「辯」「証」之中－ 論法斯塔夫在«亨利四世(上)(下)部»裡對謠言、驗證與懷疑論的操控

Abstract

本文旨在探討法斯塔夫如何運用謠言虛實參半的特性, 將其中謠言中的不確定性轉化為對驗證方法的質疑。藉由探討文藝復興戲劇如何利用不確定性展現懷疑論者對既定概念的挑戰與啟發, 轉向分析法斯塔夫如何利用同樣模式對既定觀念展現反思。另一方面, 此種不確定性卻也可能被濫用。如同法斯塔夫嘗試藉由各種驗證方式(如邏輯、證據)支持自利的觀點, 此種濫用驗證的傾向最終將導致如同懷疑論般質疑驗證是否必定導向真理的疑問。並以此觀點嘗試解釋為何驅逐法斯塔夫是必要的。

Although critics for centuries attempt to offer a unified view to describe Falstaff’s nature as benign or vicious, some critics seem to fall short of evaluations to consider Falstaff’s motivations when they interpret Falstaff’s behavior along with his words. Critics such as Nicolas Rowe (1709) and Samuel Johnson (1787) have evaluated Falstaff’s character relevant to specific aspects of his behavior－such as Falstaff’s charm, wit or offenses－to justify that Falstaff is more mirthful than immoral. However, those lines of thought would remain contentious if we are not aware of the motivations when Falstaff exhibits dubious actions and beliefs. Even if recent critics appear to relate to Falstaff’s motivations to justify their evaluations of Falstaff’s character, they oftentimes focus more on Falstaff’s individual demeanor than the guiding principles behind.\n\nThe failure to perceive the principles that guide Falstaff’s behavior is significant because it would affect the way we should plausibly understand Falstaff’s nature, his behavior, and eventually his rejection. Since these issues are largely connected, to misconstrue one or more of these issues would render our evaluations problematic.Naturally enough, we should best identify Falstaff’s underlying principles before determining whether Falstaff’s rejection is justifiable or not.\n\nIn this regard, I argue for self-interest to be Falstaff’s inherent principle. Because of his expedient frame of mind to misuse verification systematically to justify dubious self-interest, Falstaff is detrimental both to our methodologies to verify and the conception of truth. Moreover, this inherent principle seems to be what Harry Frankfurt (2005) demonstrates to be the origin of skepticism, the distrust that we could obtain neither the methods nor the capabilities to perceive truth (64). This\nexpedient frame of mind renders Falstaff the agent who fosters skepticism throughout 1 and 2 Henry IV, and justifies why Falstaff’s rejection is legitimate.