The Weak Preempting the Strong: The Case of the Taiwan Strait

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to decide whether a preemptive strike is a better option for a weaker power at the beginning of an asymmetric military conflict. The author examines five possible situations in the Taiwan Strait crisis via normal form game, extensive form game, and mixed strategy in order to discover why a weaker power might choose to launch a preemptive strike under certain circumstances. The findings show that no matter whether two or three countries are involved in armed conflict in the Strait or whether such an asymmetric conflict is initiated by Taiwan or China, it would always be in Thiwan`s interest to assert preemption, assuming conflict has become inevitable. Given situations of incomplete information, the results still hold. This presents strong evidence that a weaker power facing unavoidable armed conflict should strike first. This study also proves that the threat need not be ”imminent”: it need only be ”inevitable.”