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Title: 會計師事務所最適薪資契約之設計
An Optimal Design of Wage Contracts of Public Accounting Firms
Authors: 李佳玲
Lee, Jia-Ling
Liu, Victor W.
Keywords: 薪資契約;自我選擇;離職率
wage contract;self-selection;turnover
Date: 1997-03
Issue Date: 2017-11-15 14:53:42 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 會計師事務所之經營,內部面臨查帳員離職率逆選擇的問題,外部面臨業務競爭激烈的環境,本文欲驗證透過薪資契約之設計,可減輕離職率或競爭之問題。結果發現透過薪資契約之自我選擇機制,可以區分出會計師事務所高離職型態與低離職型態的查帳員。但自我選擇機制與競爭問題存在一抵換關係,事務所面臨消弭逆選擇與降低競爭程度之抉擇問題。本文建議大型事務所應著重於減輕逆選擇問題,故需採行成長型薪資契約,小型事務所則應著重於防止引發對手競爭,故需採行市場型薪資契約。
CPA firms face high staff turnover internally and keen competition externally. This paper tries to illustrate that wage contracts can be designed to reduce turnover or competition. The results show that a self-selection wage contract can be optimally designed for public accounting firms to distinguish employees in terms of their probability of quitting. There exists, however, a trade-off between reducing adverse selection of turnover and deterring competition. This paper suggests that large CPA firms adopt a growth-wage contract to reduce the adverse selection of turnover and small CPA firms employ a market-wage contract to deter competition.
Relation: 會計評論, 30, 157-179
Data Type: article
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