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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/102653
題名: | Two-Level Games Between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations | 作者: | Lin, Jin-Wen | 關鍵詞: | two-level games;Robert D. Putnam;cross-Strait relations;linkage politics;democratic peace | 日期: | 十一月-2000 | 上傳時間: | 5-十月-2016 | 摘要: | This article develops a two-level game model to depict the sovereignty dispute across the Taiwan Strait. It shows that dissatisfaction with the status quo undermines cross-Strait stability, and that a moderate leader besieged by hard-liners in a nondemocratic regime reacts most radically to external pressures. These arguments are then empirically verified. Such findings deviate from Robert Putnam’s claim that international cooperation is enhanced by a greater domestic demand to change the status quo, and also call for a distinction between two-level games that are zero-sum and nonzero-sum. By implication, the author suggests that cross-Strait stability can be improved by concurrent power transitions, centripetal political institutions, and a nonzero-sum distribution of payoffs. | 關聯: | Issues & Studies,36(6),1-26 | 資料類型: | article |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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