the Confucius Institute and Its Cultural Implication), *Culture Journal*, No. 5, pp. 30-41.

Huang, Lianying. (2011) “Guonei Xuezhe Kongzi Xueyuan Yanjiu de Wenxian Zongshu” (Chinese Scholars Literature on Confucius Institute), *Oriental Enterprise Culture (Dongfang Qiye Wenhua)*, Issue 8, pp. 173-174.

Hughes, Christopher R. (2014) “Confucius Institutes and the university: distinguishing the political mission from the cultural,” *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 45-83.

Hydson, Valerie, (ed.) (1999) “Culture Is More than a Static Residual: Introduction to the Special Section on Culture and Foreign Policy,” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 667-675.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. (June, 2006) “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” *Policy Brief*, Vol. 47, pp. 2-8.

Lai, Hongyi. (2006) "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power," *EAI Background Brief*, No. 308, p. 7.

Li, Defang. (2012) "Zhongguo Wenhua Waijiao Moshi Jiangou—Yi Kongzi Xueyuan Weili," (The Construction of China's Cultural Diplomatic Model – A Case Study of Confucius Institute), *Contemporary World*, pp. 103-107.

Li, His-Chang, (ed.) (2009) "Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network," *The Learning Organization*, Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 469-482.

Li, Hsi Chang, Mirmirani, Sam and Ilacqua, Joseph A. (2009) "Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network," *The Learning Organization*, Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 469-482.

Li, Jinhua. (2013) "The Implication of Cultural Soft Power by the Confucius Institute," *Journal of Fujian Institute of Socialism*, Vol. 3, No. 96, pp. 46-49.

Li, Mingjiang. (2008) "China Debates Soft Power," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, pp. 287-308.

Li, Shuai. and Zhang, Yanyin. (2013) "A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education," *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association*, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 29-53.

Li, Xin and Worm, Verner. (2009) "Building China's Soft power for a Peaceful Rise," Asia Research Centre, CBS, *Copenhagen Discussion Papers*, Vol. 28, pp. 1-27.

Lijphart, Arend. (1971) "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 682-693.

Lin, Da-cheung. (2013) "Meiguo Kongzi Xueyuan Dui Zhongguo Chukou Maoyi de Yingxiang: Jiyu Meiguo Gezhou de Fenxi"(The Confucius Institute Influence American Export Trade—An Analysis of States of the America), *Shanghai Jinrong Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Shanghai Finance University)*, No. 115, pp. 98-107.

Link, Perry. (1987) "The Limits of Cultural Reform in Deng Xiaoping's China," *Modern China*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 115-176.

Liu, Guangbing. (2011) Kongzi Xueyuan Banxue Jizhi Ji Fazhan Celue

Chutan,” (A Study on Establishing Mechanism and Developmental Strategy of Confucius Institutes), *Hubei Normal University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, Vol. 31, No. 5, pp.123-125.

Lo, Joe Tin-yau and Pan, Suyan. (2014) “Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes” *A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, pp.1-21.

Lum, Thomas, (ed.) (2008) “China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” *CRS Report for Congress*, pp.1-24.

Lynch, Daniel C. (2013) “Securitizing Culture in Chinese Foreign Policy Debates: Implications for Interpreting China’s Rise,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 629-652.

Men, Honghua. (2007) “Zhongguo Ruanshili Pinggu Baogao” (Chinese Soft Power Assessment Report), *Guoji Guancha (International Observation)* Vol. 2, pp. 15-26.

Mosher, Steven W. (2012) “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics,” *Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, pp. 1-8.

Ngamsang, Sirirat and Walsh, John. (2013) “Confucius Institutes as Instruments of Soft Power: Comparison with International Rivals,” *Journal of Education and Vocational Research*, Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 302-310.

Paradise, James F. (2009) “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 647-665.

Pan, Su-Yan. (2013) “The Confucius Institute Project: China’s Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection,” *Asian Education and Development Studies*, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 22-33.

Schmidt, Heather. (2013) “China’s Confucius Institutes and the “Necessary White Body,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 647-668.

Schmidt, Peter. (2010) “At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries about Academic Freedom,” *Faculty*, pp. 1-6.

Stambach, Amy. (2014) “Confucius Institute Programming in the United States: Language Ideology, Hegemony, and the Making of Chinese Culture in University Classes,”

Anthropology & Education Quarterly, Vol. 46, Issue 1, pp. 55-70.

