Chinese Denial and Deception: Theory and Practice

Abstract

To understand broader questions concerning the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), one needs to understand Chinese denial and deception (D&D)-in terms of both theory and practice. There is evidence that China regards D&D as an integral component of national security policy and military planning. Deception readily lends itself to the defensive portion of the PLA s new combat strategy of “three attacks, three defenses” (attacking with stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters; defending against precision attack, electronic interference, and reconnaissance and monitoring). Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) selectively releases information on the PLA to the public. This intentional lack of transparency complicates assessments of the Chinese military. The PRC conducts broad-based research and development on D&D, with the subject appearing in several military and academic journal articles. Deception has been used both throughout the history of Imperial China and since the founding of the PRC in 1949. This paper examines the following issues of Chinese deception in both theory and practice: contemporary Chinese perspectives on deception; the relation of cultural and regime characteristics on deception in decision-making; PLA applications for deception; PRC employment of deception at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; and PRC potential at successful deception.