A Neo-Pragmatist Approach to the Theory of Knowledge

Abstract

英美分析哲學在過去半個世紀經歷一大變革。戴維森自認參與了一場「反主體論」之哲學革命；羅逖亦稱分析哲學正逐漸由「休姆時期」走向「康德時期」再走向「黑格爾時期」。這個哲學運動目前已廣為知曉並接受，然而它的主要輪廓卻隱而不顯且爭議連連，革命者們迄今對於革命的對象尚未取得共識：賽勒思將「賦與之迷思」視為主要反對對象；戴維森則歸之於「主體之迷思」；羅逖攻擊「自然之鏡」；麥克道歐反對 「外緣影響圖像」。本文將試著闡述此哲學運動之核心思想，主要人物及理論影響，並將其融入一實用主義架構之下，並指出新實用主義的主旨是反對笛卡爾以降以知識論為基調的現代哲學之傳統。

For many, analytic philosophy is taking a new turn in the past fifty years or so. Donald Davidson considers himself participating a philosophical revolution against what he calls “subjectivism”; Richard Rorty points out that analytic philosophy has shifted from its “Humean stage” to its “Kantian stage” and finally to its “Hegelian stage.” This so-called revolution has been more or less acknowledged nowadays; however, its main ideas as a whole have never been portrayed or agreed upon. For one thing, the proponents have different views concerning the target of the revolution. Sellars takes “the myth of the Given” as his greatest foe, Davidson owes it to “the myth of subjective,” Rorty renounces “the Mirror of Nature,” and McDowell takes issues with “the side-ways-on picture.” In this paper, I will try to put this philosophical movement in focus by spelling out its major contentions and implications in a pragmatist framework, and to explain that the main target of this philosophical trend is the philosophical tradition that has its roots in modern epistemology.