Beijing`s Maritime Rivalry with the United States and Japan: The Search for Institutionalized Mechanisms of Competition

Abstract

The PRC has become active in seeking maritime power over the past two decades. Its naval strategy has changed from one of coastal defense to that of near-sea defense in the 1980s and finally to engaging in ”blue-water defense” and oceanic enterprises in the 1990s. This maritime aggressiveness constitutes a threat to the United States and Japan, both major Pacific maritime powers. The lack of institutionalized mechanisms of competition for maritime power among the three leaves open the possibility of a zero-sum game. Since the near naval conflict of the Taiwan Strait`s crisis of 1996, the Clinton administration has been determined to reintroduce such mechanisms through full-scale engagement with the PRC. The recent Clinton-Jiang Zemin summit and resulting ”constructive strategic partnership” are steps toward building such a framework. Unlike the United States, however the PRC`s purpose is to change the status quo rather than maintain it. As a consequence of the difference between the PRC`s strategic interests, objectives, and ideology from those of the United States and Japan, consensus building in maritime competition and the establishment of institutionalized mechanisms may only be realized in the distant future.