總經理薪酬、非財務績效衡量指標與公司未來績效

Abstract

薪酬制度和績效評估係公司用來解決代理問題的激勵與監督機制，而董事會在經理人之激勵與監督上，尤其扮演重要角色。鑑於國內對董事會功能的重視，及許多文獻對傳統財務績效指標過於短視的批評，本研究參酌Hayes andSchaefer (2000)的推理，主張當董事會最適地採用財務、非財務與市場基礎的績效指標時，應可觀察到未能被財務與市場績效解釋的總經理薪酬變異，可以預測公司未來績效。本研究實證結果發現：在控制當期財務與市場績效指標對未來績效的影響後，當期薪酬和公司未來績效成正向關係，亦即總經理薪酬包含未來績效的資訊。其次，亦發現當財務與市場績效指標的精確性和敏感性愈低時，則薪酬和公司未來績效之正向關係愈強。此一針對大樣本進行分析的結果，隱含董事會可能使用了非財務資訊決定總經理薪酬，而且當財務與市場績效指標在制定薪酬的有用性愈低時，董事會會更仰賴非財務績效指標。此外，本研究透過商業週刊銀行業服務品質調查，直接檢測是否服務品質此一非財務資訊會影響總經理薪酬，並進而估計出服務品質所解釋的薪酬變異，是否和公司未來績效有關，藉以提供額外的直接證據，結果發現銀行業董事會會評估服務品質非財務績效來決定總經理薪酬。這項特定產業的直接證據，應能補充前述大樣本分析所得的間接證據。

Performance evaluation and reward systems are two important instruments used by the boards of directors to reduce agency problems. Since many recent accounting studies have criticized that accounting-based measures do not adequately reflect all the economic consequences of current actions and decisions, it is worthy to investigate whether boards of directors adopt nonfinancial measures to supplement accounting-based measures. Subject to the unobservability of compensation schemes, following Hayes and Schaefer`s reasoning, I argue if boards of directors adopt nonfinancial measures, the phenomena that CEO compensation is informative about future corporate performance should be observed. This paper shows that the relationship between compensation and future performance is significantly positive after controlling for current accounting-based and market-based measures, and that compensation is more closely related to future performance when accounting-based and market-based measures are less precise and sensitive. The results provide indirect evidence supporting the assertion that boards of directors use nonfinancial information to reward CEOs. Using the service quality data from Business Weekly, I also provide direct evidence to supplement the indirect evidence.