Sun, Ling-Jun. (2012) “Zhongguo Chuantong Wenhua Zouchuqu Yu Guojia Ruanshili De Tisheng—Jianlun Kongzi Xueyuan De Zhongyao Zuoyong” (Chinese Traditional Culture Going out to Improve the National Soft Power—On the Important Role of the Confucius Institute), *Journal of Shandong Academy of Governance*, No. 5, pp. 131-133.

Tang, Jiang-Yu. (2008) “Jiangou Zhong de Hexie Shijie: Hexie Shijie Linian de Jiangou Zhuyi Jiedu” (Harmonious World in Construction—An Observation of the Concept of Harmonious World from the Perspective of Constructivism), *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations)*, Vol. 3, pp. 7-12.

Wang, Danping and Bob, Adamson. (2014) “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” *The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 225-234.

Wang, Yanwei. (2013) “Kongzi Xueyuan De Liyi Xiangguanfang Ji Qi Hudong Guanxi: Yige Fenxi Kuangjia,” (The Interactions between the Confucius Institute’s Stakeholders: An Analytical Framework) *Yunnan Normal University*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 74-81.

Wang, Rui. (2011) “Lun Kongzi Xueyuan Jianshe de Shidai Beijing yu Wenhua Yiyi” (Historical background and Cultural Significance of Confucius Institute) *Shenyang Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Shenyang Normal University)*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 136-138.

Wei Xuemei. (2010) “Dui Tisheng Zhongguo Ruanshili de Sikao: Yi Dui Feizhou Yuanzhu Wei Shijiao” (Thought on Promoting China's Soft Strength: from the Perspective of Aiding to Africa), *Fujian Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Fujian Administration Institute)*, Vol. 4, pp. 66-71.

Wen, Tseng. (2007) “The Study on China’s Wide-Spread Confucius Institutes—An Analysis of Soft Power,” *Genamics Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 1-11.

Willnat, Lars, (ed.) (2012) “American Perceptions of China and the Chinese: Do The Media Matter?” *The 65th Annual Meeting of the World Association for Public Opinion Research*, Hong Kong, pp. 1-40.

Wuthnow, Joel. (2008) “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,”

Issues & Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 1-28.

Yu, Xintian. (2007) "The Role of Soft Power in China's External Strategy," *Global Review*, pp. 113-127.

_____. (2008) "Soft Power Construction and China's Foreign Strategy," *International Studies*, Vol. 2, pp. 15-20.

Zhang, Baohui. (2010) "Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Trends and Implications," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 39-68

Zhang, Dian-Jun. (2013) "Dangdai Zhongguo Wenhua Waijiao Zhanlue De Lishi Shanbian," (Historical Evolution of Contemporary China's Cultural Diplomatic Strategy), *Journal of Tianjin Administration Institute*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 57-65.

Zhang, Xiping. (2007) "Jianlun Kongzi Xueyuan De Ruanshili Gongneng," (Soft Power Function of Confucius Institute), *Shijie Hanyu Jiaoxue* (World Chinese Language Teaching), Vol. 1, pp. 3-5.

Zhang, Xiaoling. (2008) "China as an Emerging Soft Power: Winning Hearts and Minds through Communicating with Foreign Republic," *Discussion Paper 35*, pp. 1-18.

Zhao, Hongqin and Huang, Jianbin. (2010) "China's Policy of Chinese as a Foreign Language and the Use of Overseas Confucius Institutes," *Educ Res Policy Prac*, Vol. 9, pp. 127-142.

Zhou, Tong. (March 2013) "Kongzi Xueyuan De Fazhan Dui Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Yingxiang," (The Impact of China's Cultural Soft Power by the Development of Confucius Institute), *Popular Science*, Vol. 15, No. 163, pp. 168-170.

Zou, Keyuan. (2012) "Building a Harmonious World: A Mission Impossible?" *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 74-99.

Internet

"13th Chinese Bridge Chinese Language Competition, Confucius Institute at Maryland,"

<http://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institute-maryland/13th-chinese-bridge-chinese-language-competition>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

"A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power," *The Economist*,

December 22, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/14678507>>(accessed April 20, 2013).

“About the Confucius Institute at UK,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky Website*, <http://www.uky.edu/international/About%20the%20Confucius%20Institute%20at%20UK>>(accessed April 13, 2015).

