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CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Performance Threshold and Discretionary Accounting Choices－An Empirical Study
Pay-performance sensitivity;Performance threshold;Earnings management;Discretionary accruals
|Issue Date:||2017-11-15 14:52:48 (UTC+8)|
|Abstract:||本研究之目的係探討總經理薪酬績效敏感性(Pay-Performance Sensitivity,以下簡稱PPS）較高以及操縱前盈餘未達績效門檻的情況下，總經理是否較會藉由操縱裁決性應計項目(Discretionary Accrual,以下簡稱DA），從事盈餘管理行為，以提高本身之薪酬水準。在控制了諸多影響裁決性應計項目的因素後，實證結果顯示公司之PPS 愈高時，其DA 愈大，表示總經理從事盈餘管理的程度較高。除了探討PPS 與DA 的關係外，我們也以盈餘為「零」及「前期盈餘」作為績效門檻指標，探討績效門檻與DA 的關係。實證結果發現，公司為避免報導損失或為維持與前期盈餘一致之水準，將透過裁決性應計項目達成其提高帳面盈餘之目的。最後，本研究探討在雙重誘因（PPS 高與盈餘低於績效門檻時）的驅使下，該盈餘管理行為是否最為嚴重。實證結果顯示，在雙重誘因下，以「前期盈餘」作為門檻時，雙重誘因對裁決性應計項目之平均影響具增額效果。|
This study investigates whether increases in CEO pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) affect the CEO’s discretionary accounting choices, by examining the relation between PPS and discretionary accruals (DA), where DA are proxies for the aggregate effect of accounting choices on income. We argue that one benefit of increasing accounting income is the consequent increase in pay. Therefore, the higher the correlations between pay and reported income (higher PPS), the more income-increasing accounting choices CEO should make, hence the higher discretionary accruals. After controlling the economic determinants of the PPS and the endogeneity between PPS and DA, we find that the association between CEO pay and reported income has positive and significant influences on discretionary accruals. Two circumstances are identified where positive discretionary accruals are used to achieve certain performance thresholds. These performance thresholds are defined as (1) zero earnings, when income before discretionary accruals is less than zero; and (2) prior year reported income, when income before discretionary accruals is less than prior year reported income. We find that greater positive discretionary accruals are used to avoid earnings decreases and losses when income before discretionary accruals is less than zero or prior year reported income. Finally, we argue that CEO has greater incentive to adopt income-increasing discretionary accruals when higher PPS is coupled with losses (or earnings decreases). Our analyses show that only when higher PPS is coupled with earnings decreases can we find positive discretionary accruals becomes significantly greater. In contrast, the discretionary accruals do not demonstrate significant increases when higher PPS is coupled with losses. In our opinion, CEO may prefer to take a bath when higher PPS is coupled with losses.
|Relation:||會計評論, 36, 55-87|
|Appears in Collections:||[會計評論] 期刊論文|
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