U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations

Abstract

This article examines three cases of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1990s: the PRC’S most-favored-nation (MFN) status, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and the PRC’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT)/World Trade Organization (WTO). The key question is: How to explain the different outcomes in these three most similar cases? These variables are crucial to my explanation: (1) conflicts over conceptual framework; (2) the degree of congruence (or conflict) between U.S. demands and Chinese internal agenda and policy priorities; and (3) existence or nonexistence of support coalitions on both sides. Based on variations of these three factors in each case, this article’s conclusion is that from a U.S. policy perspective, consensus over the conceptual framework between the PRC and the United States makes agreement possible, but only successful coalition-building by the United States will turn this possibility into a reality.