“About the Institute,” <http://www.confuciusinstituteinchicago.com/about>>(accessed July 7, 2015).

“About Us,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago Website*, <http://confuciusinstitute.uchicago.edu/about-us>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

“About Us,” *Confucius Institute at Wayne State University Website*, <http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/AbouttheConfuciusInstitute>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

“About Us,” *Confucius Institute at Mason*, <http://confucius.gmu.edu/aboutus.cfm#culturalActivities>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

“About us,” *Confucius Institute Online*, September 27, 2011, http://english.chinese.cn/article/2011-09/27/content_342613.htm>(accessed June 2, 2014)

Adams, William and Zha, Daojiong, “A Lot of Active Cooperation Going on,” *A China File Conversation*, July 10, 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes>>(accessed December 1, 2015).

“Annual Events & Activities,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky Website*, http://www.uky.edu/international/annual_events>(accessed April 13, 2015).

“Annual Minnesota Chinese Language Teachers Conference,” http://confucius.umn.edu/teachers/pd/annual_teacher_mtg/index.html>(accessed June 23, 2015).

“Background & History,” *Confucius Institute at Wayne State University Website*, <http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/BackgroundHistory>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

Bandurski, David. “Culture and the 18th Party Congress,” *China Media Project*,

November 16, 2012, <<http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/11/16/28955/>>(accessed September 1, 2015).

Beijing Daxue Zhongguo Ruan Shili Ketizu (Chinese Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University), “Ruanshili Zai Zhongguo De Shijian Zhi Yi—Ruanshili Gainian,” (One of the Practice of Soft Power in China—the Concept of Soft power), People’s Daily Online, March 5, 2008, <<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/6957188.htm>>(accessed to March 3, 2014).

Blazkowska, Joanna. “Country Profiles: China,” <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_03-01.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2015).

Buckley, Chris. “Xi Pays Homage to Confucius, a Figure Back in Favor,” *The New York Times*, November 26, 2013, <<http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/xi-pays-homage-to-confucius-a-figure-back-in-favor/#more-3056>>(accessed March 30, 2016).

Cao, Diefeng. “Introduction to the Development Plan of Confucius Institute,” September 29, 2013, <<http://www.wku.edu/ci/developmentplanforci.pptx>>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).

“Center for East Asian Studies 2010,” *The Confucius Institute at Stanford University Web site*, <http://ceas.stanford.edu/docs/horizons/HORIZONS_2010.pdf>(accessed June 23, 2015).

Chey, Jocelyn. “Cultural Diplomacy and Australia-China Cultural Relations,” *AIIA NSW Branch Charteris Lecture*, July 20, 2010, <www.aiaa.asn.au/resources/papers-a-transcripts> (accessed September 1, 2015).

“China and the University of Michigan,” *Confucius Institute at University of Michigan Website*, <<http://www.confucius.umich.edu/about/china>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

“China Corner,” <<http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/China-Corner.>> (accessed Feb 2, 2015).

“China Says U.S. Directive on Confucius Institutes May Harm Friendship,” *Xinhua New Agency*, May 24, 2012, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/24/c_123187293.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014).

“China’s President Hu Jintao In Chicago: Visits City’s Confucius Institute Friday,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/21/chinas-president-hu-jinta_n_812090.html>(accessed September 25, 2014).

Chinese Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University, “The Practice of Soft Power in China—the Concept of Soft power,” *People’s Daily Online*, March 5, 2008, <<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/6957188.htm>>(accessed September 25, 2014).

“Chinese Language Courses,” *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website*, <<http://www.international.umd.edu/cim/246>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

“Chinese language courses,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Kentucky Website*, <http://www.uky.edu/international/language_courses>(accessed April 13, 2015).

“CIUC Holds Forum Discussing Chinese Foreign Policy and US-China Relations,” *Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago Website*, <<http://confuciusinstitute.uchicago.edu/ciuc-holds-forum-discussing-chinese-foreign-policy-and-us-china-relations>>(accessed June 23, 2015).

Confucius Institute, “Spring 2011 Chinese Language and Culture Classes,” <http://www.confucius.ku.edu/language_classes_spring_2011.shtml>(accessed March 3, 2014).

