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Title: On the complexity of the El Farol Bar Game: A sensitivity analysis
Authors: 陳樹衡
Chen, Shu-Heng
Gostoli, Umberto
Contributors: 經濟系
Keywords: Complex networks;Agent-based model;Economic efficiency;El Farol bar problem;Inequity aversion;Inherent complexity;Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses;Neighborhood size;Social preference;Sensitivity analysis
Date: 2016-04
Issue Date: 2017-08-22 16:35:21 (UTC+8)
Abstract: In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agentbased model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the 'keeping-up-with-the-Joneses' preference. In this study, we examine this fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of the model; specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the attendance threshold), may also play a determining role.
Relation: Simulation Series, 48(1), 25-32
Data Type: conference
Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 會議論文

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