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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111922
題名: | A Macroeconomic Model of Imperfect Competition with Patent Licensing | 作者: | 賴景昌 Hsieh, Hui-ting Lai, Ching-chong Chen, Kuan-jen |
貢獻者: | 財政學系 | 日期: | Oct-2015 | 上傳時間: | 10-Aug-2017 | 摘要: | This paper sets up an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that features the strategic interaction between the patent-holding firm and licensees, and uses it to analyze the relevant macro-variables under various licensing arrangements. Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the equilibrium aggregate output and aggregate consumption under fixed-fee and royalty licensing regimes are always greater than those under the no licensing regime. Moreover, the equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the fixed-fee licensing regime are always greater than those under the royalty licensing regime. Second, with the higher (lower) technology level the patent holder prefers the fixed-fee (royalty) contract. Third, welfare could be improved through technology transfer, and the level of welfare under the fixed-fee licensing regime is higher than that under the royalty licensing regime. Lastly, this paper discusses some extensions of the baseline model. © 2015 by De Gruyter. | 關聯: | B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 15(4), 1579-1618 | 資料類型: | article | DOI: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2013-0144 |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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