憲政規則與理性選擇：台灣少數政府的存續（2000～2008）

Abstract

2000年政黨輪替後，開啟台灣長達八年的民進黨少數政府時期。一般而言，政府的「成立」與「存續」是兩個不同的課題，因為除典型總統制之外，其他憲政體制下的行政部門在成立後隨時都有可能面臨議會的不信任，遭受倒閣去職。顯然地，由於未能「保證」獲得議會多數支持，少數政府在成立之後的存續基礎最為薄弱，隨時可能基於議會多數的不信任案而終結。就台灣的情況而言，少數政府的成立主要為憲法增修條文第三條第一項「總統行使行政院院長任命權」所致，但少數政府的存續則是受到其他與倒閣相關的憲法規定影響。本文將立基Bergman所提出「政府成立」的憲政規則概念，延伸為「政府解散」的憲政規則，並結合Strom提出的在野政黨理性選擇觀點，試圖解釋台灣的少數政府存續現象，認為民進黨少數政府的存續乃是在野政黨針對憲法「倒閣」規定所做的理性選擇。

After the government change over in at 2000, the power over the executive department was gained by President Chen Shui-bian and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose presence in the Legislative Yuan never became a majority until 2008. Generally speaking, there are distinctions between \"formation\" and \"survival\" of a government. Excluding presidential systems, all executive departments can be potentially dismissed by submitting act from a legislative non-confidence vote in any constitutional regime. A minority government, therefore is pretty fragile due to the lack of \"trust\" from parliament as a supporting foundation. In Taiwan`s case, the DPP minority government is primarily based on the Additional Article § 3.1. This article combines Bergman`s standpoint of negative constitutional rules and Strom`s perspective on opposition rational choice and tries to clarify the survival of DPP minority government from the opposite majority`s rational considerations.