Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/109720


Title: 休姆的保守效益主義:休姆的效益與社會性概念之探索
Authors: 陳建綱
Contributors: 政治系
Keywords: 休姆;正義;社會契約;親社會性;效益
David Hume;Justice;Social Contract;Sociability;Utility
Date: 2016
Issue Date: 2017-05-17 16:14:47 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 本計畫的主要目的在於呈現休姆思想的效益主義特徵,在下述意義上,它或將對於現代英國政治思想之研究稍有貢獻。在晚近的研究文獻中,休姆對於效益主義的主要奠基者如邊沁、詹姆士彌爾、約翰彌爾的影響,越來越不受到重視。誠如邊沁在他第一部發表的著作《政府論片簡》所揭示的,乃是受到休姆的《人性論》的影響他才以效益作為道德的基礎與首要原則。自此之後,邊沁終其一生致力於思考、寫作與社會改革,其思想本源與立論依據都未曾背離休姆給他的啟發。兩位彌爾雖然在不同程度上承襲與改造了邊沁的思想,但不論是他們所採取的倫理自然主義與道德心理學,或是以經驗主義與道德情感主義批判理性主義,以及他們對於社會效益的追求與對於實然與應然問題的看法,無一不繼受了休姆的思考架構和邊沁對此架構的系統性發展。同樣值得一提的是,之後的重要英國政治思想家與政治思想史研究者,如西季威克、Leslie Stephen、
Ernest Albee等人,同樣也肯認了前述的思想史觀點而視休姆為效益主義家族的重要成員。然而到了二十世紀下半葉,隨著社會契約論的復甦,休姆思想的效益主義特徵受到掩蓋。為了為休姆思想研究保留更多元的詮釋空間,本計畫因此試圖探討休姆的效益主義以及他與社會契約論的差異,而這對於作者於下一階段的研究計畫亦有相當實質的助益。質言之,不論是本計畫所關注的,或是作者於下階段所要探討的,其實都指向同一個方向,也就是在理論的意義上,為當代人理解公共性與社會生活探尋一支不同於權利的公共論述。為達此目標,作者因而必須將研究目標從主宰現代政治語彙的權利觀與社會契約論轉向效益主義。如同Leslie Stephen在他對於邊沁的詮釋中提出的,位居邊沁思想核心的並非權利而是責任(responsibility)。權利與責任兩者間的差異,唯有經由更多的閱讀與研究才能加以系統化的梳理,然而在一個意義上,權利是慮己性(self-regarding)的概念,責任則是慮他性(other-regarding)的概念。在以權利觀為基礎的社會中,其成員習於視他者為稀有資源的競爭者,而社會則是為了滿足個人之自我利益的工具。相對的,在以責任觀為基礎的社會中,雖然社會成員無法(或許也不應該)擺脫人性中與生俱來的自利性,然而,效益所象徵的公共利益在此處卻取得了獨立於個人利益之加總的道德地位。這意味著,人們仍將繼續追求其自利,但在面對自利與公益之間無可避免且屢屢發生的衝突時,受到效益主義與責任觀所引導的人們將由衷為此感到焦慮與不安。不論人們最終的決定是維護私利或保全公益,作者認為,相較於以權利為基礎的社會關係,責任觀更能實質地減少人們成為搭便車者的動機,進而賦予社會生活較為厚實的道德意涵。
This project aims to reveal the utilitarian features of Hume’s political thought. What has been played down by recent studies is Hume‘s impact on the founders of utilitarianism, including Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. As indicated by Bentham in A Fragment, it was due to the inspiration of Hume’s Treatise that he considered utility as the foundation of morals. Thereafter Bentham devoted himself to thinking, writing and social
reform, and the origin of his thought as well as the basis of his argument were still inspired by Hume. Although two Mills transformed Bentham’s utilitarianism, yet they adopted ethical naturalism and moral psychology, and depending on empiricism and moral sentimentalism they criticized rationalism, none of these is not following Hume’s structure of thought based on which Bentham expanded systematically. Other important British thinkers and researchers, like Henry Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen,
Ernest Albee, they all inherited this view and regarded Hume as an important member of utilitarianism. However, with the resurrection of contractarianism in the second half of 20th century, the utilitarian tincture of Hume’s thought was concealed. In order save different interpretations of Hume’s thought, this project aims to recover the utilitarian account of Hume, which further lends support to the author’s research in the next stage. Both the approach recovered in this project, and the issues that concern the author in the next stage, what they reveal is the author’s attempt to disclose a public discourse other than ‘right’. Therefore, the author turns his attention from the discourse of right and social contract to utilitarianism. As one finds in Leslie Stephen’s interpretation of Bentham that, the core of Bentham’s thought is responsibility rather than right. Right is a self-regarding idea whereas responsibility is otherregarding.
In a right-based society, its members tend to regard others as competitors for resources, and society as
an instrument aiming to fulfill their self-interest. By contrast, in a society based on responsibility, although
its members cannot get rid of selfishness implanted in their nature, utility which represents public interest
acquires a freestanding moral position and may not be taken as the aggregation of individual’s self-interest. The author argues that responsibility may substantively lower social member’s motives for being free-riders, and transforms social life into a moral entity.
Relation: MOST 104-2410-H-004-004
Data Type: report
Appears in Collections:[政治學系] 國科會研究計畫

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