“Confucius Institute at Michigan State University,” *Confucius Institute at Michigan State University Website*, <<http://en.crtvu.edu.cn/confucius-institute>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

“Confucius Institute at Portland State University,” *Confucius Institute at Portland State University Website*,

<[http://www.google.com.tw/?gws_rd=cr&ei=xKsqUuWYBIXSkwWKwoHwBg#q=The+Confucius+Institute+at+Portland+State+University+\(CI-PSU\)](http://www.google.com.tw/?gws_rd=cr&ei=xKsqUuWYBIXSkwWKwoHwBg#q=The+Confucius+Institute+at+Portland+State+University+(CI-PSU))>(accessed July 7, 2015).

“Confucius Institute at San Diego State University,” *Confucius Institute at San Diego State University Website*, <http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_8349.htm>(accessed July 7, 2015).

“Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland,” *Hanban Website*, <http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_8399.htm>(accessed March 3, 2014).

The Confucius Institute at the University of Utah, *Confucius Institute at the University of Utah* 2010 Annual Report, <http://confucius-institute.utah.edu/documents/docs/organization-1721-1311089133.pdf> >(accessed March 3, 2014).

“Confucius Institute Founded,” http://ceas.stanford.edu/docs/horizons/HORIZONS_2010.pdf>(accessed June 23, 2015).

“Confucius Institute University of Minnesota, 2011-2012 Annual Report: Promoting the study of Chinese language and culture throughout Minnesota,” http://confucius.umn.edu/about/annual_reports/2011-12_CIUMN_report.pdf >(accessed July 7, 2015).

“Confucius Institute Update,” *Penn State College of Liberal Arts*, October 1, 2014, <http://www.la.psu.edu/news/confucius-institute-update>>(accessed December 2, 2015).

Editorial Board, “The price of Confucius Institutes,” *The Washington Post*, June 21, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-confucius-institutes/2014/06/21/4d7598f2-f7b6-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html>(accessed January 2, 2016).

Eferighe, Joshua. “GW opens doors to China with Confucius Institute,” *The Washington Times*, April 10, 2013, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/10/gw-opens-doors-to-china-with-confucius-institute/>>(accessed September 25, 2014).

Efthymiou, Pavlos. “Chinese Soft Power: Sources And Implications For The US,” December 21, 2012, <http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sources-andimplications-for-the-us/> >(accessed April 4, 2014).

“Events Archive,” *The Confucius Institute at Stanford University Web site*, http://www.stanford.edu/dept/asianlang/cgi-bin/confucius_institute/events_archive.php?ay=2010-2011>(accessed June 23, 2015).

“Excerpts from feedbacks of Arkansas High School Students,” *Confucius Institute at University of Central Arkansas Website*, <http://uca.edu/confucius/excerpts-from-feedbacks/>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

Feith, David. “China’s Beachhead in American Schools,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May

26, 2014,
<<http://online.wsj.com/articles/david-feith-chinas-beachhead-in-u-s-schools-1401124980>
>(accessed February 1, 2015).

Feldscher, Kyle. "President Obama wants 1 million Americans learning Chinese by 2020,"
Washington Examiner, September 25, 2015,
<<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-wants-1-million-americans-learning-chinese-by-2020/article/2572865>>(accessed February 1, 2015).

"First Confucius Institute in the U.S.," *Inside Confucius*, April 23, 2013,
<<http://wkujournalism.com/insideconfucius/?p=534>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

Fischer, Karin. "State Department Directive Could Disrupt Teaching Activities of
Campus-Based Confucius Institutes," *the Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 21, 2012,
<<http://chronicle.com/article/State-Department-Directive/131934>>(accessed December 2,
2015).

"Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 18th Party Congress," *Xinhua*, November 17,
2012, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_7.htm
>(accessed October 1, 2014).

"Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress," *Beijing Time*, December 10,
2002,
<http://www.bjreview.com/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/10/content_79209_5.htm>(accessed
December 1, 2015).

Garcia, Evan. "Scholarly Subversion or Innocuous Instruction? The Confucius Institute
Debate," *Chicago Tonight*, January 19, 2015,
<<http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/01/19/scholarly-subversion-or-innocuous-instruction>
>(Access to January 2, 2016) (accessed January 2, 2016).

Geegan, Sarah. "UKCI Named 2012 Confucius Institute of the Year,"
<http://www.uky.edu/international/CI_of_the_Year>(accessed April 13, 2015).

