DSpace Community: 政治大學國際關係研究中心出版
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/68133
政治大學國際關係研究中心出版2024-03-28T09:36:02Z中國大陸媒體在數位時代的轉型:媒體「智庫化」研究
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147754
題名: 中國大陸媒體在數位時代的轉型:媒體「智庫化」研究; Transformation of the Mainland Chinese Media in the Digital Age: A Study on the Media Think-Tanks
摘要: 中國大陸媒體的「智庫化」轉型不失為應對數位技術衝擊、改變危局的一種探索。在這過程中,一些實踐路徑卻具有重建合法性的理論意義。為此,本文從合法性的理論視角出發,以沿海地區某報為個案,探討當下大陸媒體轉型過程中的合法性重構。研究發現,中國大陸媒體智庫角色的合法性重構體現於政策、認知、效用三個層面。政策層面上,興辦智庫既回應了政策性需求,也使媒體得以重新定位與政府的關係。認知層面上,在新角色的自我合法化過程中,記者編輯們除了表達對新角色的認同或不認同之外,還介入對新角色的主動定義。效用層面上,合法性表現為相關編輯記者通過「智庫化」轉型在職業安全感、額外資源、社會地位等方面所獲得的切實利益。本文結論指出,數位技術對中國大陸媒體構成真正衝擊和威脅的是,下位合法性,即以輿論監督為主要特色的「社會喉舌」功能的發揮,大陸媒體尤其是市場化機構媒體迫切需要重構下位合法性。正是在這種重構中,媒體掀起了「智庫化」轉型熱潮,各級政府部門成為最主要服務對象。相應地,以公共性為內核的下位合法性讓位於以公關性為內核的下位合法性。; Think-tank transformation of the media is thriving in Mainland China. How to interpret the phenomenon? Based on the theoretical perspective of legitimacy and using case study as research method, this article explores how the mainland media reconstruct their legitimacy in the process of the thinktank transformation. We argue that legitimacy reconstruction of mainland media is realized at three levels, i.e., political, cognitive, and pragmatic legitimacy. Politically, media’s think-tank transformation is encouraged and urged by the government; cognitively, media staff engages in the redefinition of their professional roles while adapting to the transformation; pragmatically, the journalists gain tangible personal benefits in the process which in turn have strengthened media legitimacy. We conclude that, in the process of legitimacy reconstruction, the media has turned themselves from a public service institution which emphasizes independence from power to a public relation institution which serves primarily the interest of the governments.2023-10-04T01:27:38Z習時期中共地方治術:省委常委調整與組成分析(2012~2022)
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147753
題名: 習時期中共地方治術:省委常委調整與組成分析(2012~2022); Does Economic Development Influence the Decision-Making of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Regarding Appointments and Adjustments of Provincial-Level Party Standing Committee Members?
摘要: 經濟發展績效是否影響中共省委常委的組成與調整?本文觀察習近平時期中共中央如何運用地方人事權治理地方。蒐整2012 年至2022 年省委常委資訊,本文觀察省委常委的中央下派與博士常委比例是否受到經濟績效的影響,並比較習兩任期的差異。統計結果指出,經濟發展績效越差會導致中央下派更多中央部委官員到地方任職,並任用更多的博士常委;此外,與習第一任期相比,習第二任期明顯較少下派中央官員,以及選任更多博士常委。進一步觀察省委人事與領導人考察之間的關係,分析發現一省有越多常委來自中央下派,習考察該省市的次數會顯著降低,顯示兩者或有互補效應。本文深化吾人對習時期中央地方關係之理解,也為將來分析習第三任期的地方治術提供了厚實基礎。; This article delves into the impact of economic development on the decisions of the Communist Party of China (CPC) regarding the selection and alteration of members within provincial-level Party standing committees. The study investigates how the CPC leverages its authority in personnel management to bolster local governance. By analyzing an exclusive dataset encompassing CPC provincial-level standing committee members from 2012 to 2022, this article assesses the repercussions of provincial economic growth on the adjustment of Party members within provincial-level standing committees. Specifically, the study examines the proportion of members appointed by the central government and the proportion of members holding doctoral degrees. The findings of the research indicate that a province with a lower economic growth rate tends to witness an increase in the percentage of its CPC standing committee members who have prior experience working within the central government before their current appointment. Additionally, a lower economic growth