Credibility and the U.S. Defense of Taiwan: Nullifying the Notion of a “Taiwan Threat”

Abstract

Taiwan is not a threat to the United States and cannot compel the United States to enter into military conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Hence, there really is no “Taiwan threat.” The United States will use military force to defend Taiwan from an attack by the PRC only f Washington determines that such an intervention serves US. interests, especially the intention to appear credible. This is principally a matter of national security. By demonstrating the resolve to act in accordance with what the United States has indicated are its preferences, the United States hopes its credibility will “buy” support from allies and deter challenges by adversaries. Washington＇s predisposition to act in defense of US. credibility offers Taipei-and Being-leverage over US policy that either may try to exploit. However there is no assurance that the leverage will be effective in prying out of Washington the policy that is sought. While the United States may be inclined to support Taiwan, whether it does so or not depends on calculations of interest by American policymakers at the instant that US. support is needed. The United States might enter the fray to defend its credibility. 0r competing interests may lead the United States to stand down from the role Washington has assumed in support of Taiwan to advance some other, more pressing, objective. The point is that US. policymakers determine U.S. interests and nothing Taiwan does or fails to do will lead the United States to act in a way that Washington judges to be contrary to those interests.