Experience and Rational External Constraint

Abstract

在〈一個真理與知識的融貫理論〉（”A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”）這篇文章中，戴維森提出一個關於知識的融貫理論。其中，他宣稱了一個著名的命題：「除了其他信念之外，沒有任何事物能做為持有一信念的理由。」在《心靈與世界》（”Mind and World”）一書裡，邁道爾（J. McDowell）批評說，戴維森的理論並未合理說明我們的信念與世界之間的關聯，也使得內容這個概念變得不可理解。本文試圖釐清這兩位哲學家關於感官經驗和經驗內容的爭議。我將指出，他們的爭執是在以下兩個論題上：第一，關於經驗思想所需的理性限制和外在限制是否可以分開處理？第二，關於經驗內容的說明是否在理論上優先於戴維森的基進詮釋理論？接著我將嘗試使他們的爭議有所進展。我將考量戴維森對邁道爾的反駁，然後從邁道爾的立場來對戴維森的意見提出兩點質疑：首先，從邁道爾的角度，戴維森所謂的經驗是非概念性的。這樣的經驗能否提供用以修正信念的理由，是令人存疑的。其次，戴維森用來說明內容的三角測量理論其實已經預設了內容這個概念。

In ”A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” Donald Davidson proposes a coherence picture of knowledge in which he makes the famous claim that ”nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.” In Mind and World, John McDowell criticizes Davidson`s theory for failing to make room for the connection between our worldviews and reality and leaving the notion of content unintelligible. In this paper I try to clarify their disagreement regarding perceptual experience and empirical content. I suggest that their dispute lies in the following two issues: whether the rational and external constraints on empirical thought can be treated separately, and whether an account of empirical content is theoretically prior to radical interpretation. Then I explore some possibilities by which their debate may be advanced. I make two moves on behalf of McDowell to show how Davidson`s reply to his criticism may be found unsatisfactory. First, from a McDowellian point of view, it is not clear how Davidson`s nonconceptual notion of experience might provide reason for revising beliefs. Second, Davidson`s triangulation account of content presupposes the notion of content already.