rate corresponds to a higher percentage of standing committee members possessing doctoral degrees within provincial-level CPC standing committees. Furthermore, the research also reveals that, in comparison to Xi’s first term, during Xi’s second term, the CPC significantly decreased the number of central officials dispatched to provincial governments while simultaneously promoting more officials with doctoral degrees to positions within Party provincial-level standing committees. Additional analysis suggests that in provinces with a higher representation of standing committee members originating from the central government, the likelihood of Xi Jinping conducting an inspection tour to that province diminishes. This observation suggests that personnel management serves as a compensatory measure for Xi’s direct inspections. This article not only contributes comprehensive research to deepen our comprehension of central-local relations within the Xi era but also establishes a foundation for future studies investigating how the central government strategically employs personnel management to enhance local governance during Xi’s third term.2023-10-04T01:27:18Z中共的反霸權論述:新時代與舊傳統
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147752
題名: 中共的反霸權論述:新時代與舊傳統; Anti-Hegemony Discourse of the Chinese Communist Party: The New Era and The Tradition
摘要: 十八大之後,中國奮發有為的外交風格常被視為中國積極謀求霸權的表現,但習近平又屢次提到中國堅決反對霸權主義,並強調「中國夢不是霸權夢」。不同於大多文獻忽略這一類主張的作法,本文認為反霸權論述非常重要,因為它不僅是包含中共世界觀的意識形態論述,也是中共對外塑造正當性的話語體系。 本文透過梳理中共反霸權論述的發展歷史,並對習近平的2486 篇講話進行文字探勘,以了解中共反霸權論述的意涵與意義。本文將比較江澤民、胡錦濤、習近平在十五大至二十大的報告文本,分析在奮發有為的外交新時代,反霸權論述將產生何種變化。 本文指出,中共語境中的霸權是強權政治的代名詞,反霸權論述是中共在外交領域具有實用主義色彩的意識形態論述,它由「反霸」和「不稱霸」兩部分內容構成,並且具有「變形蟲」特徵,會順應外交需要延伸其內涵。基於反霸權論述在時間軸上的分布,我們發現當中國與外界激烈對抗或中國需要建立國際形象時,反霸權論述就會增加,我們認為這意味著這套論述是服務於中共對外的對抗性需求與正當性需求。最後,在比較習近平與江澤民、胡錦濤的講話文本之後,本文發現習近平的講話中「不稱霸」的表述更加具體,整體的對抗性更強,並且明確了中國在「反霸」事業上領導者的角色。本文認為這是中國的外部環境與習近平個人因素共同作用的結果。; After Xi Jinping came to power, his assertive diplomatic style was seen as seeking hegemony. However, Xi Jinping reiterated that China resolutely opposed hegemony, and “the Chinese dream is not a dream of hegemony.” Unlike most literature that ignores such claims, this paper believes that the discourse on anti-hegemony is important because it represents not only an ideological discourse encompassing the Chinese Communist Party’s worldview but also a discourse system for the CCP to establish its legitimacy. This research reviews the history of the CCP’s anti-hegemony discourse and analyzes 2,486 speeches by Xi Jinping using text mining to understand the meaning and implications of the CCP’s anti-hegemony discourse. This paper also compares the report texts of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping from the 15th to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and analyzes how the anti-hegemony discourse has evolved in the new era of majorcountry diplomacy. This paper argues that within the context of the CCP, hegemony is synonymous with power politics, and the anti-hegemony discourse serves as a practical ideological discourse used by the CCP in the field of diplomacy. It consists of two parts: “anti-hegemony” and “non-hegemony”, and has the characteristics of “amoeba”, which will expand its connotation according to diplomatic needs. Based on the distribution of anti-hegemony discourses on the time axis, we found that when China is in fierce confrontation with other countries or China needs to establish a good international image, anti-hegemony discourses will increase. We believe that anti-hegemony discourses meet the CCP’s external confrontation and legitimacy needs. Finally, after comparing the speech texts of Xi Jinping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, the paper finds that the expression of “not seeking hegemony” in Xi Jinping’s speech is more specific, so the China’s leadership role in counter-hegemony becomes clearer. The paper suggests that this shift is influenced by China’s external environment and Xi Jinping’s personal factors.2023-10-04T01:27:02Z中共「二十大」與政治導向的菁英管理:習時期高層幹部懲罰案例分析