_____. "UK's Confucius Institute sends 29 professors to China; program promotes
China literacy," *KyForward*, August 14, 2013,
<<http://www.kyforward.com/our-universities/2013/08/14/uks-confucius-institute-sends-29-professors-to-china-program-promotes-china-literacy/>>(accessed April 13, 2015).

Gioia, Michael. "Forbes accuses Stanford of collaborating with Chinese spies via Confucius Institute," *University Wire*, December 24, 2014, <http://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/10/24/forbes-accuses-stanford-of-collaborating-with-chinese-spies-via-confucius-institute/>>(accessed January 23, 2016).

"Global Image of the United States and China," *Pew Research*, July 18, 2013, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/global-image-of-united-states-and-china/>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

Gonzalez, Mike. "China's Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC," <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/chinas-public-opinion-warfare-how-our-culture-industry-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-prc>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

Grossman, Ron. ed. "China-run Confucius Institutes under fire in U.S. schools, like CPS," *Tribune Business News*, December 5, 2014, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-confucius-institute-hearing-met-20141204-story.html>>(accessed March 3, 2016).

Hartig, Falk. "Confucius Institutes—Quo Vadis?" *The Diplomat*, October 21, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/confucius-institutes-quo-vadis/>>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).

Hanban, "About Confucius Institute," *Hanban Website*, http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm>(accessed March 29, 2016).

Hanban, "Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes," *Hanban Website*, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm>(accessed March 2, 2016).

Hanban, "Confucius Institutes Worldwide Celebrate Confucius Institute Day," *Hanban Website*, October 10, 2014, http://english.hanban.org/article/2014-10/16/content_557341.htm>(accessed September 2, 2015).

Hanban, "Xi Jinping: Confucius Institutes serve as important platforms to help the world know China," *Hanban website*, October 28, 2015, http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-10/28/content_620866.htm>(accessed March 30, 2016).

Hu, Helen. "Controversial Confucius Institute Promotes Understanding of Chinese Culture," *Diverse*, December 25, 2015, <http://diverseeducation.com/article/50223/>><http://diverseeducation.com/article/50223/>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

Hu, Jintao. "Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress," *Xinhua News Agency*, October 25, 2007, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>>(accessed October 1, 2014).

Hubbert, Jennifer. "Ambiguous States: Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power in the U.S. Classroom," *Academia.Edu*, http://www.academia.edu/8957882/Ambiguous_States_Confucius_Institutes_and_Chinese_Soft_Power_in_the_U.S._Classroom>(accessed March 28, 2016).

"Introduction to the Confucius Institutes," August 29, 2009, http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22308.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014).

"Jiang Zemin's Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Xinhua News Agency*, November 7, 2002, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/48352.htm>>(accessed December 1, 2015).

Jones, Olivia. "UK Confucius Institute Recognized Internationally," *Kentucky kernel Campus News*, January 16, 2013, <http://kykernel.com/2013/01/16/uk-confucius-institute-recognized-internationally/>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

"K-12 Outreach," *Confucius Institute at Wayne State University Website*, <http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/K-12-Outreach>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

Kang, Hyungseok. "Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: International Cultural Politics of Soft Power and the Creative Economy," p. 3. <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2011-08-loam/Reframing-Cultural-Diplomacy-International-Cultural-Politics-of-Soft-Power-and-the-Creative-Economy-Hyungseok-Kang.pdf>>(accessed September 1, 2015).

Kluver, Randy. Introduction: The Confucius Institute as a communicative phenomenon, *China Media Research*, 2014; 10(1),

<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Introduction%3A+The+Confucius+Institute+as+a+communicative+phenomenon.-a0361847636>>(accessed December 1, 2015).

“Language and Culture Summer Camp,” *Confucius Institute at Michigan State University Website*,
<http://www.experiencechinese.com/index.php/programs/summer-camp>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

Lee, Gregory. “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes PART II,” *China File Conversation*, July 1, 2014,
<http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes-part-ii>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

Lee, Vine. “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes in the US,” *Foreign Policy*, July 11, 2014,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/the_debate_over_confucius_institutes
>.

Levine, Stephen; Mecacci, Matteo; Hill, Michael; Zha Daojiong, Hanson, Stephen; Gallagher, Mary. “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes in the United States,” *Foreign Policy*, July 11, 2014,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/the_debate_over_confucius_institutes
>(accessed January 2, 2016).

