贓物所有權歸屬之賽局分析

Abstract

在贓物所有權歸屬問題之下，本文承繼 Rose（2010）的設定，使用賽局模型分析贓物不適用善意取得（即無條件歸還原持有者）及適用善意取得的法律規定，並討論我國實際贓物所有權的制度，並比較三種制度下的參賽者的聯合效用大小。透過本研究可發現，原持有者擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物不適用善意取得較有效率；當潛在買方擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物適用善意取得較有效率。而我國現有制度不管在何種情況之下，皆不是最有效率的，故我國對贓物所有權歸屬的法律從效率面而言有重新檢討之必要。

Modifying the settings of Rose (2010), this paper uses the game theoretic model to discuss whether a stolen good is applicable of bona fide acquisition system. We compare the total utilities among three systems: a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, and the real regulation in Taiwan. It is shown that as the utility of the potential buyer with the ownership is much lower than that of the owner, a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant is the most efficient while as the utility of the potential buyer with the ownership is much higher than that of the owner, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer is the most efficient. The regulation in Taiwan is not the best to the society and necessary for the government to amend.