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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112281| 題名: | 代理模型中的策略性利他行為 Friendship building with boss: strategic prosocial behaviors in agency model |
作者: | 蔡一豪 Tsai, Yi Hao |
貢獻者: | 何靜嫺 蔡一豪 Tsai, Yi Hao |
關鍵詞: | 社會網路 代理模型 公司治理 Social network Principal-Agent model Corporate governance |
日期: | 2017 | 上傳時間: | 28-八月-2017 | 摘要: | Many recent researches examine the social networks between directors and CEO and show their negative impacts on corporate governance (see Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Gaspar and Massa, 2007). If, this negative relation between social connection and corporate governance is true, we would expect that family firms where the CEOs and directors are family members should have the worst governance and the worst performance. This certainly is not the case. So how exactly the social network between board members and CEO can influence corporate governance and the firm performance? Our paper provides the first theoretical discussion on this effect. 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(2008). Inequity aversion and team incentives. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 297-320.\nSliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes. American Economic Review, 97(3), 999-1012.\nTracey, D., and Johannesson, M. (2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 990-1008.\nvon Siemens, F. A. (2010). Heterogeneous social preferences, screening, and employment contracts. Oxford Economic Papers, 63(3), 499-522. | 描述: | 碩士 國立政治大學 經濟學系 103258009 |
資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258009 | 資料類型: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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