Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100128


Title: 心知與心慮──兼論荀子的道德主體與人的概念
Other Titles: Mind’s Consciousness and Mind’s Deliberation On both moral agency and Concept of person in Xunzi
Authors: 東方朔
Shuo, Dongfang
Keywords: 認知;思慮;心之所可;長慮顧後
Cognition;Consideration;Mind’s Approval;Considering the Long View
Date: 2012-01
Issue Date: 2016-08-11 16:06:47 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 本文試圖檢討荀子有關心的概念的構成,重點在於闡發心的認知特性和荀子所謂的「心之所可」所包含的內部結構及其在成就人的概念中的意義和作用。荀子主性惡,人性中沒有如孟子一樣的養之即可放乎四海的「四端」,而荀子言心又重在心的認知的性格,心並不能創造道德法則。但荀子倚重「心之所可」,使得他即便在性惡論的條列之下,人的道德修身也得以可能。在此一過程中,人性的原始欲望和「心之所可」所包含的思慮、辨識、反省、評估及意志決斷在成就一個道德主體和人的概念中扮演著關鍵的角色。
This essay attempts to reflect the constitution of Xunzi’s conception of mind. It focuses on illuminating the cognitive of mind, and the inner structure contained in Xunzi’s “mind’s approval” and its meaning in making the concept of person. Unlike Mencius, Xunzi holds that human nature is evil and there are no four sprouts which are universal if you nourish it. Xunzi focuses on the cognitive of mind which can’t create moral law. He relies on the “mind’s approval”, making the moral cultivation possible even in the premises of evil nature, in this process, the original desire in human nature and the “mind’s approval” which containing consideration、recognization、self-examination、evaluation and determination, play a key role in making a moral agency and the concept of person.
Relation: 政治大學哲學學報, 27, 35-74
The national Chengchi university philosophical
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[政治大學哲學學報 THCI Core] 期刊論文

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