馬希翁的第三還原：向他者的宗教經驗敞開

Abstract

胡塞爾號召「回到事物自身」啟發廿世紀如火如荼的現象學運動，但是他訴求還原方法讓人質疑有走向獨我論的超驗現象學之嫌，因此接續現象學運動的海德格與德希達毫不猶疑的指責，批評胡塞爾停留在顯現直觀、感覺直觀上，以為現象學必須另謀出路。但是，馬希翁卻以為胡塞爾訴求還原並非切斷與自然態度的關聯回到超驗主體，反而這樣的做法脫離不了自然態度而回到與世界的關聯，於是他從海德格訴求存有者的存有，了解到感覺直觀必然已有範疇直觀、本質直觀，對象的肉身顯現還有其意義產生，他從德希達「衍異」概念訴求異於顯現的語言符號，了解到直觀作為顯現的直觀在於現象既與的優先性，顯現類似索引在作為純粹的他人的呼召形式。因此，對於馬希翁而言還原並不像是胡塞爾回到顯現，也不像是海德格回到存有，而是在作為現象的自我既與，所以他總結現象學發展的歷史提出：「有多少還原，就有多少既與」。

“Phenomenology” as a movement has its origins in transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Husserl asserts the primacy of transcendental reduction, and makes it a philosophical method to serve a scientific basis for all knowing. Reduction seems to focus on a reduction to objective, ”present” phenomena. People find Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental consciousness as a “metaphysics of presence”(following Heidegger, Derrida). They attack Husserl’s presentive intution is nothing but to free presence from any condition. Marion finds different insight in Husserl’s work. Phenomenology is concerned with concrete acts of meaning-intendings, not as empirically occurring facts, but they have intentional, a priori structure. Husserl proposes a categorical intuition side by side with sensory intuition. Heidegger seeks the conceptual groundwork to understand his own question of the Being of beings. He reveals that everything perceived bodily is in signification. In agreement with Heidegger, Derrida believes signification without intuition, and stresses the sign foreign to presence. For Marion, presentive intuition insists neither presence, nor being, but the primacy of givenness of phenomenon. It means that presence is pure form of the call from other. He is thus led to posit a formulation like “the more reduction, the more givenness”.