關於《第二批判》的「理性事實學說」之兩種解讀方式

Abstract

關於《第二批判》中有名的「理性事實學說」有一些不同的解讀方式，一般較傳統的看法是把「理性事實」理解成道德法則存在的事實，在這種理解下有些人認為康德在該書中完全沒有提供什麼論證；另外有些人則認為該書中仍舊可以找到能替康德辯護的論證。後面這些人又分兩類，一類認為康德其實提出像演繹這樣強的論證 (Beck)，另一類則認為康德提出不是演繹的一種較弱的論證 (Henrich)；最近幾年德國有位學者Willaschek提出新的一種看法，他認為這個事實不是指道德法則存在的事實，而是「理性的行動」作為一種事實，Willaschek以後者為基礎，發展出一種與傳統不同的解讀方式。\\r 這篇文章中筆者首先想要處理的是根據這兩個不同的解釋，對康德的《第二批判》論證構造（尤其是第一節到第八節）如何出現不同的樣貌。

There are several possible readings about the famous “doctrine fact of reason of the second Critique. Traditionally it is understood to be the fact of existence of moral law. Under such understanding some philosophers claim that there are no argument at all in this book, and others argue on the contrary that Kant did offer some arguments in it. Of the second group, somebody contends that Kant give a strong argument like a deduction(Beck), somebody else says that Kant had a weak argument, i.e. an argument without the sense of deduction(Henrich). In the recent years, Willaschek gave a new interpretation on the basis of different meaning of the fact of reason. According to Willaschek, the fact of reason does not mean the fact of existence of moral law, instead it means “the act of reason” as a fact. Willaschek developed thereafter some new perspectives of the second Critique, which I find very interesting. In this paper I try to summarize the arguments of both interpretations, especially that of Beck and Willaschek in order to make clear two possible reading of the second Critique, especially the beginning 8 sections.