Domestic Politics and the U.S.-China WTO Agreement

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of domestic politics on U.S.-China negotiations over Beijing’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The argument is that, contrary to recent theories emphasizing the obstacles domestic divisions pose to international cooperation, domestic opposition to the WTO agreement in both the United States and China did not constrain the ability of American and Chinese negotiators to initiate and reach an agreement. Several conditions facilitated the conclusion of the WTO deal. First, dovish actors (i.e., those within a country whose preferences are closer to those of the foreign country) in both states held greater internal decision-making power Second, the reformist leadership in China considered international cooperation as a way to overcome opposition to their domestic reform agenda and used their authority to circumvent domestic opposition that otherwise would have derailed the agreement. Such dramatic changes in elite preferences in favor of cooperation can in turn be explained by China’s increasing integration with the world economy. Third, the agreement was designed in the United States in a way that concentrated benefits on the internationally-oriented sectors of the economy thus minimizing opposition from other domestic forces. The paper illustrates the importance of these conditions to the conclusion of the agreement through a detailed analysis of U.S-China negotiations between 1999 and 2000 over Chinese entry into the WTO.