Particularism, Pattern and Rule-following

Abstract

Frank Jackson, Michael Smith與Philip Pettit在〈道德個別主義與模式〉一文中為原則主義者辯護，他們主張「對」這個道德語詞的意義，必定受一個統攝性的意義模式所規範。而如果這個統攝性的意義模式是X，那麼我們就可以推導出一個為真的道德原則「X是對的」。如此一來，主張沒有為真的道德原則存在的個別主義就被否證了。 就文獻上來看，有四種用來證成有此統攝性的意義模式存在的論證。它們分別是概念掌握論證 (conceptual competence argu-ment)、意義的規範性論證 (the normativity of meaning)、一致性論證 (consistency) 與可普遍性論證 (universalizability)。本文目的在於悍衛個別主義，筆者將論證以上四種論證都不成功。在文章末尾，筆者將更進一步論證，即便有此統攝性的意義模式存在，這也無助於原則主義者宣稱有真的道德原則存在，因為「對」這個道德語詞的意義模式 (pattern) 不同於對的判準 (criterion)。

Frank Jackson, Michael Smith and Philip Pettit, in their co-authored paper “Ethical Particularism and Pattern” argue on behalf of the principlists that there must be a unifying meaning pattern gov-erning the term “rightness”. And if there is a unifying meaning pat-tern, let’s say X, that governs the use of the term “rightness”, then we can get a true moral principle of the following form: X is right. Par-ticularism, a doctrine which denies the existence of any true moral principles, would thus be falsified. In defense of particularism, I will critique four arguments invoked in support of the claim that there is such a pattern: the conceptual competence argument, the normativity of meaning argument, the consistency argument, and the universalizability argument. I contend that none of these arguments work. In the end of my paper, I argue that even if there is a pattern of the term “rightness”, it will not help the principlists to establish their claim that there are true moral principles, for a meaning pattern of rightness has to be distinguished from a criterion of rightness.