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147751
題名: 中共「二十大」與政治導向的菁英管理:習時期高層幹部懲罰案例分析; The CPC’s 20th National Congress and Elite Management with Political Orientation: An Analysis of Punishment Cases of Senior Officials during the Xi’s Era
摘要: 中共建政以來,「政治」乃是與中央保持一致的代名詞。領導人任內建立「政治標準」,除確保菁英與中央路線的一致性,更藉此控管菁英晉升,排除不合作者。因此歷任領導人經常透過組織、紀律甚至運動等工具來維繫路線。習近平接班後也建立個人政治導向的菁英管理模式,至中共「二十大」對高層領導幹部的「能上能下」建立新的標準。本文認為,這樣的標準,除了派系因素外,多數是習主政十年,藉由中央文件與對高層幹部紀律懲處逐步累積而來。本文透過文字探勘彙整習時期菁英落馬的依據,從大量文本中看出語彙間的關聯性,體現該技術對中共文件分析的貢獻,但可能忽略詞頻較低,詞彙網絡關係較弱者,因而在解讀上僅能呈現習近平對「廉潔」紀律的重視。倘若能抽出重大事件的個案進行探討,有利於讓文字探勘與傳統文本詮釋提供更完整的解釋功能。本文發現,中央懲處背後所要表達的政治標準,在於對黨的忠誠、意識形態信仰,以及腐敗背後所衍生對「黨的領導」的破壞。比如習近平以「談話調研」取代胡錦濤時期的「票決制」,除解決地方幹部賄選問題,也讓菁英甄補的目標從「新老交替」轉向強調「政治標準」,但「政治標準」可能導致幹部向上依附的慣性,不利於決策的理性化。; Since the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, “Zhengzhi”(政治) has been synonymous with aligning with the central authority. During their leadership tenure, they established “political criteria”(政治標準)to ensure consistency with the central route among the elite and also used this to control elite promotions and exclude incompatible collaborators. Therefore, past leaders often employed tools such as organization, discipline, and even movements to maintain the course. After Xi Jinping took over, he also established a personal political-oriented elite management model. He not only broke the age limits but also created new standards for elite promotion in the 20th national congress of the CCP. The article argues that such standards have mostly evolved over the past decade of Xi’s leadership, accumulating gradually through central documents and disciplinary actions against senior officials, with factional factors being a contributing factor. This article utilizes text mining to consolidate the basis for identifying fallen elites during the Xi’s era. It reveals the associations between vocabulary from a large corpus, demonstrating the contributions of this technique to the analysis of CCP documents. However, it may overlook words with lower frequency and weaker vocabulary network relationships, thus only highlighting Xi’s emphasis on “integrity” discipline in interpretation. If it is possible to select specific cases of significant events for investigation, it will be beneficial in enhancing the explanatory capabilities of both text mining and traditional text interpretation. This article finds that the political criteria underlying the Central Disciplinary Actions lie in loyalty to the party, ideological beliefs, and the erosion of “party leadership” stemming from corruption. For example, Xi Jinping replaced the “voting system”( 票決制)of the Hu Jintao era with “discussion and check”(談話調研)which not only addressed the issue of local officials engaging in bribery and election fraud but also shifted the focus of elite recruitment from “generational alternation”(新老交替) to emphasizing “political criteria”. However, the emphasis on “political criteria” may lead to the inertia of officials seeking upward patronage, which is not conducive to rational decision-making.2023-10-04T01:26:22Z