「從康德到黑格爾」？—「人類精神的實際歷史」之構想的歧義

Abstract

費希特「人類精神的實際歷史」的構想在德國觀念論的歷史中先後為謝林在先驗觀念論體系與黑格爾在精神現象學中承繼，故而論者常把精神現象學置於費希特此一構想與謝林先驗觀念論體系的脈胳中，藉以理解精神現象學，而預設了三者所處理的課題相同。然而，此一觀點忽略了「精神」—或是「意識」—一詞在德國觀念論實現「人類精神的實際歷史」的構想時所具有的歧意。依其歧意，「人類精神的實際歷史」的構想可以有不同的對象。本文將以費希特與謝林的文本為例，說明此一歧意。

Fichte’s conception of a pragmatic history of human spirit was adopted by Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in the history of German Idealism. Thus, the Phenomenology of Spirit is often placed by interpreters in the context of the successive realization of the conception of a pragmatic history of human spirit, while it is presupposed that Fichte, Schellling and Hegel shared a common theoretical project. Yet this approach ignores that the term “spirit”—or “consciousness”—was used equivocally in the context of the realization of Fichte’s conception of a pragmatic history of human spirit in the German Idealism. This paper shall clarify this equivocality as it is found in some works of Fichte and Schelling