Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
Authors: Chen, Y.-H.;Chen, Y.-C.;Kuo, W.-J.;Kan, K.;Yang, C.C.;Yen, Nai Shing
Contributors: 心腦中心
Keywords: cost benefit analysis;decision making;dorsal anterior cingulate cortex;executive function;functional magnetic resonance imaging;insula;reward;substantia nigra;theory of mind;ventral tegmentum
Date: 2017-04
Issue Date: 2017-05-08 14:31:04 (UTC+8)
Abstract: The hypothesis of strategic motives postulates that offering fairly in the Ultimatum Game (UG) is to avoid rejection and receive money. In this fMRI study, we used a modified UG to elucidate how proposers reached decisions of offering fairly and to what extent they considered offering selfishly with different stakes. We had proposers choose between a fair and a selfish offer with different degrees of selfishness and stake sizes. Proposers were less likely and spent more time choosing the fair offer over a slightly-selfish offer than a very selfish offer independent of stakes. Such choices evoked greater activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortices that typically involve in allocation of cognitive control for cost/benefit decision making. Choosing a fair offer in higher stakes evoked greater activation in the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) and the areas that previously have been implicated in reward and theory of mind. Furthermore, choosing a slightly selfish offer over a fair offer evoked greater activation in the anterior cingulate sulcus, ACCg, ventral tegmental area (or substantia nigra) and anterior insular cortex signalling the higher gain and implying higher rejection risk. In conclusion, our findings favoured the hypothesis that proposers offer fairly based on the strategic motives. © 2017 The Author(s).
Relation: Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 527
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[心智‧大腦與學習研究中心 ] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing