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Title: Two-Level Games Between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations
Authors: Lin, Jin-Wen
Keywords: two-level games;Robert D. Putnam;cross-Strait relations;linkage politics;democratic peace
Date: 2000-11
Issue Date: 2016-10-05 16:55:24 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This article develops a two-level game model to depict the sovereignty dispute across the Taiwan Strait. It shows that dissatisfaction with the status quo undermines cross-Strait stability, and that a moderate leader besieged by hard-liners in a nondemocratic regime reacts most radically to external pressures. These arguments are then empirically verified. Such findings deviate from Robert Putnam’s claim that international cooperation is enhanced by a greater domestic demand to change the status quo, and also call for a distinction between two-level games that are zero-sum and nonzero-sum. By implication, the author suggests that cross-Strait stability can be improved by concurrent power transitions, centripetal political institutions, and a nonzero-sum distribution of payoffs.
Relation: Issues & Studies,36(6),1-26
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[Issues & Studies] 期刊論文

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