Liu, Cindy, (ed.) “A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,” *China Daily USA*, May 30, 2014,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed December 1, 2015).

“Loh Attends Confucius Institute Meetings in China,” *University of Maryland Website*, November 11, 2013,
<http://www.umdrightnow.umd.edu/news/loh-attends-confucius-institute-meetings-china>
>(accessed March 3, 2014).

“Madam Xu’s Party Line; Beijing confirms that Confucius Institutes subvert Western academic freedom,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 25, 2015,
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/madam-xus-party-line-1419375797>>(accessed March 3, 2016).

Marquand, Robert. "Academic flap turns up heat on China's Confucius Institutes," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 22, 2014, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0822/Academic-flap-turns-up-heat-on-China-s-Confucius-Institutes>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

Mathews, Mackenzie. "Confucius instructors teach students in Detention Center," *Wkuherald*, April 16, 2014, <http://wkuherald.com/news/article_612fb5c0-c5b7-11e3-a9af-001a4bcf6878.html>(accessed March 28, 2016).

Mattis, Peter. "Reexamining the Confucian Institutes," *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2012, <<http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

McCord, Edward A. "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom; Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend," February 15, 2014, <<http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/response-to-sahlins-6.pdf>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, "Xi Jinping Visits Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand," December 24, 2011, <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t891076.htm>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

"Mission and History," *The Confucius Institute at UW-Platteville*, <<https://www.uwplatt.edu/confucius/mission-and-history>>(accessed May 1, 2015).

Mosher, Steven W. "Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics," *Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, March 28, 2012, <<http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics>>(accessed December 1, 2015).

"New," *Confucius Institute at San Diego State University Website*, <<http://confucius.sdsu.edu/news.html>>(accessed July 7, 2015).

"New," *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website*, <<http://www.international.umd.edu/cim/5092>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

Nye, Joseph S. "Soft Power and Higher Education,"

<http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffp0502s.pdf>> (accessed April 3, 2015).

Nuland, Victoria. “State Department Daily Press Briefing,” *U.S. Department of State*, May 24, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/05/190847.htm#CHINA>>(accessed December 1, 2015).

“Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development Plan during the National “12th Five Year Plan” Period, *China Copyright and Media*, February 16, 2012, <http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/02/16/outline-of-the-cultural-reform-and-development-plan-during-the-national-12th-five-year-plan/>>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).

Palit, Parama Sinha. “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes,” *China Research Center*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013), <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/>>(accessed December 1, 2015).

“Proposal to establish a UWM Confucius Institute,” <https://www.google.com.tw/#q=UWM+Confucius+Institute>>(accessed February 2, 2015).

Pui, Shiau. *The Confucius Institute at Stanford University Web Site*, January 10, 2013, oia.stanford.edu/node/14779>(accessed June 23, 2015).

Qu, Yingpu; Zhao, Huanxin; and Cheng, Yingqi. “Confucius Institutes go beyond borders,” *China Daily*, December 2, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/02/content_15978436.htm>(accessed September 25, 2014).

Rawnsley, Gary. “Limits of China’s Cultural Diplomacy,” *China Policy Institute*, October 23, 2013, <http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/10/23/limits-of-chinas-cultural-diplomacy/>>(accessed May 1, 2014).

Redden, Elizabeth. “Chinese-funded institutes raise concerns on U.S. campuses,” *Inside Higher Education*, January 4, 2012, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/story/2012-01-04/chinese-funded-instit>

[utes-us-colleges/52378280/1>\(accessed June 23, 2015\).](#)

_____. “Confucius Controversies,” *Inside Higher ED*, July 24, 2014,

<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/24/debate-renews-over-confucius-institutes>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

_____. “Confucius Says ...,” *Inside Higher Ed*, July 24, 2014,

<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities>>(accessed March 28, 2016).

_____. “Rejecting Confucius funding,” *Inside Higher Ed*, April 29,

2014, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/29/chicago-faculty-object-their-campus-confucius-institute>>(accessed December 2, 2015).

Rosen, Stanley; Berry, Michael; Cai, Jindong; and Melvin, Sheila. “Xi Jinping’s Culture Wars,” *China File Conversation*, November 12, 2014,

<https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/xi-jinpings-culture-wars>>(accessed March 30, 2016).

Sahlins, Marshall. “China U.,” *The Nation*, October 29, 2013, <

<http://www.thenation.com/print/article/176888/china-u> 2013/11/3>(accessed June 23, 2015).

