The Chinese Cult of Defense

Abstract

The People s Republic of China (PRC) has been identified as a looming strategic threat. Considerable attention has been given to China’s assertive rhetoric and militant behavior. Being has been depicted as increasingly belligerent over the past decade, a perception in direct conflict with earlier images of China. Ancient China usually is portrayed as possessing a weak martial tradition, a cultural predisposition to seek nonviolent solutions to problems of statecraft, and a defensive-mindedness, favoring sturdy fortifications over expansionism and invasion. Hence the question: Is China a peaceful, defensive-minded power or a bellicose, expansionist state? Has China become more belligerent in recent years? How can contemporary depictions of a bellicose China be reconciled with earlier portrayals of a dominant pacifist tradition? This article contends that existing depictions of China’s strategic culture are flawed. China’s strategic disposition cannot accurately be characterized as either pacifist or bellicose. The country rather has a dualistic strategic culture. The two main strands are a Confucian-Mencian one, which can be described as conflict-averse and defensive-minded, and a Realpolitik one, which can be described as favoring military solutions and being offensive-oriented. Both strands are operative and both influence and combine in dialectic fashion to produce a “Chinese Cult of Defense.” This cult paradoxically predisposes Chinese leaders to pursue offensive military operations as a primary alternative in pursuit of national goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely defensive and last resort. This dualistic strategic culture has been a constant, and China has not become more bellicose or aggressive in recent years except to the extent that the warfighting capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have improved and that military doctrine has changed..