邁向職業經理人：公司化改制後中國大陸中央國有企業領導人的行為分析

Abstract

何種制度結構主導著公司化改制後的中國大陸中央國有企業（央企）領導人的行為？針對6個壟斷產業中20家央企的52位領導人進行檢驗，本文主張在公司化改制初期，主要的政策目標為國有部門的利潤極大化，因此央企領導人的考核標準也以經濟表現為導向。此一標準的確立可視為1990年代官僚菁英現代化與制度化的進程在國有部門的應用，領導人的專業表現成為考核與升遷的主要依據。在中國大陸黨國制度下的轉型經濟，央企領導人的經濟動機與政治動機並非必然相互衝突，追求更好業績的同時其實是為了追求更好的政績以期在黨國體制中獲得晉升。

The conventional wisdom holds that managers of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are Communist cadres whose behavior is governed more by state interests than economic logic. An increasing number of incidents, however, have shown a managerial inclination to protect firms` commercial interests when they clash with state-mandated programs. Drawing on evidence from the state-monopolized industries in China, this study explores the transformation of managerial behavior from being state-driven toward being profit-driven. It argues that as a product of the party-state`s continued emphasis on meritocracy in elite management, SOE managers in China have been transformed into de facto entrepreneurs whose career promotion is linked to their economic performance. SOE managers in possession of commercial knowledge and economic ambition constitute a professional team that is leading Chinese state firms to compete in a globalized market. This new personnel management system in China`s SOE sector also reflects the adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party in pursuing pro-market reform.