台灣對於大陸在1995-96年及1999-2000年武力威脅的反應

Abstract

本文評估台灣民眾、政治菁英、利益團體、和決策者對於大陸在 1995-96 年及 1999-2000年武力威脅的反應。據此，本文進而解釋為何台灣面對大陸在 1995-96 年及 1999-2000 年的兩次武力威脅時，遭受巨大金融損失與沈重心理壓力，卻沒有對大陸做出明顯的讓步。本文認為大陸武力威脅在台灣造成很大的反效果。台灣的人民、政治菁英（總統候選人）、利益團體（台商）都強烈反對大陸的威脅，支持台北對抗北京。因此，台北有很多政治資本對抗北京的威脅。同時，台灣領導人擔心，只要台北屈服於北京武力威脅一次，大陸便會繼續對台灣威脅以要求台灣做政治讓步（信譽關切），同時也會傷害到台灣未來在兩岸談判中的地位（相對利得關切），所以更不願意對大陸做讓步。

This paper assesses the reaction of the Taiwanese public, political elites, interest groups, and \r\ndecision-makers to China’s 1995-96 and 1999-2000 military threats. Accordingly, this paper \r\nexplores, with significant financial losses and immense psychological pressure exerted by China, why Taiwan did not make any explicit concessions to China during the two Taiwan Strait incidents in 1995-96 and 1999-2000. This paper concludes that Chinese military threats stirred strong counter-productive effects in Taiwan. The Taiwanese public, political elites (presidential candidates), interest groups (Taiwan-invested enterprises in China) all seriously opposed China’s threats, supporting Taipei to confront Beijing. Consequently, Taipei had a great deal of political capital to defy Beijing’s threats. Furthermore, Taiwanese leaders perceived that concessions made by Taiwan under threatening circumstances would have simply encouraged China to threaten Taiwan in the future (i.e., reputation concerns) and undermine Taiwan’s status in future negotiations with China (i.e., relative gains concerns). Therefore, Taiwan would be further inclined not to make concessions to China under Chinese threats because of the above concerns.