Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
An Optimal Design of Wage Contracts of Public Accounting Firms
Liu, Victor W.
|Issue Date:||2017-11-15 14:53:42 (UTC+8)|
CPA firms face high staff turnover internally and keen competition externally. This paper tries to illustrate that wage contracts can be designed to reduce turnover or competition. The results show that a self-selection wage contract can be optimally designed for public accounting firms to distinguish employees in terms of their probability of quitting. There exists, however, a trade-off between reducing adverse selection of turnover and deterring competition. This paper suggests that large CPA firms adopt a growth-wage contract to reduce the adverse selection of turnover and small CPA firms employ a market-wage contract to deter competition.
|Relation:||會計評論, 30, 157-179|
|Appears in Collections:||[會計評論] 期刊論文|
Files in This Item:
All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.