国際経済制度における中国の協調性－－銀行規制と財政金融政策の事例分析

Abstract

全球金融危機後，受到中國的崛起的影響，以往以歐美為中心運作之國際經濟制度，是否將無法運作，受到廣泛地質疑。然而，另一方面負責國際銀行管制的巴塞爾委員會，以及協商主要國家財政金融政策之G20，在金融危機後一連串之對策易違反制度性共識的是歐美主要國家，中國反而可謂順從，自始至終進行協調。本文提出異於通則理解之例證，並由此角度分析巴塞爾委員會與G20 等非正式制度之規範與權力關係。其次，在制定基礎規範之權力（階層）關係上，相對於歐美主要國家中國是處於新加入者之地位，所以受到國際制度共識之影響程度相對高。

The rise of China is widely viewed as undermining liberal international regimes, largely because it does not share democratic capitalist values. This crisis is generally thought to be more severe in informal institutions such as the Basel Committee and the G20 because of their extensive reliance on normative consensus. However, recent developments in international economic governance reveal a different picture. Throughout the process of deliberation, German opposition significantly affected the G20 agenda for macroeconomic policy coordination. With respect to banking regulations, the United States repeatedly delayed the implementation of rules agreed upon by the member states. In both cases, however, Chinese compliance and cooperation was relatively good. In order to explain this unexpected occurrence, in this article, the author offers an analytical framework of normative hierarchy drawn from the realist regime theory and a constructivist analysis of power. Using this framework, this article will illustrate that informal regimes are endowed with a hierarchy in which subordinate member states such as China are more vulnerable to criticism and praise, since they are more in need of policy ideas and legitimacy, as provided by superordinate Western member states.