Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Matching Impacts of School Admission Mechanism: An Agent-Based Approach
Authors: 陳樹衡
Chen, Shu-Heng;Wang, Connie Houning;Chen, Weikai
Contributors: 經濟系
Keywords: matching mechanism;agent-based modeling;serial dictatorship;Boston mechanism;Chinese parallel
Date: 2016-09
Issue Date: 2017-04-25 15:49:47 (UTC+8)
Abstract: Matching mechanisms are critical in determining the assignments of students to schools. We used agent-based modeling (ABM) to simulate the three mechanisms experienced in the fiercely competitive admission systems in China: serial dictatorship (SD), the Boston mechanism (BM), and the Chinese parallel mechanism (CP). We evaluated their multifaceted outcomes under different policy settings, school capacities, and behavioral assumptions. We have replicated their major characteristics found in the analytical models and showed that CP behaves as a hybrid of SD and BM. ABM allows us to distinguish their aggregate effects from distributional effects and their long-term level effects from short-term volatility effects. We found that this kind of “out-of-equilibrium’’ analysis, while mostly absent in the analytical equilibrium analysis, is crucial for practical policy analysis.
Relation: Eastern Economic Journal, pp.pp 1-25
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing