政黨候選人選擇機制的變遷：以台灣為例

Abstract

政黨的主要功能是提供公民與政治領域之間的連結，而這個連結的第一步就是在選舉中提名候選人（Hazan and Rahat 2010）。然而，由於政黨內部資料不易取得，各類型實證研究往往難以展開，無怪乎政黨候選人甄補機制被學者稱為是政黨的「秘密花園」（secret garden）（Gallagher and Marsh 1988），外人難以一窺究竟。就算學者有機會獲得相關資料，但由於資料缺乏系統性的整合，使得研究成果往往流於描述性，較缺乏理論意涵（Barnea and Rahat 2007; Gallagher 1988a; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Rahat and Hazan 2001）。\n本研究旨在建立解釋台灣政黨候選人選擇機制變遷的分析架構，並驗證相關假設。具體而言，本研究旨在回答以下兩大問題：第一、探討哪些因素造成台灣政黨候選人選擇機制的變遷？而這些因素之間的關聯性為何？第二、以台灣的經驗作為個案研究，檢討國外學者發展的架構是否適用？而台灣政黨候選人擇機制的變遷經驗是否可進一步通則化？本研究改良Barnea and Rahat (2007)的分析架構，從政治系統、政黨體系、及黨內體系等三個不同層次及其之間的關聯性，來探討台灣主要政黨候選人選擇機制變遷的主因。本研究主要有以下三點發現：第一、從政治系統來看，台灣民主化的確帶動政黨候選人選擇機制分權化。此外，屬於政治系統的因素如選制變遷，對於候選人選擇機制就算沒有決定性的影響，但仍有催化機制改造的作用。譬如：立委選制改為單一選區制之後，對於政黨而言，找出「最有實力當選」的人更為重要，這也使得基層民意參與政黨候選人選擇機制有了更強的正當性。第二、政黨改革候選人選擇的時機，通常都發生在政黨選舉失利時。而某政黨在選舉失利時，也通常是黨內勢力重組時，並藉以鏟除原本制度的既得利益者。因此，黨際競爭與黨內競爭這兩項因素會依序決定候選人選擇機制改革的面貌。第三、優勢政黨的候選人選擇機制強調解決黨內競爭衝突，劣勢政黨的候選人選擇機制則強調強化黨際競爭力。以台灣來說，這兩個不同的關注面所設計的制度卻殊途同歸，即擴大更多基層民意參與\n。

This project aims to build up a new analytical framework to explain the institutional transformation of candidate selection methods among Taiwan’s parties and to test relevant hypotheses. Specifically, this project answers two broad research questions: first, what are major factors to explain the transformation of CSMs among Taiwan’s parties? Is there any causal linkage among these factors? Second, to what extent do the analytical frameworks developed in the context of western democracies can help explain Taiwan’s case? Whether the transformation of candidate selection\nmethods in Taiwan can be generalized as a new analytical framework in a comparative perspective? This project\nmodifies the analytical framework proposed by Barnea and Rahat (2007), and analyzes the changes of Taiwan major parties’ CSMs from the three different levels—namely, political system, inter-party competition, and intra-party competition. Our findings are three-folded: First, from the perspective of political system, Taiwan’s democratization has forced the major parties’ CSMs to become more and more decentralized. Additionally, the changes of electoral system also facilitated the decentralized reforms of CSMs. Second, the major parties tended to reform its CSMs right after their defeats in the election. When any one of the major party reforms its CSMs, its intra-party competition becomes more severe and new alignment among factions within the party may emerge. Third, an advantageous party (such as the long-term ruling party Kuomintang) may focus on how to resolve its intraparty\nconflict when it designs its CSMs; on the other hand, a disadvantageous party (such as the long-term opposition party Democratic Progressive Party) may focus on how to strengthen its competitiveness in the election by choosing candidates who have the best winning odds. Although the above two rationales seem to be different, they actually lead to similar, if not the same, CSMs—that is, the two\nmajor parties tend to delegate their power to the general public and use a more inclusive approach to chose their candidates.