非短視雙占在不同數據情境下之認定問題

Abstract

本研究計畫的主要目的是建構一個非短視廠商策略性進入市場時間點決策的估計模型。主要是將賽局選擇權的概念與決策架構帶入由Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) 與Berry (1992) 開創的實證進入賽局文獻中。本計畫的主要創新為將文獻中慣用的短視假設鬆綁。在此短視的意思為廠商不理會等待進入時機的選擇權價值。第一階段的估計模型建立將面臨如何將賽局選擇權的理論架構轉換為計量架構的挑戰。本計畫預計會使用美國航空公司國內線的數據進型理論模型的估計。自從八零年代美國政府對航空業的政策鬆綁後，美國航空公司進入自由競爭的狀態，使得我得觀察到許多的進入時間決策點。而在市場觀察到並不是每一個城市對的市場都是由規模較大且用軸心輻射狀方式經營航線的大家航空公司率先進入市場，這正好與計畫主持人先前的理論研究結果相符。本計畫用數據主要回答的問題為是否能判定廠商在做進入時間點決策是短視或是非短視?非短視模型的估計和文獻中以短視模型估計的結果有何不同?

This paper provides a method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information duopoly entry\r\ngame with uncertainty. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of this research is to relax the assumption that the firms disregard the option value of “waiting to enter”. The main challenge is to setup the game theoretical real option model with parametric specification for the firms’ payoff function and have the econometrician able to identify the distribution of the unobservable. One goal of the paper is to empirically test which entry decision behavior match the firms‘ entry decisions better, the NPV rule or the real options method? I’ll use the U.S. domestic airline data to estimate my empirical model of strategic entry timing. As we observe the sequence of entries in different city pairs, the major airlines are not always the leaders. This observation not only match the theoretical results from my previous research, but also in the airline industry, it allows me have many observations of entry and the fact that it has been deregulated since 1980s allows me to observe\r\nthe nature of competition between airlines. Can I identify the firms‘ entry methods used? How different is the estimations of my model from the literature?