Although Xi Jinping is the eminent military and political leader in the People's Republic of China, his ability to effectively execute decrees is dependent on the support of local leaders. Because political interests affect the ability of local governments to respond to central policies, a political interest model was employed to analyze the relations between central and local governments after the 18th National Congress of the CPC. The research found that Xi Jinping faces local governments with higher levels of power than those in the Hu Jintao period. The distribution of political interests in the 18th National Congress have reduced centrally and increased locally. Among the various provinces, Shanghai and Tianjin are considered to have 'strong and powerful' influences on central policies. Faced with these heightening local powers, the central government sought to reduce local influence through personnel redeployment. After the first plenary session of the 18th Central Committee, Politburo members who were locally stationed decreased from eleven to six. Two Politburo Standing Committee members, who were local representatives, were promoted to the central office. This trend indicates that the power distribution of central and local governments tend to move toward a power balance model of centralization. Therefore, although the central government can implement policies that are discordant with local interests, it is difficult for the central government to avoid resistance from certain provinces.