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The Institutional Foundations of China's Local Government Behavior: A Literature Review
local government behavior;market-preserving fiscal federalism;political tournament model;fiscal revenue maximization model
|Issue Date:||2017-11-13 11:44:30 (UTC+8)|
This paper reviews the literature in the field of political economy with regard to the incentive mechanism underlying the behavior of local governments in China, its arguments, and the critiques involved. There are three theories to be investigated sequentially, namely market-preserving fiscal federalism, political tournament theory, as well as fiscal revenue maximization model. Market-preserving fiscal federalism has been adopted as a basic framework to study the political-economic issues in China during its transitional period. It has been criticized for its failure in the submission of empirically supportive evidence. Political tournament theory stresses the influence of the CCP's bureaucratic system on the behavior of local officials. It seems to be widely accepted among scholars due to relevant concepts. However, the lack of completeness in both theoretical definition and empirical evidence is severely criticized. The fiscal revenue maximization model keeps its assumption as simple and straightforward as its name implies. But its theoretical validity is still subject to further empirical findings in the future.
|Relation:||東亞研究, 47(1), 39-80|
|Appears in Collections:||[東亞研究] 期刊論文|
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