Schmidt, Peter. “At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries About Academic Freedom,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 17, 2010,

http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/Events-News/Article-Detail.php?art_uid=2433>(accessed March 3, 2014).

“Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago,” *Chicago News*, September 25, 2014,

<http://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confucius-institute-university-chicago>>(accessed December 2, 2015).

Sun, Hao. “U.S. State Department clarifies directive on Confucius Institutes,” *Xinhua*, May 25, 2012,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-05/25/c_123187508.htm>(accessed December 2, 2015).

“The Confucius Institute at the University of Michigan: 2010-2011 in Review,” *Confucius*

Institute at University of Kentucky Website,
<http://www.confucius.umich.edu/uploads/EiyZeEcUkGm9cmdM5uqA>>(accessed December 2, 2015).

“The Mission,” *Confucius Institute at Wayne State University Website,*
<http://clas.wayne.edu/ci/mission>>(accessed May 1, 2015)..

“The price of Confucius Institutes,” *The Washington Post*, June 21, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-confucius-institutes/2014/06/21/4d7598f2-f7b6-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html>(accessed May 1, 2015).

“The Second Executive Workshop for Confucius Institute Directors 2010- Learning from each other and making progress together,” *XMU Newsletter*, April 26, 2011,
http://ice.xmu.edu.cn/english/showletter.aspx?news_id=2830>(accessed May 1, 2015).

Thorpe, Becca. “The Future of Confucius Institutes in the U.S.,” *Pulitzer Center*, March 5, 2015,
<http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/united-states-china-confucius-institutes-academic-free-dom-culture-sharp-seminar>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

Tiezzi, Shannon. “The Future of China’s Confucius Institutes,” *The Diplomat*, September 30, 2014,
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-future-of-chinas-confucius-institutes/>>(accessed January 2, 2016).

“University of Maryland – Confucius Institute at Maryland (CIM),” *Office of International Affairs at University of Maryland Website,*
<http://college-park.cylex-usa.com/company/university-of-maryland---the-confucius-institute-at-maryland--cim--18231912.html>>(accessed March 3, 2014).

“US directive on Confucius Institutes may harm ties,” *China Daily*, May 25, 2012,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-05/25/content_15382955.htm>(accessed March 3, 2014).

Wang, Hui. “Criticism of Confucius Institutes unfair,” *China Daily*, October 30, 2014,
http://chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-10/30/content_18825648.htm>(accessed March 23, 2015).

“World University Rankings 2012-2013,”

<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking>>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).

“Xi Jinping’s Talks at the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art,” *China Copyright and Media*, October 16, 2014, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/xi-jinpings-talks-at-the-beijing-forum-on-literature-and-art/>>(accessed March 30, 2016) .

Xian, Wen. “Learning while teaching - the Confucius Institute win-win,” *People’s Daily Online*, May 20, 2014, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0520/c98649-8729640.html>>(accessed March 30, 2016) .

XMU Newsletter, “The Second Executive Workshop for Confucius Institute Directors 2010- Learning from Each Other and Making Progress Together,” April 26, 2011, http://ice.xmu.edu.cn/english/showletter.aspx?news_id=2830>(accessed March 3, 2014).

Zhang Guozuo, “Tisheng Woguo Wenhua Ruanshili de Zhanlue Sikao” (The Strategic Thinking of Enhancing China’s Cultural Soft Power), *Qiushi* (Seeking Truth), April 4, 2011, http://www.qstheory.cn/tbzt/sqjlz/zgtsshzywh/qshqwg/201104/t20110427_78521.htm> (accessed September 25, 2014).

Zhang, Pengfei, “China Commemorates Confucius with High-profile Ceremony,” *Xinhua*, September 25, 2014, <http://english.cntv.cn/2014/09/25/ARTI1411604274108319.shtml>> (accessed March 30, 2016).

Zhang, Qidong. “Stanford dean: Builds bridges with CI,” *China Daily*, April 4, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm?> (accessed June 23, 2015).

Zhao Pingping, “Interview with Nancy Romig, the senior project director at CI of MSU,” *CRIENGLISH.com*, August 3, 2009, <http://english.cri.cn/7106/2009/08/03/102s506143.htm>>(accessed April 3, 2015).

Zheng, Bijian. “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status>>(accessed September 1, 2015).