Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100116


Title: Epistemic Entitlements and Practical Reasons
Other Titles: 知性權限與行動理由
Authors: 何志青
Ho, Jih-Ching
Keywords: 幻覺論證;主體無法區分性;行動理由;知覺權限
the argument from illusion;subjective indistinguishability;practical reason;epistemological entitlement
Date: 2010-01
Issue Date: 2016-08-11 15:59:31 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 幻覺論證長久以來在知識論、行動理論以及心靈哲學中佔有重要地位。本文試圖從較整體的角度來探討此論證。關於心智與世界二者之連結,幻覺論證提出一「複雜觀點」(sophisticated view),其中不僅審視經驗、知識和行動,並且說明了幻覺、錯誤判斷以及誤導行動。本文提出「簡單觀點」(simple view) 以取代「複雜觀點」。簡單觀點的優勢在於不預設特殊狀態,避免不切實際的化約目的以及具爭議性的方法學(藉由失敗案例來解釋成功案例)。最後,簡單觀點嘗試解釋幻覺論證的主要理論依據──主體無法區分性現象──將其視為一種規範的而非本體論的議題。
The Argument from Illusion has long been dominant in epistemology, action theory, and theory of mind, and this paper attempts to look at it from a holistic point of view. The Argument generates a “sophisticated view” of the connection between mind and world, which accommodates not only experience, knowledge, and action but also illusion, misjudgment, and misguided action. In the paper I propose a “simple view” in place of the sophisticated view. The simple view is preferred because it presupposes no extraordinary states and stays away from the unrealistic goal of reduction and the controversial method of explaining success in terms of failure. Finally, the simple view seeks to understand the phenomenon of subjective indistinguishability—the theoretical ground for the Argument from Illusion—as a normative rather than an ontological issue.
Relation: 政治大學哲學學報, 23, 117-138
The national Chengchi university philosophical
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[政治大學哲學學報 THCI Core] 期刊論文

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