Democratic Stability under Taiwan`s Semi-Presidentialist Constitution: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

Abstract

Domestic stability is believed to be a key factor affecting cross-Strait peace. This article examines whether Taiwan r evolving democratic institutions may nurture greater political stability, defined as a government’s ability to make changes while keeping it self irreplaceable. The main argument is that, in a semi-presidential system, legislative assertiveness and executive-parliamentary congruence are each sufficient to induce stability, and that instability accompanies a powerful president if the government is divided. Depending on the nature of the status quo, a government can be both stable and responsive at the same time. As a result of the increased number of legislative seats occupied by the ruling party and the adjustment of the president’s political style, stability has indeed increased in Taiwan. There is also room for the president to break the current cross-Strait gridlock, moreover, f he can moderate his ideological position gradually and consistently.