中国外交における「核心利益」論の展開

Abstract

本文主要分析關於南海問題與尖閣諸島（釣魚臺群島問題），中國如何展開其「核心利益」論。所謂「核心利益」此一說法，是2000年代初期為了向美國呼籲臺灣問題之重要性，而開始被使用；然此後其適用對象也擴大至西藏、新疆等，被囊括至2009年11月之《中美共同聲明》。2010年春天，中國大陸政府官員向美國政府官員表明南海為其「核心利益」之報導擴散開後，因被視為中國對外強硬姿態之一環，遂於國內外引起關注。然而有關對外強硬姿態，也約在同年夏天起於國內外受到相當高的批評，「核心利益」開始成為限定性；但並無明示性地否定其適用於南海。另對於尖閣諸島問題，於2012年春天左右，也有被認為認定為「核心利益」之事態，然至於何種程度正式，則相當地隱晦。關於這些，中國對於「核心利益」之認定，近乎無止盡的持續強調其重要性，然模糊其官方的本質，乃為確保外交上之自由度。

This article analyzes how China has used the concept of `core (national) interest` in diplomacy, particularly in dealing with the South China Sea and the Senkaku problems. China began to use the notion of `core interests` to appeal the seriousness of the Taiwan problem to the United States in the early 2000s and expanded the application of the term to Tibet and Xingjiang in the latter half of the first decade. It was included in the U.S.-China Joint Communique of November 2009. In spring 2010, New York Times` report of Chinese high officials characterizing the South China Sea as a `core interest` attracted broad attention as a manifestation of Chinese assertive foreign behavior. However, as the assertiveness was criticized as counterproductive within China, the term came to be defined in a limited manner, but its application to the South China Sea was not explicitly denied. Since spring 2012, there were several indications that the Senkaku islands belonged to the `core interests` but their official nature was unclear. On these issues, Chinese expressions came infinitely close to using the term to emphasize seriousness of the issues while remaining unclear about their official nature to retain diplomatic flexibility.