Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100137
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creator史偉民zh_TW
dc.creatorSHI, Wei-Min
dc.date2013-01
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-11T08:08:55Z-
dc.date.available2016-08-11T08:08:55Z-
dc.date.issued2016-08-11T08:08:55Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100137-
dc.description.abstract費希特主張自我由智性直觀給出,也就是自我建立其自身。費希特在回應舒爾策對萊因厚得的批判時,發展出他的自我概念。本文在此一脈絡之中檢視此一概念,以釐清自我究竟在那一個意義上建立其自身,並論證他的自我概念並不支持自我創造世界的命題。
dc.description.abstractFichte maintains that the Self is given through intellectual intuition, which means that the Self posits itself. In order to clarify the sense in which the Self posits itself, this paper studies Fichte’s concept of the Self in the context of his response to Schulze’s criticism on Reinhold, where Fichte developed the concept. It is then argued that Fichte’s concept of the Self does not support the thesis that the Self creates the world.
dc.format.extent910159 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.relation政治大學哲學學報, 29, 119-154
dc.relationThe national Chengchi university philosophical
dc.subject費希特; 自我; 智性直觀
dc.subjectFichte; Self; Intellectual Intuition
dc.title費希特的自我概念:自我意識與智性直觀zh_TW
dc.title.alternativeFichte on the Self: Self-Consciousness and Intellectual Intuition
dc.typearticle
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item.grantfulltextrestricted-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.openairetypearticle-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
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