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|Title:||A Neo-Pragmatist Approach to the Theory of Knowledge|
|Issue Date:||2016-08-11 15:21:23 (UTC+8)|
For many, analytic philosophy is taking a new turn in the past fifty years or so. Donald Davidson considers himself participating a philosophical revolution against what he calls “subjectivism”; Richard Rorty points out that analytic philosophy has shifted from its “Humean stage” to its “Kantian stage” and finally to its “Hegelian stage.” This so-called revolution has been more or less acknowledged nowadays; however, its main ideas as a whole have never been portrayed or agreed upon. For one thing, the proponents have different views concerning the target of the revolution. Sellars takes “the myth of the Given” as his greatest foe, Davidson owes it to “the myth of subjective,” Rorty renounces “the Mirror of Nature,” and McDowell takes issues with “the side-ways-on picture.” In this paper, I will try to put this philosophical movement in focus by spelling out its major contentions and implications in a pragmatist framework, and to explain that the main target of this philosophical trend is the philosophical tradition that has its roots in modern epistemology.
|Relation:||政治大學哲學學報, 12, 27-70|
The national Chengchi university philosophical
|Appears in Collections:||[NCCU Philosophical Journal] Articles|
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